Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung
Studies in Philosophy and Social Science

Herausgegeben von
Max Horkheimer

Jahrgang 9
1941

Mit Gesamtregister

Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag

Photomechanischer Nachdruck
mit Genehmigung des Herausgebers

März 1980
Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, München

Umschlaggestaltung: Celestino Piatti
Gesamtherstellung: C. H. Beck'sche Buchdruckerei, Nördlingen
Printed in Germany · ISBN 3-423-05975-3

Studies in Philosophy and Social Science

Volume IX/1941

Published by the
Institute of Social Research
Morningside Heights
New York City
1941

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STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

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THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

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PREFACE.

The present publication deals with problems of modern mass communication. It is the outcome of collaboration between the Institute of Social Research and Columbia University's Office of Radio Research. As a result of frequent exchanges of views between members of the two institutions, many specific questions have arisen concerning the interaction between critical theory and empirical research. It is impossible to do justice to this whole problem within the scope of a single issue. We consider it possible, however, to present examples of an approach especially aware of the necessity to integrate theoretical thinking with empirical analysis. The essays that follow should be read as such examples.

It gives us great satisfaction that for the first time some of our ideas have been applied to specifically American subject matters and introduced into the American methodological debate. We feel particularly indebted to Paul F. Lazarsfeld who has taken categories developed by us in a totally different, highly abstract context, and attempted to present them in terms of the concrete desiderata confronting today's social research.

MAX HORKHEIMER.

New York City
April 1941

Remarks on Administrative and Critical Communications Research.

By Paul Felix Lazarsfeld.

During the last two decades the media of mass communication, notably radio, print and film, have become some of the best-known and best documented spheres of modern society. Careful studies have revealed the size of the audiences of all major radio programs and the composition of this audience in respect to sex, income, and a few other criteria. The circulations of newspapers and magazines are recorded by specially organized research outfits, and others report currently on which magazine stories and which advertisements are read week by week. Books, radio programs, and movies are tested as to the difficulty of the language they use and as to how adequate they are for the different educational levels of the population. The types of entertainment that different groups of people prefer are being investigated all the time, and many promotional campaigns are tested currently as to their success. A number of important new techniques have been developed in the course of all these research efforts. Modern sampling techniques, for instance, have made great progress because it has been realized that the practical value of a study would be lost if it were conducted among a group of people who are not representative of those sections of the population which the sponsoring agency wants to reach. Interviewing techniques have been greatly refined for similar reasons. The competitive character of much of this work has led to ever better methods of recording facts as to the extent of listening and reading. Where a subject matter doesn't lend itself to simple recording devices, great progress has been made in developing indices for complex attitudes and reactions.[1]

Behind the idea of such research is the notion that modern media of communication are tools handled by people or agencies for given purposes. The purpose may be to sell goods, or to raise the intellectual standards of the population, or to secure an understanding of governmental policies, but in all cases, to someone who

[1]For a general orientation in the field see Douglas Waples, *What Reading Does to People*, University of Chicago Press, 1940 and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page*, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1940. For more current and specific information the *Public Opinion Quarterly*, published by the Princeton University Press, is the best source of articles and bibliography.

uses a medium for something, it is the task of research to make the tool better known, and thus to facilitate its use.

As a result, all communications research centers around a standard set of problems. Who are the people exposed to the different media? What are their specific preferences? What are the effects of different methods of presentation? One who uses media of communication is in competition with other agencies whose purposes are different, and thus research must also keep track of what is communicated by others. Finally, communications research has to be aware that the effect of radio, print, or the movie, does not end with the purposive use which is made of it by administrative agencies. If advertisers, for example, feel that radio is an especially powerful selling device, then printed media will receive less money, and research will have to see whether radio brings about a general deterioration of the reading habits of the population.

Studies of this kind are conducted partly by the major publishing organizations and radio networks and partly by academic agencies supported by universities or foundations.[1] Considerable thought has been given during the past years to clarifying the social and political implications of this new branch of social research. Its relationship to the present crisis is very interestingly discussed in a new study by Harold Lasswell.[2] One who has not participated in work of this kind can get a good picture of its atmosphere from a "fable" written by participants in the course of a series of discussions which took place during 1939 and 1940. We quote:

> "In the interests of concreteness, let us attempt to state the job of research in mass communication in a situation which, though purely hypothetical, serves to illustrate what that job involves.
>
> "Let us suppose that government leaders and those responsible for mass communication are in agreement with respect to policy toward alien groups in this country. The public, they believe, should be made aware of the dangers of subversive activities on the part of aliens, but popular antipathy toward aliens in general should be minimized, and, above all, outbreaks of anti-alien sentiment should be avoided. The policy that the channels of mass communication must serve, then, becomes one of increasing public awareness of specific dangers of subversive action, while, at the same time, building tolerance toward aliens in general.

[1]Among the universities, the University of Chicago Library School and the University of Minnesota Journalism School are especially active in the field of communications research. Organizations doing similar work with foundation funds are the Adult Education Association, the American Film Center, the Columbia University Office of Radio Research, the Library of Congress and the Princeton Public Opinion Research Project. In the magazine field, *Life* and *McCall's* are currently publishing valuable information. Material on radio can best be obtained through the research directors of the Columbia Broadcasting System and the National Broadcasting Company.

[2]Harold Lasswell, *Democracy Through Public Opinion.* George Banta Publishing Co. 1941.

"Suppose that some popular evening radio program, known to attract a considerable portion of the total listening audience, includes an address dealing with the dangers of subversive activities on the part of aliens. The explicit intention of the speaker, of his sponsors, and of the stations which carry the program is simply to further the policy outlined above by drawing attention to dangers to which the country should be alive. News dispatches of the next day or two, however, bring reports from various parts of the country of outbreaks of feeling against alien groups. Reports of local utterances in connection with these outbreaks carry allusions to the broadcast address of the evening. As a result, there is at least a strong suspicion that some connection exists between them and what was said on the evening broadcast.

"Suppose, too, that those responsible for the original address decide that they are likewise responsible for doing something to repair the damage which they quite innocently caused. This decision takes on new importance as the network involved receives from the Federal Communications Commission a request for the text of the address. Conscientious effort to repair the damage, it is clear, involves learning more of what the damage was. The comment it occasioned in the press makes clear that its effects were felt not through the radio alone, but through reports of the unfortunate address which the newspapers carried, in the local utterances which alluded to it, and even in some widely distributed newsreel reports of the local outbreaks that followed. What people then must be reached if the untoward effects of the broadcast are to be remedied?

"What were those effects and precisely what in the broadcast address provoked them? Clearly the broadcast was not alone responsible. Something in what was said evidently combined with the predispositions of the listeners and with the current circumstances—with the force of events, and probably with other widely disseminated communications—to set the stage for what ensued.

"Recognizing these questions as basic in any conscientious effort to repair the damage, those responsible set about to get them answered. Each station which carried the address is asked immediately to dispatch to network headquarters all the evidence that can be gathered on the attention it attracted in the area of the station's coverage—newspaper reports of the address itself, editorials and speeches referring to it, reports of the outbreaks that ensued, newsreel treatments of them, etc. Each station too, is asked to assign the best qualified members of its staff to interviewing listeners to determine as best they can what in the address led to the unanticipated outbreaks. Particularly are they urged to have their interviewers talk with individuals who took an active part in the outbreaks in question. Some of the stations, concerned to do their part, enlist the help of competent specialists from nearby universities to study more intensively the predispositions of individuals who were most aroused by the address, and to attempt to discover what other circumstances combined with the address to make them act as they did. The interviewing organization of one of the national polls is also brought into play to study similarly a cross-section of the country's population sure to comprise both listeners who were affected and not affected by the broadcast, and some as well whom it did not reach at all, directly or indirectly.

"As reports come in from all these inquiries, a new picture of the situation takes shape. To the surprise of the speaker, his sponsors, and the net-

work, what seemed innocent references to the few aliens believed to be engaged in subversive activities were taken by listeners to apply both to aliens generally and to hyphenates from countries thought hostile to American interests and traditions. Some of the individual interviews and the poll reports show an equally surprising attitude of general hostility toward these groups. Some of them specifically allude to what are taken to be racial traits of the group involved, others to specific individuals of the group who are in business competition with the informants. Still others mention seemingly authentic reports of Fifth Column activities in conquered European countries; and a considerable number refer to purported activities of this kind in the United States and in South America. Clearly, the stage was set on the evening of the broadcast for what actually happened both by the general psychological predisposition of listeners, and by the force of recent events.

"All this, of course, clearly contributed to the unusual attention this particular broadcast received—on the part of the radio audience, through the press dispatches which reported it, in the newsreels, and through the local utterances which ensued. Curiously too, the program in which the address was included on this particular evening had a larger audience than usual. Its rating on that evening, as reported by audience research agencies, jumped substantially from its customary level. To be sure, the inclusion of this particular address had been announced in advance, and by coincidence on this particular evening another popular program ordinarily broadcast at the same time, had gone off the air for the summer. This other program, it was generally assumed, appealed more to less educated listeners, with the apparent result that the audience for this address included, perhaps for the first time, more listeners of lower educational status—a supposition confirmed by a breakdown of audience research figures in terms of socio-economic status and by a check of the ratings of other programs broadcast at the same hour, none of which rose above their usual rating and some of which showed a marked decline.

"How to repair the damage done thus becomes more problematical than had at first appeared. Obviously, another address to counteract the one which had caused the damage would not be sufficient. Comparable announcements of it might of course again attract to the program much the same audience as the week before. But, it is pointed out, there is no reason to assume that the predispositions of listeners or the force of circumstances would again lead them to depart from their ordinary listening habits. Furthermore, there is no assurance, for much the same reasons, that a counteracting address would occasion equal attention in the press or in local utterances. Finally, the original speaker is undoubtedly now firmly identified, in the minds of listeners, with the views on alien and hyphenate groups attributed to him as a result of his earlier address. Would another address by him change that identification? What, then, can be done?

"In the face of this problem comes the suggestion that outside advice should be had. Unless this broadcast is to go down in record as the beginning of a destructive wave of feeling against all aliens and hyphenates and thus utterly defeat the interest which prompted it, any remedial measures have to be most carefully planned. Who is there who can contribute to a better understanding of what happened, and who to suggest what might be done by way of remedy?

"Suppose at this point help is sought from a social psychologist known to have been studying anti-minority feeling. When he is called in, it appears that he has for sometime been recording and analyzing whatever appears in the press, the radio, motion pictures, or in public utterances that seem to have a bearing on the subject. He points out that this is not an isolated episode, but rather, one more in a development which he had for some time been following. Just such anti-minority feeling had been developing in the country over a period of years. The growth of anti-Semitic sentiment in this country had been well recognized, and now the same feelings seemed to be shifting to other scapegoats.

"According to his analysis, the recent flow of mass communication had reflected this general trend. The term 'Fifth Column,' obscurely used in the Spanish Civil War, had had wide currency. In fact, the Allies had missed few opportunities to emphasize the concept, as, for example, in their use of Major Quisling's name. At the same time, reports of Fifth Column activities in the other conquered countries had been coming through, supported in still more recent times by revelations of similar activities in South America. Thus, strong pro-Ally feeling in this country, supported by the growing predisposition to fear and feel hostility toward minority groups, led to the over-generalization of the remarks made in the broadcast address.

"Such feelings, the specialist might go on to point out, would be less restrained among less educated and less self-conscious groups. Furthermore, these groups in his opinion would be less likely to respond to any intellectual appeal that might be devised to counteract the effect of the earlier talk. This, he advises, must be kept in mind as remedial measures are planned. In fact, he is in doubt as to what any single remedial effort can accomplish. Rather, since the talk in question was no isolated example, remedial effort must take into account all the other factors in current mass communication which tend, as he sees it, to arouse just such anti-minority feeling. To repair the damage, he points out, it is necessary to determine who must be reached, not only in terms of geographical coverage, but in psychological terms as well. His final advice at this stage is therefore to turn to another specialist who has studied both the geographical and psychological composition of the audience reached by various types of mass communication.

"This specialist, when called in, readily confirms from his own observations that the program on the night in question reached an audience psychologically different from that it usually attracted. To reach that audience necessitates in his opinion close attention to the listening, reading, movie-going habits of the part of the population affected by the original broadcast. He knows in general the characteristics of each of these audiences and the types of listening, reading, and films which ordinarily attract them. His studies, too, give him some basis for predicting how any given group will respond to a given type of program, though he would need to verify prediction by a careful check on the effects which resulted from the particular address in question. He also knows that the same message conveyed by different media, to reach the audience desired, would have to stress different aspects of the subject which are especially appropriate for the medium in question. If the counteracting measures planned are to be really remedial, he would strongly suggest some pre-testing of the responses which they actually evoke. He would propose, therefore, that any remedial measures should be tried out in advance on a relatively small but typical sample of the popula-

tion, and that a study of their responses be made as a basis for possible modifications before an attempt is made to reach any wider public.

"Thus, with the help of these and other specialists, the job begins. Agreed as it is that the possibility of unintended effects must be avoided, the advice of these specialists is followed. There is no need here to attempt to suggest the nature of what is done, but only to indicate how research in mass communication might contribute to the result. With the help of specialists in such research, the audience originally affected is redetermined. Types of radio programs, press releases, and newsreel treatments are worked out, calculated on the basis of the best evidence available to get a new hearing for the subject, adequate to counter the effects of the original address. Undoubtedly an explanation would be prepared for delivery by the original speaker, but other speakers would be enlisted whose position and identification in the public mind are likely to make their parts most widely influential. All materials prepared are pre-tested as had been suggested and at relatively slight expense—indeed, far less expense, proportionately, than merchandisers ordinarily incur in testing the market for new products. Conscientious effort having taken them so far, those responsible agree in wishing now to have some further test of the actual effects of what they have planned by way of remedy. Accordingly, arrangements are made in advance of their campaign to gauge its progress.

"A happy ending to this fable can probably take the form of a series of charts which subsequently ease the conscience of all concerned by showing, as their campaign proceeds, a consistent decline in all indices of overt hostility toward the groups against which outbreaks of feeling were directed.

"If the fable has a moral, too, that perhaps may come when all concerned, in the relief that follows in their success, philosophize a bit on their experience. The original speaker, the sponsors, and the broadcasters are still convinced of their initial innocence. But they are plagued a bit by certain recollections. One of them remembers, for example, suggesting extra publicity for the broadcast on the ground that the address to be included was particularly timely. Another recalls that the topic of the address was suggested by an acquaintance prominent in an organization which presumably on patriotic grounds had for some time been advocating stricter control of aliens in the country. In the end, their feeling is that however innocent their conscious purposes, they too, as Americans of their time, shared the same predispositions in planning the broadcast, and responded to the force of the same circumstances, as did the listeners to it. It is well, then, that conscious intention should be checked by more objective standards when instrumentalities are used so powerful in their influence as modern mass communication. Somehow the mere fact that they brought objective standards into play seemed to have sharpened their common sense and made them more wary for the future. If similar research had made them warier at the outset, need all this have happened? Need they have run the risk that the inevitable delays in repairing the damage they had caused made its complete repair impossible? Perhaps, they conclude, in media like radio where "instant rejoinder" is often difficult, more trouble should be taken to avoid mistakes like this.

"This fable, it is recognized, may seem to exaggerate the importance of research in mass communication. Ordinarily, to be sure, common sense, the high standards of the communications industries, and the controls of

legal and administrative regulation have appeared sufficient to assure the use of mass communication in the public interest. Ordinarily, wisdom in that use, it might appear, can be allowed to develop by trial and error and the resulting rules of thumb. A critical situation, like that supposed, admittedly throws into high relief considerations which, though always present, ordinarily seem less urgent. But crisis, as the derivation of the word implies, forces judgment; and a desired solution of the crisis necessitates that judgment shall not be mistaken. The critical situation of our fable, then, rather than exaggerating, perhaps only puts into perspective the consequences of mistaken use of mass communication and the help which research can give in avoiding such mistaken use."

Research of the kind described so far could well be called *administrative research.* It is carried through in the service of some kind of administrative agency of public or private character. Administrative research is subject to objections from two sides. On the one hand, there are the sponsors themselves, some of whom feel that they have not really got their money's worth. One good guess, so the argument goes, is of more practical importance than all the details which might be brought to light by an empirical study. There is, however, a fallacy behind this objection. Although speculation is indispensable for guidance in any kind of empirical work, if honestly carried through it will usually lead to a number of alternative conclusions which cannot all be true at the same time. Which one corresponds to the real situation can be decided only by empirical studies.[1] From another side comes an objection directed against the aims which prevail in the majority of current studies. They solve little problems, generally of a business character, when the same methods could be used to improve the life of the community if only they were applied to forward-looking projects related to the pressing economic and social problems of our time. Robert S. Lynd, in his *Knowledge for What,* has vigorously taken this point of view and has shown many ways whereby research could be made more vital.

Neither of these two arguments doubts that research can and should be done at the service of certain well-defined purposes. But at this point a third argument comes up. The objection is raised that

[1]There is a rather suggestive way to overcome the argument of the futility of empirical research. One might, for instance, tell such an opponent that according to studies which have been done people who make up their minds during a political campaign as to how to vote are influenced by very different factors than those who have more permanent political affiliations. The opponent will find that immediately understandable and will say that he could have come to this conclusion by using good common sense. It so happens that the opposite is true and that it is possible to predict to a high degree the vote of originally undecided people by means of the same characteristics which describe people with actual party affiliations. There are many other examples by which common sense first can be led to conclusions which then are proved by actual data to be incorrect.

one cannot pursue a single purpose and study the means of its realization isolated from the total historical situation in which such planning and studying goes on. Modern media of communication have become such complex instruments that wherever they are used they do much more to people than those who administer them mean them to do, and they may have a momentum of their own which leaves the administrative agencies much less choice than they believe they have. The idea of *critical research* is posed against the practice of administrative research, requiring that, prior and in addition to whatever special purpose is to be served, the general role of our media of communication in the present social system should be studied. The rest of these remarks are devoted to a formulation of this conception and to a short appraisal of its possible contributions to current communication research.

The idea of critical research has been developed in many studies by Max Horkheimer.[1] It seems to be distinguished from administrative research in two respects: it develops a theory of the prevailing social trends of our times, general trends which yet require consideration in any concrete research problem; and it seems to imply ideas of basic human values according to which all actual or desired effects should be appraised.

As to prevailing trends, everyone will agree that we live in a period of increasing centralization of ownership. Yet, although large economic organizations plan their production to the minutest detail, the distribution of their products is not planned systematically. Their success depends upon the outcome of a competition among a few large units which must rally sizeable proportions of the population as their customers. Thus promotion in every form becomes one of the main forces in contemporary society. The technique of manipulating large masses of people is developed in the business world and from there permeates our whole culture. In the end everything, be it good or bad, is promoted; we are living more and more in an "advertising culture." This whole trend is accentuated still more by the fact that it has to disguise itself. A salesman who has only one line to sell has to explain to each customer why this line suits just his individual purposes. The radio announcer who serves one national advertiser identifies himself to millions of listeners as "your" announcer.

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[1]Cf. especially "Traditional and Critical Theory" in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, VI (1937), pp. 245-295; "Philosophy and Critical Theory" pp. 625-631. The examples used here in presenting the idea of critical social research were taken from studies done by Dr. T. W. Adorno.

Such an analysis becomes an element of strong concern and solicitude if it is felt that these trends impair basic values in human life. The idea that our times are engulfed by a multitude of promotional patterns is coupled with the feeling that human beings, as a result, behave more and more like pawns upon a chessboard, losing the spontaneity and dignity which is the basic characteristic of the human personality. In order to understand clearly the idea of critical research, one must realize that it is being urged by men who have the idea ever present before them that what we need most is to do and think what we consider true and not to adjust ourselves to the seemingly inescapable.

The theory of a trend toward promotional culture leads to the conclusion that certain tendencies of our time jeopardize basic human values because people are kept from developing their own potentialities to the full. To be fit for the daily competition, we do not spend our leisure time developing a rich range of interests and abilities, but we use it, willingly or unwillingly, to reproduce our working capacity. Thus, not having acquired any criteria of our own, we succumb to and support a system of promotion in all areas of life, which, in turn, puts us in ever-increasing dependence upon such a system; it gives us more and more technical devices and takes away from us any valuable purposes for which they could be used.[1]

Thus the stage is set for the procedures of critical research. A critical student who analyzes modern media of communication will look at radio, motion pictures, the press, and will ask the following kinds of questions: How are these media organized and controlled? How, in their institutional set-up, is the trend toward centralization, standardization and promotional pressure expressed? In what form, however disguised, are they threatening human values? He will feel that the main task of research is to uncover the unintentional (for the most part) and often very subtle ways in which these media contribute to living habits and social attitudes that he considers deplorable.

What are the operations into which critical communication research could be broken down? The answer is not easy and a first attempt might be made by visualizing how a student would be trained

[1]It might help to clarify these ideas by comparing them briefly with other trends of thought, such as the consumer movement on the one hand and propaganda analysis on the other. The consumer movement is concerned with concrete wrongs in current advertising and might even denounce all advertising as economically wasteful. For the critical approach, business advertisement is only one of the many promotional forms by which present society is maintained and its cultural rather than its economic implications are discussed. A similar difference appears in comparison with propaganda analysis. The problem is not that people are misled in regard to certain isolated facts, but that they have less and less opportunity to develop standards of judgment of their own because wherever they turn they are caught by some kind of promotion.

to make observations in everyday life and to try to interpret them in terms of their social meaning. You sit in a movie and look at an old newsreel showing fashions of ten years ago. Many people laugh. Why do those things which we admired just a little while ago seem so ridiculous now? Could it be that we avenge ourselves for having submitted to them under general pressure, and now that the pressure in favor of these particular styles has been lifted, we compensate by deriding the idols of yesteryear? At the same time, we submit to the style-promotion of today only to laugh at it a few years from now. Could it be that by laughing at past submission, we gather strength to submit to the present pressure upon us? Thus, what looks to an ordinary observer like an incident in a movie theater, becomes, from this point of view, a symptom of great social significance.

Or you find that a large brewery advertises its beer by showing a man disgustedly throwing aside a newspaper full of European war horrors while the caption says that in times like these the only place to find peace, strength, and courage is at your own fireside drinking beer. What will be the result if symbols referring to such basic human wants as that for peace become falsified into expressions of private comfort and are rendered habitual to millions of magazine readers as merchandising slogans? Why should people settle their social problems by action and sacrifice if they can serve the same ends by drinking a new brand of beer? To the casual observer the advertisement is nothing but a more or less clever sales trick. From the aspect of a more critical analysis, it becomes a dangerous sign of what a promotional culture might end up with.

A next step in trying to explain this approach could be taken by applying it not only to an observation of daily life, but to problems we meet in textbooks current in the social sciences. A text on the family, for example, would not be likely to contain a detailed analysis showing how one of the functions of the family in our society might be that of maintaining the authoritarian structure necessary for our present economic system, that the predominant position of the father might prepare the child to accept the privations he will suffer as an adult, and to do so without questioning their necessity. Applying this to a study of the family in the depression we might depart from the traditional question of what changes the depression has brought about in family life. Couldn't it be that the family has influenced the depression? Interesting research problems would come up: what was the effect of different family constellations upon people's ability to find out-of-the-way jobs, to use initiative in organizations of unemployed, and so on?

Another example could arise from a well-known observation which can be found in every text on social psychology, to the effect that the way we look at the world and react to the problems of the day is determined by our previous experience. The notion of experience is taken as a psychological concept which does not need much further elucidation. But could it not be that what we call "experience" undergoes historical changes? Visualize what experience meant for a man who lived in a rather stable, small community, reading in his newspaper elaborate accounts of events he considered news because they happened a few weeks before, spending many an hour walking through the countryside, experiencing nature as something eternally changeless, and as so rich that years were needed to observe all its details. Today we live in an environment where skyscrapers shoot up and elevateds disappear overnight; where news comes like shock every few hours; where continually new news programs keep us from ever finding out the details of previous news; and where nature is something we drive past in our car, perceiving a few quickly changing flashes which turn the majesty of a mountain range into the impression of a motion picture. Might it not be that we do not build up experiences the way it was possible to do decades ago, and if so wouldn't that have bearing upon all our educational efforts? Studies of smaller American communities have shown that since the turn of the century there has been a steady decrease of efforts in adult education of the old style. Now radio with its Professor Quiz program brings up new forms of mass education which, in their differences from the old reading and discussion circles, show a striking parallel to the development sketched here.[1]

Omitting a number of details and specifications, the "operation" basic to this approach consists of four steps.

a) A theory about the prevailing trends toward a "promotional culture" is introduced on the basis of general observations. Although efforts are steadily being made to refine and corroborate this theory it is taken for granted prior to any special study.

b) A special study of any phenomenon consists in determining how it expresses these prevailing trends (introduced in (a)) and in turn contributes to reinforcing them.

c) The consequences of (b) in stamping human personalities in a modern, industrial society are brought to the foreground

[1] cf. W. Benjamin's study on Baudelaire in this periodical, Vol. VIII (1939-40), p. 50 ff.

and scrutinized from the viewpoint of more or less explicit ideas of what endangers and what preserves the dignity, freedom and cultural values of human beings.

d) Remedial possibilities, if any, are considered.

Before we turn to the value which such an approach can have for the specific field of communications research, it is first necessary to meet an objection to the idea of critical research which may be raised against it on its own ground, to wit, that so much of its effort is spent on what might be called "showing up" things, rather than on fact-finding or constructive suggestions. It must be admitted that being constructive is a rather relative concept, and that the question of what are relevant facts cannot be decided only according to established procedures. The situation is somewhat similar to the wave of criticism which started with the reports of the Royal Commission in the British Parliament and with the English social literature of the Dickens type in the first half of the last century. Then, the task was to discover and to denounce the material cruelties of the new industrial system: child labor, slum conditions, and so on. Not that all these horrors have now been eliminated, but at least there is enough public consciousness of them so that whenever a student finds similar conditions, for instance among migrant workers or sharecroppers, some steps toward improvement are taken. The trend of public opinion and public administration is toward better social conditions. In cultural matters, a similar development has not yet taken place. The examples given above will be taken by many readers as rather insignificant in a field which is not of great practical importance. It might very well be, however, that we are all so busy finding our place in society according to established standards of success that nothing is more important at this moment than to remind ourselves of basic cultural values which are violated, just as it was of decisive historic importance a hundred years ago to remind the English middle classes that they were overlooking the sacrifices which the new strata of industrial laborers underwent when the modern industrial world was built. As Waller has pointed out,[1] the moral standards of tomorrow are due to the extreme sensitiveness of a small group of intellectual leaders of today. A few decades ago the artist who was destined to be the classic of the succeeding generation was left to starve in his own time. Today we are very eager not to overlook any growing talent, and we have fellowships and many other institutions which try to assist the growth of any seed of artistic

[1]*The Family*, Dryden Press, 1931.

development. Why should we not learn also to be more hospitable to criticism and find forms in which more patience can be exercised to wait and, in the end, to see what is constructive and what is not.[1]

And now for the specific contributions which the idea of critical research can make to the student who is engaged in the administrative research side of the problem. As long as there is so little experience in the actual cooperation of critical and administrative research, it is very difficult to be concrete. One way to put it is to point to the strong intellectual stimulation which derives from such joint efforts. There will be hardly a student in empirical research who does not sometimes feel a certain regret or impatience about the vast distance between problems of sampling and probable errors on the one hand, and the significant social problems of our times on the other. Some have hit upon the solution of making their social interests their private avocation, and keeping that separate from their research procedures, hoping that one day in the future the two will again merge. If it were possible in the terms of critical research to formulate an actual research operation which could be integrated with empirical work, the people involved, the problems treated and, in the end, the actual utility of the work would greatly profit.

Such a vitalization of research might well occur in a variety of forms which can only be exemplified and not stated in a systematic way. Quite likely, for instance, more attention will be given to problems of control. If we study the effects of communication, however fine methods we use, we will be able to study only the effects of radio programs or printed material that is actually being distributed. Critical research will be especially interested in such material as never gets access to the channels of mass communication: What ideas and what forms are killed before they ever reach the general public, whether because they would not be interesting enough for large groups, or because they would not pay sufficient returns on the necessary investment, or because no traditional forms of presentation are available?

Once a program is on the air or a magazine is printed, critical research is likely to look at the content in an original way. A num-

[1] It is quite possible that the radio industry could lead in releasing some of the pressure which, at this time, keeps much social research in conventional forms and cuts it off from expanding into new fields. Already, in the field of politics, the radio industry has proved itself more neutral and more balanced than any other large business institution. The necessity of keeping in touch with the large masses of the population might also make them more amenable to trying methods of research even if, at first, they seem less innocuous. An honest analysis of program contents and program policies might be the first testing ground.

ber of examples are available in the field of musical programs.[1] Serious music on the radio is not unconditionally accepted as good. The promotion of special conductors, which exaggerates the existing differences and detracts from attention to more important aspects of music, is pointed to as another intrusion of an advertising mentality into an educational sphere. The ceaseless repetition of a comparatively small number of recognized "master works" is derived from the necessity to keep public service programs more in line with commercial fare of the radio. From such an analysis concrete suggestions evolve as to how music programs on the radio should be conducted to make them really serve a more widespread music appreciation. A discussion of the social significance and the probable effect of popular music, to which almost 50 per cent of all radio time is given, is also available and so far represents the most elaborate analysis of a type of mass communication from the point of view of critical social research.[2] Similar studies of printed matter can be made. For instance, what is the significance of the great vogue of biographies during the last decade? A study of their content shows that they all talk in terms of sweeping laws of society, or mankind or the human soul to which every individual is submitted and at the same time point up the unique greatness and importance of the one hero they are treating.[3] The success of this kind of literature among middle class readers is taken as an indication that many of them have lost their bearings in regard to their social problems. These biographies reflect a feeling that we are swept by waves of events over which the ordinary human being has no control and which call for leadership by people with super-human abilities. By such analysis anti-democratic implications are carved out in a literary phenomenon which otherwise would not attract the attention of the social scientist.

On the other end, upon studying the actual effects of communications, larger vistas are opened to someone whose observations are influenced by the critical attitude here discussed. To give only one example: We praise the contribution which radio makes by enlarging so greatly the world of each single individual, and undoubtedly the praise is deserved. But is the matter quite so simple? A farmer might be very well equipped to handle all the problems which his

[1]See T. W. Adorno, "On a Social Critique of Radio Music," on file at the Office of Radio Research, Columbia University.

[2]See T. W. Adorno, "On Popular Music," in this issue.

[3]Such an analysis has been carried through by L. Lowenthal of the Institute of Social Research and is now being extended to the many biographies which are currently appearing in American magazines with mass circulation.

environment brings up, able to distinguish what makes sense and what doesn't, what he should look out for and what is unimportant. Now the radio brings in a new world with new problems which don't necessarily grow out of the listener's own life. This world has a character of magic, where things happen and are invisible at the same time; many listeners have no experience of their own which would help them to appraise it. We know that that sometimes has very disturbing effects, as witnessed by the attitude of women listeners to daytime serials,[1] by the attitude of millions of letter writers who try to interfere with the world of radio without really believing that their efforts will make any difference. It certainly should be worthwhile not to stop at such incidental observations but to see whether people's attitudes toward reality are not more profoundly changed by radio than we usually find with more superficial observations of their daily habits.

Columbia University's Office of Radio Research has cooperated in this issue of *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science* because it was felt that only a very catholic conception of the task of research can lead to valuable results. If there is any general rule of thumb in intellectual work it should be the advice never to pass over criticism without exhausting all the constructive possibilities which might be implied in another person's point of view. The present remarks were written for the purpose of clarifying some of the difficulties which were experienced in actually formulating what critical social research consists in and seeing its best place in a scheme of general integration of all efforts. The writer, whose interests and occupational duties are in the field of administrative research, wanted to express his conviction that there is here a type of approach which, if it were included in the general stream of communications research, could contribute much in terms of challenging problems and new concepts useful in the interpretation of known, and in the search for new, data.

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[1]See the paper of Herta Herzog in this issue.

On Popular Music.

By T. W. Adorno.

With the assistance of George Simpson.

I. THE MUSICAL MATERIAL.

The two spheres of music.

Popular music, which produces the stimuli we are here investigating, is usually characterized by its difference from serious music. This difference is generally taken for granted and is looked upon as a difference of levels considered so well defined that most people regard the values within them as totally independent of one another. We deem it necessary, however, first of all to translate these so-called levels into more precise terms, musical as well as social, which not only delimit them unequivocally but throw light upon the whole setting of the two musical spheres as well.

One possible method of achieving this clarification would be an historical analysis of the division as it occurred in music production and of the roots of the two main spheres. Since, however, the present study is concerned with the actual function of popular music in its present status, it is more advisable to follow the line of characterization of the phenomenon itself as it is given today than to trace it back to its origins. This is the more justified as the division into the two spheres of music took place in Europe long before American popular music arose. American music from its inception accepted the division as something pre-given, and therefore the historical background of the division applies to it only indirectly. Hence we seek, first of all, an insight into the fundamental characteristics of popular music in the broadest sense.

A clear judgment concerning the relation of serious music to popular music can be arrived at only by strict attention to the fundamental characteristic of popular music: standardization.[1] The

[1]The basic importance of standardization has not altogether escaped the attention of current literature on popular music. "The chief difference between a popular song and a standard, or serious, song like Mandalay, Sylvia, or Trees, is that the melody and the lyric of a popular number are constructed within a definite pattern or structural form, whereas the poem, or lyric, of a standard number has no structural confinements, and the music is free to interpret the meaning and feeling of the words without following a set pattern or form. Putting it another way, the popular song is 'custom built,' while

(footnote continued on next page)

whole structure of popular music is standardized, even where the attempt is made to circumvent standardization. Standardization extends from the most general features to the most specific ones. Best known is the rule that the chorus consists of thirty-two bars and that the range is limited to one octave and one note. The general types of hits are also standardized: not only the dance types, the rigidity of whose pattern is understood, but also the "characters" such as mother songs, home songs, nonsense or "novelty" songs, pseudo-nursery rhymes, laments for a lost girl. Most important of all, the harmonic cornerstones of each hit—the beginning and the end of each part—must beat out the standard scheme. This scheme emphasizes the most primitive harmonic facts no matter what has harmonically intervened. Complications have no consequences. This inexorable device guarantees that regardless of what aberrations occur, the hit will lead back to the same familiar experience, and nothing fundamentally novel will be introduced.

The details themselves are standardized no less than the form, and a whole terminology exists for them such as break, blue chords, dirty notes. Their standardization, however, is somewhat different from that of the framework. It is not overt like the latter but hidden behind a veneer of individual "effects" whose prescriptions are handled as the experts' secret, however open this secret may be to musicians generally. This contrasting character of the standardization of the whole and part provides a rough, preliminary setting for the effect upon the listener.

The primary effect of this relation between the framework and the detail is that the listener becomes prone to evince stronger reactions to the part than to the whole. His grasp of the whole does not lie in the living experience of this one concrete piece of music he has followed. The whole is pre-given and pre-accepted, even before the actual experience of the music starts; therefore, it is not likely to influence, to any great extent, the reaction to the details,

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the standard song allows the composer freer play of imagination and interpretation." (Abner Silver and Robert Bruce, *How to Write and Sell a Song Hit*, New York, 1939, p. 2.) The authors fail, however, to realize the externally super-imposed, commercial character of those patterns which aims at canalized reactions or, in the language of the regular announcement of one particular radio program, at "easy listening." They confuse the mechanical patterns with highly organized, strict art forms: "Certainly there are few more stringent verse forms in poetry than the sonnet, and yet the greatest poets of all time have woven undying beauty within its small and limited frame. A composer has just as much opportunity for exhibiting his talent and genius in popular songs as in more serious music" (pp. 2-3). Thus the standard pattern of popular music appears to them virtually on the same level as the law of a fugue. It is this contamination which makes the insight into the basic standardization of popular music sterile. It ought to be added that what Silver and Bruce call a "standard song" is just the opposite of what we mean by a standardized popular song.

except to give them varying degrees of emphasis. Details which occupy musically strategic positions in the framework—the beginning of the chorus or its reentrance after the bridge—have a better chance for recognition and favorable reception than details not so situated, for instance, middle bars of the bridge. But this situational nexus never interferes with the scheme itself. To this limited situational extent the detail depends upon the whole. But no stress is ever placed upon the whole as a musical event, nor does the structure of the whole ever depend upon the details.

Serious music, for comparative purposes, may be thus characterized:

Every detail derives its musical sense from the concrete totality of the piece which, in turn, consists of the life relationship of the details and never of a mere enforcement of a musical scheme. For example, in the introduction of the first movement of Beethoven's Seventh Symphony the second theme (in C-major) gets its true meaning only from the context. Only through the whole does it acquire its particular lyrical and expressive quality,—that is, a whole built up of its very contrast with the *cantus firmus*-like character of the first theme. Taken in isolation the second theme would be disrobed to insignificance. Another example may be found in the beginning of the recapitulation over the pedal point of the first movement of Beethoven's "Appassionata." By following the preceding outburst it achieves the utmost dramatic momentum. By omitting the exposition and development and starting with this repetition, all is lost.

Nothing corresponding to this can happen in popular music. It would not affect the musical sense if any detail were taken out of the context; the listener can supply the "framework" automatically, since it is a mere musical automatism itself. The beginning of the chorus is replaceable by the beginning of innumerable other choruses. The interrelationship among the elements or the relationship of the elements to the whole would be unaffected. In Beethoven, position is important only in a living relation between a concrete totality and its concrete parts. In popular music, position is absolute. Every detail is substitutable; it serves its function only as a cog in a machine.

The mere establishment of this difference is not yet sufficient. It is possible to object that the far reaching standard schemes and types of popular music are bound up with dance, and therefore are also applicable to dance-derivatives in serious music, for example, the minuetto and scherzo of the classical Viennese School. It may be maintained either that this part of serious music is also to be

comprehended in terms of detail rather than of whole, or that if the whole still is perceivable in the dance types in serious music despite recurrence of the types, there is no reason why it should not be perceivable in modern popular music.

The following consideration provides an answer to both objections by showing the radical differences even where serious music employs dance-types. According to current formalistic views the scherzo of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony can be regarded as a highly stylized minuetto. What Beethoven takes from the traditional minuetto scheme in this scherzo is the idea of outspoken contrast between a minor minuetto, a major trio, and repetition of the minor minuetto; and also certain other characteristics such as the emphatic three-fourths rhythm often accentuated on the first fourth and, by and large, dance-like symmetry in the sequence of bars and periods. But the specific form-idea of this movement as a concrete totality transvaluates the devices borrowed from the minuetto scheme. The whole movement is conceived as an introduction to the finale in order to create tremendous tension, not only by its threatening, foreboding expression but even more by the very way in which its formal development is handled.

The classical minuetto scheme required first the appearance of the main theme, then the introduction of a second part which may lead to more distant tonal regions—formalistically similar, to be sure, to the "bridge" of today's popular music—and finally the recurrence of the original part. All this occurs in Beethoven. He takes up the idea of thematic dualism within the scherzo part. But he forces what was, in the conventional minuetto, a mute and meaningless game-rule to speak with meaning. He achieves complete consistency between the formal structure and its specific content, that is to say, the elaboration of its themes. The whole scherzo part of this scherzo (that is to say, what occurs before the entrance of the deep strings in C-major that marks the beginning of the trio), consists of the dualism of two themes, the creeping figure in the strings and the "objective," stone-like answer of the wind instruments. This dualism is not developed in a schematic way so that first the phrase of the strings is elaborated, then the answer of the winds, and then the string theme is mechanically repeated. After the first occurrence of the second theme in the horns, the two essential elements are alternately interconnected in the manner of a dialogue, and the end of the scherzo part is actually marked, not by the first, but by the second theme which has overwhelmed the first musical phrase.

Furthermore, the repetition of the scherzo after the trio is scored

so differently that it sounds like a mere shadow of the scherzo and assumes that haunting character which vanishes only with the affirmative entry of the Finale theme. The whole device has been made dynamic. Not only the themes, but the musical form itself have been subjected to tension: the same tension which is already manifest within the two-fold structure of the first theme that consists, as it were, of question and reply, and then even more manifest within the context between the two main themes. The whole scheme has become subject to the inherent demands of this particular movement.

To sum up the difference: in Beethoven and in good serious music in general—we are not concerned here with bad serious music which may be as rigid and mechanical as popular music—the detail virtually contains the whole and leads to the exposition of the whole, while, at the same time, it is produced out of the conception of the whole. In popular music the relationship is fortuitous. The detail has no bearing on a whole, which appears as an extraneous framework. Thus, the whole is never altered by the individual event and therefore remains, as it were, aloof, imperturbable, and unnoticed throughout the piece. At the same time, the detail is mutilated by a device which it can never influence and alter, so that the detail remains inconsequential. A musical detail which is not permitted to develop becomes a caricature of its own potentialities.

Standardization.

The previous discussion shows that the difference between popular and serious music can be grasped in more precise terms than those referring to musical levels such as "lowbrow and highbrow," "simple and complex," "naive and sophisticated." For example, the difference between the spheres cannot be adequately expressed in terms of complexity and simplicity. All works of the earlier Viennese classicism are, without exception, rhythmically simpler than stock arrangements of jazz. Melodically, the wide intervals of a good many hits such as "Deep Purple" or "Sunrise Serenade" are more difficult to follow *per se* than most melodies of, for example, Haydn, which consist mainly of circumscriptions of tonic triads, and second steps. Harmonically, the supply of chords of the so-called classics is invariably more limited than that of any current Tin Pan Alley composer who draws from Debussy, Ravel, and even later sources. Standardization and non-standardization are the key contrasting terms for the difference.

Structural standardization aims at standard reactions. Listening to popular music is manipulated not only by its promoters, but as it

were, by the inherent nature of this music itself, into a system of response-mechanisms wholly antagonistic to the ideal of individuality in a free, liberal society. This has nothing to do with simplicity and complexity. In serious music, each musical element, even the simplest one, is "itself," and the more highly organized the work is, the less possibility there is of substitution among the details. In hit music, however, the structure underlying the piece is abstract, existing independent of the specific course of the music. This is basic to the illusion that certain complex harmonies are more easily understandable in popular music than the same harmonies in serious music. For the complicated in popular music never functions as "itself" but only as a disguise or embellishment behind which the scheme can always be perceived. In jazz the amateur listener is capable of replacing complicated rhythmical or harmonic formulas by the schematic ones which they represent and which they still suggest, however adventurous they appear. The ear deals with the difficulties of hit music by achieving slight substitutions derived from the knowledge of the patterns. The listener, when faced with the complicated, actually hears only the simple which it represents and perceives the complicated only as a parodistic distortion of the simple.

No such mechanical substitution by stereotyped patterns is possible in serious music. Here even the simplest event necessitates an effort to grasp it immediately instead of summarizing it vaguely according to institutionalized prescriptions capable of producing only institutionalized effects. Otherwise the music is not "understood." Popular music, however, is composed in such a way that the process of translation of the unique into the norm is already planned and, to a certain extent, achieved within the composition itself.

The composition hears for the listener. This is how popular music divests the listener of his spontaneity and promotes conditioned reflexes. Not only does it not require his effort to follow its concrete stream; it actually gives him models under which anything concrete still remaining may be subsumed. The schematic build-up dictates the way in which he must listen while, at the same time, it makes any effort in listening unnecessary. Popular music is "pre-digested" in a way strongly resembling the fad of "digests" of printed material. It is this structure of contemporary popular music, which in the last analysis, accounts for those changes of listening habits which we shall later discuss.

So far standardization of popular music has been considered in structural terms—that is, as an inherent quality without explicit

reference to the process of production or to the underlying causes for standardization. Though all industrial mass production necessarily eventuates in standardization, the production of popular music can be called "industrial" only in its promotion and distribution, whereas the act of producing a song-hit still remains in a handicraft stage. The production of popular music is highly centralized in its economic organization, but still "individualistic" in its social mode of production. The division of labor among the composer, harmonizer, and arranger is not industrial but rather pretends industrialization, in order to look more up-to-date, whereas it has actually adapted industrial methods for the technique of its promotion. It would not increase the costs of production if the various composers of hit tunes did not follow certain standard patterns. Therefore, we must look for other reasons for structural standardization—very different reasons from those which account for the standardization of motor cars and breakfast foods.

Imitation offers a lead for coming to grips with the basic reasons for it. The musical standards of popular music were originally developed by a competitive process. As one particular song scored a great success, hundreds of others sprang up imitating the successful one. The most successful hits, types, and "ratios" between elements were imitated, and the process culminated in the crystallization of standards. Under centralized conditions such as exist today these standards have become "frozen."[1] That is, they have been taken over by cartelized agencies, the final results of a competitive process, and rigidly enforced upon material to be promoted. Non-compliance with the rules of the game became the basis for exclusion. The original patterns that are now standardized evolved in a more or less competitive way. Large-scale economic concentration institutionalized the standardization, and made it imperative. As a result, innovations by rugged individualists have been outlawed. The standard patterns have become invested with the immunity of bigness—"the King can do no wrong." This also accounts for revivals in popular music. They do not have the outworn character of standardized products manufactured after a given pattern. The breath of free competition is still alive within them. On the other hand, the famous old hits which are revived set the patterns which have become standardized. They are the golden age of the game-rules.

This "freezing" of standards is socially enforced upon the agen-

[1]See Max Horkheimer, *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, vol. VIII, 1939, p. 115.

cies themselves. Popular music must simultaneously meet two demands. One is for stimuli that provoke the listener's attention. The other is for the material to fall within the category of what the musically untrained listener would call "natural" music: that is, the sum total of all the conventions and material formulas in music to which he is accustomed and which he regards as the inherent, simple language of music itself, no matter how late the development might be which produced this natural language. This natural language for the American listener stems from his earliest musical experiences, the nursery rhymes, the hymns he sings in Sunday school, the little tunes he whistles on his way home from school.—All these are vastly more important in the formation of musical language than his ability to distinguish the beginning of Brahms' Third Symphony from that of his Second. Official musical culture is, to a large extent, a mere superstructure of this underlying musical language, namely the major and minor tonality and all the tonal relationships it implies. But these tonal relationships of the primitive musical language set barriers to whatever does not conform to them. Extravagances are tolerated only insofar as they can be recast into this so-called natural language.

In terms of consumer-demand, the standardization of popular music is only the expression of this dual desideratum imposed upon it by the musical frame of mind of the public,—that it be "stimulatory" by deviating in some way from the established "natural," and that it maintain the supremacy of the natural against such deviations. The attitude of the audience toward the natural language is reinforced by standardized production, which institutionalizes desiderata which originally might have come from the public.

Pseudo-individualization.

The paradox in the desiderata—stimulatory and natural—accounts for the dual character of standardization itself. Stylization of the ever identical framework is only one aspect of standardization. Concentration and control in our culture hide themselves in their very manifestation. Unhidden they would provoke resistance. Therefore the illusion and, to a certain extent, even the reality of individual achievement must be maintained. The maintenance of it is grounded in material reality itself, for while administrative control over life processes is concentrated, ownership is still diffuse.

In the sphere of luxury production, to which popular music belongs and in which no necessities of life are immediately involved, while, at the same time, the residues of individualism are most alive there in the form of ideological categories such as taste and free

choice, it is imperative to hide standardization. The "backwardness" of musical mass production, the fact that it is still on a handicraft level and not literally an industrial one, conforms perfectly to that necessity which is essential from the viewpoint of cultural big business. If the individual handicraft elements of popular music were abolished altogether, a synthetic means of hiding standardization would have to be evolved. Its elements are even now in existence.

The necessary correlate of musical standardization is *pseudo-individualization.* By pseudo-individualization we mean endowing cultural mass production with the halo of free choice or open market on the basis of standardization itself. Standardization of song hits keeps the customers in line by doing their listening for them, as it were. Pseudo-individualization, for its part, keeps them in line by making them forget that what they listen to is already listened to for them, or "pre-digested."

The most drastic example of standardization of presumably individualized features is to be found in so-called improvisations. Even though jazz musicians still improvise in practice, their improvisations have become so "normalized" as to enable a whole terminology to be developed to express the standard devices of individualization: a terminology which in turn is ballyhooed by jazz publicity agents to foster the myth of pioneer artisanship and at the same time flatter the fans by apparently allowing them to peep behind the curtain and get the inside story. This pseudo-individualization is prescribed by the standardization of the framework. The latter is so rigid that the freedom it allows for any sort of improvisation is severely delimited. Improvisations—passages where spontaneous action of individuals is permitted ("Swing it boys")—are confined within the walls of the harmonic and metric scheme. In a great many cases, such as the "break" of pre-swing jazz, the musical function of the improvised detail is determined completely by the scheme: the break can be nothing other than a disguised cadence. Hence, very few possibilities for actual improvisation remain, due to the necessity of merely melodically circumscribing the same underlying harmonic functions. Since these possibilities were very quickly exhausted, stereotyping of improvisatory details speedily occurred. Thus, standardization of the norm enhances in a purely technical way standardization of its own deviation—pseudo-individualization.

This subservience of improvisation to standardization explains two main socio-psychological qualities of popular music. One is the fact that the detail remains openly connected with the underlying scheme so that the listener always feels on safe ground. The choice

in individual alterations is so small that the perpetual recurrence of the same variations is a reassuring signpost of the identical behind them. The other is the function of "substitution"—the improvisatory features forbid their being grasped as musical events in themselves. They can be received only as embellishments. It is a well-known fact that in daring jazz arrangements worried notes, dirty tones, in other words, false notes, play a conspicuous role. They are apperceived as exciting stimuli only because they are corrected by the ear to the right note. This, however, is only an extreme instance of what happens less conspicuously in all individualization in popular music. Any harmonic boldness, any chord which does not fall strictly within the simplest harmonic scheme demands being apperceived as "false," that is, as a stimulus which carries with it the unambiguous prescription to substitute for it the right detail, or rather the naked scheme. Understanding popular music means obeying such commands for listening. Popular music commands its own listening-habits.

There is another type of individualization claimed in terms of kinds of popular music and differences in name-bands. The types of popular music are carefully differentiated in production. The listener is presumed to be able to choose between them. The most widely recognized differentiations are those between swing and sweet and such name-bands as Benny Goodman and Guy Lombardo. The listener is quickly able to distinguish the types of music and even the performing band, this in spite of the fundamental identity of the material and the great similarity of the presentations apart from their emphasized distinguishing trade-marks. This labelling technique, as regards type of music and band, is pseudo-individualization, but of a sociological kind outside the realm of strict musical technology. It provides trade-marks of identification for differentiating between the actually undifferentiated.

Popular music becomes a multiple-choice questionnaire. There are two main types and their derivatives from which to choose. The listener is encouraged by the inexorable presence of these types psychologically to cross-out what he dislikes and check what he likes. The limitation inherent in this choice and the clear-cut alternative it entails provoke like-dislike patterns of behavior. This mechanical dichotomy breaks down indifference; it is imperative to favor sweet or swing if one wishes to continue to listen to popular music.

II. PRESENTATION OF THE MATERIAL.

Minimum requirements.

The structure of the musical material requires a technique of its own by which it is enforced. This process may be roughly defined as "plugging." The term "plugging" originally had the narrow meaning of ceaseless repetition of one particular hit in order to make it "successful." We here use it in the broad sense, to signify a continuation of the inherent processes of composition and arrangement of the musical material. Plugging aims to break down the resistance to the musically ever-equal or identical by, as it were, closing the avenues of escape from the ever-equal. It leads the listener to become enraptured with the inescapable. And thus it leads to the institutionalization and standardization of listening habits themselves. Listeners become so accustomed to the recurrence of the same things that they react automatically. The standardization of the material requires a plugging mechanism from outside, since everything equals everything else to such an extent that the emphasis on presentation which is provided by plugging must substitute for the lack of genuine individuality in the material. The listener of normal musical intelligence who hears the Kundry motif of "Parsifal" for the first time is likely to recognize it when it is played again because it is unmistakable and not exchangeable for anything else. If the same listener were confronted with an average song-hit, he would not be able to distinguish it from any other unless it were repeated so often that he would be forced to remember it. Repetition gives a psychological importance which it could otherwise never have. Thus plugging is the inevitable complement of standardization.[1]

Provided the material fulfills certain minimum requirements, any given song can be plugged and made a success, if there is adequate tie-up between publishing houses, name bands, radio and moving pictures. Most important is the following requirement: To be plugged, a song-hit must have at least one feature by which it can be distinguished from any other, and yet possess the complete conventionality and triviality of all others. The actual criterion by which a song is judged worthy of plugging is paradoxical. The publisher wants a piece of music that is fundamentally the same as all the other current hits and simultaneously fundamentally different from them. Only if it is the same does it have a chance of being

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[1]As the actual working of the plugging mechanism on the American scene of popular music is described in full detail in a study by Duncan MacDougald, the present study confines itself to a theoretical discussion of some of the more general aspects of the enforcement of the material.

sold automatically, without requiring any effort on the part of the customer, and of presenting itself as a musical institution. And only if it is different can it be distinguished from other songs,—a requirement for being remembered and hence for being successful.

Of course, this double desideratum cannot be fulfilled. In the case of actual published and plugged songs, one will generally find some sort of compromise, something which is by and large the same and bears just one isolated trade-mark which makes it appear to be original. The distinguishing feature must not necessarily be melodic,[1] but may consist of metrical irregularities, particular chords or particular sound colors.

Glamor.

A further requirement of plugging is a certain richness and roundness of sound. This requirement evolves that feature in the whole plugging mechanism which is most overtly bound up with advertising as a business as well as with the commercialization of entertainment. It is also particularly representative of the interrelationship of standardization and pseudo-individualization.

It is musical glamor: those innumerable passages in song arrangements which appear to communicate the "now we present" attitude. The musical flourishes which accompany MGM's roaring lion whenever he opens his majestic mouth are analogous to the nonleonine sounds of musical glamor heard over the air.

Glamor-mindedness may optimistically be regarded as a mental construct of the success story in which the hardworking American settler triumphs over impassive nature, which is finally forced to yield up its riches. However, in a world that is no longer a frontier world, the problem of glamor cannot be regarded as so easily soluble. Glamor is made into the eternal conqueror's song of the common man; he who is never permitted to conquer in life conquers in glamor. The triumph is actually the self-styled triumph of the

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[1]Technical analysis must add certain reservations to any acceptance of listener reactions at their face value in the case of the concept of melody. Listeners to popular music speak mainly about melody and rhythm, sometimes about instrumentation, rarely or never about harmony and form. Within the standard scheme of popular music, however, melody itself is by no means autonomous in the sense of an independent line developing in the horizontal dimension of music. Melody is, rather, a function of harmony. The so-called melodies in popular music are generally arabesques, dependent upon the sequence of harmonies. What appears to the listener to be primarily melodic is actually fundamentally harmonic, its melodic structure a mere derivative.

It would be valuable to study exactly what laymen call a melody. It would probably turn out to be a succession of tones related to one another by simple and easily understandable harmonic functions, within the framework of the eight bar period. There is a large gap between the layman's idea of a melody and its strictly musical connotation.

business man who announces that he will offer the same product at a lower price.

The conditions for this function of glamor are entirely different from those of frontier life. They apply to the mechanization of labor and to the workaday life of the masses. Boredom has become so great that only the brightest colors have any chance of being lifted out of the general drabness. Yet, it is just those violent colors which bear witness to the omnipotence of mechanical, industrial production itself. Nothing could be more stereotyped than the pinkish red neon lights which abound in front of shops, moving picture theatres and restaurants. By glamorizing, they attract attention. But the means by which they are used to overcome humdrum reality are more humdrum than the reality itself. That which aims to achieve glamor becomes a more uniform activity than what it seeks to glamorize. If it were really attractive in itself, it would have no more means of support than a really original popular composition. It would violate the law of the sameness of the putatively unsame. The term glamorous is applied to those faces, colors, sounds which, by the light they irradiate, differ from the rest. But all glamor girls look alike and the glamor effects of popular music are equivalent to each other.

As far as the pioneer character of glamor is concerned, there is an overlapping and a change of function rather than an innocent survival of the past. To be sure, the world of glamor is a show, akin to shooting galleries, the glaring lights of the circus and deafening brass bands. As such, the function of glamor may have originally been associated with a sort of advertising which strove artificially to produce demands in a social setting not yet entirely permeated by the market. The post-competitive capitalism of the present day uses for its own purposes devices of a still immature economy. Thus, glamor has a haunting quality of historic revival in radio, comparable to the revival of the midway circus barker in today's radio barker who implores his unseen audience not to fail to sample wares and does so in tones which arouse hopes beyond the capacity of the commodity to fulfill. All glamor is bound up with some sort of trickery. Listeners are nowhere more tricked by popular music than in its glamorous passages. Flourishes and jubilations express triumphant thanksgiving for the music itself—a self-eulogy of its own achievement in exhorting the listener to exultation and of its identification with the aim of the agency in promoting a great event. However, as this event does not take place apart from its own celebration, the triumphant thanksgiving offered up by the music is a self-betrayal. It is likely to make itself felt as

such unconsciously in the listeners, just as the child resents the adult's praising the gifts he made to the child in the same words which the child feels it is his own privilege to use.

Baby talk.

It is not accidental that glamor leads to child-behavior. Glamor, which plays on the listener's desire for strength, is concomitant with a musical language which betokens dependence. The children's jokes, the purposely wrong orthography, the use of children's expressions in advertising, take the form of a musical children's language in popular music. There are many examples of lyrics characterized by an ambiguous irony in that, while affecting a children's language, they at the same time display contempt of the adult for the child or even give a derogatory or sadistic meaning to children's expressions ("Goody, Goody," "A Tisket a Tasket," "London Bridge is Falling Down," "Cry, Baby, Cry"). Genuine and pseudo-nursery rhymes are combined with purposeful alterations of the lyrics of original nursery rhymes in order to make them commercial hits.

The music, as well as the lyrics, tends to affect such a children's language. Some of its principal characteristics are: unabating repetition of some particular musical formula comparable to the attitude of a child incessantly uttering the same demand ("I Want to Be Happy");[1] the limitation of many melodies to very few tones, comparable to the way in which a small child speaks before he has the full alphabet at his disposal; purposely wrong harmonization resembling the way in which small children express themselves in incorrect grammar; also certain over-sweet sound colors, functioning like musical cookies and candies. Treating adults as children is involved in that representation of fun which is aimed at relieving the strain of their adult responsibilities. Moreover, the children's language serves to make the musical product "popular" with the subjects by attempting to bridge, in the subjects' consciousness, the distance between themselves and the plugging agencies, by approaching them with the trusting attitude of the child asking an adult for the correct time even though he knows neither the strange man nor the meaning of time.

Plugging the whole field.

The plugging of songs is only a part of a mechanism and obtains its proper meaning within the system as a whole. Basic to the system

[1]The most famous literary example of this attitude is "Want to shee the wheels go wound" (John Habberton, *Helen's Babies*, New York, p. 9 ff). One could easily imagine a "novelty" song being based upon that phrase.

is the plugging of styles and personalities. The plugging of certain styles is exemplified in the word swing. This term has neither a definite and unambiguous meaning nor does it mark a sharp difference from the period of pre-swing hot jazz up to the middle thirties. The lack of justification in the material for the use of the term arouses the suspicion that its usage is entirely due to plugging —in order to rejuvenate an old commodity by giving it a new title. Similarly plugged is the whole swing terminology indulged in by jazz journalism and used by jitterbugs, a terminology which, according to Hobson, makes jazz musicians wince.[1] The less inherent in the material are the characteristics plugged by a pseudo-expert terminology, the more are such auxiliary forces as announcers and commentaries needed.

There is good reason to believe that this journalism partly belongs immediately to the plugging mechanism, insofar as it depends upon publishers, agencies, and name bands. At this point, however, a sociological qualification is pertinent. Under contemporary economic conditions, it is often futile to look for "corruption," because people are compelled to behave voluntarily in ways one expected them to behave in only when they were paid for it. The journalists who take part in the promotion of a Hollywood "oomph-girl" need not be bribed at all by the motion picture industry. The publicity given to the girl by the industry itself is in complete accord with the ideology pervading the journalism which takes it up. And this ideology has become the audience's. The match appears to have been made in heaven. The journalists speak with unbought voices. Once a certain level of economic backing for plugging has been reached, the plugging process transcends its own causes and becomes an autonomous social force.

Above all other elements of the plugging mechanism stands the plugging of personalities, particularly of band leaders. Most of the features actually attributable to jazz arrangers are officially credited to the conductor; arrangers, who are probably the most competent musicians in the United States, often remain in obscurity, like scenario writers in the movies. The conductor is the man who immediately faces the audience; he is close kin to the actor who impresses the public either by his joviality and genial manner or by dictatorial gestures. It is the face-to-face relation with the conductor which makes it possible to transfer to him any achievement.

Further, the leader and his band are still largely regarded by the audience as bearers of improvisatory spontaneity. The more

[1]Wilder Hobson, *American Jazz Music*, p. 153, New York, 1939.

actual improvisation disappears in the process of standardization and the more it is superseded by elaborate schemes, the more must the idea of improvisation be maintained before the audience. The arranger remains obscure partly because of the necessity for avoiding the slightest hint that popular music may not be improvised, but must, in most cases, be fixed and systematized.

III. THEORY ABOUT THE LISTENER.

Recognition and acceptance.

Mass listening habits today gravitate about recognition. Popular music and its plugging are focused on this habituation. The basic principle behind it is that one need only repeat something until it is recognized in order to make it accepted. This applies to the standardization of the material as well as to its plugging. What is necessary in order to understand the reasons for the popularity of the current type of hit music is a theoretical analysis of the processes involved in the transformation of repetition into recognition and of recognition into acceptance.

The concept of recognition, however, may appear to be too unspecific to explain modern mass listening. It can be argued that wherever musical understanding is concerned, the factor of recognition, being one of the basic functions of human knowing, must play an important role. Certainly one understands a Beethoven sonata only by recognizing some of its features as being abstractly identical with others which one knows from former experience, and by linking them up with the present experience. The idea that a Beethoven sonata could be understood in a void without relating it to elements of musical language which one knows and recognizes—would be absurd. What matters, however, is what is recognized. What does a real listener recognize in a Beethoven sonata? He certainly recognizes the "system" upon which it is based: the major-minor tonality, the inter-relationship of keys which determines modulation, the different chords and their relative expressive value, certain melodic formulas, and certain structural patterns. (It would be absurd to deny that such patterns exist in serious music. But their function is of a different order. Granted all this recognition, it is still not sufficient for a comprehension of the musical sense.) All the recognizable elements are organized in good serious music by a concrete and unique musical totality from which they derive their particular meaning, in the same sense as a word in a poem derives its meaning from the totality of the poem and not from the everyday use of the word, although the recognition of this everydayness of the word

may be the necessary presupposition of any understanding of the poem.

The musical sense of any piece of music may indeed be defined as that dimension of the piece which cannot be grasped by recognition alone, by its identification with something one knows. It can be built up only by spontaneously linking the known elements—a reaction as spontaneous by the listener as it was spontaneous by the composer—in order to experience the inherent novelty of the composition. The musical sense is the New—something which cannot be traced back to and subsumed under the configuration of the known, but which springs out of it, if the listener comes to its aid.

It is precisely this relationship between the recognized and the new which is destroyed in popular music. Recognition becomes an end instead of a means. The recognition of the mechanically familiar in a hit tune leaves nothing which can be grasped as new by a linking of the various elements. As a matter of fact, the link between the elements is pre-given in popular music as much as, or even to a greater extent than, the elements are themselves. Hence, recognition and understanding must here coincide, whereas in serious music understanding is the act by which universal recognition leads to the emergence of something fundamentally new.

An appropriate beginning for investigating recognition in respect of any particular song hit may be made by drafting a scheme which divides the experience of recognition into its different components. Psychologically, all the factors we enumerate are interwoven to such a degree that it would be impossible to separate them from one another in reality, and any temporal order given them would be highly problematical. Our scheme is directed more toward the different objective elements involved in the experience of recognition, than toward the way in which the actual experience feels to a particular individual or individuals.

The components we consider to be involved are the following:

a) Vague remembrance.
b) Actual identification.
c) Subsumption by label.
d) Self-reflection on the act of recognition.
e) Psychological transfer of recognition-authority to the object.

a) The more or less vague experience of being reminded of something ("I must have heard this somewhere"). The standardization of the material sets the stage for vague remembrance in practically every song, since each tune is reminiscent of the general pattern and of

every other. An aboriginal prerequisite for this feeling is the existence of a vast supply of tunes, an incessant stream of popular music which makes it impossible to remember each and every particular song.

b) The moment of actual identification—the actual "that's it" experience. This is attained when vague remembrance is searchlighted by sudden awareness. It is comparable to the experience one has sitting in a room that has been darkened when suddenly the electric light flares up again. By the suddenness of its being lit, the familiar furniture obtains, for a split second, the appearance of being novel. The spontaneous realization that this very piece is "the same as" what one heard at some other time, tends to sublate, for a moment, the ever-impending peril that something is as it always was.

It is characteristic of this factor of the recognition experience that it is marked by a sudden break. There is no gradation between the vague recollection and full awareness but, rather, a sort of psychological "jump." This component may be regarded as appearing somewhat later in time than vague remembrance. This is supported by consideration of the material. It is probably very difficult to recognize most song hits by the first two or three notes of their choruses; at least the first motif must have been played, and the actual act of recognition should be correlated in time with the apperception—or realization—of the first complete motifical "Gestalt" of the chorus.

c) The element of subsumption: the interpretation of the "that's it" experience by an experience such as "that's the hit 'Night and Day.'" It is this element in recognition (probably bound up with the remembrance of the title trade-mark of the song or the first words of its lyrics[1]) which relates recognition most intimately to the factor of social backing.

The most immediate implication of this component may be the following: the moment the listener recognizes the hit as *the* so and so

[1]The interplay of lyrics and music in popular music is similar to the interplay of picture and word in advertising. The picture provides the sensual stimulus, the words add slogans or jokes that tend to fix the commodity in the minds of the public and to "subsume" it under definite, settled categories. The replacement of the purely instrumental ragtime by jazz which had strong vocal tendencies from the beginning, and the general decline of purely instrumental hits, are closely related to the increased importance of the advertising structure of popular music. The example of "Deep Purple" may prove helpful. This was originally a little-known piano piece. Its sudden success was at least partly due to the addition of trade-marking lyrics.

A model for this functional change exists in the field of raised entertainment in the nineteenth century. The first prelude of Bach's "Well Tempered Clavichord" became a "sacral" hit when Gounod conceived the fiendish idea of extracting a melody from the sequel of harmonies and combining it with the words of the "Ave Maria." This procedure, meretricious from its very inception, has since been generally accepted in the field of musical commercialism.

—that is, as something established and known not merely to him alone—he feels safety in numbers and follows the crowd of all those who have heard the song before and who are supposed to have made its reputation. This is concomitant with or follows hard upon the heels of element b). The connecting reaction consists partly in the revelation to the listener that his apparently isolated, individual experience of a particular song is a collective experience. The moment of identification of some socially established highlight often has a dual meaning: one not only identifies *it* innocently as being this or that, subsuming it under this or that category, but by the very act of identifying it, one also tends unwittingly to identify *oneself* with the objective social agencies or with the power of those individuals who made this particular event fit into this pre-existing category and thus "established" it. The very fact that an individual is capable of identifying an object as this or that allows him to take vicarious part in the institution which made the event what it is and to identify himself with this very institution.

d) The element of self-reflection on the act of identification. ("Oh, I know it; this belongs to me.") This trend can be properly understood by considering the disproportion between the huge number of lesser-known songs and the few established ones. The individual who feels drowned by the stream of music feels a sort of triumph in the split second during which he is capable of identifying something. Masses of people are proud of their ability to recognize any music, as illustrated by the widespread habit of humming or whistling the tune of a familiar piece of music which has just been mentioned, in order to indicate one's knowledge of it, and the evident complacency which accompanies such an exhibition.

By the identification and subsumption of the present listening experience under the category "this is the hit so and so," this hit becomes an object to the listener, something fixed and permanent. This transformation of experience into object—the fact that by recognizing a piece of music one has command over it and can reproduce it from one's own memory—makes it more proprietable than ever. It has two conspicuous characteristics of property: permanence and being subject to the owner's arbitrary will. The permanence consists in the fact that if one remembers a song and can recall it all the time, it cannot be expropriated. The other element, that of control over music, consists in the ability to evoke it presumably at will at any given moment, to cut it short, and to treat it whimsically. The musical properties are, as it were, at the mercy of their owner. In order to clarify this element, it may be appropriate to point to one of its extreme though by no means rare manifestations. Many people,

when they whistle or hum tunes they know, add tiny up-beat notes which sound as though they whipped or teased the melody. Their pleasure in possessing the melody takes the form of being free to misuse it. Their behavior toward the melody is like that of children who pull a dog's tail. They even enjoy, to a certain extent, making the melody wince or moan.

e) The element of "psychological transfer": "Damn it, 'Night and Day' *is* a good one!" This is the tendency to transfer the gratification of ownership to the object itself and to attribute to it, in terms of like, preference, or objective quality, the enjoyment of ownership which one has attained. The process of transfer is enhanced by plugging. While actually evoking the psychic processes of recognition, identification, and ownership, plugging simultaneously promotes the object itself and invests it, in the listener's consciousness, with all those qualities which in reality are due largely to the mechanism of identification. The listeners are executing the order to transfer to the music itself their self-congratulation on their ownership.

It may be added that the recognized social value inherent in the song hit is involved in the transfer of the gratification of ownership to the object which thus becomes "liked." The labelling process here comes to collectivize the ownership process. The listener feels flattered because he too owns what everyone owns. By owning an appreciated and marketed hit, one gets the illusion of value. This illusion of value in the listener is the basis for the evaluation of the musical material. At the moment of recognition of an established hit, a pseudo-public utility comes under the hegemony of the private listener. The musical owner who feels "I like this particular hit (because I know it)" achieves a delusion of grandeur comparable to a child's daydream about owning the railroad. Like the riddles in an advertising contest, song hits pose only questions of recognition which anyone can answer. Yet listeners enjoy giving the answers because they thus become identified with the powers that be.

It is obvious that these components do not appear in consciousness as they do in analysis. As the divergence between the illusion of private ownership and the reality of public ownership is a very wide one, and as everyone knows that what is written "Especially for You" is subject to the clause "any copying of the words or music of this song or any portion thereof makes the infringer liable to prosecution under the United States copyright law," one may not regard these processes as being too *unconscious* either. It is probably correct to assume that most listeners, in order to comply with what they regard as social desiderata and to prove their "citizenship," half-humorously

"join" the conspiracy[1] as caricatures of their own potentialities and suppress bringing to awareness the operative mechanisms by insisting to themselves and to others that the whole thing is only good clean fun anyhow.

The final component in the recognition process—psychological transfer—leads analysis back to plugging. Recognition is socially effective only when backed by the authority of a powerful agency. That is, the recognition-constructs do not apply to any tune but only to "successful" tunes,—success being judged by the backing of central agencies. In short, recognition, as a social determinant of listening habits, works only on plugged material. A listener will not abide the playing of a song repeatedly on the piano. Played over the air it is tolerated with joy all through its heyday.

The psychological mechanism here involved may be thought of as functioning in this way: If some song-hit is played again and again on the air, the listener begins to think that it is already a success. This is furthered by the way in which plugged songs are announced in broadcasts, often in the characteristic form of "You will now hear the latest smash hit." Repetition itself is accepted as a sign of its popularity.[2]

Popular music and "leisure time."

So far the analysis has dealt with reasons for the acceptance of any particular song hit. In order to understand why this whole *type* of music maintains its hold on the masses, some considerations of a more general kind may be appropriate.

The frame of mind to which popular music originally appealed, on which it feeds, and which it perpetually reinforces, is simultaneously one of distraction and inattention. Listeners are distracted from the demands of reality by entertainment which does not demand attention either.

The notion of distraction can be properly understood only within its social setting and not in self-subsistent terms of individual psychology. Distraction is bound to the present mode of production, to the rationalized and mechanized process of labor to which, directly or indirectly, masses are subject. This mode of production, which engenders fears and anxiety about unemployment, loss of income, war, has its "non-productive" correlate in entertainment; that is,

[1]Cf. Hadley Cantril and Gordon Allport, *The Psychology of Radio*, New York, 1935 p. 69.

[2]The same propaganda trick can be found more explicitly in the field of radio advertising of commodities. Beautyskin Soap is called "famous" since the listener has heard the name of the soap over the air innumerable times before and therefore would agree to its "fame." Its fame is only the sum-total of these very announcements which refer to it.

relaxation which does not involve the effort of concentration at all. People want to have fun. A fully concentrated and conscious experience of art is possible only to those whose lives do not put such a strain on them that in their spare time they want relief from both boredom and effort simultaneously. The whole sphere of cheap commercial entertainment reflects this dual desire. It induces relaxation because it is patterned and pre-digested. Its being patterned and predigested serves within the psychological household of the masses to spare them the effort of that participation (even in listening or observation) without which there can be no receptivity to art. On the other hand, the stimuli they provide permit an escape from the boredom of mechanized labor.

The promoters of commercialized entertainment exonerate themselves by referring to the fact that they are giving the masses what they want. This is an ideology appropriate to commercial purposes: the less the mass discriminates, the greater the possibility of selling cultural commodities indiscriminately. Yet this ideology of vested interest cannot be dismissed so easily. It is not possible completely to deny that mass-consciousness can be molded by the operative agencies only because the masses "want this stuff."

But why do they want this stuff? In our present society the masses themselves are kneaded by the same mode of production as the articraft material foisted upon them. The customers of musical entertainment are themselves objects or, indeed, products of the same mechanisms which determine the production of popular music. Their spare time serves only to reproduce their working capacity. It is a means instead of an end. The power of the process of production extends over the time intervals which on the surface appear to be "free." They want standardized goods and pseudo-individualization, because their leisure is an escape from work and at the same time is molded after those psychological attitudes to which their workaday world exclusively habituates them. Popular music is for the masses a perpetual busman's holiday. Thus, there is justification for speaking of a pre-established harmony today between production and consumption of popular music. The people clamor for what they are going to get anyhow.

To escape boredom and avoid effort are incompatible—hence the reproduction of the very attitude from which escape is sought. To be sure, the way in which they must work on the assembly line, in the factory, or at office machines denies people any novelty. They seek novelty, but the strain and boredom associated with actual work leads to avoidance of effort in that leisure-time which offers the only chance for really new experience. As a substitute, they crave a

stimulant. Popular music comes to offer it. Its stimulations are met with the inability to vest effort in the ever-identical. This means boredom again. It is a circle which makes escape impossible. The impossibility of escape causes the wide-spread attitude of inattention toward popular music. The moment of recognition is that of effortless sensation. The sudden attention attached to this moment burns itself out *instanter* and relegates the listener to a realm of inattention and distraction. On the one hand, the domain of production and plugging presupposes distraction and, on the other, produces it.

In this situation the industry faces an insoluble problem. It must arouse attention by means of ever-new products, but this attention spells their doom. If no attention is given to the song, it cannot be sold; if attention is paid to it, there is always the possibility that people will no longer accept it, because they know it too well. This partly accounts for the constantly renewed effort to sweep the market with new products, to hound them to their graves; then to repeat the infanticidal maneuver again and again.

On the other hand, distraction is not only a presupposition but also a product of popular music. The tunes themselves lull the listener to inattention. They tell him not to worry for he will not miss anything.[1]

The social cement.

It is safe to assume that music listened to with a general inattention which is only interrupted by sudden flashes of recognition is not followed as a sequence of experiences that have a clear-cut meaning of their own, grasped in each instant and related to all the precedent and subsequent moments. One may go so far as to suggest that most listeners of popular music do not understand music as a language in itself. If they did it would be vastly difficult to explain how they could tolerate the incessant supply of largely undifferentiated material. What, then, does music mean to them? The answer is that the language that is music is transformed by objective processes into a language which they think is their own,—into a language which serves as a receptacle for their institutionalized wants. The less music is a language *sui generis* to them, the more does it become established as such a receptacle. The autonomy of music is replaced by a mere socio-psychological function. Music today is largely a social cement. And the meaning listeners attribute to a material, the

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[1]The attitude of distraction is not a completely universal one. Particularly youngsters who invest popular music with their own feelings are not yet completely blunted to all its effects. The whole problem of age levels with regard to popular music, however, is beyond the scope of the present study. Demographic problems, too, must remain out of consideration.

inherent logic of which is inaccessible to them, is above all a means by which they achieve some psychical adjustment to the mechanisms of present-day life. This "adjustment" materializes in two different ways, corresponding to two major socio-psychological types of mass behavior toward music in general and popular music in particular, the "rhythmically obedient" type and the "emotional" type.

Individuals of the rhythmically obedient type are mainly found among the youth—the so-called radio generation. They are most susceptible to a process of masochistic adjustment to authoritarian collectivism. The type is not restricted to any one political attitude. The adjustment to anthropophagous collectivism is found as often among left-wing political groups as among right-wing groups. Indeed, both overlap: repression and crowd-mindedness overtake the followers of both trends. The psychologies tend to meet despite the surface distinctions in political attitudes.

This comes to the fore in popular music which appears to be aloof from political partisanship. It may be noted that a moderate leftist theatre production such as "Pins and Needles" uses ordinary jazz as its musical medium, and that a communist youth organization adapted the melody of "Alexander's Ragtime Band" to its own lyrics. Those who ask for a song of social significance ask for it through a medium which deprives it of social significance. The use of inexorable popular musical media is repressive *per se*. Such inconsistencies indicate that political conviction and socio-psychological structure by no means coincide.

This obedient type is the rhythmical type, the word rhythmical being used in its everyday sense. Any musical experience of this type is based upon the underlying, unabating time unit of the music, —its "beat." To play rhythmically means, to these people, to play in such a way that even if pseudo-individualizations—counter-accents and other "differentiations"—occur, the relation to the ground metre is preserved. To be musical means to them to be capable of following given rhythmical patterns without being disturbed by "individualizing" aberrations, and to fit even the syncopations into the basic time units. This is the way in which their response to music immediately expresses their desire to obey. However, as the standardized metre of dance music and of marching suggests the coördinated battalions of a mechanical collectivity, obedience to this rhythm by overcoming the responding individuals leads them to conceive of themselves as agglutinized with the untold millions of the meek who must be similarly overcome. Thus do the obedient inherit the earth.

Yet, if one looks at the serious compositions which correspond to this category of mass listening, one finds one very characteristic fea-

ture: that of disillusion. All these composers, among them Stravinsky and Hindemith, have expressed an "anti-romantic" feeling. They aimed at musical adaptation to reality,—a reality understood by them in terms of the "machine age." The renunciation of dreaming by these composers is an index that listeners are ready to replace dreaming by adjustment to raw reality, that they reap new pleasure from their acceptance of the unpleasant. They are disillusioned about any possibility of realizing their own dreams in the world in which they live, and consequently adapt themselves to this world. They take what is called a realistic attitude and attempt to harvest consolation by identifying themselves with the external social forces which they think constitute the "machine-age." Yet the very disillusion upon which their coordination is based is there to mar their pleasure. The cult of the machine which is represented by unabating jazz beats involves a self-renunciation that cannot but take root in the form of a fluctuating uneasiness somewhere in the personality of the obedient. For the machine is an end in itself only under given social conditions, —where men are appendages of the machines on which they work. The adaptation to machine music necessarily implies a renunciation of one's own human feelings and at the same time a fetishism of the machine such that its instrumental character becomes obscured thereby.

As to the other, the "emotional" type, there is some justification for linking it with a type of movie spectator. The kinship is with the poor shop girl who derives gratification by identification with Ginger Rogers, who, with her beautiful legs and unsullied character, marries the boss. Wish-fulfillment is considered the guiding principle in the social psychology of moving pictures and similarly in the pleasure obtained from emotional, erotic music. This explanation, however, is only superficially appropriate.

Hollywood and Tin Pan Alley may be dream factories. But they do not merely supply categorical wish-fulfillment for the girl behind the counter. She does not immediately identify herself with Ginger Rogers marrying. What does occur may be expressed as follows: when the audience at a sentimental film or sentimental music become aware of the overwhelming possibility of happiness, they dare to confess to themselves what the whole order of contemporary life ordinarily forbids them to admit, namely, that they actually have no part in happiness. What is supposed to be wish-fulfillment is only the scant liberation that occurs with the realization that at last one need not deny oneself the happiness of knowing that one is unhappy and that one could be happy. The experience of the shop girl is related to that of the old woman who weeps at the wedding services

of others, blissfully becoming aware of the wretchedness of her own life. Not even the most gullible individuals believe that eventually everyone will win the sweepstakes. The actual function of sentimental music lies rather in the temporary release given to the awareness that one has missed fulfillment.

The emotional listener listens to everything in terms of late romanticism and of the musical commodities derived from it which are already fashioned to fit the needs of emotional listening. They consume music in order to be allowed to weep. They are taken in by the musical expression of frustration rather than by that of happiness. The influence of the standard Slavic melancholy typified by Tchaikowsky and Dvorak is by far greater than that of the most "fulfilled" moments of Mozart or of the young Beethoven. The so-called releasing element of music is simply the opportunity to feel something. But the actual content of this emotion can only be frustration. Emotional music has become the image of the mother who says, "Come and weep, my child." It is katharsis for the masses, but katharsis which keeps them all the more firmly in line. One who weeps does not resist any more than one who marches. Music that permits its listeners the confession of their unhappiness reconciles them, by means of this "release," to their social dependence.

Ambivalence, spite, fury.

The fact that the psychological "adjustment" effected by today's mass listening is illusionary and that the "escape" provided by popular music actually subjects the individuals to the very same social powers from which they want to escape makes itself felt in the very attitude of those masses. What appears to be ready acceptance and unproblematic gratification is actually of a very complex nature, covered by a veil of flimsy rationalizations. Mass listening habits today are *ambivalent.* This ambivalence, which reflects upon the whole question of popularity of popular music, has to be scrutinized in order to throw some light upon the potentialities of the situation. It may be made clear through an analogy from the visual field. Every moviegoer and every reader of magazine fiction is familiar with the effect of what may be called the obsolete modern: photographs of famous dancers who were considered alluring twenty years ago, revivals of Valentino films which, though the most glamorous of their day, appear hopelessly old-fashioned. This effect, originally discovered by French surrealists, has since become hackneyed. There are numerous magazines today that mock fashions as outmoded, although their popularity dates back only a few years and although the

very women who appear ridiculous in the past styles are at the same time regarded as the peak of smartness in present-day fashions. The rapidity with which the modern becomes obsolete has a very significant implication. It leads to the question whether the change of effect can possibly be due entirely to the objects in themselves, or whether the change must be at least partly accounted for by the disposition of the masses. Many of these who today laugh at the Babs Hutton of 1929 not only admire the Babs Hutton of 1940 but were thrilled by her in 1929 also. They could not now scoff at the Barbara Hutton of 1929 unless their admiration for her (or her peers) at that time contained in itself elements ready to tilt over into its opposite when historically provoked. The "craze" or frenzy for a particular fashion contains within itself the latent possibility of fury.

The same thing occurs in popular music. In jazz journalism it is known as "corniness." Any rhythmical formula which is out-dated, no matter how "hot" it is in itself, is regarded as ridiculous and therefore either flatly rejected or enjoyed with the smug feeling that the fashions now familiar to the listener are superior.

One could not possibly offer any musical criterion for certain musical formulas today considered tabu because they are corny—such as a sixteenth on the down beat with a subsequent dotted eighth. They need not be less sophisticated than any of the so-called swing formulas. It is even likely that in the pioneer days of jazz the rhythmical improvisations were less schematic and more complex than they are today. Nevertheless, the effect of corniness exists and makes itself felt very definitely.

An adequate explanation that can be offered even without going into questions that require psychoanalytical interpretation is the following: Likes that have been enforced upon listeners provoke revenge the moment the pressure is relaxed. They compensate for their "guilt" in having condoned the worthless by making fun of it. But the pressure is relaxed only as often as attempts are made to foist something "new" upon the public. Thus, the psychology of the corny effect is reproduced again and again and is likely to continue indefinitely.

The ambivalence illustrated by the effect of corniness is due to the tremendous increase of the disproportion between the individual and the social power. An individual person is faced with an individual song which he is apparently free either to accept or reject. By the plugging and support given the song by powerful agencies, he is deprived of the freedom of rejection which he might still be capable of maintaining toward the individual song. To dislike the song is no longer an expression of subjective taste but rather a rebellion against

the wisdom of a public utility and a disagreement with the millions of people who are assumed to support what the agencies are giving them. Resistance is regarded as the mark of bad citizenship, as inability to have fun, as highbrow insincerity, for what normal person can set himself against such normal music?

Such a quantitative increase of influence beyond certain limits, however, fundamentally alters the composition of individuality itself. A strong-willed political prisoner may resist all sorts of pressure until methods such as not allowing him to sleep for several weeks are introduced. At that point he will readily confess even to crimes he has not committed. Something similar takes place with the listener's resistance as a result of the tremendous quantity of force operating upon him. Thus, the disproportion between the strength of any individual and the concentrated social structure brought to bear upon him destroys his resistance and at the same time adds a bad conscience for his will to resist at all. When popular music is repeated to such a degree that it does not any longer appear to be a device but rather an inherent element of the natural world, resistance assumes a different aspect because the unity of individuality begins to crack. This of course does not imply absolute elimination of resistance. But it is driven into deeper and deeper strata of the psychological structure. Psychological energy must be directly invested in order to overcome resistance. For this resistance does not wholly disappear in yielding to external forces, but remains alive within the individual and still survives even at the very moment of acceptance. Here spite becomes drastically active.

It is the most conspicuous feature of the listeners' ambivalence toward popular music. They shield their preferences from any imputation that they are manipulated. Nothing is more unpleasant than the confession of dependence. The shame aroused by adjustment to injustice forbids confession by the ashamed. Hence, they turn their hatred rather on those who point to their dependence than on those who tie their bonds.

The transfer of resistance skyrockets in those spheres which seem to offer an escape from the material forces of repression in our society and which are regarded as the refuge of individuality. In the field of entertainment the freedom of taste is hailed as supreme. To confess that individuality is ineffective here as well as in practical life would lead to the suspicion that individuality may have disappeared altogether; that is, that it has been reduced by standardized behavior patterns to a totally abstract idea which no longer has any definite content. The mass of listeners have been put in complete readiness

to join the vaguely realized conspiracy directed without inevitable malice against them, to identify themselves with the inescapable, and to retain ideologically that freedom which has ceased to exist as a reality. The hatred of the deception is transferred to the threat of realizing the deception and they passionately defend their own attitude since it allows them to be voluntarily cheated.

The material, to be accepted, necessitates this spite, too. Its commodity-character, its domineering standardization, is not so hidden as to be imperceptible altogether. It calls for psychological action on the part of the listener. Passivity alone is not enough. The listener must force himself to accept.

Spite is most apparent in the case of extreme adherents of popular music—jitterbugs.

Superficially, the thesis about the acceptance of the inescapable seems to indicate nothing more than the relinquishing of spontaneity: the subjects are deprived of any residues of free will with relation to popular music and tend to produce passive reactions to what is given them and to become mere centers of socially conditioned reflexes. The entomological term jitterbug underscores this. It refers to an insect who has the jitters, who is attracted passively by some given stimulus, such as light. The comparison of men with insects betokens the recognition that they have been deprived of autonomous will.

But this idea requires qualifications. They are already present in the official jitterbug terminology. Terms like the latest craze, swing frenzy, alligator, rug-cutter, indicate a trend that goes beyond socially conditioned reflexes: fury. No one who has ever attended a jitterbug jamboree or discussed with jitterbugs current issues of popular music can overlook the affinity of their enthusiasm to fury, which may first be directed against the critics of their idols but which may tilt over against the idols themselves. This fury cannot be accounted for simply by the passive acceptance of the given. It is essential to ambivalence that the subject not simply react passively. Complete passivity demands unambiguous acceptance. However, neither the material itself nor observation of the listeners supports the assumption of such unilateral acceptance. Simply relinquishing resistance is not sufficient for acceptance of the inescapable.

Enthusiasm for popular music requires wilful resolution by listeners, who must transform the external order to which they are subservient into an internal order. The endowment of musical commodities with libido energy is manipulated by the ego. This manipulation is not entirely unconscious therefore. It may be assumed that among those jitterbugs who are not experts and yet are enthusiastic

about Artie Shaw or Benny Goodman, the attitude of "switched on" enthusiasm prevails. They "join the ranks," but this joining does not only imply their conformity to given standards; it also implies a decision to conform. The appeal of the music publishers to the public to "join the ranks" manifests that the decision is an act of will, close to the surface of consciousness.[1]

The whole realm of jitterbug fanaticism and mass hysteria about popular music is under the spell of spiteful will decision. Frenzied enthusiasm implies not only ambivalence insofar as it is ready to tilt over into real fury or scornful humor toward its idols but also the effectuation of such spiteful will decision. The ego in forcing enthusiasm, must over-force it, since "natural" enthusiasm would not suffice to do the job and overcome resistance. It is this element of deliberate overdoing which characterizes frenzy and self-conscious[2] hysteria. The popular music fan must be thought of as going his way firmly shutting his eyes and gritting his teeth in order to avoid deviation from what he has decided to acknowledge. A clear and calm view would jeopardize the attitude that has been inflicted upon him and that he in turn tries to inflict upon himself. The original will decision upon which his enthusiasm is based is so superficial that the slightest critical consideration would destroy it unless it is strengthened by the craze which here serves a quasi-rational purpose.

Finally a trend ought to be mentioned which manifests itself in the gestures of the jitterbug: the tendency toward self-caricature which appears to be aimed at by the gaucheries of the jitterbugs so often advertised by magazines and illustrated newspapers. The jitterbug looks as if he would grimace at himself, at his own enthusiasm and at his own enjoyment which he denounces even while pretending to enjoy himself. He mocks himself as if he were secretly hoping for the day of judgment. By his mockery he seeks to gain exoneration for the fraud he has committed against himself. His sense of humor makes everything so shifty that he cannot be put—or, rather, put himself—on the spot for any of his reactions. His bad taste, his fury, his hidden resistance, his insincerity, his latent contempt for himself, everything is cloaked by "humor" and therewith neutralized. This interpretation is the more justified as it is quite unlikely that the ceaseless repetition of the same effects would allow for genuine merriment. No one enjoys a joke he has heard a hundred times.[3]

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[1] On the back of the sheet version of a certain hit, there appears the appeal: "Follow Your Leader, Artie Shaw."

[2] One hit goes: "I'm Just a Jitterbug."

[3] It would be worth while to approach this problem experimentally by taking motion pictures of jitterbugs in action and later examining them in terms of gestural psychology. Such an experiment could also yield valuable results with regard to the question

(footnote continued on next page)

There is an element of fictitiousness in all enthusiasm about popular music. Scarcely any jitterbug is thoroughly hysterical about swing or thoroughly fascinated by a performance. In addition to some genuine response to rhythmical stimuli, mass hysteria, fanaticism and fascination themselves are partly advertising slogans after which the victims pattern their behavior. This self-delusion is based upon imitation and even histrionics. The jitterbug is the actor of his own enthusiasm or the actor of the enthusiastic front page model presented to him. He shares with the actor the arbitrariness of his own interpretation. He can switch off his enthusiasm as easily and suddenly as he turns it on. He is only under a spell of his own making.

But the closer the will decision, the histrionics, and the imminence of self-denunciation in the jitterbug are to the surface of consciousness, the greater is the possibility that these tendencies will break through in the mass, and, once and for all, dispense with controlled pleasure. They cannot be altogether the spineless lot of fascinated insects they are called and like to style themselves. They need their will, if only in order to down the all too conscious premonition that something is "phony" with their pleasure. This transformation of their will indicates that will is still alive and that under certain circumstances it may be strong enough to get rid of the superimposed influences which dog its every step.

In the present situation it may be appropriate for these reasons—which are only examples of much broader issues of mass psychology—to ask to what extent the whole psychoanalytical distinction between the conscious and the unconscious is still justified. Present-day mass reactions are very thinly veiled from consciousness. It is the paradox of the situation that it is almost insuperably difficult to break through this thin veil. Yet truth is subjectively no longer so unconscious as it is expected to be. This is borne out by the fact that in the political praxis of authoritarian regimes the frank lie in which no one actually believes is more and more replacing the "ideologies" of yesterday which had the power to convince those who believed in them. Hence, we cannot content ourselves with merely stating that spontaneity has been replaced by blind acceptance of the enforced material. Even the belief that people today react like insects and are degenerating into mere centers of socially conditioned reflexes, still belongs to the façade. Too well does it serve the purpose of those

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of how musical standards and "deviations" in popular music are apperceived. If one would take sound tracks simultaneously with the motion pictures one could find out i.e. how far the jitterbugs react gesturally to the syncopations they pretend to be crazy about and how far they respond simply to the ground beats. If the latter is the case it would furnish another index for the fictitiousness of this whole type of frenzy.

who prate about the New Mythos and the irrational powers of community. Rather, spontaneity is consumed by the tremendous effort which each individual has to make in order to accept what is enforced upon him—an effort which has developed for the very reason that the veneer veiling the controlling mechanisms has become so thin. In order to become a jitterbug or simply to "like" popular music, it does not by any means suffice to give oneself up and to fall in line passively. To become transformed into an insect, man needs that energy which might possibly achieve his transformation into a man.

Radio as an Instrument of Reducing Personal Insecurity.

By Harold D. Lasswell.

As long as radio reflects the interests of an individualistic society, there will be "psychological" programs, programs devoted to the explanation and handling of human nature. The child who is born into an individualistic society develops acute consciousness of his own ego, since he is trained to compare himself incessantly with all potential rivals. He is taught to discipline his own impulses in the interest of success, and by success is meant the improvement of his control over such values as power, respect and income. In return for work well done, success is said to be sure. (It is no accident that one of the most popular mottoes of the last generation was "Strive and Succeed"; this formula is one of the most characteristic expressions of modern individualism.)

The taste for psychology may be found among all men everywhere, but only among individualistic societies does the taste become a craving that approaches the magnitude of an addiction. Within the general framework of such a culture, there are zones of special emphasis upon individualistic achievement. The child who is reared in a middle class family usually grows to share the middle class aspiration to rise in the world. The middle class child is the quintessential climber in a society of climbers ("climbing" is spoken of technically as "mobility upward", as improvement of status in the distribution of available values in a community).

Whatever conflicts are found in the culture as a whole are brought to burning focus in the lives of middle class children. The ideological structure of our own society is no homogenous unity, since it contains ideals that are difficult to hold in balanced relation to one another. There is great stress upon individual achievement; but this is mitigated by the virtues of service and loyalty. Within the occupational network of our culture are found two sharply contrasting types, one devoted to the pursuit of money, the other to the service of non-pecuniary aims. (Recall, in this connection, the difference between what is expected of a businessman and of a clergyman.)

The double standard of success and service creates enormous difficulties in the lives of middle class boys and girls. If the middle

class is the germinating bed of ambitious climbers, it is also the custodian of morality, of ideals of sacrifice on behalf of values that transcend the limits of the individual ego. The typical conflict within the personality of the middle class youth is between "ambition" and "ideals"; the individual suffers from contradictory emphases that are found throughout the total structure of an individualistic society.

Given the individualistic traditions of American life, we know that the taste for psychology will be particularly active during periods of social difficulty. When they meet rebuff severe crises are generated within the personalities of all who share individualistic traditions. From the earliest days they have been trained to appraise the value of the ego in terms of success and failure. If they proudly accept responsibility for what they achieve, they seem bound to accept the onus of blame for what they do not attain. But they are restive under the onus of responsibility for lack of success. When they are thrown back upon themselves, they seek escape from the keen anxieties that arise from the feelings of futility and guilt. At such times the need of insight, the need of clarification of the position of the person in relation to the whole of experience, is most acute; and "psychology" is one of the symbols of reference to those who claim expert knowledge of human nature. Hence the prominence of "psychology" in the interest scale of insecure people; hence the truth in the prediction that as long as the media of mass communication in an individualistic society reflect popular sentiment, they will concern themselves with psychology—to some extent at all times; to a greater extent in times of general insecurity.

Explanations of human nature, popular or scientific, fall in three convenient categories. Stress may be put upon the impulses and ideas of the person, upon the environment to which he is exposed, or upon a balance of internal and external factors. Strictly speaking, there is a continuous gradation from one extreme to the other, hence there are varying degrees of balance and imbalance in between. For the sake of clarity we may speak of Type A, concerned with the internal environment, Type B, descriptive of the external environment, and Type C, presenting a balance of the two sets of factors. The scientific point of view is Type C. It is, of course, taken for granted that there are large degrees of difference in the amount of stress put upon internal or external factors among various groups of specialists.

Type A may be illustrated by the following excerpt from a broadcast by the present writer:[1]

[1]Number 12, *Human Nature in Action,* Sustaining Program of the National Broadcasting Company, April 5, 1940. The script collaborator was Albert N. Williams of NBC.

(In accordance with the plan of the series, the "Dictator" type of personality is shown from four successive standpoints: conventional, intimate, unconscious, formative. An example of characterization from the conventional standpoint):

MAN: (FADE ON) Well—let me tell you one thing. You may be Mayor of this town—but you don't any more run this town than you run my business—my business is this town. . . .

ANALYST: We will call this man the hyperaggressive type, which means simply that here is a man who imposes his personality upon other people to an intense degree. This man could have been a dictator. In fact, he is definitely of the stuff from which Napoleans are made. . . .

(From an intimate point of view):

MAN: (FADE ON) Huh! Look down their noses at me because I never went to college. . . . I don't know modern art. . . . I don't know literature. . . . I think I better have my secretary get me some books on modern art and the next time I have a dinner party I'll teach those people a thing or two about their own subjects. . . .

ANALYST: You see what the psychology of this man is? Every time he feels inferior because of a blind spot in his intellectual makeup he immediately takes drastic measures to correct that fact. He is a very imaginative, well-trained man; he is a highly disciplined person who knows his weaknesses, and takes immediate steps to correct them. . . .

(From an unconscious point of view, as reflected in his dreams):

(DREAM TECHNIQUE)

MAN: This art gallery of mine . . . this great art gallery . . . those pictures cost a million dollars . . . each one cost a million dollars . . . they are the greatest pictures in the world and nobody can see them except me . . . ohhh . . . it's pulling off my arms . . . it's pulling off my right arm . . . and ohhh that picture . . . is pulling off my right leg . . . I'm being killed . . . those pictures are pulling off my arms and legs . . . ohhhhhhhh (FADE).

ANALYST: Yes . . . the pattern of his dreams is quite similar . . . great possessions and then final destruction. . . .

The foregoing extracts concentrate attention upon the inner life of the subject, and relate behavior and conduct in the immediate present chiefly to other parts of the internal environment. The dream life is brought prominently into the focus of attention as an index of the incompatible tendencies that are found within the "Dictator's" personality. Taken out of its context, we have here a rather good example of Type A.

The following excerpts deal with the formative years of the same man:

> BOY: (FADE ON) Have to work at a paper stand all day long . . . I can play baseball . . . I can have a good time like the other kids . . . but mother says that I've got to work at a paper stand all day long . . . never have any fun, never have any time to play baseball . . . never any money to go to the movies. . . .
>
> ANALYST: Yes . . . he was a victim of poverty . . . he couldn't enjoy a free life of boyhood, but had to work. . . .

These sentences relate the boy to his external environment, emphasizing both his poverty and the exactions of his mother. Taken by themselves, we would not hesitate to classify them in Type B of the explanations mentioned above. Taken in conjunction, as part of the same script as Type A, they justify the inclusion of the broadcast in Type C, the balanced type.

For the proper study of psychological broadcasts, as of any broadcast, content analysis is essential. If we are to discover the effect of psychological programs upon the listening audience, we must make use of the methods adequate to the task of describing them. In the foregoing example, we have illustrated a very crude variety of content analysis. Excerpts have been selected that answer two opposite specifications: Presentation of the subject as dependent upon his internal environment; presentation of the subject as dependent upon his external environment. More refined methods would make it possible to describe relative degrees of such presentations within the limits of these selected excerpts. The soliloquy about the rebuff at the dinner party obviously refers to an interpersonal situation in the recent past of the subject. The connection of the dream sequence with an external situation involving people is not evident on the face of the record. Hence the dream sequence falls entirely within the category of the subjective event without explicit reference to an immediate feature of the personal environment. (The allusions to the gallery are not explicitly made to people.)[2]

Why is it important to distinguish carefully among the forms of psychological explanation that are current in our society? Chiefly because there are very searching hypotheses about the alleged effect of these various forms upon political and social movements. We have no adequate data at present that enable us to confirm or to disaffirm any seriously held hypothesis about the effects of psychological

[2]It is not within the scope of this article to pursue the problem of content analysis any further. Reference may be made in this connection to H. D. Lasswell, "A Provisional Classification of Symbol Data," *Psychiatry* (1938): 1:197-204.

programs upon those who listen. However, the possibility that research may yield data on significant questions is presumably increased when we guide our investigations by important hypotheses; and with this in mind, we have put in the very forefront of this discussion the classification of programs according to the stress given to internal or external factors in the causation of conduct and behavior.

And what are the socially significant hypotheses that lay so much emphasis upon the type of psychological explanation? With the greatest succinctness, the hypothesis (a compound hypothesis) is that in an individualistic society in our historical period Type A has reactionary, Type B has revolutionary, and Type C has adjustive effects. Let us consider what is meant by the suggestion that Type A has reactionary results upon the auditing group. It is said that such explanations of human activity lead the individual to concentrate his attention upon the subtleties of private experience, and to divert his gaze from the broad situations in the culture that need change, if more healthy private lives are to be made possible. Explanations of Type B, on the other hand, fix attention upon the broader outlines of the institutions of society, and attaches to them major responsibility for the distortion of human personality. It is predicted that those who accept explanations of the B type are more disposed to participate actively in social and political movements for the fundamental reconstruction of the social order.

In passing, it may be suggested that the first hypothesis is plausible, as stated, only if immediate effects are taken into consideration. It is doubtful if passivity is the enduring response to incessant stress upon subjective factors. On the contrary; if the level of general insecurity continues high, more and more members of the community may be expected to be "fed up" on "little Willie stories," upon childhood memories to account for difficulties that seem plausibly accounted for by the threat of unemployment and of invasion from abroad. If the revulsion against "Hamletism" rises to significant dimensions, the choice of activistic symbols depends upon the alternatives available at the moment (revolutionary, counter-revolutionary).[3]

In any case Types A and B are probably connected with rigid and dogmatic ways of responding to the difficulties of adapting a richly complicated social structure to internal and external stress. Type C is the pattern of psychological explanation that may be expected to

[3]The hypothesis that explanations of Type B necessarily lead to "progressive" political movements is among the unconfirmed, though dogmatically reiterated, assertions of Communists.

nourish and sustain the progressive adjustment of an individualistic society to the needs of the time. In Type C the emphasis is balanced, correcting over-emphasis upon an individualistic ideology without flying to the opposite extreme of dogmatic anti-individualism.

It is not easy to give currency to balanced explanations of the C type. We know only too well that specialists as well as laymen have their difficulties when they try to clarify the complex interrelationships of internal and external environments. Among scientists the inept days of opposing such ambiguities as "heredity" versus "environment" are practically at an end. Yet among laymen echoes of the past continue to resound in the overtones of popular speech. We have not made proper use of our modern instruments of communication to clarify the community as a whole about the nature of human nature, about the complex interrelations between one person and another. We can demonstrate in many instances the connection between timidity and the kind of maternal care received by the individual; yet these distinctions, often corroborated by common experience, are obscure when the layman begins to think about "human nature." He is unprovided with a vocabulary appropriate to the context. Subtle interconnections are dramatized in his mind around crude expressions like "heredity" or "environment"; there is little perception of the variable degrees of effectiveness to be assigned to the internal or the external environment at a given moment. No doubt the use of such expressions as "interpersonal relations" will polarize many realistic associations in the minds of laymen. Eventually it may be possible to talk quietly about different kinds of interpersonal situations, and to estimate the relative influence of internal and external factors upon the adjustment of each participant.

It is necessary to experiment with different ways of bringing language about the internal and the external environment into the same universe of discourse. The present writer has experimented in this direction by inviting attention to focus upon "impulses" and "practices," with special reference to "destructive impulses" and "destructive practices." Human destructiveness is thus expressed in two forms, directly through destructive impulses that are unchecked, and less directly through institutional practices that provoke crises by creating situations in which destructive impulses are sharply stimulated. The task of reducing human destructiveness is to discover and to spread proper methods of controlling destructive impulses, once aroused, and of reducing the occasions that prod them into concentrated life.

In addition to a common language that balances internal and external factors in the explanation of human nature in action, there

is need of common language about important specific factors. The writer has experimented in this direction by calling attention to "hurt ego" (alternatively: "damaged self-esteem," "endangered self-respect," "damaged deference," "compromised human dignity" . . .) as a major cause of human destructiveness. This emphasis is in line with the findings of modern psychiatry, and of other branches of specialized research on the dynamics of personality formation.[4] This method of analysis was presented on the radio in two forms, one a series of lectures, and the other a series of dramatizations with analysis.[5]

Quite apart from the question of whether these specific formulations are fortunate or not, the urgency of directing radio research toward the study of the effects of different kinds of psychological broadcasts is great. If any of the basic hypotheses about Types A, B and C are true, they are of the gravest importance for understanding the human consequences of radio as an instrument of communication in American society. It should not be forgotten that psychological explanations are not only given currency over the radio in broadcasts that happen to be called "psychological." In fact, the most important effect of radio upon the popular understanding of psychological causation may take place in "commercial" broadcasts that have never been conceived as disseminating psychological information or misinformation. If, in this discussion, we refer to explicitly labelled "psychological" (or near psychological) programs, we do not lose sight of the total problem of assessing, through any period of time, the total psychological content of the broadcasts to which the listening audience is subjected.

For the guidance of research and policy in reference to psychological broadcasts, let us specify in more detail the objectives to be sought. We assume, at the outset, that the socially significant purpose of these broadcasts is *insecurity reduction*. The reduction of the national level of insecurity can be sought by means of broadcasts that contribute to *insight*, *recognition*, and *selection*.

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[4]A recent clarifying statement is by Harry Stack Sullivan, President, The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, Washington, D. C., "Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry," *Psychiatry* (1940) 3:1-117.

[5]The first series of Human Nature in Action began May 17, 1939, and concluded August 9, 1939. The second (dramatized) series began January 12, 1940, and ended December 17, 1940 (with number 46). The writer proposed the idea of combining dramatization with analytic comment some time before the series. He was fortunate in having assigned to him a talented writer and director, Albert N. Williams, who had been experimenting along many new program lines, including the combination of drama with comment. The experiments were undertaken at the instance of James Rowland Angell and Walter Preston, Jr., of NBC. The contrast between the lecture-question method and the drama-analysis pattern may be seen with special clarity by contrasting the last episode of the first series with "The Dictator."

(1) *Insight.* To some extent the anxiety level of individuals can be reduced by insight, rendering them less tense, less worried and irritable, less compulsive in their attitude toward themselves and the world.

(2) *Recognition.* Persons can be trained to recognize personality conditions that require expert assistance. Many tragedies have been averted because someone has had the discrimination to steer individuals into competent hands before destructive breakdown took place.

(3) *Selection.* Assuming that dangerous conditions can be recognized, there is the added step of selecting competent experts.

Patient research is needed to translate these standards into the specifics of practical application. It would be unwise to underestimate the complexity of the problems involved at each step in the inquiry. With reference to insight, for example, we know that there is no one-to-one correspondence between degrees of insight and levels of anxiety, although there is a broad inverse relationship between the two (the greater the insight, the less the anxiety). More refined study shows that the initial phases of an insight process intensify anxiety before they release it. There are subjectively complacent individuals who must endure sharp increases in the level of their anxiety before they can achieve enough insight to bring about a general reduction in anxiety and tension.[6]

Taking it for granted that conscientious and skillful investigation will reduce the ambiguity of these standards, we may take the further step of formulating the characteristics of programs compatible with them.

1. *Cautious Optimism.* Optimism is needed if listeners are to feel reassured about the possibility of freeing themselves (and others) of anxiety. Yet there is need of restraint in reference to the removal of noxious subjective states, since optimism can be carried so far that it arouses incredulity and leads to frustration. False optimism can prepare the way for crushing disillusionment. Hence the need of cautious optimism—for calm, matter-of-factness, for balanced and unexaggerated statement, for emphasis upon slow and steady effort to surmount difficulties, for expert attention to cope with many difficult situations.

2. *Restrained Endorsement of Specific Means.* In a sense this is a sub-category of "cautious optimism," but it is singled out for coordinate emphasis because of the frequency with which it is dis-

[6] "Uncertainty" is a realistic appraisal of a situation whose outcome is indeterminate. "Anxiety" is a dysphoric subjective state that is disproportionate to the external situation.

regarded in current practice. Our dependable knowledge of human nature is regrettably meagre, and restraint is needed in the endorsement of any diagnosis or of any therapeutic expedient. There can be confidence without over-confidence in the efficacy of any specific item.

3. *Balance of Internal and External Factors.* We have dealt extensively above with the need of maintaining a balance between internal and external factors in the explanation of human activity.

4. *Balance of Prestigeful and Non-prestigeful Instances.* There is danger in crippling the usefulness of psychology if it is popularly understood as a system of innuendo. This impression can be gained when psychological explanations are invoked only to account for the Hitlers and never for the Churchills. It is true that we seek psychological insight chiefly to get rid of disturbing personal relations; yet there is a theory of "successes" as well as "distortions."

5. *Guidance to Competent Specialists.* If the listening audience is to act wisely with reference to dangerous human situations, there is need of definite instruction about how to identify such situations, and how to get in touch with competent specialists. But who, it may be asked, are the competent specialists? Our knowledge of human nature has been growing with startling rapidity in recent years, and the onrush of new data has not been critically evaluated and finally assimilated into our social inheritance. No one body of specialized observers can justifiably claim to monopolize useful knowledge of man and his works. Yet there are certain extreme conditions in which it is imperative to establish contact with a qualified physician, and preferably a psychiatrist. Over the years, no doubt, guidance will present less delicate problems than it does today; it is unlikely that we will suffer from another inundation of interpretations and methods quite as extensive as occurred during the past generation. (Contrast Sigmund Freud, for example, with Ivan P. Pavlov.)

Let no one assume that the present writer is under the impression that the series of programs to which reference has been made in this article constitutes a model of conformity to these standards. Without passing judgment upon degree to which the Human Nature in Action broadcasts as a whole measure up to these requirements, certain deficiencies may be specified at once. It is probable that the "optimism score" of some of the broadcasts would be low. "The Dictator," for example, contained little if any explicit suggestion that tendencies toward the formation of dictatorial personalities could be brought under control. To some extent, of course, any balanced explanation of human personality contributes to optimism, since it suggests that what can be understood can be partially directed. Some

of the broadcasts were explicit in suggesting that certain noxious situations had been cleared up by means of proper methods of thought and of adjusting the external environment. But in the main the series was diagnostic, and offered a bare minimum of specific therapeutic suggestions. For this reason the series would obtain a high score on a "restrained endorsement" scale. In fact one irate (and highly exceptional) listener expressed the sentiment of an unknown number of his colleagues when he wrote:

> I would like to be delivered from the recital of case after case of neurotic aberration, from Psychiatry, "our latest experiment in ignorance," into some hope of sanity through mental hygiene,—the only *constructive hope* for relief and upbuilding. From long and close study of the methods of so-called psychiatrists, I am convinced that they tend to *deepen every morbid tendency*—instead of leading out and up and on into sanity and balance. We aren't all morons who wish to swallow such stuff as is dealt out. From dealing with subnormal and diseased, you seem to accept them as typical. Surely there is no hope or uplift on that line.

Probably, too, the broadcasts would rank high on "balance of internal and external factors." There would be a lower score, and possibly a much lower score, on the "balance of prestigeful and nonprestigeful instances," although the second third of the second series had to do with historical personages of some eminence.

We need much careful investigation to determine the effect of psychological programs in general, and of specific patterns in particular, upon various listening audiences. The effect will depend, in part, upon the varied predispositions latent and active in the personalities of those who listen. Indeed, one of the most interesting questions to be raised in connection with psychological broadcasts is who listens to them at all. This is what Paul F. Lazarsfeld calls the preselective effect, the self-selecting not only of radio as a channel of communication, but of specific types of program.

Very few facts are known about those who listen to psychological broadcasts. From the general theory of response, however, we may propose certain hypotheses as a guide to future study. Any response is a function of two sets of factors, environmental and predispositional (R is a function of E and P. P is equivalent to the expression "internal environment" used above). The probability of a positive rather than a negative response to any given environment is increased if past response to the dominant features of the environment have been followed by gains rather than losses (if the environment has changed indulgently rather than deprivationally to the responder). Now who are the people who may be said to be predisposed toward

listening to a psychological program? (Whether they keep it up or not can be predicted on the same principle; if the listening is followed by gains, the probability of further listening is increased.)

Certainly we may expect that one listening group will be composed of (1) *those who talk or want to talk about psychology*. By watching the technique of the broadcast, they hope to improve their own skill in talking about the subject. In the past they have often gained vocabulary by exposing themselves to the language of others about psychology; hence we may expect them to continue until their gains drop down. (It should be noted that the responses that affect predisposition may be the focussing of attention upon the successful responses of others.)

The following references to those who listened to the Human Nature in action programs are intended to add concreteness to general hypotheses here outlined about the preselective effects of psychological broadcasts. It was not possible to study the listening audience with enough care to create an inclusive picture.

One listening group was composed of colleagues in various universities who were interested in the problem of talking about psychology to laymen, and who wanted to form a first-hand impression of the drama-analysis technique of presentation. (I may also add, in all candor, that some of them, acquainted with some of my technical publications, listened out of sheer incredulity that the writer could deliver a simple and popular lecture.) The writer received a steady trickle of criticisms from these colleagues, many of whom were not personally known to him. Often the suggestions were very penetrating. One distinguished psychiatrist and social psychologist wrote as follows:

> Unfortunately I heard only three so far but I think that is enough to get some impression of the whole. What I want to say is that I found the ones I heard very good indeed. It seems to me that the idea of blending theoretical explanation with slight dramatization is an excellent one. It makes the whole thing very much alive and at the same time in no way cheapens it. Your theoretical comment and the examples chosen seem to me excellent and I should think that they attain the purpose of giving knowledge and of suggesting thought to a wide range of people. . . . I think it might be a good idea to emphasize somewhat more that given such and such childhood background, this background is not the simple "cause" for a specific outcome but that certain other factors which complicate the picture and which cannot be dealt with in the broadcast make for the one or other outcome. In other words, I feel that although one should show the listener the general lines of development, one should also make him feel how complex the causal relationship between early experiences and later personality development is.

Another social psychologist with psychoanalytical training found much to praise in the method of presentation, but he, too, wanted more explicit references to the part of the social structure in which the child was reared. He was inclined to the view that the use of "psychological" language obscured the correlation of the conduct discussed with facts of social structure. Thus some of the situations depicted in the broadcasts were typical of lower middle class families in which an ambitious mother believes that she has married "beneath her position," and strives to realize through the children the career that she "threw away." And in the text of the analytical comments there were no explicit references made to these important facts about the position of the family in the structure of society.

These remarks, it will be noted, bear on the all-important question of the proper balance between internal and external factors, and they reflect judgments made during the first series and the first half of the second series, when the facts of the internal environment were conspicuous.[6a]

Incidentally such appraisals show how broadcasts on psychology can be critically used for educational purposes. It would be a mistake to imagine that radio broadcasts can substitute for textbook or lecture in the classroom (as some over-enthusiasts have occasionally suggested). The chief role of the psychological broadcast in relation to classroom work is supplementary in two directions. To some extent the broadcast can enliven the interest of some classes in the subject, and confer a sense of vivid reality upon some of the words in the text, or in the lecture delivered by a familiar teacher. Of more importance is the critical study of the material included (and excluded) in the broadcast. To what extent is a balance held between internal and external factors? To what extent is the terminology chosen consistent with particular schools of systematic thought? To what degree is the vocabulary clarifying to the layman, and consistent with a scientifically defensible framework?

Some teachers wrote in to report on discussions with colleagues who listened to the broadcasts, or to tell about the result of classroom discussion after a broadcast.

Among the many specialists who communicated with the writer were sociologists, social psychologists, psychologists, political scientists, anthropologists, economists, philosophers, psychiatrists, physicians, social workers, adult educators, army morale officers, educational directors in CCC camps; college, junior college, and high school administrators; high school teachers of the social studies;

[6a]See footnote 5.

clergymen; librarians; graphologists; nurses; students (many in search of "term paper" material).

From the foregoing listeners who use or want to use language about psychology, we pass over to a group (2) that is *aware of the problem of manipulating other people* (without necessarily wanting to talk about the theory of it). This group is separated by a gentle slope, rather than a sharp cliff, from the first group here described (and detailed study might show that the persons referred to here belong in the first class). The manipulators (who may actually avoid shop talk about psychology, for fear of arousing the "guinea pig response") include public relations counsels, advertising men, display consultants, salesmen, playwrights, lawyers, receptionists, dentists, teachers of music and art.

The last group (3) in the present list includes the enormous total of those who suffer from *anxiety or uncertainty about the self or others*. In this group are some of the patients in mental and other hospitals, mothers left behind by their children, jilted suitors and partners in marital splits, elderly persons concerned about senescence, young parents (prospective, actual), disturbed adolescents, anxious bachelor women (more often than men), and the like.

Systematic study would enable us to locate the zones in the social structure that, at a given time, give rise to the most disturbed personalities. We have already called attention to the conflictful middle classes; but an inclusive survey would explore all the classes distinguished according to power, respect, income, safety.[7]

What are the forms of response available to the groups that preselect psychological programs? Since we have selected insecurity reduction as the social purpose of psychological broadcasting, it is convenient to consider responses as follows:

(1) Immediate or eventual reduction of anxiety in the self, (a) with the reduction of anxiety in others, (b) with the increase of anxiety in others;
(2) Immediate or eventual increase of anxiety in the self, (a) with increased anxiety in others, (b) with decreased anxiety in others.

From case studies we know that the reduction of anxiety in one person is not invariably followed by reductions in the anxiety of those whom he affects. If a timid husband becomes more assertive as he

[7]A suggestive inventory by a contemporary psychiatrist is by James S. Plant, *Personality and the Cultural Pattern*, New York, 1937. For a more comprehensive and systematic picture, consult Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction; Studies in Modern Social Structure*, New York, 1940.

overcomes certain internal limitations, he may precipitate severe difficulties in the personality of his wife, if she is unstably integrated. We know, too, that increasing anxiety may reduce anxiety in others, if the effect of augmented anxiety is to reduce the provocative intimidation of another person.

Reliable data about the effects of psychological broadcasts must come from observers who obtain a total, intensive view of persons who preselect such radio programs.[8] It is futile to attempt to infer effects from the classification of the mail received from the listening audience. We do not know who writes, as distinguished from who listens and does not write; and we do not know what connection there is between what is written, and the effect of the broadcast upon the level of anxiety.

However, the mail received from the radio audience need not be ignored entirely, since we may classify it into groups and undertake to do the field work needed to discover the correlation between the manner of man who writes in a given vein, and the total effect of the broadcast.

It is convenient to separate the mail received from the listening audience into those containing *no special requests* and *special requests.* Another interesting classification is according to *plus* or *minus* references to the speaker and the program.

(Since an example of extremely adverse criticism was given above, this may be balanced by instances of extremely favorable criticism. The following is by Bob Landry, able radio editor of VARIETY (February 7, 1940), who had this to say in the exuberant language of the showman's journal:

> A professor of social psychology, Harold Lasswell, has de-jinxed the well-known but little-loved "educational program" and is proving on Friday nights at 10:45 over the NBC red that a touch of showmanship will transform the potentially dull into the vividly engrossing. . . . He has evolved the lecture-with-dramatic-flashbacks. And it's highly stimulating as an authentic advance in the art of radio. The formula is as flexible as an Arabian acrobat.
>
> The Lasswell series is called "Human Nature in Action" and deals with problems of neurosis (queer birds to you, muggs!), which is a subject that can get lost in the fog of big words in no time if the professor lets himself go. Lasswell not only keeps his theme in sharp focus all the way, but by the use of professional actors to illustrate his points is able to make the jump from the academic to the specific and, better than that, the dramatic fade-in and fade-out puts human sympathy and compassion into a subject that is often discussed as if sensitive human souls were so many pieces of rhinoceros skin.

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[8]Concerning intensive and extensive standpoints of observation, see Harold D. Lasswell, "Person, Personality, Group, Culture," *Psychiatry* (1939) 2:533-561.

> Mrs. Drudge, a gal with a tangled personality, was examined by the professor from the standpoint of what she is outwardly, privately, subconsciously, and, in retrospect, what influences moulded her. The actress who played Mrs. Drudge was excellent, and the whole effort stacked up as basic drama, viz., putting the human ego under a microscope and then magnifying it for the whole radio world. In its way it was as significant as the headlines from Finland.
>
> To disarm his listeners, Lasswell has, with Confucius-like wisdom, omitted both "professor" and "doctor" from his billing.

Among those who make *no special requests*, several responses may be distinguished. Some go no further than to note examples of the types described by the speaker. Often the writer says no more than that he, himself, or someone known to him, is a "perfect example."

Sometimes the correspondent raises a general question that bears no avowed or obvious relationship to a worry. The problem is posed in the general spirit of intellectual inquiry; and there may be original disquisitions upon problems touched upon, or suggested by, the speaker.

Often the dominant trend of the letter seems to be self-justification. One example is a pencilled note from a New England farmer's wife:

> You be careful what you say of the woman who can't make up her mind, the silly talking woman. She isn't as silly as you think. Just her way of doing business is with her heart and intuition which sounds pretty foolish to a hard headed business man. I graduated at 21 and tried every way to be a business woman. After six years I decided I was getting nowhere fast. At the time I had three or four men friends, and so I selected the one I thought would make a good husband and father. We were married. He is a smart young man and I have done everything to push him ahead. We own our own home and have three beautiful children. Perhaps you will call me a drudge. If so, I still like it. I don't like the little social clubs. They push me around too much and I haven't the time or it isn't worth the energy to push them around. Then I stay at home a lot. I have plenty of work. . . . Your radio program is fine. Keep up the good work. (Name and address.)

The *special request* communications ask for discussions or replies over the air, by special correspondence, or by personal consultation. (Sometimes there are requests to get the writer a job, or there are lecture and other invitations.)

One group poses a problem for discussion that is apparently not a problem that disturbs the writer, but is intellectually stimulating. One woman from a high income group, active in civic affairs, writes to suggest the analysis of two fellow townsmen, whom she describes

in friendly, and somewhat puzzled, fashion. A receptionist describes a fellow worker in detail, exhibiting no animus, and betraying no concern about the other worker as a serious problem.

Some write of problems in the handling of others (sometimes disguising the fact that the type described constitutes a specific problem to the writer). Representative is this terse, straightforward letter of a cultured woman from a farm community in the West:

> Because of a problem which is confronting me—the problem of a young woman who, though she seems normal in other respects, has a tendency to literally fall in love with other women (and at present with my young daughter, a perfectly normal girl) I am writing for any available books, pamphlets, or printed information on the subject of perversion of this kind. I want, if possible, to help this strange young woman to understand herself; and in order to do so, I need information myself. If you can help me in any way by sending such information if you have it, or by directing me to any source where it can be obtained, I shall be glad to pay for your service, and for the material I may receive.

Much of the special request correspondence asks help in relation to the self as the dominant problem. Sometimes there is a slight disguise—as in the case of an acloholic who called up over the long-distance telephone during a broadcast to ask for a discussion of the psychology of alcoholism, which he assured us would be of great benefit to the whole world (thus including himself).

Using these various categories of correspondence, it will be possible to select subjects from among those who respond to future psychological broadcasts, and to learn more about the impact of these programs upon determinate portions of the population. Such full knowledge of representative persons will enable us to test the revolutionary, reactionary, or adjustive effect of psychological programs of Types A, B, and C. Only when further investigation has been done can we translate general program standards into the specifics of effective policy, and embark with certainty upon the fundamental task of reducing the level of personal insecurity by the proper articulation of radio with every agency of mass communication.

On Borrowed Experience.

An Analysis of Listening
to Daytime Sketches.

By Herta Herzog.

If, on an average weekday, one could see at a glance what all the women throughout the country are doing at a specific time, he would find at least two million of them listening to a so-called "daytime serial." Some of these women would just be sitting in front of the radio; most of them would be doing some housework at the same time; but all of these two millions would attentively follow the day's installment of a dramatization which mirrors scenes from the everyday life of middle class people. A number of these stories have gone on for eight years. Each day's episode is introduced by a short summary of the previous day's events, and winds up with questions preparing for the coming sequel. "What will Mrs. X do tomorrow?" "Will Fate catch up with Mr. Y?"

A program of this kind lasts fifteen minutes, and when it is finished another serial comes on the air. Often eight or ten such programs follow one another without interruption other than the voice of the announcer who tells about the product and the company sponsoring the particular dramatization. There are between two and three hundred stories broadcast over American stations during the day, and in one of the larger cities a woman can listen to a score or two of them between morning and evening without more effort than an occasional switch of the dial from one station to another.

Since the life of very many middle class and lower middle class people is uneventful, the variety of incidents in these programs is many times greater than anything which these women could live through or observe themselves. Thus the question comes up of whether, through daytime serials, radio is likely to have a great influence upon the attitude of these listeners toward their own lives and the problems they have to meet.

To determine the effect of these programs seems an urgent, but by no means easy task of contemporary social research. One would

have to study their content very carefully. One would have to know which women listen and which women do not listen. Most of all, one would have to check periodically, with a great variety of listeners, to see whether there are any changes in their way of thinking and living which could be traced to the programs.

The present study has tried to prepare the way for such a larger enterprise by reporting on interviews with a number of women who listen regularly and were asked about what these programs mean to them, why they listen, and what they do with what they hear. It is intended to give a picture of these women's reactions and to develop a conceptual framework which would be helpful for future, more elaborate analysis.

The Material.

The report is based on personal interviews obtained within the last two years with 100 women living in Greater New York. An effort was made to cover women in various age and income groups. Most of the persons interviewed were housewives, some had worked previous to their marriage, others had not. Among them were also a few high school students and a number of maids. All the women interviewed listened to at least two daytime serials regularly,[1] the number actually listened to varying from two to 22 programs daily. Thus, the study must be considered an analysis of fan listeners.

The first twenty interviews were made as "open" interviews to cover the ground thoroughly. From these discussions a questionnaire was developed which, in its final form, was used for the second half of the sample. The questionnaire covered the listening habits of the respondents, a detailed discussion of the favorite programs of each, a number of questions trying to get at the general appeal of the programs, and finally, some information about the listeners themselves, such as their reading habits, social activities, hobbies or special interests, favorite movies, and the things they wanted most in life. The questionnaire is attached in the Appendix.

"Getting into trouble and out again."

The listeners' reports on the content of their favorite stories boils down almost invariably to one stereotyped formula. Contents of various programs are described as "getting into trouble and out again." Following are a few answers given by the people studied when they were asked to describe their favorite story.

[1]Sixty-five different programs were mentioned as listened to. The programs most frequently referred to were: Road of Life, Woman in White, Life Can Be Beautiful, and The Goldbergs.

I like DAVID HARUM. It is about a town philosopher who solves everyone's problems, even his enemies'. He is also in the races. Right now his horse has been poisoned and someone stole the body. They are trying to figure out why. *He always is in trouble and out again.*

My favorite is SOCIETY GIRL. The story is about a young man who marries the boss's daughter. The boss buys them a beautiful estate on Long Island. They are *going to have some kind of trouble* about the old graveyard and a tombstone which has been tampered with. They *will find a way out,* though.

I like the O'NEILLS. It is about a widowed mother and her children and grandchildren. The twins offer many problems. The son gets into riots, and the daughter may go to Chicago. But Ma O'Neill will *settle everything,* and *something else will come up.*

The average number of daytime serials listened to regularly by the women in this study is 6.6 programs. Very few of the listeners said "yes" to the question whether they were only listening "because there was nothing else on at this particular time of the day." When asked whether they selected the programs to fit their daily work-schedule or whether they adjusted their schedule to fit the programs, 31 per cent said the latter. Three-fourths of the listeners claimed they had never been "bored" with their favorite story, while 57 per cent could not mention any incident in the stories listened to which they had disliked in any way.

These data indicate an intensive and obviously quite satisfactory consumption of radio stories. How does this tie in with the fact that the "getting into trouble and out again" formula is applied to all the sketches? Why is it that people do not get tired of stories with the same theme?

Programs Picked to Match the Listener's Problems.

The listeners studied do not experience the sketches as fictitious or imaginary. They take them as reality and listen to them in terms of their own personal problems. Listeners to the same sketch agree about its "trouble" content, but find it realized in quite different ways. The following comments were made by women who listened to the same program, namely, ROAD OF LIFE.

It is concerning a doctor, his life and how he always tries to do the right thing. Sometimes he gets left out in the cold too.

Dr. Brent is a wonderful man, taking such good care of a poor little orphan boy. He is doing God's work.

It is a drama, Jim Brent and Dr. Parsons—jealousy, you know. There are several characters, but Jim Brent is the important one. He will win out in the end.

It is about a young doctor in Chicago. I like to hear how he cures sick people. It makes me wonder whether he could cure me too.

All of these listeners look for the "troubles" in the story and how they are solved, but each interprets the "trouble" situation according to her own problems. Thus, for example, a sick listener stresses the sick people cured by the doctor in the story. The young high school girl, who wishes she knew interesting people like Dr. Brent, picks the jealousy aspect of the story and the way Dr. Brent stands up to it. The woman over forty, with the memory of a sad childhood, insists that Dr. Brent "is doing God's work." And the mother sacrificing herself for an unappreciative family feels a common bond in the fact that "sometimes he (Dr. Brent) is left out in the cold too."

Each of these women also listens to a number of other programs. In picking the programs she likes, she selects those presenting problems which are to her mind most intimately related to her own. Sometimes all the stories listened to have the same central theme to the listener. Thus the woman quoted above, who likes Dr. Brent because of his kindness to the orphan boy, listens to four other programs which have a "kind adult" for one of their leading characters. Her comment on RIGHT TO HAPPINESS is: "The mother is a fine woman. She gave her life up for her child." Of HILLTOP HOUSE she says: "The woman there is not getting married because she has to take care of the orphanage." She also listens to MYRT AND MARGE and THE O'NEILLS, which she describes in similar terms as having a "kind mother" as the leading character.

Similarly, the young high school girl who would like to know a person like Dr. Brent listens, in addition to ROAD OF LIFE, to two more programs, which she describes as "love stories." They are OUR GAL SUNDAY and HELEN TRENT.

Sometimes the listeners go through quite a complicated process of shifting and exchanging incidents and characters in their favorite stories to suit their own particular needs. This behavior was brought out clearly in the case of a middle aged quite balanced woman whose chief interest in life is her family. She listens to only two radio programs because she claims she has "no time for more." Listening for her has the function of keeping alive the contact with the various members of her family when the real members are at work or in school. Her favorite story is PEPPER YOUNG'S FAMILY. She is interested in it because "the son there acts against his father just the way our son does." But she doesn't care for the mother in this sketch because "she is too submissive"; so she turns to a second program, THE WOMAN IN WHITE, for there "the woman is boss."

By scrambling the mother in the one sketch with the father and son in the other she establishes a family situation which she considers most "similar" to her own. To use her own words, the programs "help keep her company" when she is at home alone.

The more complex the listener's troubles are or the less able she is to cope with them, the more programs she seems to listen to. Thus we find on the one hand the woman quoted above who listens to only two programs because she has "no time" for more—that is, probably "no need" for more. On the other hand is the extreme case of a colored maid in a home with no fewer than five radios in it, who listens to twenty-two stories daily. To this person of very little education, with no friends or relatives and few opportunities for a normal life, the radio stories are practically everything. "Sunday," she said, "is a very bad day for me. I don't know what to do with myself. During the week I have the stories." When asked how long, in her opinion, a story should last, misunderstanding the reason for the question she said anxiously, "They're not going to stop them, are they? I'd be lost without them!"

Having no life apart from the stories, this listener wants to listen to as many of them and as long as she possibly can. Since all the stories have the common theme of getting into trouble and out again, it is possible for the listener to combine aspects of various stories into a sort of patchwork of "reality" which best fits her particular needs.

Three Main Types of Gratification.

Basically the various stories mean the same thing to all the listeners. They appeal to their insecurity and provide them in one way or another with remedies of a substitute character. This occurs in, roughly, three types of reactions, which are differentiated as modes of experience but not in terms of their function.

1. Listening to the stories offers an emotional release.
2. Listening to the stories allows for a wishful remodelling of the listener's "drudgery."
3. Listening provides an ideology and recipes for adjustment.

Some of the listeners enjoy the stories primarily as a means of letting themselves go emotionally. Others enjoy them because they provide the opportunity to fill their lives with happenings which they would like to experience for themselves. Still others enjoy them in a more realistic way because they furnish them with formulas to bear the kind of life they are living.

Following is a detailed description of how these various types of gratification come about.[2]

I. LISTENING AS AN EMOTIONAL RELEASE.

Many of the listeners become emotionally excited when listening to the stories. When asked whether they had ever been "very excited" about a story, 50 per cent of them said yes. A number also claimed they could not work while listening. Said one of them: "I can't even do my crocheting when I am listening. I just have to sit still, they get me so excited." The claims of excitement aroused by listening were corroborated by actual observations of some of the respondents while they listened to a story. Such observations were made in a casual and thus quite reliable manner. If for instance a woman complained that the interview interfered with her favorite story, the interviewer politely offered to listen with her and postponed the interview until afterward. In this way it was actually observed how excited some of the listeners became, how they were talking back to the radio, warning the heroes, and so on.

Listening to the stories provides for emotional release in various forms. It provides an outlet for the pent-up anxieties in giving the listener a "chance to cry." It provides, secondly, emotional stimuli and excitement to a listener who is temperamentally unable to have such emotional experiences otherwise or who lives a kind of life which just does not provide such stimuli. Third, it gives the listener a chance to compensate for her own hardships through aggressiveness against other people. Sometimes such tendencies of aggressiveness are satisfied within the stories themselves by giving the listener the opportunity to enjoy "other people's troubles." Sometimes the stories serve as a means to feel vastly superior to people in the actual environment of the listener. Building a "union of sufferers" with the characters of the story, the listener becomes contemptuous and aggressive against members of the world actually surrounding her.

A Chance to Cry.

Several of the respondents like the sketches because they give them a chance to let themselves go and to release the anxiety stored up in them. This is what the crippled listener already quoted said:

> In a case like mine you can go crazy just sitting and thinking, thinking. Sometimes the stories get me and I cry. I think I am a fool, but it makes me feel better.

[2]The material was not sufficiently large to study the important problem of the correlation of listener characteristics and type of gratification obtained from listening.

Another case is that of a newly married young woman. She used to work before she was married; now she has to live with her in-laws and is quite upset over the narrowness of her new life. She turned to the radio stories orginally in order to have something to talk about with her mother-in-law. She said:

> There is no one program I like particularly well. They all tug at the heart-strings, they are so sad. I am very nervous sometimes, but my troubles are such stupid ones. I love to listen to the programs; I can cry with them.

The sketches, in their *specific* sad content, serve as an outlet for the *unspecific* anxiety of this listener. They give her a chance to cry, which is gratifying for two reasons. First, many adults would deny themselves the "right" to cry over themselves. Having outgrown the status of the child who could come and cry on its mother's lap, they have lost the comfort of an emotional release in spite of the increase in problems demanding such release. In the second place, the stories allow for crying without the listener's having to reveal the real reasons for her wanting to cry.

In other instances the programs are enjoyed not as an outlet but as a stimulus for an emotional excitement which the listener misses in actual life.

"Surprise, happy or sad."

The above is the comment of a woman who says she has always enjoyed life. She mentions nothing that she would like to have. She feels that the troubles in radio stories are about the same as her own. "But," as she says, "they can make more of it. They can put them on a big scale." She herself is middle aged, excessively fat, placid, and barely able to read or write. Anything that moves her is "fine." She wants the stories to "go on forever." She likes HELEN TRENT because:

> She has hundreds of experiences with her designing, and all. There is always a surprise coming up. Happy or sad, I love it.

When asked whether she would prefer to have her favorite story happen to her in actual life she answered with a decided no. "I am too old," she said. "When you get older you give all that (romance) up."

Similarly, the young woman quoted before, who finds relief in crying over the stories, says she would rather lead a "peaceful life" than have the actual experiences as told in the stories. The listeners

prefer the release of being moved to the moving experience itself. They accept the stories as a substitute for reality, just as they identify themselves with the content of the stories and take, as will be seen, the success of the heroine as a substitute for their own success.

The stories make for a short-lived pseudo-catharsis. The laughing or crying produced by them makes the listeners feel better only as long as the story lasts. They keep asking for new "surprises" and new "chances to cry," in the realization that their actual lives will not give them the emotional experiences they crave. "I am too old for romance," says one woman. "My life would make a stupid story," says another. Thus the question might be raised of whether the temporary emotional release obtained from listening to other people's troubles will not, in the long run, have to be paid for by an intensified sense of frustration and by the listener's having been rendered still more incapable of realizing emotional experiences outside the stories.

"If I'm blue it makes me feel better . . ."

A number of the listeners said they felt a sense of relief in knowing that "other people had their troubles too." In a few cases this relief is tied up with the fact that in finding out about other people's troubles the listener loses the sense of having been singled out for trouble herself. In a few others it seems related to the stories' helpfulness in focussing a general sense of frustration upon events or things which "happen." If one knows what is wrong, and if this happens to be a particular "event," rather than the structure of the society one lives in, it makes for a release of anxiety. Most frequently, however, the listeners enjoy the troubles of other people as a means to compensate for their own misery through aggressiveness against others. The stories provide the listeners with subjects to be aggressive against.

Some of the respondents find a particular relief in listening to the troubles of other people who are supposedly "smarter" than they are. In the words of one of them:

> If I am gloomy it makes me feel better to know that other people have hardships too. They are so smart and still they have to suffer.

The listeners also enjoy the stories as an oulet for feelings of aggressiveness which they would not allow themselves otherwise. An example is the reaction of a listener describing herself as a "religous" woman. She reads no other book but the Bible and dislikes the movies because they are not "clean." She approves, how-

ever, of the radio stories because the people in them "are so brave about their own troubles and in helping other people. They teach you to be good." Although she claims she listens to "learn to be still more helpful," the episode she liked best was one which dealt with a catastrophe suffered by the heroine:

> I liked it best when they were so happy before the husband got murdered and so sad afterwards.

The interest in other people's misfortunes was also brought out in the answers to the question whether and about which incidents the respondents had ever been very much excited. Forty-one per cent of those who answered in the affirmative referred to murders, violent accidents, gangsters, and fires; 15 per cent more mentioned illness and dying; 26 per cent spoke of psychological conflicts, while only 18 per cent named incidents of a non-violent or non-catastrophic kind. The aggressive meaning of these answers was exemplified rather strikingly in the following comment of a listener who explained why she never had been really excited.. Referring to WOMAN IN WHITE she said:

> I thought the murder *would* be exciting. But it was not. It happened abroad somewhere.

How closely the aggressiveness against the radio characters is tied up with the listener's desire to find compensation for her own troubles is demonstrated in the following remark of a listener. She has had a hard time bringing up her children after her husband's death. She chooses programs which have as their heroine a self-sacrificing woman. Her comment about one of them is:

> I like HILLTOP HOUSE. The woman there is always doing things for children. . . . I wonder whether she will ever get married. Perhaps it isn't right for her to do it and give up the orphanage. She is doing such a wonderful thing. I really don't think she should get married.

This listener compensates for her resented fate by wishing a slightly worse one upon her favorite radio character. In return for the death of her own husband she wants the heroine to have no husband at all. She expects her to sacrifice herself for orphan children, whereas she herself is sacrificing herself for her own.

In the examples given so far the listeners found scapegoats for aggressiveness within the stories themselves. In the cases which will be reported below the stories serve as a means to bolster up tendencies of aggressiveness which are directed against people in the listeners' actual environment.

The Union of Sufferers.

Some of the listeners use the stories to magnify their own "suffering." In identifying their sacrifices with those in the stories they find a means to label and to enhance their own. When one of the respondents was asked the routine question about whether she was married and whether she had any children, she gave the following information. She was a widow and she had been living with her only son. Recently, however, she had moved away from her son's apartment so as "not to be in his way." She was induced to make this sacrifice by her favorite story, STELLA DALLAS. Her comment on the heroine which was made at some other point of the interview, was:

> She is like me. She also does not want to be in her daughter's way . . . How does she look? Well, she is a regular person, one in a thousand, always doing the right thing. She is getting tired and haggard. She has just spent herself.

It is possible that this listener did move away from her son's apartment to be like "Stella Dallas." We do not know how voluntary this act of hers was or how much it was appreciated. In any case, her identification with the radio heroine who has "spent herself" gives the listener a chance to make the most of her own act of tolerance and self-sacrifice.

Such identified tolerance sometimes gives the listener a feeling of superiority. She feels different from other people. Admiring the radio characters excessively, she imagines she is like them. While rising to new heights of "tolerance" in this identification, she becomes at the same time contemptuous and critical of the world around her. An example of this may be found in the following two remarks by a woman who listens to the programs because the people in them are so "wonderful":

> They teach you how to be good. I have gone through a lot of suffering, but I still can learn from them.

Yet this same woman, when asked whether she disliked any program, answered:

> I don't listen to THE GOLDBERGS. Why waste electricity on the Jews?

Obviously her "tolerance" wasn't wide enough to include the Jews. It seems rather a means to feel superior to them.

An example of the manner in which the stories are used as an excuse for being critical of people in the listener's actual environ-

ment is the case of a woman living in the neighborhood known as Greenwich Village. She "loathes it." When asked what she wanted most in life she said: "A home in the country, just for me and my family, with a *white fence* around it."

She admires the programs because they portray the "clean American life," as contrasted to the hated "Village." Admiration for the radio people is for her a means to exaggerate her contempt against the world surrounding her while at the same time providing for a fence against it.

II. LISTENING AS A MEANS OF REMODELLING ONE'S DRUDGERY.

In the various forms of gratification characterized as "emotional release," listening makes for the stimulation or the release of emotions which the listener would not be able to feel or allow herself to enjoy otherwise. The story content is only indirectly important insofar as it provides a sufficiently strong emotional appeal.

In the cases to be described now the connection between the radio stories and the listener's situation is of a much more comprehensive character. Emphasis is on the specific content of the story rather than on its emotional appeal. The listener pretends that what is happening in the stories is happening to her. She not only feels *with* the radio characters, like the person who gets emotional release from listening; she *is* the characters. Accepting the story content as a substitute for reality, she uses it to remodel her life. In this type of experience the distinction between "story" reality and actual reality is destroyed by wishful thinking.

Drowning One's Troubles.

In the most radical form of identification the listener escapes into the story quite consciously. She makes use of the stories to superimpose upon her life another, more desirable life. Listening works as a potent drug making her forget her own troubles while listening to those described in the stories. One of these listeners said:

> I can hardly wait from Friday till Monday, when the stories come on again. They make me forget my own troubles. I have only money problems. They don't. Their troubles are more complicated, but also more exciting. Also, they can solve them. For instance, they just hop into a plane when they want to go to Washington. Money doesn't seem to matter to them. In the stories there is real romance. I love to hear about romance. I keep waiting for David to propose.

The stories are as real to the listener as an actual experience. She experiences the romance of MARY MARLIN as if it were her own.

A romance experienced by means of the story is a satisfactory substitute for a real life experience, because of two conditions which do not exist in reality. For one, happenings in the stories are to a large extent determined by the listener's desires. If she wants a romance she selects a program which gives it to her. Within the story, the listener still has a choice in terms of "how it ought to be." If MARY MARLIN in the story does not get enough romance the listener may still feel:

> *I* would have made David propose months ago. They don't have to make him the perfect bachelor. I would have made him slip.

If the listener feels the story is not going to develop at all the way she wants it to, she may even discontinue listening and look for another story. Such discontinuation of listening to a program which had been listened to regularly before was reported by 63 per cent. In two-thirds of the cases the reasons were external, such as the program having gone off the air. In one-third the program was no longer listened to because of the listeners' disapproval. The most frequent reasons were that it was "too improbable," or "too monotonous." Both these objections in most cases meant merely that the program was not developing fast enough or not in the direction the listener hoped it would. This is brought out quite clearly in the comment of a listener who stopped listening to HELEN TRENT:

> I stopped listening when Helen Trent went to Hollywood. It was so improbable. I have been in Hollywood myself. It is an awful place. Wives lose their husbands there. Why did she not go to some nice, safe place? There are a lot of them in this country.

The program was considered "improbable" because its expected course threatened to interfere with the listener's desire to hear about "nice," that is, "safe" places and relationships.

Secondly, listening provides the chance to live "exciting lives" while one "relaxes" and "smokes a cigarette." As mentioned already, hardly any of the listeners would prefer to have the incidents of the stories actually happen to them instead of hearing them over the radio. They enjoy a condition in which they may lose themselves in an excitement related to borrowed rather than to their own experiences.

Examples of complete escape into the stories, such as the one quoted above, were not frequent among the women studied. This is probably due to the character of the stories. They supposedly portray everyday life and contain at least so many allusions to it that they do not allow very easily for a complete forgetting of the

listeners' own drudgery. For the most part the listeners studied select certain aspects of the stories to fit into their lives in such a way as to make them more interesting or more agreeable. Such glorification of the listeners' own life goes all the way from finding fulfillment of desires which are not fully satisfied in life to finding compensation for personal failure in borrowing the story-character's success.

Cultivating the "Happy" Aspects.

Some of the respondents use the radio programs to get more of the kind of experiences which they claim to enjoy in real life. An example is the case of a young married woman who likes to listen to "some other happy marriages." She says:

> I just love to listen to those programs. Dr. Brent is like a second husband. After all, I can get married only once. I would love to have some more husbands.

We cannot tell from our data whether the listener is as happily married as she claims to be. The Dr. Brent in the story is not an admitted substitute for her real husband. Very likely, however, the desires for her marriage are greater than their fulfillment and listening to Dr. Brent as a "second husband" is used to make up for it.

Similarly, another "happily married" woman says: "I like to snatch romance wherever I can get more of it."

In both instances there is the desire to use the stories as a means of duplicating what one already has. The added quantity provides a substitute for an intensity of experience which is probably lacking in real life.

Filling in the Gaps.

Still others use the programs to inject into their lives elements which they admittedly miss in actual life. Here belongs the woman married to a sick husband whom she loves very much. Her favorite program is VIC AND SADE and she especially likes the "funny episodes" in it. She says:

> Since my husband got sick we haven't had much fun. I love to listen to VIC AND SADE. They are like us. Vic looks like my husband. Many funny things happen to them. I always tell my husband about them.

The episode she liked best was the one in which Sade mixed up her shoes at a friend's party and came home with one shoe that was

hers and one that was not. This listener probably feels tied down in a marriage which, at the moment, seems to be based primarily on loyalty. Telling her husband about the funny episodes happening to the couple in the story serves as a substitute for their actual occurrence.

One of the gratifications of this type most interesting from a sociological point of view is tied up with stories of doctors as the leading characters. Listening to such stories is a source of extreme gratification not only for the old spinster or the widow:

> Dr. Brent is such a lovely man. He takes care of physical and spiritual problems of all the people who come to him. He reminds me a little bit of my own doctor, but I think Dr. Brent is a younger and more lovable man.

> My husband died and my brother had a stroke. I really don't have anybody to talk to, and I would have needed advice in the tragedy which happened to my daughter. Dr. Brent is such a fine man. It helps me to listen to him. I really have him right in my room.

The kind and efficient Dr. Brent is enjoyed also by the woman who said, at one point in the interview: "At home *I* am the boss," indicating that she does not consider her husband qualified to be. Dr. Brent is loved, too, by the girl who wishes she knew "another person like him." Women in all phases of life seem to have a frequently unfulfilled need for the kind and able male who is protector rather than economic provider or competitor. The doctor of the story fits into this gap. He acquires a kind of father-role for the listener.[3]

Reviving Things Past.

Some listeners use the stories to revive things that are past and gone. The associations provided by the stories serve to carry them back to other, more pleasant times. Thus a woman, who was brought up in a small town and feels homesick for it, finds in DAVID HARUM a chance to get back to the small-town life she once knew. Says this listener:

> I like to listen to DAVID HARUM and his homely philosophy. It is about a small town. I was brought up in one too, and I loved it.

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[3]Whether the importance of the doctor as a father substitute is fostered by the story contents or due to a particular attitude among the listeners cannot be decided without a careful content analysis. Such an analysis is at present under way at the Office of Radio Research at Columbia University. Be it either way, the stress on doctors as psychological consultants might indicate a declining importance of the minister as the helper in spiritual matters. It seems as if, for many people, health has become a substitute for salvation.

Another woman likes OUR GAL SUNDAY because she herself grew up in a mining town. Listening to the story reminds her of "home." She says:

> OUR GAL SUNDAY is about a poor girl found on a doorstep. She is raised by two men in a mining town, and when she grows up she marries a lord. The part about the mining town reminds me of my own life, for I was brought up in one too. I am so far away and there's nobody here to remind me of it otherwise.

Sometimes it is persons, and not situations, that are remembered, as in the case of a listener who said, referring to THE GOLDBERGS:

> Ma Goldberg reminds me of a woman I used to know as a kid. She lived right next door. She was always finding excuses when we didn't behave well. She was always saying good things.

Thirty-nine per cent of the listeners stated they had known "similar" people, while 27 per cent said they had come across "similar" situations to those described in some of the stories. The difference between the two figures must first be proven in a larger sample before an interpretation ought to be ventured. Even in the small sample tested, both figures were significantly higher than the number of cases whose primary source of gratification was related to the familiarity with the persons or situations depicted in the program. Associations with the past account for the primary enjoyment of a program only if the memories evoked are a highly suitable substitute for a less desirable present. This is illustrated in the following comment of a respondent:

> I like to listen to HELEN TRENT. Her romance sounds like mine. My husband was always so lovable and affectionate. He never squabbled. We were very happy, and still are. This story brings back my romance after nineteen years.

This woman was probably not aware that in telling her story she invariably used the past tense. Her "we are still happy" exemplifies exactly the kind of gratification she gets from listening. There is probably more "squabbling" now between herself and her husband. She enjoys HELEN TRENT as the chance to relive her own early love experiences by pretending that what was true nineteen years ago is still true today.

For the listener it seems more important that the story evokes a memory which allows for wishful thinking than that the similarity between story situation and remembered situation is a complete one. If the listener would like very much that what happens in the story would actually happen to her, she is likely to construct "similarities"

in an artificial manner. This is exemplified in the comment of a 55 year old woman who also listens to the romance of HELEN TRENT because it reminds her of experiences of her youth. When she was asked whether she had ever used any product of a sponsoring company, she said:

> I use the face cream advertised by HELEN TRENT because she is using it and she is over 35 years herself and still has all those romances.

This listener does not seem quite convinced about the applicability of the story. By using the beautifying cream that her heroine uses she adds supporting evidence to the rather weak and wishful analogy between herself and Helen Trent. The product, particularly if tied up with the story in such an intricate manner, is the link between the world of story happenings and reality. Through the real face cream the fictitious happenings of the stories are brought within the realm of possible occurrences.[4]

Compensating for Failure through Identification with Success.

A great number of the women use the stories to compensate for specific personal failures. They enjoy listening to the success the radio heroine is having in the field where they themselves have failed. When one of the women was asked what she wanted most in life she said, "A happy marriage." She also said that she didn't like to have company because her husband might be "rude" to them. This woman picks as her favorites stories in which "a woman puts things over." Her comment is interesting:

> I like EASY ACES. There is a dumb woman and she puts things over. I also like HILLTOP HOUSE. The woman in it is always doing things. She has no time to marry.

This listener's comment on HILLTOP HOUSE is very different from the comments of other listeners to the same program. Instead of stressing the self-sacrificing and "doing good" elements she interprets the story in terms of her own difficulties and failures. According to her, the heroine "has no time to marry," and she sees in her the "independent" rather than the "good" woman.

Still another of the listeners seems to have been a failure in her family relations. Her daughter has run away from home to marry,

[4] The kind of advertising in which the product is built into the events of the story in such a manner that it seemingly accounts for some of the "nice" things in the stories is probably more efficient than a promotion of the product which is independent of the story. The respondents occasionally stressed that they disliked such advertising because it "takes time away from the story."

and of her husband she says, "He is away from home five nights of the week." She picks programs like THE GOLDBERGS or THE O'NEILLS, each portraying a successful mother or wife. She says:

> I like the O'NEILLS. It stresses harmony and yet it portrays the individuality of family members.

At the same time she is quite critical of Ma O'Neill and says:

> No woman can be that divine and keep her ideals that long.

And of Ma Goldberg she says:

> I have no such hysteria and excitement as Ma Goldberg has. I would never butt into other people's lives as she does.

Why does she go on listening if she disapproves of the leading characters? Obviously she would not be able to bear the thought that other women are so much more successful than she if she could not find any fault with them. She has to tell herself that the stories are not quite true to life or that MA GOLDBERG is not a pleasant personality type if she wants to enjoy listening to them. Her superficial criticism of the stories is the condition for her being able to use them as fully as substitutes as she actually does.

Betting on Outcomes as a Means of Feeling Superior.

A few of the better educated among the respondents disclaimed any personal interest in the stories and said they listened only for entertainment. They were interested in seeing "how problems are treated" or "how things come out." One of them said:

> I used to go to work previously. This always gave me a lift. I have nothing to keep me busy now. I listen to the programs for no personal reasons. I want to see how problems are treated. I'm usually right in my predictions.

These listeners do not have a "personal" interest in the stories in the sense that they want to identify with, or escape into, the content of the stories. They use the stories chiefly as a means to demonstrate to themselves or some of their co-listeners that they were right in predicting the outcome.[5] If things do not turn out as they predicted, they can always claim that the stories aren't true to life. In passing judgment on script writers and actors they consider themselves

[5] A similar reaction was also found among listeners to the Professor Quiz program. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, *Radio and the Printed Page*, page 87. There it took the form of the listeners' selecting the potential winner from among all the contestants right after the beginning of the program and following it through like a race.

superior to those who "take such stories seriously." They feel on a level with powerful people who are controlling things rather than being controlled.

The feeling of superiority connected with such a "detached" appraisal of the stories is illustrated in the following comment:

> I like SCATTERGOOD BAINES. It is a New England situation. He is one of Clarence Budington Kelland's best characters. He has possibility and flexibility . . . I bet with my daughter on the endings. It all fits into my interest in social work. Of course, I would never take anything seriously in them, but I suppose some people do.

The stories provide this listener with substitutes just as they do the more naive listener. Betting on the outcome is a chance to be right. Thus it works as compensation for the listener's lack of success in other fields. Judging the characters of the script writer seems to be a substitute for being a real friend of his or of other "interesting" people.

III. LISTENING FOR RECIPES MAKING FOR ADJUSTMENT.

In the types of gratification described as "remodelling of drudgery" the story content serves as a means wishfully to change the listener's life. Many listeners, however, do not identify themselves with the stories to the extent of accepting them as substitutes for reality. They identify themselves with them only insofar as they provide adjustment to the kind of life they are living. The stories provide such adjustment in three main forms. They give meaning to a world which seems nothing but a humdrum existence by offering a continuous sequence of events. Second, they give the listener a sense that the world is not as threatening as it might seem by supplying them with formulas of behaviour for various troublesome situations. Third, they explain things by providing labels for them. Happenings in a marriage, in a family, in a community are verbalized in the programs and the listeners are made to feel that they understand better what is going on around them. Listening provides them with an ideology to be applied in the appraisal of the world which is actually confronting them.

The following analysis aims to show in greater detail how each of these "recipes for adjustment" comes about and with what elements in the stories they tie up particularly.

"I don't feel empty any longer."

A number of respondents claimed that the stories had filled their "empty lives" with content. The mere fact that something is

scheduled to occur every day provides an element of adventure[6] in their daily drudgery. Life becomes meaningful as a sequence of daily fifteen minute broadcasts.

> . . . the stories have really given me something. I don't feel empty any longer.

> Nothing ever happens in my life, but I have the sketches. It is something to look forward to every day.

But for the sketches, this listener feels she would have nothing to look forward to from one day to the next. The stories make for adjustment to an otherwise empty and meaningless life because of their continued character.

When asked how long a radio story should last, only 12 per cent of the respondents placed a limit in terms of months. The rest wanted them to last at least a year or longer. Some suggested that a story should go on "as long as it was interesting," or "forever." Here are some comments on this aspect:

> I want the story to go on for years so that my family can grow up right along with it.

> They should go on as long as they are interesting. One gets to know the people and they are like one of the family. I would hate to lose them.

The listeners do not want to lose the story-family which is the model for their actual family. They do not want to lose the story characters they have grown to consider as belonging to their family. They want the stories to go on because they hate to lose the sense of an eventful life they built up listening to them. This is true even for the women who wanted a limit put on the length of the stories. Their objections are not directed against "serial" stories as such; they want a limited length only to avoid "dragging." Thus:

> If they keep them too long they have to drag them. They should get things settled once in a while so they can get a fresh start.

By "dragging," the listeners mean too much talking, as interfering with the progress of the action. They dislike it because it spoils the illusion of a life full of happenings. Here is a typical comment of a woman who was "bored" by too much talking:

> Last time I listened to BIG SISTER they wanted to get somebody to help this boy who has a tumor. They wanted to get a specialist. It wasn't so interesting. The two of them (Ruth and John) just sat and

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[6]In a way the radio stories have taken up the old epic form which describes life as a series of adventures. This form is also still alive in the "funnies."

> talked. They didn't do anything. I thought the boy might die in the meantime. Why didn't they get going?

The listener disliked the lengthy discussion between Ruth and John because she feared "the boy might die in the meantime." This would have put a sudden end to his part in the story and thus destroyed the sense of a continuously eventful life she had enjoyed in listening.

The desire to have things "go on" seems really a desire to have them continue in the expected way, along accepted patterns. In a culture which represses curiosity, first of all in the sexual sphere, people are made to cling to stereotyped solutions. The deeper the frustrations the greater the needs for such stereotypes.

An interesting corroboration of this hypothesis was found in correlating the desired length of the stories with the total number of stories listened to. Among the women listening to fewer than five programs a day, for each ten who gave any limitation for the stories or said they had no opinion, there were three who wanted the stories to go on "forever" or "as long as they were good." Among those who listened to five or more programs the number rose to seven.

If, in this connection, we take the number of programs listened to as an index of the listener's insecurity and needs, we can then say that the more troubles the listener has the longer she wants the stories to last. And it is probably no mere coincidence that the movie most frequently mentioned as best liked should be GONE WITH THE WIND, the longest of all the most recent pictures. As one woman put it, when asked how long a story should last:

> It should just go on like GONE WITH THE WIND. It can have no end.

"They teach me what to do."

Another form of listening which makes for adjustment of the listener to her own life is related to the advice obtained from hearing the various stories. Many of the respondents explained spontaneously that they liked listening because the stories taught them what to do or how to behave. Following are a few comments:

> I listen for what good it will do me. The end of the story in AUNT JENNY always settles problems and sometimes the way they settle them would help me if the same thing happened to me.

> If you listen to these programs and something turns up in your own life, you would know what to do about it.

> I like to listen to Ma Goldberg and see how she goes about fixing things. It gives me something to think about when I am sewing. She teaches me what to do.

The listeners feel prepared for the complexities of their own lives in the conviction that there are formulas of behavior ready for all situations and that they can acquire them from listening to the stories. This conviction is closely tied up with the assumption that the stories are "true stories." This is a claim made by some of the programs and accepted by the listeners.

> I like AUNT JENNIE'S STORIES because they are real everyday people that you might meet. They even tell you so—that they are real-life stories. I think they could happen.

The following incident shows that such a claim fits into the desires of the listeners who want the stories to be "true stories." A hypothetical question was posed: A new sponsor wants to introduce some changes in a program. Should he change the actors and leave the story the same, or would the respondent prefer to have him change the story but keep the same actors on the program?

A very great number of the women interviewed could not answer the question. They were unable to differentiate between the actor as a character and the actor as a person. The strength of the listeners' desire to believe that the stories are real is indicated even in the answer of a woman who supposedly understood the question and voted against a change in actors. She said:

> The Youngs, Mr. and Mrs., used to have these long talks in bed, and now when they do I can't stand it. She is in bed with another man, now that they have changed actors.

The "truth" of the stories is defined in those terms which are most comforting to the listener. This is illustrated in the following comment of a listener who explained why she preferred listening to the stories to going to the movies:

> I am not so crazy about the movies. The sketches are more real, more like my own life. The things that happen in the movies seldom happen to people that I know. I like to listen about plain, everyday people.

She considers the stories more "real" because they concern "average" people similar to herself so that she can identify herself with them. At the same time, however, she wants them to be sufficiently superior to herself to make the identification worth while. The characters in the stories have to be "plain" and at the same time exercise a "wonderful philosophy." The stories have to concern things which happen in "everyday life" while at the same time following the pattern of "getting into trouble *and out* again." In their demands upon the

story contents the listeners fluctuate between the two desires of wanting to learn from the stories and to use them as a means of escape. For learning's sake they want them to portray reality. As a means of escape they want them to picture a "better world." These two demands are not contradictory, as it seems at first. They have a common root in the insecurity of the listeners.

The Need for Advice.

The listeners would not seek advice in the stories if they did not need it and if the advice obtained did not, in a way, fit into their needs. A great number of the regular listeners to serial stories are lower income group housewives who see it as their duty to manage the home on what their husbands make. Many of them seem extremely insecure. This was brought out most strikingly in the answers to a question as to what three things they most wanted to have. In only 12% of the answers were such things as interesting friends, travel, sports, etc., important. All the rest wished for a secure home.

Advice, on the other hand, seems to be particularly inaccessible to the listeners studied. The husband shows up in the interviews as the economic provider rather than as a consultant in family affairs. Only one-fifth of the respondents mentioned that they see a great many friends. Various reasons are given for this. Seeing friends "costs money," which is not available. Seeing friends is an "effort," while listening to the stories is not. Friends have the same troubles as the listener, and since they cannot take care of their own, they wouldn't be of any help to the listener.

> Lots of people have problems like mine or the ones told in the stories, but they would not be able to explain them.

Finally, the listener does not ask advice from friends because she would be ashamed to admit that she needs it.

It is altogether different with the radio. The listeners feel they have a right to expect and accept help because they patronize the companies which sponsor the programs. Of the women interviewed, 61% said that they used some of the products of sponsoring companies. Said one of them:

> I am kidded by everybody because my pantry shelf is full of radio brands. The programs help me, so I've got to help the products.

In a way the radio seems to have taken the place of the neighbor. The neighbor as a competitor has become the stranger, while the radio in its aloofness is the thing humanly near to the listener. It

offers friends who are "wonderful and kind," and the listeners tend to forget that this kindness is designed to make them buy. They are enchanted by a one-sided relationship which fits into their isolationist desires. The radio people give advice and never ask for it, they provide help without the listeners having to reveal their need for it.

Last, but not least, the radio people and the occupations they portray are frequently socially superior to the listener. The listener enjoys their company because it raises her own social level. This was illustrated in the following comment of a lower income group housewife:

> If you have friends in, you have to go down to their level. They are sometimes so dumb. The radio people are more interesting. I love being with them.

For many a listener actual friends seem to have acquired a new function. They are the people with whom she talks over the programs. The study shows that 41 per cent of the listeners discuss the stories with their friends.[7] This discussion is of great psychological importance to the listener in that it allows for the transformation of the stories into something that is her own property. Thus, one of the respondents makes an out-of-town call every day to New Jersey to tell her girl friend about "her sketches." Very likely the girl friend in this case listens to the same stories. However, the respondent feels she discusses "her" stories with her. In a world which offers so few chances for real experiences, any happening must be made immediately into something owned. "Try to live today so tomorrow you can say what a wonderful yesterday," a sentiment expressed by a theme song, embodies the same desire to live so as to have memories.

"Potential" Advice.

The great majority of listeners spontaneously stated that they had learned something from listening to the stories. However, when asked whether any of the stories had ever indicated to them what to do in a particular situation or how to get along with people, only one-third said that they had. The reason for the drop lies in the listeners' preference for "potential" advice rather than a concrete application.

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[7]Only 14 per cent discussed them with their husbands. 10 per cent talk them over with their children. 37 per cent do not discuss them with anyone. The percentages refer to the number of respondents mentioning each category.

The listeners enjoy getting a kind of advice which allows for wishful thinking. We happened to interview one woman on the day that the heroine in her favorite story had come into a lot of money. She was concerned with how she might keep her children from throwing it away. The listener felt that there was no chance of ever getting so much money herself, but still felt that she had learned from the program. She said:

> It is a good idea to know and to be prepared for what I would do with so much money.

Although this listener knew the need for this advice would never come up, she enjoyed playing around with the idea. The advice works as a substitute for the condition of its applicability.

Similarly, a number of listeners claimed they enjoyed seeing how other people solved their troubles because it made them feel that "if the radio people can manage their troubles I might be able to also." In drawing the parallel they liked to overlook that the story situation might not be quite so complicated as their own, and that the story's heroine had more resources available than they had.

In line with this, the listeners are all in favor of a "beautiful philosophy" as long as they are not really expected to use it themselves. Thus, when asked why they liked the programs their answers were frequently like the following:

> I like David Harum. He lives in the country and is a philosopher. He settles the problems of all the people who come to him. He helps those who have not against those who have. There are still good people left in the world.

> I like THE GUIDING LIGHT. The minister there takes care of everybody who needs him. He keeps a light burning at night for people in distress to find him.

Listening to such kind people fills the respondents with the hope that a "guiding light" may burn for them also. That they are interested in the benefits of kindness rather than in its performance was brought out quite clearly in the answers to the question as to whether the listeners, at any point in their favorite story, would have acted differently from the characters in the story. They were split into two groups, those who talked about what "they would have done" and those who talked about what "the actors should have done." The former group disagreed on the ground of too much sacrifice in words like the following:

> I would not have forgiven my husband that often. One has a right to happiness.

The latter group disagreed on the ground of too little sacrifice and said, for instance:

> She went on the stage after her second marriage. The children did not like her new husband. She should not have done it. It was her fault they did not like him; she should have stayed at home.

The seriousness of the desire to learn paired with the desire for a comfortable solution is also demonstrated in the comments made in answer to the question whether the listeners knew of any problems they would like to have presented in a story. About one-third of the listeners answered in the affirmative. Here are a few quotations:

> When a man's disposition changes suddenly after being married for a long time. He starts gambling and to be unfaithful. What's the explanation?
>
> I should like to know how much a daughter should give her mother from the money she makes. I give everything I earn to my mother. Do I have to?
>
> Whether I should marry if I have to live with my mother-in-law.
>
> A story which would teach people not to put things over.
>
> About religious and racial differences.
>
> About mixed marriages.

The comments indicate a very great faith put in radio. People want the stories to solve their most specific and private problems. In the omission of controversial issues, the stories probably leave unsatisfied just those people who are the most eager searchers for means of adjustment. The comments also indicate that the listeners hope for a comforting solution. They would like to be told, for instance, that it is not necessary to give one's whole salary to the family. They would like a story which teaches "other people" not to put things over.

"They explain things to me."

Listening not only provides the respondents with formulas for behaviour in various situations, it also gives them sets of explanations with which they may appraise happenings. In following a story and hearing the characters discuss what occurs to them and how they feel about it, the listener feels she is made to "see things."

> I like Papa David in LIFE CAN BE BEAUTIFUL. He always uses very much psychology.
>
> I do not know much about life and I am sometimes scared seeing how things happen to people. It does me good to listen to these stories. They explain things to you.

> I like family stories best. If I get married I want to get an idea of how a wife should be to a husband. Some of the stories show how a wife butts into everybody's business, and the husband gets mad and they start quarrelling. The stories make you see things.

In listening to the stories the often inarticulate listener finds that feelings can be expressed. She is made aware of a meaning to things which goes beyond the mere surface appearance. She realizes the existence of causal relations between happenings. There is, however, the danger that such "understanding" is paired with the illusion of a simple and ready explanation being available for every situation and every happening. The listener quoted last, for instance, seems satisfied with labelling a "good marriage" as one where the wife "does not butt into everybody's business."

Thus the question of what the listeners do with the knowledge acquired from listening becomes of paramount importance.

The Application of the Stories.

As mentioned above, one-third of the listeners stated that the stories had helped them "in indicating what to do in a particular situation or how to get along with other people." Following are some of the comments which show how the "advice" obtained has actually been applied by the listeners.

> Listening to AUNT JENNIE'S STORIES today was very important for me. The fellow had an argument with the uncle and he blamed it on the girl. That was wrong of him. It was just like my boy friend. The other night I went to a wedding in the neighborhood where there were a lot of girl friends. Some of the boys told my boy friend. He has been mad at me ever since. Listening to the stories lets me know how other girls act, and listening to the way that girl argued today, I know how to tell my boy friend where he can get off. Life is so confusing sometimes.

> Bess Johnson shows you how to handle children. She handles all ages. Most mothers slap their children. She deprives them of something. That is better. I use what she does with my own children.

> When my lawsuit was on, it helped me to listen to Dr. Brent and how calm he was.

> When my boy did not come home till late one night from the movies and I was so worried it helped me to remember how they had been worried in the story and he came home safely.

> When Clifford's wife died in childbirth the advice Paul gave him I used for my nephew when his wife died.

The spheres of influence of the stories are quite diversified. The respondents feel they have been helped by being told how to get

along with other people, how to handle their boy friends or bring up their children. They feel they have learned how to express themselves in a particular situation. They have learned how to comfort themselves if worried.

In many cases these seem to be potential rather than fulfilled goals. The stories obviously released the worries of a mother by helping her pretend that everything will turn out all right and that her young son will come home safely; they have provided for an escape into calmness for a highly upset listener.

It is doubtful whether the girl's relationship to her boy friend is put on a sounder basis and a "confusing life" really understood when she has learned "how to tell her boy friend where he can get off." The woman who has learned to deprive her children rather than slap them seems to do the first thing in substitution for the other without understanding the underlying pedagogical doctrine. One might wonder how much the bereaved nephew appreciated the speech his aunt had borrowed from her favorite story.

Without a careful content analysis and a more elaborate study of the effects of listening upon the psychological make-up of the listeners it is impossible to give a final interpretation of the comments quoted above. It can not be decided from this material whether the stories are qualified to awaken or increase the psychological articulateness of the listener and have just been misunderstood or abused in some cases, or whether they themselves tend to foster a superficial orientation rather than true psychological understanding.

The analysis of gratifications, which was the problem of this study, has shown that the stories have become an integral part of the lives of many listeners. They are not only successful means of temporary emotional release or escape from a disliked reality. To many listeners they seem to have become a model of reality by which one is to be taught how to think and how to act. As such they must be written not only with an eye to their entertainment value, but also in the awareness of a great social responsibility.

Appendix.

Interviewer's Name:.................................Number of Interview:.................

Women's Daytime Serial Programs.

I. General Listening Habits

1. To which daytime serial programs do you listen fairly regularly? Since when? How did you start listening to each of them?
   Name of Program *Listened to since when* *How started*
2. How does listening to them fit into respondent's daily schedule?
   a. Generally speaking, which of the following is true for you:
      Programs are selected to fit into your daily work schedule...........
      Efforts are made to fit your work into the program schedule........
      Neither is entirely true...

   Details:

   b. *(Interviewer:* Find out on what station and at what time each of the programs listed under #1 is heard: then fill in.)
      Programs come one after the other, without interruption...........
      with interruption...........
      How many switches of stations are made during total listening period?...........
      If any switches of station: does respondent know about programs following? What is her opinion about them?
3. Do you listen to other daytime serial programs occasionally?
   Yes...........No...........
4. If you could listen to just one, or a limited number of the programs listed under #1, which would be your first choice? Second? Third? Fourth? Fifth?
   1................................ 2................................ 3................................
   4................................ 5................................
5. What is the content of the three best liked programs? *(Interviewer:* Get description of the three best liked programs by saying that you do not happen to know them.)
   1.................................:
   2.................................:
   3.................................:
6. Have you listened fairly regularly to any serials before to which you do not listen now? Yes...........No...........
   If Yes: Which programs? Why did you give up listening to them? *(Interviewer:* Differentiate between objective reasons, such as programs going off the air, and subjective ones, such as dislike or being bored. If the latter, find out why.)
   Programs no longer listened to *Reasons*

7. (Ask this question only if #6 was answered with "No," or "Yes, program went off the air.") Are there any programs which you dislike or would not be at all interested in listening to? Yes........... No...........
   If Yes: Which programs are they and why do you not care to listen to them?
8. Can you remember how long ago you first started listening to any daytime series? What first made you interested in them?

II. WHY LISTENING: GENERAL APPEAL

1. Various people listen to serials for various reasons. Which of the following points would you say are important to you? *(Interviewer:* Use free space on right hand side for respondent's comments.)
   a. To have company when nobody else is around
   b. To hear about somebody else's problems rather than your own for a while
   c. To keep informed about how your radio friends are making out
   d. Because you can count on something to happen every day
   e. Because the people in the stories are a nice sort of people with a philosophy you approve of
   f. Because you like to see how other people with problems similar to your own are making out
   g. Because you like to hear about romance and family life and other things which have happened to you or might happen to you
   h. Because it is a good way to find out what other people are concerned with
   i. Because there is nothing else you can get at this time of the day
   j. Because being at home a great deal of the day, you like to have your mind occupied.
2. Which do you like better: Listening to serials over the radio...........; Going to the movies...........; Why?
3. Which do you like better: Listening to serials over the radio...........; Reading a magazine...........; Why?
4. Which do you like better: Listening to serials over the radio...........; Being invited out or having company in...........; Why?
5. Which would you prefer: Having the stories told over the radio...........; Having the things told happen to you in real life...........; Why?

III. WHY LISTENING: APPEAL IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC EPISODES

A. FAVORITE PROGRAM

Ask the following in terms of the favorite program. Only when the question cannot be answered for the favorite program should it be asked for another serial. Be sure always to mention the name of the serial to which the answer refers.

1. Can you describe any events in your favorite story which you liked particularly? Yes...........No...........Details.
2. Can you describe any events for which you did not care at all?
3. Have you ever been bored at any point? Yes...........No...........
   If Yes: When?
4. Do you find it hard to visualize the actors? Yes...........No...........
   How do you picture them?
   a. Does any of them remind you of a person you know? Yes...........
      No...........*If Yes:* Get details.
   b. *If No:* Does any actor in any other story remind you of somebody you know? Yes...........No...........
      If Yes to 4b, get details.
5. If there was a change in your favorite program, which of the following would you mind less:

   If the story remained the same but the actors changed................
   If the story changed but the actors remained...........
   Why?
6. How do you think your favorite story is going to continue? (In the next week? Later on?)
7. What product do they advertise?..
   Do you use it? Not at all...........; Use since started listening...........;
   Used before already...........
   a. Do you use the products of other stories you listen to?...........
      All...........; Some...........; None...........

B. ANY SERIAL PROGRAM

8. In this or any other program, was there ever a situation where you would have acted differently from how it happened in the story? Yes...........No...........Explain.
9. Can you mention a story or episode which meant a great deal to you in indicating what to do in a particular situation or how to get along with people? Yes...........No...........Details.
10. Did you ever come across a problem or a situation in any of the stories which had occurred to somebody you know, or to yourself? Yes...........No...........Details.
11. Do you remember ever having gotten quite excited about a story? Yes...........No...........*If Yes:* When, and which story?

IV. GENERAL APPRAISAL

1. As a rule, which of the following is more true: The various stories are quite similar...........; rather different from each other...........
   Explain:
2. Which of the following is true, as a rule: The people in the various stories have about the same amount of troubles as you have...........; more troubles...........; less troubles........... Explain:
3. How do you like the episodes to end: Happily...........; sad...........; mixed........... Explain:

4. What do you prefer: Stories with problems similar to your own ....; stories with problems quite different from your own...........? Explain:
5. Is there any particular problem you would want to have treated in a story? Which?
6. Do you have any definite opinion about how many months or years a serial story should last?
7. Would you like a new station to bring out one complete half-hour story every day? Yes...........No...........Explain:
8. Do you talk about the stories with your friends...........; your husband...........; your children...........; nobody...........?

V. Description of Respondent

Address.. Age........... Education....................

Single...........Married...........If married: Number and age range of children.................................

Occupation: (Own or husband's if she is a housewife)...........................

Phone: Yes...........No...........Car: Yes...........No...........Description of type of place she lives in..

Last book read...When finished..........................

Magazines read..

Does she read serial stories there? Yes...........No...........

Newspapers read fairly regularly...

....

Attends meetings of any clubs or organizations...

....

Do friends visit her: During the day: A great deal...........Sometimes ....Rarely...........

Evenings: A great deal...........Sometimes...........Rarely...........

Any hobbies or special interests?..

....

What radio programs liked best?...

....

Three movies liked very well...

....

What are the three things she would be most interested to have..............

....

If not working now: Ever worked before? Yes...........No...........*If Yes:* Would she like to return to it? Why?...

....

Additional data:

Hollywood and the European Crisis.

By William Dieterle.

Faced with its first great crisis since gaining world supremacy during the last war, Hollywood is a melancholy place now that another conflict threatens to strip it of its throne. It has begun, at last, to toy with the idea of a Hitler-governed Europe of tomorrow, and its first reaction to a situation, as yet purely theoretical, is one of unmitigated gloom.

"What will happen to the motion picture industry if Hitler wins this war?" That is what all Hollywood is asking, and those who propose to answer agree in a common pessimism.

In the light of past events it is strange indeed to find such speculations in the cinema capital. When the war broke out last September, no place on earth could have given less serious reflection to the war's potentialities than did Hollywood. The town's bitter hatred of Hitler and all he represented was one of the few genuine things about it. Therefore, basing its assumption on a vast emotional bias, it predicted that a crushing Nazi defeat was but a matter of a few weeks. I wish that I might here be accused of overstatement, but I can not. That precisely was the town's attitude. That, so far as Hollywood was concerned, ended the affair, except for time which would bring fulfillment to its prophecy.

And time marched on. The winter passed, and with the spring came the bright blue weather of May. Hitler struck on the Western front. The terror of the "Blitzkrieg" was born.

The ensuing headlines bewildered the entire world and horrified the most of it. But to say that Hollywood was puzzled by the news would in no sense express the town's reactions. Hollywood was stunned. A blow in the head with an axe could not have put the town's ill-prepared faculties in a more helpless condition. And when it recovered from its daze, Hollywood went hysterical. It borders now upon a panic which, with a slight impetus, could ripen overnight into catastrophic dimensions.

The hysteria is founded upon the claim that the back-bone of American industry is its foreign markets. At least, that is the only logical conclusion to be drawn from the bare facts of recent happenings. The studios are calling mass meetings of their employees, and from the tenor of the producers' sentimental pleas one is led to

believe that without its foreign markets the motion picture industry in America can no longer operate with profit.

It is a new note for Hollywood, which, if anything, is usually overly optimistic; and as such, it has attracted the suspicions, rather than the sympathies, of the film industry's cynical critics. Several individuals have insisted in uncompromising terminology that the war scare is but a convenient device for the studio heads to use in coercing their labor. By painting the situation as dark as possible, claim these critics, the studio heads hope to convince their dissatisfied workers that they should be happy with what they have and not be trying to get more.

I do not agree with these contentions. Having been closely associated with Hollywood's motion picture industry for the past ten years, I think that I know the difference between its sham and sincerity. And I believe, in this instance, that the film heads are genuinely alarmed over the cataclysmic aspects this war has assumed. When they imply that a Hitler victory would ruin Hollywood, they mean it. They may be mistaken, but not insincere.

It does seem, however, that the conclusion, if justified, is a bit belated. Before an impending crisis, any careful merchant reorganizes his enterprise to meet all possible eventualities. Must we then suppose that Hollywood did not? Or, to bring the matter potently up to date, are we to believe that Hollywood can not?

There's no denying that its foreign markets is a potent item in the film industry. In normal times thirty-five percent of Hollywood's annual take came from foreign countries. Changed continental conditions have already cut to the heart of this snug source of income. Pleading for drastic cuts in R.K.O.'s allowance, George Schaeffer, the company's president, revealed that that studio alone had lost $400,000 in foreign revenues during the last four months of 1939. That sum would have doubtless saved R.K.O. from ending its last fiscal year $180,000 on the red side of the company ledgers. From this it can be imagined what Hollywood will suffer if it loses the entire European market, which is almost a certain eventuality if Hitler wins this war.

It is true that extreme optimists in the film industry are still looking at the situation through rose-colored glasses. They believe that Hitler, for purely economic reasons, can not afford to abandon American films entirely. They will be too important as commercial factors in stabilizing the financial structure of his new organization once the conflict has ended. There would be some glimmering of hope in this viewpoint if Hitler could regard the facts dispassionately. But this he can not.

The whole world knows that Hitler has a psychopathic penchant for revenge. One only has to recall what has happened to his critics in previous days to predict his attitude toward Hollywood, which more than any other group of people has attacked the dictator most virulently. With that vast enthusiasm for doing a thing up properly it has smeared the critic-hating chancellor from one end of creation to the other.

Not only did the town cold-shoulder his goodwill ambassador, Leni Riefenstahl, until she's still perhaps sneezing from that frosty reception, but it has, with a crusader's enthusiasm, strewn the screen with Anti-Nazi pictures until Job himself, if he were a Nazi, could not endure it. And Hitler, by a couple thousand light-years, is not Job. To believe that he would allow economic considerations to stand in the way of his wreaking a personal revenge upon those who have so bitterly assailed him is ludicrous.

Lest the industry should blame itself—and certainly it should not—for its treatment of the chancellor, let it remember Russia and what happened to its markets there. Immediately after coming into power Stalin banned American films, with but few exceptions, from the Soviet Union. Pictures produced by other countries fared no better. It is only since the Russo-German treaty that a few Nazi films have been admitted into Russia.

Both, Hitler and Stalin, openly express their bitter hatred of the American concept of life. Then for political reasons alone, why should Hitler tolerate films based upon a capitalistic philosophy in a Nazi-controlled Europe? The logical answer is that he will not.

Motion pictures are of no vital necessity to totalitarian countries. Furthermore, if Hitler decides that he needs films, he, unfortunately for Hollywood's last hope in case of a Nazi victory, is in a position to make them. In addition to his German facilities he will have control of the movie industries of a half-dozen countries. Already the French studios, which have turned out undoubtedly some of the finest films ever produced, are in his hands. The French industry has previously been handicapped only by the lack of funds and organization, both of which the Germans can provide.

Poland, Czechoslovakia, Holland, and Sweden, Italy, and Spain all turned out creditable films; and if Great Britain falls, all of the old Europe falls. The totalitarians will be in complete domination. It is my belief in such a case, that the various film centers of the continent may again resume their work, but under Nazi control. Competition will thus be eliminated. The studios will be bound together in a sort of pan-European film union. Pictures will be freely exchanged between the separate countries. The necessity for

Hollywood as far as Europe is concerned will have completely disappeared.

These facts are presented on the supposition that Hitler wins this war. Suppose he loses. An Allied victory will not, as Hollywood is prone to believe, bring back the fat European markets of former days. Regardless of the outcome, the war will have left its devastating mark upon the continent. The old Europe is definitely gone; the new one will have to be handled with extreme care.

It is logical to assume that films made for the American audience will no longer fit the psychology of a people embittered and saddened by the terrible hell they have been through. With completely open markets, Hollywood would have to produce for two entirely different audiences. That, according to Hollywood's viewpoint, could not be done with profit; only under the old system permitting it to market the same films in both Europe and America can the industry survive. Let's look at the facts underlying this contention.

There are in the world 67,030 motion picture theatres wired for sound. Of this number 35,963 are found in Europe, 19,032 in the United States, 6,568 in the Far East, 5,403 in Latin America, 1,246 in Canada, and 968 in Africa and the Near East. The European figure does not include some 30,000 theatres and "Workers Halls" in Russia, where pictures are shown without admission charges.

In 1938, the last of Hollywood's good years, sixty-five percent of the world's entire screen time was monopolized by American films. To this proportion Hollywood was at the service of a three billion dollar investment, which is the estimated value of the world's motion picture equipment. In return, according to Department of Commerce estimates, Hollywood could attribute from thirty-five to forty percent of its total gross to its foreign markets.

Europe was naturally its greatest source of foreign revenue. Film theatres in France grossed around a billion francs in 1938. Forty-five percent of the films shown were produced by Hollywood. Belgium used sixty percent American films. Italy, with a decree requiring the showing of one Italian film for every two foreign, exhibited about thirty American pictures; the remainder came from Germany as a friendly concession to the axis alliance.

Germany itself was not an entirely negligible market for Hollywood. In 1937 fifty-two American films were exhibited by the Nazi theatres as compared with ninety-six of German production. But evidently it was Hitler's intention to eliminate Hollywood's products. Even had the war not started, Germany's exhibition plans called for the use of not more than thirty American films in 1939. It is an

ironically odd fact that the United States, on the other hand, imported and exhibited last year eighty-five German films.

Hollywood's most important European market, however, was the United Kingdom, which spoke the language sound-tracked on American films. Of all the pictures shown in the British Isles in 1938, eighty-one percent came from Hollywood. In that year Great Britain did an estimated business of $35,000,000 with Hollywood. With 5,300 theatres attended by an average weekly audience of 18,000,000 in normal times, the British exhibitors in 1939 grossed $250,000,000, which is no small item in the world's annual motion picture income.

It should be pointed out, however, that before the war Hollywood was losing its grip upon the British market. England was becoming more self-sufficient in its own film production; quotas were hamstringing activities. Despite the $35,000,000, Hollywood's business with the United Kingdom in 1938 represented a drop of fifty percent from a previous high. In that year the United Kingdom stood but fourth in importance among Hollywood's foreign markets. Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico all preceded it.

Optimists attribute this disastrous slash in the British market to the crisis which for years hung over England before the actual commencement of hostilities. They explain that the public's interest had been diverted from the theatre by the seriousness of the threatened conflict.

With the easing up of tension, argue the optimists, the British market would have resumed its former status. One can do no more now than speculate upon the soundness of this point of view. There's little need of discussing it today. Whatever possibilities it possessed ended with the outbreak of the war.

However, war or no war, world conditions are very unstable. There is nothing to indicate that they will be any different for many years to come. Civilization seems in the grip of gigantic birth-throes. Whether it is being born into death or into an abundant life is beside the point in this article. The fact is that it's suffering. And with pain comes suspicion and fear.

Under the stress we seek refuge in the strength of our national unities. More and more are individual countries attempting to insure the maintenance of national entity through the increase of economic self-sufficiency. It stands to reason then that they will be increasingly reluctant toward seeing their capital leave for foreign shores with a no more solid substance left in exchange than dubious entertainment.

Hollywood's heyday in foreign markets has passed. For the future the American motion picture industry would be more than

wise in considering only the business which the United States alone is capable of giving it. Hic Rhodos, hic salta! Whatever happens, Hollywood can at least depend upon its American market. Let's forget world markets for a moment and see what the United States has to offer its film industry.

At present there are 17,003 theatres operating in America, which last year served an average weekly attendance of 85,000,000 people, more than a third of world's entire audience. With proper methods this number may be increased. In the peak attendance year of 1930 America's cinema audience averaged 110,000,000 people weekly.

Twenty-three cents was the average admission paid last year. The film box-office grossed in the United States alone nearly one billion dollars, a stupendous figure that placed the motion picture business seventh in rank among the leading American industries.

Since approximately one-fourth of the box office dollar is allotted to film production, the studios, which last year spent an estimated $165,000,000, received in return about $250,000,000 from America alone. The difference, of course, was far from being net profit.

Beside its production expenses, the studio paid out $46,000,000 on supplies and maintenance. A six percent interest on the original $125,000,000 investment in studio materials would account for another $7,500,000. State and Federal taxes sliced $10,000,000 more from the gross income. So by subtracting these total expenditures estimates from the gross income, we can see that Hollywood's net profits from its American audience amounted to not over $21,500,000.

To the average eye this is a sizeable sum, but not to Hollywood, which remembers that four of its eight major studios could cover that figure with their net earnings of the last year. A single company counted its net profits for the last fiscal year at $9,841,530.61.

The drastic cut in figures is at the base of Hollywood's panicky outlook on the future. It sees the situation in terms of proportions, and not in terms of its ultimate possibilities. Thus once again it has jumped headlong into a conclusion that seems not justified.

Let's not forget that beside the United States, the industry still has access to the Orient and to Latin America. In the prime days Hollywood was too busy raking in its European gold to take either of these commercial fields very seriously. But Latin America alone has 5,400 theatres, seventy-six percent of whose entire screen fare is made up of American films.

It is true that both the Oriental and Latin American markets may go the way of the European ones. Japan already has rather stringent quota regulations, and production in Latin America is increasing yearly.

However, even if the entire foreign markets are eventually wiped out, I insist that Hollywood can maintain its functioning, and functioning with profit. Let it take a lesson from other American enterprises. Macy's, for instance, which caters to a purely American trade, has been able to offer the public quality products at moderate prices and still enjoy a reasonable income. Woolworth's, which could not, as Hollywood says it would be forced to do, decrease the quality of its goods, is continuing satisfactory operations regardless of the effects of world-conditions on its wide-spread foreign markets. And Hollywood will likewise be able to make money on readjusted budgets.

There will have to be reorganization in the studios, drastic reorganization. To get a clearer picture of the inner-financial workings of the studio, let's look at a breakdown of the production dollar, on which the budgets are determined. It is divided as follows:

Cast 25%; extras, bits, and characters 5%; director 10%; director's assistant 2%; cameraman and crew 1.5%; lights 2%; makeup, hair-dressers, and supplies 0.9%; teachers 0.2%; crew and labor 1.2%; story preparation 7%; story costs 5%; costumes and designers 0.2%; sets and art directors 12.5%; insurance 2%; stills and photographs 0.4%; cutters 1%; film negative 1%; tests 1.2%; sound negatives and engineering 3.1%; publicity, transportation, research, technical, miscellaneous 2%; indirect costs 15%.

One does not have to be a financial expert to see the disproportionate nature of these figures. Anyone can understand that budgets, based upon the given percentage allotments, can be enormously cut without harming the essential requirements of picture production. So if Hollywood claims that it can not make quality films on reduced expenditures, it should start an unbiased consideration of its possibilities. It will find that a newer and more economical system of operation is absolutely practical.

Besides, it is time for Hollywood to begin recognizing its responsibility to the millions of workers who, either directly or indirectly, depend upon it for a living. There is an estimated $1,900,000,000 in film theatres in America. The owners of most of these are small-town people who ask no more than a modest living for their investments.

Around 300,000 people are in the actual employment of the industry. The exhibition field alone uses 255,000; an additional 13,000 work in the distributing departments; and the studios themselves have 30,000 individuals on their payrolls. Have the producers forgotten these people? If not their brothers keepers, it is a matter of good insurance to remember that their destinies are also interwoven

with that of the nation of which, regardless of future positions, they will always be a part. It is up to Hollywood to keep its share of the nation's employees drawing a paycheck.

There is still another factor which the industry must accept as its obligation. As a pure economic catalyst, so vital to prosperity in this country, Hollywood's importance can not be over-estimated. It touches the nation's pocket-book in devious ways. For instance, the newspapers and magazines of America depended upon the motion picture industry last year for $77,000,000 of their paid advertisements.

The theatres of small towns are like small hearts in circulating and redistributing the money. Sixty-five percent of the cash taken in at the box-office is retained for use in the places where the theatres are located. It goes to pay the janitor, the coal bill, taxes, the ushers, the projectionist, insurance, advertisement in local papers, the girls that sell tickets, the real-estate agent, and the management.

Of the actual production money twenty-eight percent is spent among the people of Los Angeles and its environment. There is hardly an individual in that vast city of a million and a half population who is not affected economically by the motion picture industry. Last year the weekly payroll of the studios amounted to $2,557,692.30.

Therefore, it is perilous to the economic stability of this country to assume that all of this will come to an end if Hitler wins this war. The industry still has its twenty years of experience in picture-making; it still has its enormous technical resources; it still has its vast abundance of creative manpower. And if the worst happens, it will still have the support of 85,000,000 people. What else, besides reorganization itself to meet circumstances, does Hollywood need?

Radio and Education.

By Charles A. Siepmann.

Over a hundred million people in this country listen more or less regularly to the radio. The average American has his set tuned in for some four hours a day. These are striking facts which, with others no less striking, never fail to attract attention to the subject. But the real interest of radio lies back of the statistics. Moreover it is not only with their implications that we are concerned, but with the bearing of purpose on practice in the wider social context of our common plight today.

The commodity which radio purveys and the structure of the industry as we know it are no mere accidents. Both are the product of circumstances and forces which have brought them into being, which condition the structure and affect the service. Radio does not exist in a vacuum.

Neither radio nor education, nor the relation of one to the other, can therefore usefully be studied except in this wider context. More, perhaps, than any other invention of modern science, radio mirrors back to us our present state, the forces with which we contend and the decisions of purpose and of practice which confront us.

My approach itself requires clearer definition, for it conditions at once the aspects of radio to be studied and the conclusions to be drawn. To clarify my purpose, I venture to quote Thomas Jefferson. "This country, which has given to the world the example of physical liberty, owes to it that of moral emancipation also, for as yet it is but nominal with us." The moral implications of radio's influence on people are, then, chosen as the basis of appraisal of what it does and what it may yet do. These are chosen advisedly because we face a moral issue in the revolutionary situation which confronts us. From this standpoint, radio may seem to be in the position of the rich man in the parable, who went away sorrowing "for he had great possessions." The parallel, of course, is not exact in that the radio industry, unlike the rich man of the parable, is not confronted, in the matter of choice and of decision, by one who was himself the incarnation of the good. Radio, rather, stands over against a public, and agents of the public, as divided and confused about ends as is radio itself.

If, at this early stage, then, we may hazard a generalization, it is that this infant prodigy, this new instrument of power, as yet lacks consistent purpose. It is with the absence of policy and the reasons for that absence that we shall be concerned, and with an attempt to clarify what in the course of time may yet emerge as policy enriched and fortified by purpose.

In recognition of the fact that undivided purpose is absent, and that its absence is characteristic of our state, as of that of radio, is to be found the corrective to false hopes and a clue to the proper context of thought about the problem. Science and invention have tempted us to exaggerated hopes, to an undue preoccupation with the unlimited means at our disposal, to concern with processes, and to oversight of ends, ends, mark you, that are unattainable and yet to be pursued. The prevalent disillusionment among the young and the general perplexity stem largely from this source of error. We emerge from an era of shallow optimism only to realize that in a quite fundamental sense, whether the context is that of education, of politics, or of society, "the road winds up hill all the way, yes, to the very end." In spite of all the ballyhoo and promotional extravagances of the radio industry, which flatter only to deceive, radio offers no prospect of a cultural millennium. It is a two-edged weapon, capable of great service but adding equally to the complexity of our problems as persons and as collective members of society. Like other instruments of power, radio is there to use and the outcome of its use depends on the integrity and purpose of those who control it, on the powers of response of those who listen, and on the emergent pattern in the kaleidoscope of interacting forces—those "objective influences" of which we hear so much and by which industry and listener alike are held to be affected.

Our concern, then, is with the moralities of broadcasting. To assess them fairly and relevantly we shall have to concern ourselves with three aspects of the problem, first with the inherent possibilities of the medium itself, second, with the limitations imposed upon their use by the structure of the industry, and, third, with limitations and opportunities determined by the nature and circumstance of radio's listening public.

First, then, radio's distinctive attributes. Radio has unique resources. What are they? One can cite but a few. It has range, what is technically known as coverage. It disposes of time and distance. It at once rids us in some measure of the solitude of isolation, and imposes upon us that deeper solitude which comes of wider knowledge and experience. In this, as in so many other respects that we shall touch on, radio at once exemplifies and aggravates conditions

peculiar to our time. The implications of this first attribute of radio are too many and too complex to name. A few may serve as illustration. Radio has range. It, therefore, increases and accelerates the impact of ideas, of information, of events, of a multitude of stimuli; which by their very quantity affect our outlook and our poise. "The world," as Wordsworth put it, "is too much with us; late and soon, getting and spending, we lay waste our powers." As we shall see later, the nature of such impact is affected by the purposes and interests of those who control radio. Where values are concerned, everything depends upon the accent of emphasis. If we are concerned with the moral implications of the radio, we shall, therefore, do well to identify the accent of its emphasis, those implications of value, which are residual in the listener's consciousness as consequence of the total impact of what he hears. Radio thus, inherently and without willing it, aggravates what Professor Dewey calls "the ratio of impersonal to personal activities which determine the course of events." It constitutes yet another of those objective forces which have induced a sense of helplessness among individuals and robbed them of any real feeling of participation in events.

Radio in one sense, by eliminating spatial isolation, makes of us citizens of the world. Does it, or can it, also make us good citizens? One may at least hazard the view that the very power and opportunity inherent in this instrument may defeat its own ends by the very wealth of the resources which it offers. Our minds and our emotions are on the whole less efficiently organized than our stomachs; but even the stomach has limited powers of digestion. It is arguable that radio creates for us a surfeit of stimulus, of information, and suggestion, which *unless counterbalanced by controls of purpose, selection, and direction,* may well wreak more havoc than advantage.

Another corollary of radio's resource of coverage is that it constitutes the people's instrument. It reaches all, and, therefore, must serve all. The implications of this fact for education will be touched on later. The abuse of the fact in terms of the misleading cliché that radio must therefore "give the people what it wants" will also be referred to when we survey the structure of the industry. But a challenge to that assertion must be offered here and now. Who are the people? And what are their wants? In a final and decisive sense the people are persons, individuals demanding of us that reverence for personality which is inherent in democratic thought. The yardstick of radio's achievement, the measure of its constructive, as against its potentially destructive, influence, is the degree to which it enhances in individuals that sense of and that capacity for being

persons—individual, discriminating, morally, sensitively aware, which is the final object of all education. In the matter of purely literary taste and judgment, Matthew Arnold once suggested that the reader should have in mind lines chosen from some great passage in literature by which to test the inherent quality of what he reads. Extreme as it may sound, a similar yardstick might well prove useful for the listener over against every program that he hears in terms of a question as to whether this or that that comes over the radio contributes to freedom, freedom, that is, conceived of as an enhancement of personality. Is he more or is he less a person for the experience which radio offers? It is by some such yardstick that the structure of our society and the contributory elements therein are likely to be judged in a decisive hour, if not consciously, at least subconsciously by what, for want of a better term, we may call the will of the people. The revolutionary context of our time has reference to this very issue. Radio is merely a microcosm of the wider context of politics and of society.

Radio not only has great range but great resources of technique. American radio in all but one significant field has carried these techniques to a greater degree of skillful perfection than that which obtains in any country. Again the subject is one too vast to be adequately covered, but three instances at least of the peculiar techniques of radio may be mentioned, enhanced as they are by the vast, sweeping range and reach of the wave lengths of the air. Even in this sophisticated age, there attaches still to radio some of the attributes of magic. Its disposal of space and time still carries a romantic appeal which holds our interest. There is an expectancy associated with all listening, a wonder not unlike that associated with the working of a miracle. Communication between persons, wonderful as it is, we take for granted. But communication over the air still has this attribute of wonder. It is for this reason that the spoken word, the radio talk, is, potentially at any rate, charged with such great possibilities. President Roosevelt's fireside talks are an outstanding example of that contagion of personality which is associated with good radio talk. The skills which go to it and their variant potentialities deserve a chapter of their own. But suffice it here to say that to convey intimacy and absolute sincerity is of the essence of the matter. Few men achieve these skills and, for reasons peculiar to broadcasting in this country, their development has gone relatively by default. There are, of course, signal exceptions, but they are few. But the fact remains that the spoken word over the radio constitutes, perhaps, the most powerful integrating force that we have yet enjoyed. There is, of course, much that radio cannot communicate, as we shall

see later. But the resources of the spoken word, still to be developed and exploited beyond anything we now dream of, stand as a signal example of a technique that has attached to it one attribute at least of very special significance. That attribute is associated with the two words already mentioned—intimacy and sincerity. Circumstances recently forced on radio a serious and dangerous distortion of this unique resource. It was inevitable that in a presidential election the microphone should be set up in places and under circumstances alien to radio's true purpose and sphere of service. Candidates and candidates' supporters spoke before vast crowds, playing upon mass emotions, evoking mass response. The atmosphere of the hustings was carried into millions of homes as a brutal assault on privacy and as a travesty of that art of quiet, personal communication, which is, potentially at least, one of the glories of radio technique. Here again we come upon the two-edged weapon. There is no need to point to the analogy of its destructive use in the totalitarian countries where contempt for persons has become an axiom of politics. Let the matter rest at that.

Let us now turn briefly to a technique of a very different order. Radio drama, not itself very significant as a new form of art and soon, no doubt, to be discarded altogether with the advent of television, today commands perhaps the greatest and the most consistent audience of any programs broadcast. The fact that in radio the stage is the listener's imagination, coupled with that element of magic already spoken of, gives to this technique a power over emotion and imagination with which the student of "soap opera" is familiar. The fact that this technique is used for purposes with which education can have no dealings cannot conceal or dispose of the fact that we have here a powerful means of influence where influence is most needed, that is, where values are concerned and the purging rather than the prostitution of emotional response. From the point of view of Jefferson's moral emancipation, what is significant is that we have here again the means to destroy or, not to cure, but to alleviate. Cure there is none, for us or for any generation. Yet in the range, the coverage of radio, and its resources of technique we have, as has been said, an instrument which is the peoples' instrument, available to us at a time when claims upon the peoples' intelligence and understanding are greater in extent and in intensity than they have ever been. How comes it then that we are so far short of that illusory millennium, that, indeed, we may not even be upon the road which leads somewhere? At least part of the answer can be found in observation of the structure of the industry, which now constitutes our second port of call.

Here, as throughout this study, it will be well to stress again the wider implications of the radio both in respect of cause and of effect. Radio is what it is because we are what we are, habituated to a circumstance and outlook which not only derive from past history and tradition, but are themselves in some measure out of date. It is in this sense that the structure of the radio industry is not an accident. It derives from principles of policy which rest upon past precedent and are inherent in the pattern of American thought and practice. Radio as an industry stands for the principle of free, competitive enterprise associated with the profit motive. By such a practice and by such motive forces the resources of invention and experiment have been made available to the public. It was so that radio was launched, but it was not so entirely that radio developed. (Here again radio illustrates trends and developments of outlook and organization which hopefully affect one's estimate of what is yet to come.) Only a few years elapsed before it became evident that unrestricted competition was impracticable. A gentlemen's agreement between the contestants for channels of the air broke down and led to chaos, and the industry itself sought regulation and protection from government. From Mr. Hoover, then Acting Secretary of Commerce, came a first definition of principles which in the same breath acknowledged the validity of free enterprise and introduced an element of control by government restricting the wanton ravages of cut-throat competition. These three principles are worth quotation. They claim first that government and, therefore, the people have today the control of the channels of the air, in itself a new and significant departure of principle and policy. They claim, secondly, that radio activities are largely free, free of monopoly, free in program and free in speech. The third is a moral principle. "We can protect the home by preventing the entry of printed matter destructive to its ideals, but we must double guard the radio." But, as has been rightly pointed out, no protection of specific ideals is possible unless they are determined and used as a basis for restricting program content. The agency later created to define these ideals in terms of "the public interest, convenience and necessity" was the Federal Communications Commission. Years have passed, but little flesh has been put upon the bare bones of that equivocal phrase. Yet, tardy and tentative as the Commission has proved in practice, its continuing existence is significant, a sign of the emergence of a new concept in politics which is slowly, painfully gaining acceptance. That concept has to do with the new and wider scope and responsibility of government. It is paralleled by the emergent conception of public service, to be associated with, and a prior condition of, continued private enterprise. The activities of the F.C.C. continue

to be resented by the trade, but its influence cannot be questioned, even if it is indirect. Uneasy about further regulation and control, the industry has in some measure put its own house in order. It has its own moral code, excellent within the rather narrow limits which it has so far reached. Moreover, "public service" has been adopted by the industry as the specific label for certain aspects of its work. Under this head, to be sure, we find an odd miscellany. The motive back of its compilation is not wholly disinterested, but it remains significant as a laggard trend.

If thus far there seems to be but grudging recognition of what radio has done, let us at once and with admiration concede two signal achievements in the field of public service. Whatever qualifications, in respect of countervailing practice, we must add, regardless of how far research may disclose limits of actual effectiveness, no one can lightly question the efficiency or the integrity of American radio in offering its listeners a full and constant service of news, and in maintaining the principle of free and fair expression of opinion on a wide range of controversial questions. These entries on the credit side are not unique, but they are outstanding. The question they raise—and it is vital from the point of view of education, the effectiveness of which depends upon consistent purpose—is why such credit entries are so far offset by debit entries, which at some points detract from, and at others wholly nullify, the value of such service rendered. The nature of these defects has to be cited. They have, also, to be traced to their source, if we are fairly to appraise radio and education as they stand and as the relation between them may develop in the future. The source appears to be the structure of the industry, the motive forces which have brought it into being. Can man serve God and Mammon? Is the profit motive, in fact, compatible with public service? The point I would here stress is that the posing of such a question implies, and falsely, an absolute choice between positive and negative reply. There are no such absolutes where human practice is concerned. Free enterprise, associated with the profit motive, is the occasion both of merits and defects of radio in America. The total elimination of defects we shall not see; nor shall we taste perfection. The problem is one of adjustment, of the elimination of a self-destructive conflict of purpose. The nature of that conflict we can, as I say, discover only by examination of defects and by diagnosis of their cause. The following are samples.

Radio's coverage is centered on densely populated areas where large audiences and big profits can be realized. Rural listeners are penalized, have relatively inferior service and choice. Competition runs counter to public service in respect of program balance. Dupli-

cation of programs on different wave lengths is monotonously evident throughout the day and night. Concern for profit leads to a concentration on programs judged to be most "popular." Minorities are neglected and even the limited potentialities of listeners with the lowest intelligence are seldom exploited. There is a monotony of entertainment, even though that entertainment masters at times greater resourcefulness and skill than anywhere on earth. Further, the large expenditures which radio involves tend, as in industry, towards centralization of control. The advantages are obvious. Resources become available which could not otherwise be afforded. But the disadvantages, which receive less advertisement, are serious. That culture is most enduring which is native, which springs from the soil. Culture cannot be distributed by mail order. It is in this sense above all others that New York is not America; still less is Hollywood. As radio becomes centralized, the role and status of local stations diminish. They become increasingly the retail distributors of a large central store. And yet for that large percentage of the population which lives in rural or small urban districts research has shown that the influence of local personality, the voice of the neighbor, still is greater than that of radio's giant creations. It is not insignificant, for instance, that in Iowa loyalty to a familiar local personality has secured, in one instance, for news interpretations and in another for musical appreciation audiences greater even than that for some of radio's top flight entertainment stars. For the better interpretation of the whole to the part, and even more of the part to the whole, we should do well still to foster that local initiative which centralization is rapidly destroying. Even more dangerous is that further consequence of centralized control by which the contact of the men of radio with their public becomes increasingly remote and impersonal. The listener is reduced to a bare statistic, an object of manipulation and exploitation which, as we shall see later, conflicts with that conception of human relations on which democratic faith itself is based.

The above considerations may seem remote from the problems of education. But they are strictly relevant, for education's influence, the accent of its emphasis, *even its opportunity to function,* depend upon the pattern of society which results from the interaction of individual parts. The above are but some of the defects of radio that stem directly from the motive forces inherent in its structure. Profit and competition in the old accepted sense of *laissez-faire* have had their day, and above all where the commodity purveyed is of such social consequence as that of radio. Hence that inauguration

of control by government as trustee for the public which has been mentioned.

But the worst and the most dangerous feature of American radio also stems directly from the profit motive. Promotional excesses, the ballyhoo of advertising, the high pitched appeals to the sensational, the constant holding of the top notes of the superlative, all these combine to achieve effects, the harmfulness of which is not capable of statistical analysis, but which with some justification one can claim *a priori* to be inherent in the process. Their danger, in a word, is the inducement of a slave mentality. They further, instead of countering, influences at work in other spheres of our experience. They aggravate that impression of individual helplessness over against objective forces which is a symptom of our neurotic state. The process, as I say, is inherent in the structure of the industry. It is the dialectic of large-scale manipulation, which, because involved in the necessity to secure a mass response to wholesale distribution of commodities, has to induce as far as possible an enslavement of the individual in matters of choice and discrimination, a constant of passivity. It has to induce the illusion of unity by methods of organized ballyhoo and the creation of stereotypes in the pattern of our likes and dislikes. Here again, radio is at once victim and agent. Because of their purposes, in this case the pursuit of profit, men become involved in a dialectic of behavior and of practice which assumes aspects of inevitability which are in fact illusory (because what a man wills conditions essentially what he does), but which assume such proportions of power as to *appear* to be beyond control. This from the point of view of education, or as I prefer to put it, from the point of view of morals is the crux of the whole matter.

The illusion of inevitability must be destroyed, or it will destroy us. If this analysis has any value, it centers on the passionate assertion that man today, as at all times, is not the victim of his circumstance but of his own blindness and deluded will. There is, indeed, a dialectic of events, an inescapable logic of consequence attendant upon any course of action. But it is our will, our purpose, which sets us upon the course. If a concern for profit or loyalties no longer compatible with the public interest outweigh in us that desire for moral emancipation which Jefferson sought, the consequence is clear. But let us not delude ourselves by substituting helplessness for irresponsibility as cause and as occasion. "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars but in ourselves that we are underlings."

But how, it may be asked, does it come about that such enslavement is in fact practicable, that the public should prove such easy game? Is it fair to cast the whole blame in such a complex situation

on those who control radio? The answer is clear and certain. It is not fair, and no such blame is cast. Those in charge of radio are but part authors of the plot. Nor is it a plot of strict design, of sheer malign purpose. Radio, as I have attempted to point out, has interest only in a context far wider than that of the industry itself. We suffer, all of us, as members of society from a kind of moral jaundice. The blame is indeed distributed. Yet we must face the fact that those who are privileged in circumstance, in the possession of power, in the administration of high office, are in a very real and crucial sense their brother's keeper. There is emergent in the history of radio, as in the developing history of this country, a new and fuller realization of the meaning of trusteeship. It would be arrogant for any man to claim as his responsibility the changing of human nature. But human nature needs to be safeguarded. It is for us to cherish in ourselves and, according to our power and our position, still more for others the possibility of growth, to be vigilant lest "we lay waste our powers." The glaring disparities in opportunity for growth which have resulted from the particular direction of our wills in the context that we have studied are evident but still too little recognized in the society in which we live and from which we glean our comforts and our satisfactions. Concern for that disparity brings us to our third port of call, to radio's listening audience, to that state of the nation to which Mr. Roosevelt in early days persistently and properly drew our attention.

Over a hundred million citizens of the United States devote to radio time and attention only less than that which they devote to work and sleep. The reason why the process of enslavement, unwittingly being realized from day to day, is possible is largely to be found in circumstances common to the large majority of these hundred million people. These circumstances can here be stated only in terms of crude statistics. These listeners are uneducated. Thirty-four million adults have never enjoyed education beyond that of the fifth grade. These listeners are poor. Fourteen millions earn incomes of no more than $26.00 a month. The vast majority of radio's audience enjoy incomes of less than $1500 a year, millions of them much less. These listeners are poor, uneducated, lonely. Their circumstances make them such. That sense of belonging, to which Professor Lasswell has constantly referred, is taken from them by the privations of economic circumstance and the still more devastating inroads on their self-respect of the inhuman tasks which they are called to undertake in industry. The sense of personal participation diminishes. The social fabric of loyalties is undermined. The personal relations of employer and employed that once gave meaning and value to labor disappear

as the forces of centralized control work upon them. As Bacon put it, "Little do men perceive what solitude is and how far it extendeth. For a crowd is not company and faces are but a gallery of pictures and talk but a tinkling symbol where there is no love. *Magna civitas, magna solitudo.*" Radio's audience is the human stuff on which huge objective forces, or as I prefer to say, the misdirected wills of men, have worked this havoc of solitude.

Some of the consequences, for radio and education, are beginning to emerge from the findings of research. The evidence is still inadequate for full and effective diagnosis and ameliorative measures. But it is ample (and for our major purposes we can forget statistics), to throw light upon the problem which educators are still slow and even reluctant to face. Cursory as this survey has been, inadequate as it must be as even a blueprint for action, it will, I hope, have suggested an approach by suggesting a new perspective, a transfer of our attention, and by demolishing the great illusion of inevitability.

In radio, in education, in the sum total of our living we face a moral issue. A choice is forced upon us by the progress of events which follow, as night follows day, the misdirection of our will. It is a choice admitting of no piecemeal answer, not an answer of lip service only but of a dominating purpose permeating all activities in which we are concerned as members of society. The choice has to do with two alternative attitudes to people. We can despise them, or we may reverence them, as we must reverence ourselves if life is to have meaning. In terms of society we can, according to our choice, manipulate people or serve them. The first is easier, the second harder than it has ever been. Easier because the status of the individual has been reduced by the inhuman factors inherent in industrial development, by the decrease of economic self-dependence and of that residuum of self-respect which men salvage from the wreckage of the conflicts of human greed and aspiration. Easier, too, because of the perfected instruments for dominating men's minds and emotions of which the radio is the supreme example. The alternative choice is the harder for the same reasons. We are far gone in circumstance. Over against the manipulative point of view of the authoritarian, we have, as President Hutchins has pointed out, little to offer in terms of superior efficiency or of material circumstance. All we have left is the remnant of a faith in persons, most positive and clear in its passionate rejection of the evil that it recognizes in the challenge which the man manipulators have flung down, too positive in terms of lip service to the mere vocabulary of freedom and emancipation, and as yet scarcely positive at all, considering the immanence of crisis, in terms of action carried into the field of government, of

administration, and private industry. We are involved today as never before; and the paradox of the centripetal forces manifest in industry and government, resulting as they do in a centrifugal reaction, where the sense of individual belonging, of pride and purpose are concerned, has been touched on in this study. The situation is, indeed, grave, and only a colossal effort of the will, a supreme sense of responsibility for public service, can keep at bay the evils and the dangers at our door. This is the context by reference to which we may consider the challenge, the hope and the opportunity which radio offers us.

Radio, as has been said, is inherently and as of right the peoples' instrument. The challenge to educators implicit in this fact is that of a redirection of attention, an emphasis on education of the people, the urgency of which at this stage scarcely needs to be pressed home. Radio as a means is thus timely, almost heaven sent as opportunity.

Devotion and enterprise on the part of those concerned with radio have developed skills most apt for communication with the people. That these are much abused by standards of the peoples' needs is not here relevant. For education the relevant consideration is the existence of a new medium and method of interpretation. The impatience of the industry with educators over their tardy recognition of the absolute necessity to find the appropriate means by which to convey truths and values, means that take account of the pathetic helplessness, the intellectual immaturity, the life and circumstance of those whom radio serves, is in large measure justified. The counter objection of the educators is no less true, namely that radio, while master of many skills, has all too often lamentably failed in exercising them for ends that correspond to peoples' true, as against their superficial, needs. It is uncomfortably true that what radio gives with one hand it takes away with the other. The virtue of education is in consistent purpose. Without adjustment of the proportions of radio's constructive and destructive influence, there is small hope that it can realize its manifest destiny in the wider context of crisis with which we are concerned. Radio has rightly stressed the need to gild the pill which is to be offered to a sick and undernourished patient. As a point of technique, this is at once appropriate to the condition of the listener and to the circumstance of radio as servant of men's leisure. Radio is right again (where it in fact succeeds in doing so), in adapting its techniques (as in the quiz program) to a frame of reference relevant to the background of experience of the listener. Radio's contributions in these respects have been both shrewd and realistic. Its shortcomings have to do with that tendency which we have noted to think of the listener in static rather than in dynamic

terms. Skills of technique are nothing worth except as vehicles of matter that is significant and by which the seeds of growth and sensitive awareness can be sown. "Soap opera" attracts by its relevance to the anxieties and morbid propensities of those who listen. It offers a context which is recognizable. Therein lies its technical merit. Its defect is that it evokes no response in which is inherent the possibility for growth of understanding. It adds nothing to experience. The present failure and the future opportunity of radio is to be found in the fruitful exploitation of techniques. And it is here that service may yet be rendered by those best fitted to charge communication with significance. The poet, the writer of genius and distinction if, while maintaining his integrity, he can keep the common touch, eschew the esoteric, has in radio a means of significant communication through which the writer's art itself may find a new lease of life and by which a truly democratic culture may yet come into being. Remember W. B. Yeats' dictum, "Think like a wise man but communicate in the language of the people."

The impatience of radio men with educators is no less justified in one other respect. There are aspects of education irrelevant to radio because alien to its resources of techniques. Alien, too, to the more pressing needs of radio's audience. It is in this connection, as with respect to the two matters above referred to, that a transfer of attention on the part of educators is necessary. Radio cannot teach. Teaching involves communication of a kind that radio cannot attempt, —a discipline, a concentration, a circumstance that have nothing to do with radio's circumstance. Nor can radio communicate the subtleties and refinements of thought and feeling that are the product of higher education. Radio can achieve little more than a stimulus. By constantly repeated injections, such stimulus may induce some modifications in our system. But it is most dangerous in education to project on others our own experience, to assume similar susceptibilities where background and circumstance are as tragically different as we have seen them to be. The men of radio are more realist than educators in recognition of ordinary peoples' priorities of need. Their fault, as we have noted, is in the too frequent exploitation instead of service to such needs. Of these priorities of need, something must here be said.

The fruits of culture in the proper sense of that term stand unassailable in their own right. But these are fruits we gather at the end of a long journey, and few have had opportunity to make that journey. For the mass audience of radio, apart from the need (which stems directly from their circumstance) of escape into a world of glamorous distraction, the first concern is with material needs, with

problems of health, of food, and the handling of children, the practices and the concerns of their humdrum day-to-day existence. Radio has found ready response to service for such needs. Whether what is communicated on such topics is always the best and the wisest that can be communicated is a moot question. Too often, preoccupation with a quick return of interest, associated with the profit motive of the advertiser, runs counter to genuine concern for service which the gilding of the pill, the simplification of things inherently not simple, may dangerously imperil. Radio both gives and takes away.

Whereas material needs are the most obvious, the listeners' psychological needs are probably the more urgent. A pathetic example of such need and of the morbid sympathetic interest which it arouses is the Good Will Court of Mr. Anthony. That Mr. Anthony dispenses but rough justice those who have listened are hardly likely to question. Doctors, psychologists, and social workers may be provoked to indignation, disgust, or to despair, by what transpires at these strip-tease acts of the human soul. Yet from a social point of view, these tawdry proceedings challenge us to thought. Rough justice may be dispensed, *but the courtroom is crammed.* The pathetic helplessness of people is here exposed in all its nakedness. Is there nothing to be done about it? Are doctors and educators, confident that they know better than Mr. Anthony, going to stand by while radio in this instance, as in many others, dips down into the unsavory depths of peoples' need? Here are priorities of need, and the rough justice dispensed over the radio may, from the point of view of these poor creatures, prove more valuable than the superior integrity of those whose knowledge stays them from rushing in where angels fear to tread. Here at least is an instance of the level at which education is urgently required. If, through the voice of Mr. Anthony, radio does disservice, it at least voices a challenge of attention to educators in their ivory towers.

What, next, of society's need of the listener? Reference having been made to radio's power of integration, we must pause a moment at least to suggest the possibilities yet to be realized by the proper adaptation of techniques for integrating our society in respect of social purpose. The new and expanding role of government demands of us accelerated powers of adaptation, of quick release from those adhesions of the past, those habituations of thought and prejudice which make us reluctant to face manifest necessities of social change. As the activities of government increase, more and more persons are affected by it. Yet it stands remote, impersonal, symbol again of the objective forces which in our confusion of purpose and of insight we are coming to believe in as disembodied powers. The new role of

government requires, and urgently, a new and intensified degree of apt interpretation. For the distortion, for selfish and disingenuous ends, of such verbal symbols as unity and patriotism, we need to substitute dynamic symbols of true unity. These can only be created and they can only be understood by the wider dissemination of knowledge about social circumstance and by the realization through government and in society of projects and activities, the constructive purpose of which can be vividly brought home to people. Radio in this matter cannot, of course, act as pioneer but merely as interpreter. It must wait upon events. Yet in respect of a more widespread consciousness of social facts, there is already work enough to do. One instance drawn from British experience may illustrate the point.

Some years ago it was decided to communicate through radio facts relevant to housing conditions in Great Britain. Week by week over a period of three months a popular sports commentator (chosen advisedly for this purpose) visited the slums and the rehousing projects of the country and reported what he saw to radio's listening audience. As a result, awareness took the place of ignorance, of that indifference to the unknown which, as society becomes more complex, becomes increasingly a source of danger and dissension. The significance of the achievement was the creation of an "area of consciousness." The public conscience was stirred. Radio was not concerned, as it must never be, to influence opinion on public policy. Its range and its resources, however, are available to us to quicken conscience, to integrate experience, by extending knowledge and promoting sympathy. The subject is, alas, too large for proper development here.

One final point, however, must be made that bears on radio's possibilities in education. Seeing that it adds to the complication of our living by the increased impact of ideas and information, it must, unless confusion is to be worse confounded, offer to a bewildered public something by way of what I term selective direction through the maze of issues and impressions with which the listener is confronted. In its interpretation of the war in Europe through news reporters and commentators, radio has rendered this very service. It is curious, though perhaps not surprising if we think of the deterrent influences, that small attempt at similar interpretation of domestic issues has been made. The need for interpretation is, as I have said, inherent in the very circumstance of radio. Its very power and range demand some such corrective to confusion and distraction. The achievement of one of these commentators must be referred to as illustrating aspects of radio most relevant to education and charged

with hopeful possibilities. Let us examine the record of Mr. Raymond Gram Swing.

The Crossley ratings show that he commands a regular listening audience of over eight millions. How and why is this significant? How has this following been achieved? By perseverance, by integrity, and by mastery of the techniques of radio talk. Each point has a special significance. Three years ago the name of Raymond Swing was scarcely known to listeners. Today for millions it has the connotation of a trusted and a needed friend. Concern over the war created, of course, the necessary frame of reference to which his commentary could be related. But his regular, recurrent presence at the microphone, together with the inherent merits of the man, created this vast audience. As with the plugging of a song, as with the constant repetition of advertisement, so with Mr. Swing. Merit given time, given also a context relevant to men's preoccupations, wins through. Relatively few such personalities have been created at the microphone because of the advertisers' concern with quick returns. It is for this reason, among others, that I stressed earlier the as yet unexplored resources of the spoken word available to radio, given time for their development. Raymond Swing's achievement is remarkable no less for the integrity of his performance. He, above all others, has recognized and cherished the ideal of realizing through radio something that I can only call a convention of good manners in communication. The integrity of his approach and of his subject has at no time been compromised. Statistics cannot prove the worth of such achievement. But Raymond Swing's eight million listeners stand as proof that the dynamic conception of human personality, the belief that discrimination is not confined to men of education is not a mere delusion.

It is, however, time to bring this study to a close. Let me summarize the argument.

The interest of radio lies in its bearing on the wider social context of crisis that has been discussed. It at once exemplifies new trends and the persistence of attitudes and loyalties no longer apt. A conflict of purpose results which is evidenced by confusions and incompatibilities in its practice. Radio exemplifies the emergent social concept of trusteeship. It is, therefore, subject to control which is as yet inadequate because it rests on no clear formulation of radio's function in society. The official agency of such control is governmental. But in a democracy such agencies of government must function as a filter of public opinion. Thus radio involves a partnership with its own public. But public opinion is as yet inadequately mobilized; and the relationship of the two partners, the balance of

power is, therefore, dangerously maladjusted. This has made possible the heresy that radio gives the public what it wants and has obscured the vital truth that the public is incapable of articulating its true needs.

It is with this issue that educators are, or should be concerned. They can voice the public's need and define that body of consistent principles on which true education rests. But they can only do so by a transfer of their attention to the priorities of need of those whom radio, the peoples' instrument, serves, and by a more practical familiarity with the resources of interpretation which radio offers. Educators can foster criticism. It is most necessary, its absence a singularity, and a measure of our tardy recognition of the power and influence and potentialities of radio.

As a basis for criticism education should foster research by means of which a nicer adaptation of the resources of radio to the ends of education may be realized. Radio integrates experience, and it can to some degree integrate society. It will do so the more and the better for collaboration by educators in securing wider frames of reference (in the experience and activities of the public) with which what radio offers can be associated and to which its developing services may be related. Is this the conclusion of the whole matter? It is not, for there is none such. We can look for no more than partial achievement. But in one respect we face a choice more absolute than relative, a choice which has to do, not with particularities of radio technique or organization, but with that issue of moral emancipation which Jefferson foresaw as America's paramount objective. With the issue of private enterprise or public control of unrestricted or restricted opportunity for profit, we are not concerned except by inference. The bearing of radio on education has finally, fundamentally, to do with the will, the purpose of those who control it, with the sincerity of their concern, as a first and dominant concern, for persons; for "faces are but a gallery of pictures and talk but a tinkling symbol where there is no love. *Magna civitas, magna solitudo.*"

NOTES ON INSTITUTE ACTIVITIES.[1]

The research project summarized below formulates certain problems which the Institute of Social Research intended to investigate about a year ago. General world conditions, however, brought to the fore other social problems more urgently connected with American interests and compelled us to postpone our original intention. The Institute plans, nevertheless, to return to this project in due time.

As published here, the project contains not only research problems but theoretical conceptions which were in part arrived at through previous research and which would in some measure have to be probed through further investigations. It goes without saying that none of these theses will be treated as dogmas once the actual research is carried through.

The publication of the project in the present issue may help further to clarify the conception of critical social research. The prevailing methodological viewpoints of this approach may briefly be characterized as follows.

I. Concepts Are Historically Formed. *The categories we intend to use are not generalizations to be attained by a process of abstraction from various individuals and species, nor are they axiomatic definitions and postulates. The process of forming these categories must take account of the historical character of the subject matter to which they pertain, and in such a way that the categories are made to include the actual genesis of that subject matter. This unique character of the relation of the concept to its "material" does not allow of such abstract concepts as "social change," "association," "collective behavior," "masses," unless these are used as mere formalistic classifications of phenomena common to all forms of society. The proper meaning of "masses," for example, cannot be derived through an essentially quantitative analysis or from certain isolated types of "collective behavior," even though such analysis may be an integral part of any attempt at a theoretical interpretation of the term. Proper methodological usage must recognize that the masses are basically different at the different stages of the socio-historical process and that their function in society is essentially determined by that of other social strata as well as by the peculiar social and*

[1]Under this heading we shall publish from time to time reports on programmatic and other activities undertaken by the Institute of Social Research.

economic mechanisms that produce and perpetuate the masses. The category is thus led, by the very nature of its concrete content, to take in other, different sectors of the given social configuration and to follow out the genesis and import of its content within the social totality. The general concept is thus not dissolved into a multitude of empirical facts but is concretized in a theoretical analysis of a given social configuration and related to the whole of the historical process of which it is an indissoluble part. Such analysis is essentially critical in character.

II. Concepts Are Critically Formed. *The critical nature of societal concepts may best be elucidated through the problem of value judgments that animates current discussion among social scientists. The latter is much more than a methodological problem today. The totalitarian states are imposing the political values of imperialist power politics upon all scientific, cultural, and economic activities. This engenders all too much readiness in democratic countries to interpret freedom of science (which is held to include freedom from value judgments) as a drawback of the democratic forms of life. Hence derives a positivist and even skeptical attitude. The attempt has been made to overcome this by a return to old metaphysics, such as neo-Thomism. But this proposed return to the supposedly absolute values of past theological and metaphysical systems may facilitate the destruction of individual liberties to an even greater degree than would the conscious and honest skepticism of the positivists. Social theory may be able to circumvent a skeptical spurning of value judgments without succumbing to normative dogmatism. This may be accomplished by relating social institutions and activities to the values they themselves set forth as their standards and ideals. Thus, the activities of a political party may be investigated in the light of the avowed aims and ends of the party without accepting these as valid or evident. If subjected to such an analysis, the social agencies most representative of the present pattern of society will disclose a pervasive discrepancy between what they actually are and the values they accept. To take an example, the media of public communication, radio, press, and film, constantly profess their adherence to the individual's ultimate value and his inalienable freedom, but they operate in such a way that they tend to forswear such values by fettering the individual to prescribed attitudes, thoughts, and buying habits. The ambivalent relation between prevailing values and the social context forces the categories of social theory to become critical and thus to reflect the actual rift between the social reality and the values it posits.*

III. Societal Concepts Are "Inductively" Formed. *Social concepts derive their critical coloring from the fact that the rift between value and reality is typical of the totality of modern culture. This leads to the hypothesis that society is a "system" in the material sense that every single social field or relation contains and reflects, in various ways, the whole itself. Consequently, an intensive analysis of a single relation or institution that is particularly representative of the prevailing pattern of reality may be far better able to develop and grasp the nature of the pattern than would an extensive compilation and description of assorted facts. The "pervasive" character of our society, the fact that it makes its peculiar relations felt in every nook and cranny of the social whole, calls for a methodologic conception that will take account of this fact. Categories have to be formed through a process of induction that is the reverse of the traditional inductive method which verified its hypotheses by collecting individual experiences until they attained the weight of universal laws. Induction in social theory, per contra, should seek the universal within the particular, not above or beyond it, and, instead of moving from one particular to another and then to the heights of abstraction, should delve deeper and deeper into the particular and discover the universal law therein.*

IV. Social Concepts Are Integrative. *The peculiar kind of induction we have just outlined makes the formation of social concepts an empirical process and yet distinguishes this from the empirical method employed in the specialized sciences. For example, the concept "youth," denoting a particular entity in present-day society, is not a biological, psychological, or sociological concept, for it takes in the entire social and historical process that influences the mentality and orientation of youth and that constantly transforms these. Consequently, our concept will assume different functions pari passu with the changing composition, function, and attitudes of youth within the shifting social pattern. And owing to the fact that the concept is to be formed under the aspect of the historical totality to which it pertains, sociology should be able to develop this changing pattern from the very content of the concept instead of adding specific contents from without.*

In this way, the various categories will be integrative ones through their very content and may themselves serve as the basis for combining the experiences and results of the various special sciences without being impeded by their several fixed boundaries.

MAX HORKHEIMER.

RESEARCH PROJECT ON ANTI-SEMITISM.

Idea of the Project.

A. Specific Character of the Project.

Propaganda to combat anti-Semitism has often been crude and ineffective because of a lack of knowledge of its psychological roots, individual as well as social. In spite of the many excellent works written on the subject, anti-Semitism is still regarded too casually and viewed too superficially, even by those whom it immediately affects. For too many people anti-Semitism is nothing more than a pitiable aberration, a relapse into the Dark Ages; and while its presence is understandable in those nations of middle and Eastern Europe whose post-war status made the permanent achievement of democracy impossible, it is on the whole viewed as an element foreign to the spirit of modern society. From this point of view, it would follow logically that anti-Semitism is an anachronism, incapable of securing a world-wide hold. This is not true. Hatred of the Jews, despite the proclamation of human rights during the most progressive periods and in the most progressive countries, has never really been vanquished and is capable of flaring up anew at any moment.

The purpose of this project is to show that anti-Semitism is one of the dangers inherent in all more recent culture. The project will combine historical, psychological, and economic research with experimental studies. Several new hypotheses will be presented which are the result of former studies of the Institute, such as that progressive modern thought has an ambivalent attitude toward the concept of human rights, that the persecution of the aristocrats in the French Revolution bears a resemblance to anti-Semitism in modern Germany, that the foreign rather than the German masses are the spectators for whom German pogroms are arranged, and so forth.

More concretely, the project will analyze the representative thought of more recent European literature and of specific historical events in order to reveal the deep roots of anti-Semitism, and a series of experiments will reveal the characteristic features of anti-Semitism in order to make it more easily recognizable in countries where it is now largely latent.

A weighty objection might be raised against a thorough scientific treatment of anti-Semitism. In dealing with the deeper mechanisms of anti-Semitism one cannot avoid mentioning things which will not be entirely agreeable to Jews. We are thinking especially of our subsection on the so-called character traits of the Jews and the genesis of these traits. One might raise the issue that anti-Semitic propagandists could misuse this and other results of our research.

We do not share this point of view. The fear that truth can also be put to bad use should never paralyze the energy needed to uncover it in its entirety, especially in such vital problems. The growing custom of suppressing important elements of the truth for so-called tactical reasons is taking on

more and more dangerous traits. It easily leads to an optimism which is satisfied to bask in general concepts such as the rights of man, progress, enlightenment, etc., without realizing that in the present phase of society these concepts tend to become mere phrases, just as the fascist advocates of persecution cynically charge.

Furthermore, it is exceedingly important for the struggle against anti-Semitism that those Jewish and non-Jewish progressive circles, which even today close their eyes to the gravity of the problem, become stirred by a scientific demonstration of its underlying causes. They must be freed from the erroneous belief that anti-Semitism exists only where it is openly expressed, for it finds nooks even in the hearts of the noblest of humans. To activate the Jews who feel reassured by the sincere protests against the German pogroms uttered by many important personalities in this and other countries, it is less important to analyze the statements of Julius Streicher than the correspondence of Voltaire and other philosophers of the Enlightenment. As long as anti-Semitism exists as a constant undercurrent in social life, its influence reaches all groups of the population and it can always be rekindled by suitable propaganda.

B. Division of the Project.

Section I: — Current Theories about Anti-Semitism

The traditional theories about anti-Semitism, of which but a few will be mentioned here, fall roughly into two groups: the rationalistic and the anti-Semitic.

A. Among the rationalistic theses, the following deserve special mention:

(1) "There is in fact no anti-Semitism at all." That is, there are no real psychological reactions which could be regarded as primarily anti-Semitic. All anti-Semitism is artificially made up and propagated as a manœuver for mass betrayal, or for the sake of distraction or robbery. The anti-Semitic reactions of the masses have merely been invented. In essence, this theory is most closely related to the idea held by many enlighteners who denounce religion as a mere "hoax of the clergy." In our view, it is much too superficial. It overlooks the fact that the actual anti-Semitic reactions themselves fulfill a decided social and psychological function. In the struggle against anti-Semitism we cannot content ourselves solely with unmasking it as a mere ideology, but must get at the roots of those of its elements which are genuine. Among these, the apparently irrational ones, the idiosyncrasies, are preeminent.

(2) The apologetic thesis that all the objections to the Jew raised by anti-Semites are frame-ups and lies—a thesis closely related to the one above. The discrediting of cheap apologetics is of central importance in the project. It is necessary to analyze the alleged qualities of the Jew which elicit anti-Semitism in order to discover which of them have a basis in reality and which are invented. The "inferiority" which is most frequently mentioned in this connection today (cf. Lee J. Levinger, *The Causes of Anti-Semitism in the United States*. Philadelphia, 1925, p. 102 ff.) is an illustration of the former category, although not the most important. The qualities to which anti-Semites constantly refer with apparent justification

cannot be understood as natural constants, as eternal biological laws; they must be regarded as character traits that may disappear along with the conditions which gave rise to them, as their disappearance in some countries already indicates.

(3) The formal sociological thesis reduces hatred for the Jews and for their specific qualities to the general category of strangeness (for example, Simmel's discourse on the stranger in his Sociology, Leipzig, 1908). It assumes the national cohesion of the Jews and a tenacious adherence on their part to their religion. This thesis, like the preceding ones, is just one side of the truth, particularly applicable to older features of anti-Semitism.

(4) The theory of envy holds that anti-Semitism is rooted in the superior intelligence and efficiency of the Jews. Because of their outstanding qualities the Jews achieve high positions in every field, thus provoking the resentment of the materially and psychologically handicapped. This thesis is too rationalistic, psychologically speaking. It assumes that anti-Semitism is caused by entirely conscious experiences and considerations, whereas such considerations actually play a relatively small part. The element of envy is of some importance, in a shifted or perverted form (e. g. the supposition of the physical, psychological, and social inferiority of the Jews) rather than in a direct form. More details concerning the conscious and subconscious envy of the Jews will be developed in the typological section.

(5) Anti-Semitism is the "socialism of fools." This theory was brought forward by social democrats (Bebel). It implies that the lower middle class in rural and metropolitan areas regards the destruction of its Jewish creditor and competitor as the easiest way out of its economic distress. This economic interpretation contains some truth, too, but it must be supplemented by an analysis of the psychological mechanisms which make even those sections of the masses which are not at all dependent on Jewish business particularly susceptible to anti-Semitic propaganda.

B. Finally, there are the actually anti-Semitic theories, particularly the thesis that Jews are by nature extreme revolutionists and have provided a large number of the leaders of the labor movement. The degree of truth in this view can be checked only by a careful comparison of the histories and social conditions of different countries. A similar analysis is to be made of the parallel thesis that the Jews are extremely capitalistic. Sombart's work, which took on a slight pro-Semitic veneer, has furthered this view considerably. He even hinted at the National Socialist equation, democratic-liberalistic-capitalistic, as well as at the myth of the power of Jewish money.

Section II. — ANTI-SEMITISM AND MASS MOVEMENTS.

This section is not intended as a history of anti-Semitism. Its aim is to reveal, by selected historical events, a set of socio-psychological trends which are characteristic of anti-Semitism as a whole. These trends are not manifested exclusively in anti-Semitic outbreaks; their basic structure can be seen in activities which have been conducted against other social groups as well. The recurrence of punishment and destruction throughout more recent history throws some light upon destructive character traits which remained latent in broad sections of the population even during "quiet" periods. It is

generally overlooked that present day National Socialism contains potentialities which have been dormant not only in Germany but also in many other parts of the world. Many phenomena familiar in totalitarian countries (for instance, the role of the leader, mass meetings, fraternizing, drunken enthusiasm, the myth of sacrifice, the contempt of the individual, etc.,) can be understood only historically—that is, from the foundations of the whole of modern history. In this section, relatively well known facts will be treated by contrasting them anew with descriptions of current problems of anti-Semitism, and socio-psychological mechanisms that are still effective will be analyzed.

A. The First Crusade.

The popular leaders under whom massacres were committed generally display ascetic features. One has only to think of Peter of Amiens, the priests Gottschalk and Volkmer, and of other preachers. The role of short slogans is also characteristic. At that time the cry, "God wills it," seized literally all Europe (cf. the cry of the National Socialists, "Germany awake!") The masses followed that slogan, feeling themselves part of a mystic community and filled with the certainty of forgiveness for their sins. Staking one's individual life and happiness mattered little (cf. the National Socialist doctrine of the unimportance of the individual and the pillorizing of egoism). Everyone subordinated himself to a "great idea." The annihilation of the inhabitants of whole provinces by enthusiastic Crusaders was fortified by the assertion that the action was directed against the foes of the highest leader, quite similar to the purges of the National Socialists. The unbelievers included not only the Turks and the Saracens but also the Jews and others whom the masses could overwhelm and pillage. Something which allegedly has languished for a long period must always be freed in order to serve as rationalization for the fury which explodes in such actions—either the holy sepulchre under the thumb of the heathen, or Germany under the Versailles treaty. The mass psychological significance of such ideologies will be explained.

B. The Albigensian Crusade.

In the Crusade against the Albigenses, a clergyman leader, Arnold of Citeaux, again held first rank. No distinction was made between Christian heretics and Jews. Both were struck by the same fury. The war was an attempt by the old bureaucracy of the church, which was being reorganized, to suppress the rising bourgeoisie. (Similarly, from the inception of National Socialism to the first years of its rule, 1927-1934, the old powers, Junkers, sections of the officer corps, Protestant clergymen, civil servants, and bankrupt munitions industrialists had reorganized themselves against the young democratic republic.) The political character of the war against the Albigenses also manifests itself in the fact that belief did not matter much to the Knights of the Crusade. Many Catholics were killed along with Protestants and Jews. They too belonged to the South, progressive in commerce and crafts. Unconcern about differences in ideology is characteristic of such uprisings. It reveals the fact that the fight against heresies or criminal elements is only a pretext for more underlying economic and socio-psychological tendencies.

C. Jew-baiting in twelfth and thirteenth century England.

During the Crusades and the first war against the Albigenses, pogroms spread over Germany, France and the East. In England, Richard the Lion-Hearted originally showed no anti-Semitic tendencies; he actually protected the Jews. But popular clergymen, especially the Archbishops of Canterbury, Thomas à Becket and Baldwin, made their appearance as anti-Semitic mass leaders. The people knelt before Thomas à Becket and were gripped by collective infatuation (cf. intoxicated enthusiasm in modern mass meetings). The connection between a special type of leader cult, mass fraternizing, and pogroms is one of the most important socio-psychological subjects for investigation. In England, which was touched by the anti-Semitic wave a hundred years later than the Continent, the cool-headedness and resistance shown at first by the British Islanders did not impair the mechanisms which impel anti-Semitism. The Channel was no barrier against social contagion.

D. The Reformation.

During the time of the Reformation the Jews were not persecuted along with the heretics, as they were during the war against the Albigenses, but with the Catholics. Just as monks and nuns were accused of hoarding secret treasures in their cloisters and indulging in unnatural practices, the Jews were blamed for lurid secret crimes in addition to their superstitious rites (cf. the present accusations in Germany against Jewish Lodges and charges of vice against Catholic clergymen). The repressed drives of the population, diverted by reformers into internal discipline and fear of conscience, come forth in the inventions about Catholics and Jews.

There were young people who, leading their elders, forced their way into churches and monasteries, destroyed works of art and made fun of priests during their sermons. Again it was chiefly young people who delighted in caricatures of Jews (cf. the role of youth in the so-called years of struggle for National Socialism).

In Martin Luther the anti-Semitic arsenal is fully equipped. The anti-rationalist Luther compares reason with a wild beast and with a whore, and lumps Jews together with prostitutes (cf. *Von den Juden und ihren Lügen*,[1] p. 94-95). Hitler forbids discussions between National Socialists and members of the other race; Luther said, "Don't dispute much with Jews about the articles of our faith" (p. 63). Luther wanted the Jews out of Germany. "Country and streets are open to them so they might move to the country if they like. We'll give them gifts, with pleasure, in order to get rid of them because they are a heavy burden, like a plague, pestilence and misfortune in our country" (p. 187). His concrete suggestions, however, do not advocate presenting them with gifts and letting them go. This is how they go: "and take away from them all their cash and jewels of silver and gold, and set it apart, to be guarded" (p. 191). "That into the hands of the young strong Jews and Jewesses are placed flails, axes, mattocks, trowels, distaffs and spindles, and they are made to earn their daily bread by the sweat of their brows (Luther says literally 'of their noses') as it is put upon the shoulders of the children of Adam" (p. 193). "That their synagogues or schools be set on fire" (p. 189). "That their houses be broken up and

[1]Ausgewählte Werke, Ergänzungsreihe dritter Band, München 1936.

destroyed . . . they be put under a roof or stable, like the Gypsies, in order to let them know that they are no longer masters in our country as they flatter themselves, but in misery and captivity as they incessantly lament and complain to God about us" (p. 190). "That their right of escort on the streets be altogether abolished. For they have nothing to do in the country because they are neither knights nor officials nor merchants, nor anything of that sort, and they ought to stay at home" (p. 191).

E. The French Revolution.

Sociological trends can be found in the French Revolution which are similar to those in popular uprisings that have an anti-Semitic flavor. Anti-Semitism is pushed into the background by the specifically equalitarian ideology. The objects of the terror are the aristocrats who, significantly enough, are branded as a race. Legislative measures, agitation, and popular uprisings against the aristocracy bear comparison to the racial upheavals of our time. There are a number of accusations against the aristocrats which correspond to the usual charges against the Jews—shirking work, parasitic character, luxury, viciousness, international connections, their claim to be chosen, etc. Similar technique can be found in mass meetings of the French Revolution and of the present time—speeches of the leaders, the power of the sub-leaders in the provinces, fear of spies and traitors, corruption scandals, the practice of denunciation, allegedly spontaneous mass action, hatred of bank capital, hatred of foreigners, and new heathen cults. Despite their diametrically opposite aims, National Socialism has more in common with the French Revolution than is generally assumed.

F. Wars of German Independence and other German uprisings.

In the wars of German Independence in 1813-1915 and in the ensuing uprisings, several features of National Socialism are heralded. The eagerness of the free cities and of the German principalities to revoke the emancipation achieved during Napoleonic rule corresponds to the National Socialist passion to avenge the "fourteen years of disgrace," that is, the Weimar Republic in which the Jews actually possessed full civil rights. In the emancipation movements of the German bourgeoisie the universities combined anti-Semitism with the German ideology of freedom. The close relation between German Protestantism, Germanic paganism, community socialism, and German ideals of unitarian government becomes obvious. Burning of books appeared in this period. Books designated by the so-called democratic papers as unpatriotic (e. g. The Code Napoleon), and writings of Jewish authors were cast into the flames with the cry, "Woe to the Jews." In Würzburg, Karlsruhe, Heidelberg, Darmstadt, and Frankfurt, Jewish houses were branded and the inhabitants mistreated. All this occurred under liberal and patriotic slogans.

The movement of the "awakening" people is also found in Holland and Scandinavia. Metternich and the conservative governments had to take strong measures against the allegedly democratic masses. The farthest seeing German thinkers, for instance Gœthe, Schelling and Hegel, stood against the "liberals" and on the side of the "reactionaries."

Section III. — ANTI-SEMITISM IN MODERN HUMANISM.

During the so-called enlightened era of the last 200 years, no stratum of the population has been free from anti-Semitism.

Some statements of an anti-Semitic nature can be found even in the works championing tolerance and humanism. It is important to investigate whether the passages dealing with the Jews disclose an ambivalence toward the concept of universal love for man, despite the fact that the authors present that concept quite sincerely. It is also important to investigate the relevance of the less exposed portions of the works of most writers who "stuck up for" the Jews. We must finally find out whether in an unguarded moment they betrayed the fact that their pro-Semitism did not overcome a deep feeling of alienation.

Proof that such contradictions exist within the individual in modern society would be particularly important for the evaluation of the many indignant declarations against anti-Semitism. Such declarations are dangerous in that they might easily lead to the erroneous belief that anti-Semitism has disappeared, at least among educated people.

The contradictions which may be found even with the most sincere proponents of the humanitarian ideal could throw light on the status of the reactionary and uneducated sections of the population. If ambivalence is present in the most progressive personalities, it will be all the sharper in the less cultured and enlightened individuals. Some scattered examples follow, in the hope that they make clear what is meant by these contradictions in the works of great thinkers.

A. French Enlightenment.

Voltaire: His name is a symbol of philosophical enlightenment and bourgeois freedom. He, more than any of his contemporaries, recognized the sufferings of the Jews and the injustices inflicted upon them. His attacks upon the Biblical history of the Jewish people are actually directed against the Christian Church belief. The Old Testament was a somewhat vulnerable point in the Church dogma because, unlike the wonders of the New Testament, it was not well protected by the authority of the Church and removed from profane thinking, but was left largely to the mercy of profane thinking; at the same time it plays its role in the canon of the Holy Writ, and the disenchantment of the Old Testament's wonders throws its light indirectly on those of the New. One can say that Voltaire's attacks against the Old Testament, insofar as they are not really directed at the Jews but indirectly against the Christian dogma which hindered the emancipation of the Jews, benefitted the latter indirectly. Nevertheless, perhaps not even Voltaire was free from anti-Semitic prejudice. In the Essai sur les mœurs (Chapter 103) he says that one is "amazed at the hatred and contempt which all nations have continually shown toward the Jews; this attitude is the necessary outcome of the Jewish law. Either they must subdue everything, or they must be thrown into the dust themselves. . . Later, when their eyes were opened a little more by victor nations, who taught them that the world was larger than they believed, their law itself made them natural fools of these nations, and finally of the whole human race." "I know," he says in a letter, "that some Jews live in the English colonies. These crooks go wherever money can be made, like the Parsees, the Banians, and the Armenians. . . But if these circumcised Israelites who sell old trousers to the savages, trace themselves back to the tribes of Naphtalimuch or Issachar, it does not make any difference. Anyhow, they are the greatest scoundrels who have ever besmirched the face of the earth." (Dec. 15, 1773, letter to Chevalier de Lisle.)

B. German Philosophy.

Herder: He is the author of The Letters for the Promulgation of Humanism. Consciously he always advocated humanitarianism and justice. His glorification of Hebrew poetry seems to protect him from any suspicion of anti-Semitism. But there are passages which might lead us to believe that there also exists a totally different Herder. He says in Adrastea, V, 7 (Conversion of the Jews) that Luther's utterances about the Jews were often too callous, in accordance with his time. "They have since been reaffirmed to such a degree that around the end of the last century, when some Jewish fathers of the family tried conditionally to associate and affiliate themselves to a newly built and enlightened Christendom, no one paid much attention to them." He does not consider it reasonable to talk too much about human rights when faced with the concrete issues of the Jewish problem: "As the business of the Jews has been known for more than three thousand years, the influence which it has had and immutably still has upon the character of that people shows itself throughout their history. Why then those more distant, far-fetched discussions, for instance, about the rights of humanity, if the question is only this: How many of this foreign people shall be allowed to conduct *this, their business,* in this European state, without detriment to the natives? Under what conditions? With what limitations? Under whose supervision? For, unfortunately, history provides sad proof that an unlimited number of them corrupt a European state, particularly one which is badly organized. Not general *humanitarian principles,* but the constitution of the nation in which the Jews carry on their profession, answers these questions." Herder expressly polemicizes against other countries patterning their attitude on the treatment of the Jews in Holland, at that time a progressive country.

Kant: According to Kant, it is an unconditional task to regard every man not as a means but as an end. By "end" Kant refers to man's position of esteem because he is a free, autonomous, rational being. His remarks about the Jews, however, do not seem at all in accord with his postulate of practical reason. The contradiction to his universal principle of morals is evident; it is hopeless to improve the Jews. "The Palestinians living among us, even the bulk of them, have earned the not unfounded reputation of cheats because of their usurious minds. It seems strange to think of a nation of cheats. But it is just as strange to think of a nation of merchants . . . acknowledged by the state, who not receiving any civic honor, desire to compensate for their loss, by outwitting the people under whose protection they live, and even each other. . . . Instead of the futile plan to "moralize" this people with regard to fraud and honesty, I'd rather like to profess my hypothesis . . . about that odd status." (Anthropology, Part k, B § 46, footnote.)

Fichte: Fichte's theories of freedom, and later, of socialism, have, rightly or wrongly, been enthusiastically accepted by many European liberals and Socialists. His moral rigorism, which, like Kant's, urges that man be judged not according to natural (i.e., racial) criteria but according to his fulfillment of duty, nevertheless condemned the Jews: "Throughout almost all European countries, a mighty, hostile state is expanding. It is constantly at war with them, and in some countries it weighs horribly upon the inhabitants. I don't believe that Jewry has become so terrible because it constitutes a separate and tightly chained state of its own . . . but because this state is based upon the hatred of the entire human race . . . Does not the reasonable thought

occur to you here that the Jews, who have a state of their own without you, will grind you other inhabitants under their heels as soon as you give them civic rights?" He comments upon these remarks in the footnote: "Let the poisoned breath of intolerance be far from these pages, as it is from my heart." And yet, "To give civic rights to the Jews, I see no measure but cutting off all their heads, and replacing them by other heads in which there is not a single Jewish idea left. To protect us from them, again, I see no other means but to conquer their Promised Land for them in order to send them there altogether." (About the French Revolution, Book I, Chapter III, pp. 114 and 115.)

Hegel: Hegel is distinguished from most philosophers of his time by his insight into the world historical situation. He showed only contempt for the Teutonic and anti-Semitic currents in the German universities. He staunchly advocated the granting of civic rights to the Jews. Some statements can be found which might contain hints of hatred for Jews: "The great tragedy of the Jewish people . . . can only create disgust. . . The fate of the Jewish people is the fate of Macbeth who overstepped the boundaries of Nature itself, clung to heterogeneous, weird beings, trod upon and murdered in their service everything that is sacred to human nature, was abandoned by his gods (for they were objects and he was a slave), and finally was smitten as a consequence of his own belief." (Fragments of Theological Studies, published by Karl Rosenkranz, in G. W. F. Hegel's Life, Berlin 1844, p. 492). "The Jewish people have been driven to Hell in the infamy of their hatred. Whoever of them has been left stalking the earth has remained as a memento" (Ibid., p. 522). According to Hegel's philosophy one can say about the Jewish people "that just because they were at the threshold of salvation, they are and have been the most object of all." (Phenomenology of Mind, II, p. 257.)

Goethe: Gœthe was no anti-Semite. On the contrary, there are many highly positive remarks in his writings about the qualities of the Jews, about their practical minds, their perseverence and tenacity. Anti-Semitic sentences are not phrased directly, but as opinions of poetic characters, whom, however, he frequently draws with sympathy. Characteristic of the time in which Gœthe lived is the way in which he associates Jews and Catholic priests, e. g., Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre (Book II, Chapters VI and XI); "Cowls for magicians, Jews and sky-pilots." They "wrangled over whether he was a sky-pilot or a Jew." Mephistopheles says "The Church alone, be it confessed, Daughters, can ill-got wealth digest." And Faust remarks, "It is a general custom, too, Practiced alike by king and Jew." (Faust, verse 2839-1842; transl. Anna Swanwick, London, 1886). In Wilhelm Meister's Wanderjahre the principles of a Utopian community are described. One passage reads: We do not tolerate "any Jews among us, for how could we grant them participation in the highest culture, whose origin and descent they deny?" (Book III, Chapter XI). Gœthe writes in the Swiss Journey: "The people there are thoroughly polite, and in their behavior show a good, natural, quiet burgher way of thinking. Jews are not tolerated there."

Such an analysis lies at the bottom of Treitschke's judgment of anti-Semitism throughout the history of the German mind. "From Luther on down to Gœthe, Herder, Kant and Fichte, almost all great Germanic thinkers agreed

in this feeling. Lessing, with his predilection for the Jews was quite singular." The only one among the later writers who resembled Lessing in this respect was Nietzsche. (We do not give any examples of pro-Semitic statements here. In the study itself we shall deal extensively with Nietzsche's positive attitude toward the Jews.)

Such inconsistency as may exist between the concrete utterances about the Jews and the humanitarian ideal within individuals would be only part of the universal contradiction between the dire reality of modern society and the dream of harmony among all humanity. The latter was consciously proclaimed by all the above thinkers. They devoted all the spiritual powers at their disposal to it. They were rooted, howeve , in the reality of their environment; their impulses, their intimate sympathies, and aversions derived therefrom.

D. French Novel.

No matter how energetically Zola, the defender of Captain Dreyfuss, fought against hatred of the Jews, elements can be found in his own works which could be classed as identical with official anti-Semitism. In his novel, *L'Argent*, Zola pictures a Jew of whom he says, "The public wealth was devoured by the ever increasing fortune of a single individual. Gundermann (the Jew in question) was, in fact, the master, the almighty king. Paris and the whole world lay trembling and obedient at his feet." Fantastic conceptions about Jewish riches and power, about the coldness and calculation of the Jews, keep recurring in French literature since Balzac.

Our analyses of these anti-Semitic tendencies of philosophers and writers are not undertaken in order to blame them for subjective insincerity. Our purpose is rather, through the revelation of these unconscious and hidden germs of anti-Semitism, to expose the problem in all its seriousness.

Section IV. — Types of present day anti-Semites.

Much of the misunderstanding about anti-Semitism has its roots in the confusion of its very different types. The success of any attempt to fight anti-Semitism depends largely on knowledge of the social and psychological genesis of its various species, often indiscernible in daily life. The types of anti-Semites are here considered from both the historical and psychological points of view.

We believe ourselves safe from the misunderstanding that according to this typology (in which even the pro-Semites are mentioned) all Christians are anti-Semites. The classification does not intend to distribute large groups of individuals among these types, but merely to formulate with theoretical precision a number of extreme possibilities of anti-Semitic attitudes. Neither do we claim that any individual who shows any of the character traits mentioned in the typology is an anti-Semite merely because of those traits, nor do we even assert that actual anti-Semites can be classified entirely according to the principles indicated. In reality the anti-Semites will often appear as combinations and intermediate forms of the "ideal possibilities" mentioned here.

A. The "born" anti-Semite.

The basic quality of this type is the renunciation of rational justification. He reacts with apparent "instinct" against so-called Jewish racial traits—flat feet, smell, hooked nose, Jewish accent, gesticulation, etc. His nausea is a reaction to the scars of mutilation which history has stamped upon the Jews. Even their names (Itzig, Levy, Cohn) are repugnant to him. He simply cannot stand the Jews. It can often be observed that this type appreciates so-called "racy" women akin to the Jewish type if they are presented to him as Gentile (note the success of Pola Negri with the National Socialists). This trend indicates that the allegedly natural anti-Semitism in some of its representatives is actually an over-compensation for suppressed or inhibited desires.

B. The religious-philosophical anti-Semite.

Although this type has largely disappeared, there are still a good many left who regard the Jews as adherents of a hostile religion. The Jews have crucified Christ. They have remained impenitent for thousands of years. They particularly ought to have been summoned to recognize him since they were witnesses of his activity and of his passion, but they have persisted in denying him. Hence the Jewish religion is in effect equivalent to absolute disbelief. The Jew is Judas. He is the stranger who deliberately excludes himself from the Christian community. He can compensate for his guilt by baptism, but even then he deserves distrust until he can prove that he has seriously atoned. Many non-believing Christians resent the Jew's tenacious adherence to outdated superstitious rites. They feel that he should have joined the dominant religion, for social and humanitarian if not for religious reasons. This category includes many humanists, Gœthe, Schopenhauer, and Hegel, insofar as they attach reservations to their favorable comments on Jews.

C. The back-woods or sectarian anti-Semite.

This type has made anti-Semitism a substitute for religion, as other groups have vegetarianism, Krishna Murti, or any other physical or psychical panacea. The imaginary world of the sectarian anti-Semite is dominated by the notion of conspiracy. He believes in Jewish world domination; he swears by the Elders of Zion. On the other hand, he himself tends to favor conspiracies which have much in common, structurally, with the images he fears (Ku Klux Klan, etc.). He considers Freemasonry and other fraternal orders to be the greatest of world perils, but he himself founds lodge-like congregations whenever possible. He has the reverence of the semi-erudite for science and believes that non-intercourse with Jews is a sort of natural cure for rejuvenating man and world.

D. The vanquished competitor.

The place of this type in the processes of production necessarily brings him into conflict with the Jews. He comes from the lower strata who are compelled to buy from Jews and to fall into their debt, from among the owners of specialty shops who are forced out of business by the competition of Jewish owned department stores, etc. His hatred does not stem from specific

characteristics of the Jews but rather from certain economic relationships through which he suffers.

Since this type of anti-Semitism has some basis in reality, it also has a certain rational character. Under certain conditions therefore, it can disappear easily. For example, during the last few years in Germany, National Socialism has, to a great extent, been deserted by these people (innkeepers, provision dealers, peasants, etc.). The promised improvement of conditions by anti-Semitic measures did not materialize. Therefore, these groups have abandoned anti-Semitism as a panacea.

E. The well-bred anti-Semite.

This is the anti-Semitism of the upper bourgeois strata who want to emulate the exclusiveness of the aristocrats which was formerly directed against them. This type of anti-Semitism, prevalent in all nations, is particularly common in the Anglo-Saxon world. Whatever may be the elements of truth in the reason usually adduced by its representatives (for instance the failure of some groups of immigrants to assimilate themselves to their new surroundings) the attitude as a whole is a phenomenon of imitation, similar to fox-hunts, chateau-like country estates, etc. Rationalizations are manifold. In addition to the religious and political arguments, those aimed at Jewish manners are particularly numerous. The Jews are supposed to be loud, unreserved, obtrusive; their inferiority complex necessitates their pushing themselves into the foreground; they are grumbling and querulous; they want the best for the least money. One always has unfortunate experiences with them. Jewish intellectuals are as impossible as Jewish business men. Their intelleotual conversations break the rules of the game. They resemble shop talk. Anyone whose emotions are too easily stirred is ignoble. Here the proverbial exception actually has the function of proving the rule.

F. The "Condottiere" anti-Semite.

This type has arisen with the increased insecurity of post-war existence. He is convinced that what matters is not life but chance. He is nihilistic, not out of a "drive for destruction" but because he is indifferent to individual existence. One of the reservoirs out of which this type arises is the modern unemployed. He differs from former unemployed in that his contact with the sphere of production is sporadic, if any. Individuals belonging to his category can no longer expect to be regularly absorbed by the labor process. From their youth they have been ready to act wherever they could grab something. They are inclined to hate the Jew partly because his cautiousness and physical inefficacy, partly because, being themselves unemployed, they are economically uprooted, unusually susceptible to any propaganda, and ready to follow any leader. The other reservoir, at the opposite pole of society, is the group belonging to the dangerous professions, colonial adventures, racing motorists, airplane aces. They are the born leaders of the former group. Their ideal, actually an heroic one, is all the more sensitive to the "destructive," critical intellect of the Jews because they themselves are not quite convinced of their ideal in the depths of their hearts, but have developed it as a rationalization of their dangerous way of living. The anti-Semitic tendencies within certain groups of the German youth movement follow the same direction.

G. The "Jew-baiter".

All types are potentially sadistic. Here, however, anti-Semitism is a relatively thin pretext for repressed fury. This type hates the alleged weakness of humanitarianism, which he brands as cowardice, and which he characterizes as Duselei (somnolence or reverie). What he hates most of all is the Jew's allegedly higher psychological faculty for "enjoying life."

This type hates the revolutionary Jew because he "wants to have it better." Nevertheless, he is himself pseudo-revolutionary, insofar as his fury is basically the naked drive for destruction, although that drive realizes itself only in excesses allowed from above. Hence he calls his own counter-revolutionary addiction to action, revolution, and the revolution, Capitalism. Many of the more radical people liquidated by Hitler in his purges and a large number of the present SS leaders fall in this category. The relation of this type of anti-Semitism to sexual drives, which incidentally has much in common with the earlier Radauantisemitismus (rowdy anti-Semitism), is comparatively unconcealed. It is often based upon unconscious or conscious homosexuality.

H. The Fascist-political anti-Semite.

This type is characterized by sober intelligence. He is cold, without affections, and is perhaps the most merciless of all. He deals with anti-Semitism as an export article. He has no immediate gratification from the persecution of the Jews, and if he has, it is only incidental. He deliberately plans their annihilation. He fulfills his task by administrative measures without any personal contact with the victims. He does not have to hate the Jews; he is able to negotiate with foreign ones most amiably. To him anti-Semitism is reified. It must function. He organizes the "spontaneous" actions of the people against the Jews. He holds in contempt the henchmen of his own will, perhaps even more than the Jews. He is nihilistic, too, but in a cynical way. "The Jewish question will be solved strictly legally," is the way he talks about the cold pogrom. Whereas Streicher is representative of the Jew-baiter, Goebbels is the incarnation of the fascist-political anti-Semite. The tremendous propaganda value of anti-Semitism throughout the world may be the only reason the fascist leaders keep anti-Semitism alive.

I. The Jew-lover.

Those persons are really free of anti-Semitism to whom the distinction makes no difference, to whom the so-called racial traits appear unessential.

There are people, however, who stress the differences between Jews and Christians in a way friendly to the Jews. This type of thinking contains an anti-Semitic nucleus which has its origin in racial discrimination. The Jews are exceedingly sensitive to this kind of anti-Semitism. The declaration of a man who professes to be particularly fond of the Jews because of their "prophetic" or other qualities discomforts them. They discover here the admission of and even the apology for that secret discrimination. The anti-Semitic types mentioned above can shift by certain mechanisms into different brands of Jew-lovers and overcompensate their hatred by a somewhat exaggerated and therefore fundamentally unreliable adoration. For instance, corresponding to the "born" anti-Semite is the man who always speaks of

his enjoyable experiences with the Jewish people; to the anti-Semitic sectarian, all the Christian religious sects which venerate the Jews as the people of the Bible, keep the Sabbath, etc.; to the socialite anti-Semite, the well-bred gentleman who finds rowdy anti-Semitism repulsive.

Section V. — The Jews in Society.

It is necessary to seek an explanation of the causes of certain Jewish character traits to which the anti-Semite reacts negatively. These causes find their roots in the economic life of the Jew, in his particular function in society and in the consequences of his economic activity.

A. The "Dirty work."

The economic activity of the Jews is largely restricted to commerce and finance because of their exclusion from the immediately productive occupations. With the increasing significance of the market in capitalist economy, the importance of trade and finance increases too. A market economy accentuates the differences among the various strata of society. The lower strata become aware of their miserable conditions not so much through intercourse with those who are really mighty (the leaders of industry and politics) but through contact with the middleman, the merchant and banker. Their hatred of these middlemen explodes in the direction of the Jews who symbolize this element.

From olden times the practice of extending credit has prevented the antagonism between the possessors of power and the economically oppressed population from leading to recurrent catastrophes. The peasant and burgher, heavily burdened by taxes, could keep their heads above water for a long time by the utilization of credit. Yet the real economic situation about which they are deceived by the institution of credit does not improve, but becomes worse; one day the bill will be presented. And the middleman, largely the Jew, who has fulfilled a function indispensable to the existence of that society, appears as the casual factor of impoverishment. The outdated theories of Sombart about the role of the Jews in modern economy will be criticized in the course of this presentation.

B. Non-productive capital.

The diffusion of slogans about the difference between productive and non-productive capital originates as a manœuver of distraction. This thesis, quite old in itself, was propagated during the struggle between the individual industrial groups and banking capital, between export industry and heavy industry, and between general directors and shareholders. During the period of inflation and deflation, the big German concerns deposited the burdens of the World War upon the shoulders of the middle and lower classes and renewed their productive equipment. They used the bankers and the Jews, together with the originators of the Versailles Treaty, as scapegoats for the misery of the post-war period. The figure of the so-called productive man was contrasted with that of the parasite. The experiences of the masses with the middleman serve to facilitate the resurrection and acceptance of the myth of the Jew as a non-productive parasite. It is difficult for the consumer to

understand the economic necessity of the intermediary functions (commerce, advertising, achievements of financial technique) which serve to raise the price of a product; it is easier for him to understand the immediate functions of the production of goods. Hence, so many of the Utopian schemes of the last few centuries proposed a society in which the intermediary functions would be completely eliminated. Such a proposal, for example, appears in Richard Wagner's imaginary world. He contrasts the heroic productive Siegfried, a mixture of the munition manufacturer, the condottiere, and the rowdy, with the dwarf, a symbol of the owners, merchants, and the resentful, eternally complaining proletariat. The anti-Semitic declaration that one part of society consists of parasites feeding upon the other social strata cannot be overcome simply by being labelled a frame-up. Its historical origin must be clarified and understood.

C. Rational law.

Since its Roman origin, civil law has been the law of creditors. Whereas it recognizes no difference between any groups or individuals but aims at the universal protection of property, it is a priori antagonistic to the debtor. Historically, because of the creditor role of the Jews, deriving from their functions as bankers and merchants, we find them usually on the side of rational law. Their foes, on the other hand, favor a vague natural law based on the "sound instinct of the people."

There is real justification for the indignation of the condemned and foreclosed peasant or the widow plunged into poverty by law. They feel that an injustice has been done them because they have fallen into misery without any moral guilt on their part. The law, however, acts only as the executor of economic tendencies within the totality of society, and these condemn certain social strata to annihilation. As an abstract category, the law is not only innocent but to a considerable degree often acts as a check upon those tendencies. The conscientious man, deprived of his property by judicial verdicts, struggling in vain against his Jewish adversary and his Jewish lawyer, is a standing figure (for example in literature, e.g., *The Merchant of Venice* and many modern works).

D. The Jewish mentality.

The psychological faculty of abstraction developed with the commercial and financial function. In the commodity economy, men face each other as equals, not according to distinctions of birth or religion. It does not matter who they are, but only what commodity they want to buy or sell. The abstract notion of the thing as a commodity corresponds to the abstract notion of man. It makes no difference if one sells art objects, cotton or guns. The psychological functions which are developed on the basis of such economic conditions and the mentality which corresponds to them are of course not limited to the Jews. Calculating, so-called rationalistic thinking, has been developed chiefly by non-Jewish philosophers. Anti-Semitism, however, seeks to identify the Jews with this school of thought. As a matter of fact, the Jews historically have always had an affinity for dauntless, abstract thinking which manifests itself in the idea of a god who regards all men as equal. But this is not the whole story. There is also a "night side" to the Jewish spirit, full of ir-

rationality and even mythology (one thinks of Jewish mystical sects such a Chassidism and of the Jewish superstition that still survives). In any event, even if one assumes that "rationalism" is the main trend among Jews, one has no reason whatsoever to bow to the verdict which anti-Semites reach on the basis of that assumption. The levelling that results from abstract thinking is a prerequisite for the development of the world, in a truly human sense, for this type of thinking divests human relationships and things of their taboos and brings them into the realm of reason. Jews have therefore always stood in the front ranks of the struggle for democracy and freedom.

The study of the so-called Jewish mentality explains why the Jews are blamed simultaneously for capitalistic and revolutionary relativistic and dogmatic, tolerant and intolerant "mindedness". Such contradictory accusations do not in fact reflect upon the Jews but rather upon the state of mankind in the present historical period. The Jews are but the bearers of society's inconsistencies.

E. The so-called race factor.

The question of the origin of those qualities which, in distorted form, are attributed to the Jews, must be answered first by refuting the race theory. As shown in the previous subsections, they are not biological but historical phenomena, characterized chiefly by the economic function into which the Jews have been forced. This explanation must not be applied automatically, however, for we see that certain intellectual and character traits are found, in a differentiated form, among Jewish individuals and families who have not themselves engaged in the occupations with which "Jewish" traits were originally connected. It is just this fact which is cited again and again by race theorists as proof of an alleged biological heritage.

The results of modern psychology may be applied to this social problem with good prospects of success. We follow the trend of modern psychology so far as to accept the thesis that just those decisive character traits which prove to be relatively constant in the individual's life may be traced back to the history and experiences of the child in his first years. In his earliest period of life, the child does not come into direct contact with the contemporary social milieu but only with his nearest of kin. Even they communicate with him less in accordance with their rational convictions than with behaviors (drive tendencies and impulses) which had been instilled in them during the earliest stages of their own lives. But it can be shown that the greatest impression on the infant is made not by the meaning of the words but by the expression, the voice, the movements of the parents. The soul of learning is imitation. The child's faculty of imitating the expressions of adults is exceedingly subtle. He observes the most unnoticeable and subtle shades of their gestures. Thus it happens that inclinations, skills, anxieties which have long lost their real meaning leave their mark on the faces and the behavior of later generations.

The development of this theory in detail can contribute not merely to a refutation of the race theory but to a positive replacement of it. It will throw light on the genesis of German, French, and English character traits as well as of Jewish traits. Even anti-Semitism itself will become more comprehensible in that the seemingly natural aversion to certain behaviors, for instance what might be called the home-grown anti-Semitism of some parts

of Germany before National Socialism, may be explained as a psychological transmission from earlier historical conditions.

Section VI.—Foundations of National Socialist anti-Semitism.

An understanding of anti-Jewish measures under National Socialism presupposes an understanding of the Nazi social and political system.

A. Antecedent History of National Socialism.

The roots of National Socialism in German and in European history in general have already been discussed in sections II and III. A survey of German philosophy and literature from the beginning of the twentieth century will show that most ideological features, such as anti-rationalism, community-madness, and the belief in a leader, have for some time dominated public thinking. We shall analyze the political pre-history of National Socialism, the Jingoism of the pre-war period to which, in spite of its anti-Semitic features, many Jews fell victim; we shall also seek to understand the specific characteristics on the basis of which the German people were aroused in 1914 and in the consequent war policy as features of the same historical roots from which National Socialism has developed. The political reasons for the decay of the Weimar Republic can be grouped into two categories: 1) The impossibility of a working parliament because of the dispossession of the middle classes. (The Communists, Social Democrats, and National Socialists together held 55.9% of all the votes in December 1930). The democratic parties therefore accepted the undemocratic practice of allowing the executive to rule by emergency decrees without the sanction of parliament, or at least of its committees. 2) The policy of toleration and alliance between the German democratic powers and the Prussian Junkers and the politically most backward sections of German heavy industry. The fact that the Junkers and heavy industry finally abandoned collaboration with the democrats and agreed to the seizure of power by the National Socialists cannot be explained primarily by their love for the new system. To face the dilemma of national as well as international danger, the help of the democratic forces was not strong enough. They chose dictatorship with no clear idea of what was to come. In the Weimar Republic the democratic powers were very weak from the beginning. As between the two extremes of the old ruling class and the radical sector of the workers, they decided in favor of the former without first being able to build up a strong policy of their own. (The project will carefully trace the individual stages of this process; alliances between the trade unions and Stinnes, between Ebert and Hindenburg, between the government and the fascist free corps, acceptance of the rearmament policy, and so forth. The terrorism of today's concentration camps was anticipated in the murder of republican leaders (Erzberger, Rathenau, Haase). The surrender of the executive powers to the Junker-loving Hindenburg, with the consent of all the democratic parties, sealed the fate of the Republic.

B. The change in the function of money.

In a laissez-faire economy the entrepreneur could tell by the increase or decrease of the money capital which he invested in an undertaking, the extent to which it was useful to society. If a factory or any other business could

not keep pace with general economic developments, this was expressed in its financial statements and finally in the disappearance of the undertaking itself. Its collapse was the judgment of the market as to its social usefulness, and this judgment was proclaimed in money. In the totalitarian state the free market is abolished, and the ability of money to "declare" ceases to exist. Now the government, together with rather small groups of the contemporary German bureaucracy, determines which undertakings are useful for its military and other purposes and which are not. The market, an anonymous and democratic tribunal, is replaced by the command and plan of those in power.

The importance of the initiative of private entrepreneurs, particularly of large and small private banks, disappears. Bankers in non-totalitarian countries sometimes reveal a sympathy for National Socialism but they have an incomplete understanding of its economic character. At this point certain figures may be mentioned: Total deposits in German private banks between 1929 and 1938 have decreased from 2,300,000,000 to 950,000,000. marks, and in all the large banking concerns, from 12,408,000,000 to 6,804,000,000. Restriction of new issues of bonds, shares, and mortgage bonds has reduced operations on the stock market to a minimum. State-directed foreign exchange control and the compulsion to sell foreign exchange, bonds, and shares to the Reichsbank further reduce banking activity. The amount of Reich loans to be subscribed by the banks is determined, to a large extent, by the Reich itself. Credit as a whole is replaced by government protection. What applies to the banks applies in part to commerce as well.

The decline in importance of the spheres of economic activity in which the German Jews were chiefly engaged is the basis of their becoming superfluous. Their economic existence was intimately connected with the liberal system of economy and with its judicial and political conditions. In liberalism, as already mentioned, the unfit are eliminated by the effectiveness of the mechanism of competition, no matter what their names are or what personal qualities they have. In the totalitarian system, however, individuals or entire social groups can be sent to the gallows at any moment for political or other reasons. The replacement of the market by a planned economy of the state bureaucracy and the decline of the power of money capital makes possible the policy against the Jews in the Third Reich.

C. The propaganda value of anti-Semitism.

The above conditions alone, however, are not sufficient to explain the maintenance and intensification of anti-Semitic measures. The weight of the fortunes stolen from the Jews for the totalitarian economy is only one of the factors operative, although quite a strong one. But what is the effect of anti-Semitic propaganda upon certain social strata of other countries? While frank disgust for the anti-Semitism of the government is revealed among the German masses, the promises of anti-Semitism are eagerly swallowed where fascist governments have never been attempted. Even where the anti-Semitic sympathies of the masses are not yet tolerated, or even not yet conscious to them because of a cultural democratic tradition, the social and psychological tendencies which veer in that direction are effective and can become activized from one day to the next. The German government is highly sensitive to these circumstances. Behind the pro-Semitic speeches of the educated it scents an opportunity for psychological guidance of the people

toward anti-Semitic aims. It is a master in linking its policies to existing or potential tensions in foreign countries. As religion formerly won foreign soil for civilization and for home industry, today the missionaries of anti-Semitism conquer the world for barbarism and German exports.

Section VII.—EXPERIMENTAL SECTION.

In this section the project plans to make the novel, and in the opinion of its directors, promising attempt to treat the phenomenon of anti-Semitism experimentally. This investigation will provide a series of experimental situations which approximate as closely as possible the concrete conditions of present day life. Its aim will be to visualize the mechanism of anti-Semitic reactions realistically. In this way it is hoped to develop the typology drafted in Section IV. At the same time, an attempt will be made to direct the experiments in such a way as to provide insights into differences of regional and social groupings in regard to anti-Semitism.

The most satisfactory method of experimentation appears to be the use of certain films to be presented to subjects of different regional and social groups. Reactions of the subjects will be obtained partly by observation of their behavior during the performances, partly by interviews, partly by their written reports of their impressions. Naturally, the element of introspection cannot be entirely eliminated, but by careful and critical interpretation of results it is hoped to reduce the flaws to a minimum.

The following example may give an idea of the plan:

A film will be made, showing boys of 12 to 15 at play. An argument and a fight ensue. The relation of guilt and innocence is difficult to untangle. The scene ends, however, with one boy being thrashed by the others. Two versions of the film will be made. In one, the thrashed boy will be played by a Gentile, in the other by a Jew. Another variation will be introduced by showing each of these versions with two different dramatis personæ. In one version, the thrashed boy will bear a Jewish name, and in the other a Christian name.

Thus the film will be shown in four different combinations:

1) The thrashed boy is a Gentile with a Gentile name.
2) “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ Jewish “
3) “ “ “ “ “ Jew “ “ Gentile “
4) “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “ Jewish “

In any one case each of these combinations will be shown to only one group of subjects, for instance, to high school boys or unemployed groups, who will not be informed in advance of the aim of the experiment. After the show, they will be told that the problem is the psychology of witness testimony. They will be cross-examined about what occurred, the question of guilt, the brave or cowardly behavior of the thrashed boy, etc. By comparing the testimony of the groups which have seen one version of the film with that of the groups which have seen the other version, it will be possible to reach conclusions about the extent of discrimination between Jews and Gentiles in perception and judgment.

Further variations are of course possible. For instance, all four versions may be presented to the same group in succession after longer intervals. The results of questioning immediately after the performance of the film will be supplemented by shorthand notes of remarks made by the audience during the performance. These notes will be taken by a person who will be present in the room but separated from the audience by a thin wall. If, for instance, it becomes evident that during the performance the thrashed boy with a Jewish name is defended by some of the participants and attacked by others, whereas at the end the witnesses reveal a united anti-Semitic influence, a contribution to the problem of susceptibility to anti-Semitic influence will have been made. The possibilities of variation are much richer than can be indicated here. It is planned to present the film not only in different social milieus in cities of the state of New York but also in other states. We hope to secure the collaboration of local universities and institutes for this purpose. The value of the results will depend to a large degree upon the number of experimental series undertaken in every milieu.

We believe that through this and similar experiments, a way will be found to study the distribution of anti-Semitism in the United States. Even though these methods have their margin of error, we believe that others have larger ones. When asked by questionnaires or interviewers, people will often reply, in accordance with their conscious conviction of the equality of human rights, that they have nothing against the Jews. In the experiment, however, where the question of anti-Semitism is not directly raised, the secret drives will appear clearly in the unconscious influencing of judgment. If extensive experimental series are undertaken in the various social milieus and in different parts of America, a rather objective picture of the anti-Semitic problem in this country may be gained. It will be especially interesting to reach those regions where few Jews live and where German propaganda works unfettered, for instance, in some states of the Northwest.

Reviews.

Dewey, John, *Theory of Valuation*. International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Vol. II, No. 4. University of Chicago Press. Chicago, Ill. 1939. (67 pp.; $1.00)

Faced as we are today with a thoroughgoing positivist repudiation of metaphysical concepts and transcendental principles, it may be well to recall the original relation of positivism to such concepts and principles. Ideas like natural law, the rights of man, the quest for happiness first gained momentum in the context of a positivist and not of a metaphysical philosophy (Locke, Montesquieu, the French enlighteners),—they could not be, and were not meant to be, verified by observation, because the reality they indicated did not belong to matter-of-fact reality, but presupposed the operation of certain laws and standards that contradicted those governing the matters-of-fact. It was of such laws and standards that the concept of reason was composed. Reason was an opposing force to the state of affairs as given; it asserted its own right as against that of authority. To think and to act according to reason was almost identical with thinking and acting in opposition to accepted norms and opinions. Reason was held to be the result of free and autonomous judgment, and the rational was that activity which followed this judgment. Appeal to the facts was meant to corroborate reason, not to override it; if the facts were at variance with reason's dictate, the former were "wrong" and had to be changed in conformity with the latter's demands.

The idea of reason which animated positivist philosophy in the 18th century was a critical one, in the sense we have just outlined. Within that same period, however, positivism began to relinquish its critical function and to replace it with a conformist and apologetic one. Both tendencies combine in Hume's philosophy, but the force of his struggle against oppressive religious and metaphysical concepts is attenuated by his concessions to "custom," which takes shape as the basic operative element in reasoning. Comte's positive philosophy completed the process of altering positivism's function. The principle of verification through facts, instead of serving to illuminate a truth which ought to be and yet is not, reenforced the truth of that which is. Reason was rendered subordinate to the observation of facts, and "facts as they are" became the final criteria of truth.

This apologetic form of positivism swept the second half of the 19th century. It did not stand alone in the struggle against autonomous and critical thought. After the breakdown of German idealism, metaphysics tried to outdo positivism in its apologetic for the given state of affairs. Freedom, critical reason, spontaneity were all relegated to a realm of "pure knowledge" where they could do no harm and generate no counter-drive against man's actual condition in empirical reality. In the latter reality, anti-positivist philosophy bound men as strongly to the authority of matters-of-fact as did positivism. In the current interchange of arguments concerning the supposed affinities between positivism and authoritarianism, one general misconception among many requires correction. The claim has been made that it was not

positivist but anti-positivist philosophy that held sway in the intellectual cultures of the authoritarian countries prior to the advent of fascism. This is correct, but anti-positivist philosophy was itself everywhere saturated with positivism, in Germany as well as in Italy. It may suffice to refer in this connection to the positivistic tendencies in *Lebensphilosophie* and Phenomenology, and in the psuedo-Hegelianism of Giovanni Gentile.

Even so, it is meaningless to ask whether positivism contributed to the rise of authoritarianism. Positivism cannot take active part in producing a change that involves and establishes total oppression, total warfare, total control and total intolerance. In a certain sense, indeed, freedom is of the very essence of positivism, the freedom to investigate, to observe, to experiment, to refrain from premature judgment and decision,—even the liberty to contradict. All this freedom, of course, occurs in the realm of science, and a scientific behavior is the condition of positivistic freedom. The truth which is to be verified by observation is, in principle at least, based upon free consent; recognition and not compulsion is its standard.

There is another reason why positivism cannot be held responsible for fascism. Positivism does not affirm anything unless it is an established fact. The positivist judgment hangs in the balance until a scientific verification has been provided. Positivism is of its very nature *ex post*. The conditions that prevail in matters-of-fact point the direction for numerous experiments, and positivism follows this lead: its approach is not an acquiescent but an experimental one, and it does not sanction change unless the experiment has been successfully completed.

It is precisely in this light that we must reformulate the question of the relation between positivism and authoritarianism. Experiments can be applied in the social as well as in the physical world. If the fascist experiment has been completed, if fascism has succeeded in organizing the world, does positivism possess any right to deny it sanction and acceptance? Is positivism not compelled, by its own principles, to comply with this world order and to work with, not against it? And, should we arrive at an affirmative answer, we can venture the further question: does not positivism "reflect" a reality in which man has surrendered to the authority of facts, in which reason, autonomous and critical thinking, is actually subordinate to observation of facts? Does the term "positive" in positivism not really imply a positive, that is to say, affirmative attitude towards the matters of fact—whatever they might be?

Dewey's *Theory of Valuation* provides an appropriate occasion for discussing the social function of positivism. Such discussion requires an analysis of positivism's attitude to value judgment, especially since positivism refers to experiments in the field of human behavior, and "human behavior *seems* to be influenced, if not controlled, by considerations such as are expressed in the words 'good—bad,' 'right—wrong,' 'admirable—hideous,' etc. All conduct that is not simply either blindly impulsive or mechanically routine seems to involve valuations" (p. 3). The experiment to create a new social and political order can be adequately described in a system of propositions about observable facts, but the description will be adequate only insofar as it contains "value concepts." Human desires and interests inevitably enter into an experiment that aims to create a new order of life, for such an experiment presupposes the judgment that the experiment is desirable. Valuations "occur only when it is necessary to bring something into existence, which is lacking,

or to conserve in existence something which is menaced by outside conditions" (p. 15). To a considerable extent, the impact of John Dewey's work and personality may have been responsible for the fact that positivism no longer maintains the ideal of a social science which is void of value judgments, but attempts to treat such judgments "in verifiable propositions." This attempt is based upon the fact that desires occur within definite "existential contexts," namely, those indicated in the last quotation above, and that they can be investigated with respect to the empirical possibility of their fulfillment and the consequences involved in it. This existential context places the propositions containing valuations in the relation of means-ends or means-consequences (p. 24), and the "continuum of ends—means" is the continuum in which the positivistic testing of valuations takes place.

Here, however, the limits of positivism have already been reached. For positivism is unable to state anything "scientific" about the desirability of the ends themselves. The positivist can weigh the ends against the means necessary to achieve them, he can investigate the conditions of their realization and ask whether it is "reasonable" to realize certain ends, he can show the consequences which are implied in this realization. But this is about all he can do. His analysis stops short at the prevailing desires and interests of men, which are the given facts, and therefore stops short at the multitude of ends prevalent in these desires and interests. He recognizes that desires and interests can still be submitted to the question as to whether they are reasonable or unreasonable (p. 29). This question is precisely the decisive one. For, if positivism measures human desires and interests according to whether they are or are not reasonable, then positivism, at least on one most fundamental point, aims at that which ought to be rather than at that which is. If the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable desires is meaningful at all, it cannot be derived from the given existential context which provoked the distinction. The standards of reason must somehow lead beyond this context,—nay, even question this context in its totality.

What are the standards according to which desires and interests can be classified as reasonable or unreasonable? Certainly not the accepted standards of custom, the current social taboos and awards—if this were the case, the very idea of real experiments in society would be destroyed; nor metaphysical norms and dogmas, which cannot be placed into an observable existential context. The positivistic answer leads definitely back to the given existential context. "The difference between reasonable and unreasonable desires and interests is precisely the difference between those which arise casually and are not reconstituted through consideration of the conditions that will actually decide the outcome and those which are formed on the basis of existing liabilities and potential resources" (p. 29). The distinction thus comes very close to what common-sense considers to be reasonable and unreasonable—a happy and successful adaptation to existing conditions, a thorough weighing of means and consequences, of liabilities and resources. The problem of the validity of the ends is replaced by the problem of the adequacy and consequences of the means. "Valuation of desire and interest, as means correlated with other means, is the sole condition for valid appraisal of objects as ends" (p. 29). If we accept this "sole condition" of appraisal, we also accept the ends that are reasonable in this sense, those

that take full account of the risks involved and of the "existing liabilities and potential resources."

Now it is obvious that desires and interests may be found that are reasonable on this ground and still aim at oppression and annihilation. The desires and interests that produced the fascist order might be such. They are frightfully reasonable if regarded in the continuum of ends and means; they did not arise "casually," and they were formed on the basis of existing liabilities and potential resources. Is there any way left for positivism to deny affirmative appraisal by applying scientific standards?

The case is explicitly stated by Dewey, and he points to a standard by which even successful interests and desires can be "revaluated." "On account of the continuity of human activities, personal and associated, the import of present valuations cannot be validly stated until they are placed in the perspective of the past valuation—events with which they are continuous" (p. 59). Such a perspective would show the continuous historical efforts of mankind to enhance and release individual potentialities, to widen the range of human desires and to provide the means for their fulfillment, without discrimination and in harmony with the perpetuation of the whole. In other words, it would show continuous striving for freedom. It would furthermore show that "a particular set of current valuations have as their antecedent historical conditions" the exact opposite, namely, "the interest of a small group or special class in maintaining certain exclusive privileges and advantages, and that this maintenance has the effect of limiting both the range of the desires of others and their capacity to actualize them (ibid.).

Should man become conscious of these antecedents, "is it not obvious that this knowledge of conditions and consequences would surely lead to revaluation of the desires and ends that had been assumed to be authoritative sources of valuation?" (ibid.) Unfortunately, it is not obvious at all. Dewey's optimism is characterized by a neglect of the existential contexts in which the authoritarian desires and interests live. The order that maintains the exclusive privileges of a "small group or special class" responds to deep-rooted human desires, desires that are spread far beyond the governing strata. The desire for strong protection, the perverse lust for cruelty, the enjoyment of power over an impotent enemy and of liberation from the burden of autonomy, and numerous other desires that shaped the individual in the prehistory of fascism have been fulfilled to such an extent that, in comparison, the desire for freedom seems to aim at some suicidal jump into nothing. The form of freedom that the run-of-the-mill individual has enjoyed in the past century must only strengthen the desire to abandon it, while the super-human courage and loyalty of those who carry on their fight for freedom in the authoritarian states is "unreasonable" according to scientific standards; all consequences and all existing liabilities and resources speak against their efforts. They cannot test and verify their values, because in order to do so they must already have won. Their existence is "good," "right," and "valuable" beyond test and verification, and if their cause loses, the world, and not their values, will have been refuted.

In the present situation of material and intellectual culture, the problem of values is, in the last analysis, identical with the problem of freedom. The

conditions of matters of fact have become so unified that the one idea, freedom, covers all that is good, right and admirable in the world. And all efforts to place the value of freedom on the same scientific level with other current valuations is an affront to freedom. For science is essentially in itself freedom, and cannot verify freedom through anything other than freedom. Freedom—and this is the profound result of Kant's analysis—is the only "fact" that "is" only in its creation; it cannot be verified except by being exercised.

This conviction distinctly motivates Dewey's attempt to save the scientific validity of values from annihilation. In doing so, however, he seems to gainsay the very basis of his positivistic method, for his faith in the power of "revaluation" presupposes a definite preference prior to all test and verification, namely, that liberty and the "release of individual potentialities" is better than its opposite.

HERBERT MARCUSE (New York).

Wirth, Louis, ed., *Contemporary Social Problems*. A Tentative Formulation for Teachers of Social Problems. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago, Ill. 1939. (IX and 68 pp.; $1.00)

This small book has a really great significance. If the program sketched in it were to be carried out, it might very well deeply affect the teaching of contemporary social problems. The book is the outcome of discussions among outstanding scholars in psychology, economics, political science, history, anthropology and sociology who were assembled to consider "contemporary social problems and issues in relation to social science education." The group had thus to determine the "criteria for the selection of the more significant problem"; the formulation of the problems; their classification; and the availability of scientific knowledge. The discussions were based on a statement which tentatively defined and classified the values of American liberal democracy and contained some methodological remarks on the distinction and the connection between "scientific" and "practical" problems. It insisted that the group discussions could only be fruitful if the many problems confronting America were reduced to a dozen or so "strategic social issues." The discussions "resulted in the formulation of a rough outline of the form that the analysis and presentation of a problem might have." This analysis distinguishes the nature of a problem (how the problem appears to the man in the street; whom it affects; why it is significant; what are the assumptions, divergence from which constitutes a problem); the method by which a social scientist formulates it; the etiology of the problem; the goals to be sought in its solution; the means for bringing about solution; and the best available sources for information. The present volume contains a brief but illuminating introduction by Mr. *Erling M. Hunt* of Teachers College (Columbia); a survey by Professor *Wirth* on the work of the study group; an article by Professor *Max Lerner*, entitled "What makes a social problem?" and a contribution from Professor *Louis Wirth* on "Housing." Further volumes are announced that will deal with "Freedom and Adequacy of Information furnished by Channels of Communication" by Professor *H. Cantril;* and one on "War" by Professor *P. E. Moseley* of Cornell.

Professor Lerner's memorandum is purely methodological, and, as he himself admits, written with an eclectic intent. It starts from the obvious point that all social problems are interrelated; it then proceeds to define "Central Problem Areas," which are determinate economic, governmental, psychological, institutional and attitudinal ones; there follow brief discussions of the genesis of a problem, its dynamics, its solution, and finally a summary of the Pedagogy of a Problem. While I can readily see the wisdom of the teaching recommendations (which indeed were also the principles of German adult labor education), I am unable to see the relevance of the methodological discussion. Interrelationships may mean everything or nothing. Taken literally, the view that all social problems are interconnected must make social research impossible. No social scientist, even if he should possess encyclopedic knowledge, can hope to set a problem in all its relationships, not to speak of analyzing it in all its ramifications. The art of the scientist and teacher alike will consist in the selection of *relevant* ramifications. Thus, the problem at once arises how to determine relevancy. One method would be the pragmatic, to decide the question according to the situation and the interest of teachers and students. The other way would be the theoretical, to base the selection on a definite sociological theory. Professor Lerner, without clearly saying so, apparently has a preference (as is proven by the chapter "Central Problem Areas" and the examples which he mentions throughout his memorandum) for the economic interpretation of social problems mediated by a psychological theory which distinguishes between "what is basic in human nature and what is socially conditioned."

One omission should be mentioned, the lack of a historical orientation. This has nothing to do with the study of history, which, as Professor Wirth mentions in his report, is not brought into consideration, but rather touches the method of research and still more of teaching. My own experience in adult education has time and again demonstrated that without tracing the historical foundations and changes of specific problems, the problems themselves will not be understood. It would be well to keep in mind Robert Lynd's remark on history in his "Knowledge for What."

Professor Wirth's paper on Housing is an example of how the results of the group's discussions can be translated into practice. The contribution is admirable in every respect, especially in the formulation of the possible lines of action for attacking the housing problem. The ramifications of the housing problem are clearly shown, even if they are, in my view, a little too narrow. I miss discussion of four specific problems: one, at least some hints as to how building construction would affect the whole economy (an analysis of the English experience would be desirable); second, an analysis of the transformation of the economic function of the mortgage lender through the operation of the Federal Housing Administration, referring to the fact that the federal insurance of mortgages makes the banks pensioners of the government. This leads to a third point: an attempt must be made to determine the ratio of costs of material, labor, interests on mortgage and financing costs. Professor Wirth, of course, mentions the high cost of the three factors, although no attempt is made to determine their relation. This discussion would in turn lead to an analysis of the policy of building unions, a necessary discussion in the light of the anti-trust action of the Department of Justice. If the other pamphlets come up to the standards of Professor Wirth's book the influence of the publications on the teaching of contemporary social problems may really become decisive.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN (New York).

Barnes, Harry Elmer, Howard Becker and **Frances Bennett Becker** (Editors), *Contemporary Social Theory*. D. Appleton-Century. New York, 1940. (XX and 947 pp.; $5.00)

It has been but 15 years since Harry Elmer Barnes edited the compendium on *The History and Prospects of the Social Sciences*, with a scope and perspective similar to that of the volume under review. A comparison of the two works shows a maturation of American social theory during the ensuing period. If in a brief time such significant advances can be made, hopes may be cherished for further progress. The level of discourse is more subtly philosophical and more sensitive to reality, the facets of approach to social data are more varied, and there is less of the callow authoritarianism and intellectual insularity that permeated the earlier volume. The contribution of the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, which appeared in the interim, to the enrichment of American social thought, is here clearly evidenced, as is the more active percolation of European social theory.

There is no essential unity, but on the contrary wide diversities in the points of view of the nineteen collaborators in this volume. The joint editors find it necessary to footnote their introductory remarks with the comment: "Each writer represents himself only. This also holds for the editors." Consequently there are repeated overlapping and contradictory positions, which are not clarified through frank analysis and reanalysis of differences with an effort to arrive at some consensus, but remain on the level of assertion and counterassertion. The claim put forth in the preface that the symposium represents a "logically organized and well-unified treatment" with a high degree of integration, is approximated only in terms of the structure of the book, but certainly not in its content.

The editors express the hope that the book might "canvass all salient aspects of contemporary social thinking and assess their significance for the current social scene . . . [that] it may help us bridge the gulf between contemporary social action and our social thought and institutions—an achievement which the editors hold to be the supreme task of the social sciences." This commendable "supreme task" of uniting theory and practice is scantily fulfilled in Part VII of the book devoted to "Some Applications of Sociological Theory to the Social Sciences and Public Problems." Except for William Seagle's original and challenging contribution on "Sociological Trends in Modern Jurisprudence," this section falls considerably below the others in its critical standards, in its coverage of the diverse approaches to the problems discussed and in the clarification of the alternatives present in thought and action.

In Part V, the discussion under the caption, "The Study of Mental Currents and Psychic Processes" is enriched by the late Alexander Goldenweiser's piece on "Some Contributions of Psychoanalysis to the Interpretation of Social Facts." While sympathetic with psychoanalysis and caustic with its critics, Goldenweiser declares *Totem and Taboo* to be an intellectual monstrosity. He ascribes Freud's partial failure to contribute constructively to an understanding of the crowd, totemism, religion and civilization to the fact that "psychoanalysis, as a general theory of the mind, is basically and emphatically a system of *individual* psychology." This system, he declares, has failed to function as a tool of social study because of the mistaken effort of Freud and his colleagues to bridge the gap between the individual and the social or cultural by introducing the erroneous concept of a racial uncon-

scious. Goldenweiser's interest in deepening the insights of social scientists by psychoanalysis purged of its aberrations, is evident likewise in his chapters on the contributions of anthropology and his appraisals of Dilthey and Rickert. In the section on anthropology, he supplements his review of earlier anthropological theory with a suggestive critical analysis of the functionalism of Malinowski and a commendation of the work of Radin and Benedict.

The articles by Howard Becker, while filled with many pertinent telling challenges, and not a few devastating and effective criticisms of the hypotheses of other social scientists, are too capricious for a volume of this type designed as a text. On the other extreme are the contributions of Harry Elmer Barnes which are, for the most part, merely expository summations of the literature of the fields which he is discussing, interspersed with casually informative critical comments. The articles of the book have helpful bibliographies, and there is also a supplementary bibliographical appendix.

BERNHARD J. STERN (New York).

Pratt, Caroll C., *The Logic of Modern Psychology.* Macmillan Company. New York 1939. (XVI, 185 pp.; $2.00)

Ulich, Robert, *Fundamentals of Democratic Education.* American Book Company. New York 1940. (X, 326 pp.; $2.25)

Smith, B. Othanel, *Logical Aspects of Educational Measurement.* Columbia University Press. New York 1938. (X, 182 pp.; $2.50)

All facts in psychology, as in any other science, are functions of the method by which they are observed and there is an acute need for the guidance of logic in the working out and checking of the methods and concepts of present day psychology.

Pratt devotes his study to the renewing of interest in the basic assumptions of psychology and to the expanding of what strikes him as the "most important, though by no means most vigorous part of psychology," namely theoretical psychology. He elaborates his view in eight major points which he has summed up with striking definiteness in his introduction. There is no operational definition of "the mind," a concept which in fact has already completely vanished from psychology. "Psychology is a convenient division of labor, not a subject-matter." No conceivable sense can be discovered in formulating a problem like that of the body-mind problem. There is, in spite of the claim which common sense and intuition put forward, no hint that the material of psychology differs from that of any other science. The idea, therefore, of a "unique mental material" does not have any place in strict scientific terminology. The guiding laws of biology are, in fact, very similar to those of psychology. If the scientific picture of the self is different from the real self, this is to be ascribed to the fundamental quality of scientific description which does not intend to give the things themselves but a systematized account of them according to certain principles. The phenomenon of meaning does not change anything in the character of psychological data. To psychology as well as to physics may be applied Eddington's famous comparison between his real and his scientific table. "What psychology strives to do, all that it ever could want to do, is to explain the self in terms of physiological conditions."

Pratt makes the method of logical analysis proposed by positivism and by operationism the fundamental of his considerations. The methodological principle of operationism applied by Bridgeman to the concepts of physics is to inquire what operations were carried out before a specific concept came into use. Though essentially in favor of this method, in adapting it to psychology, *Pratt* makes it subject to substantial criticism and puts up a firm argument against tendencies of boundless purification as demonstrated in Steven's *Discriminating Psychology.* Operationism has nothing to offer toward the collecting of initial data of observation and not much so far as the testing of deductions is concerned. Nearly all psychological concepts being ambiguous, operationism cannot exclusively direct the construction of a concept. Absolutely "pure" concepts are practically impossible. Two habits of human thinking are particularly apt to cloud the exactness of concepts: reification which attributes factual existence to ordering forms of thought (as for instance type or contrast), and infiltration which refers to the seeping into a concept of meanings which are not consciously made explicit.

The merits of *Pratt's* attempt to survey the logical implications and problems of present psychology are obvious. However, the discussion of certain perennial problems in psychology would have yielded results of a wider range if the epistemological aspect would had been not only that of positivism. The principle that questions not strictly verifiable are meaningless is perhaps not sufficient for a comprehension of the intricate conditions which have led to the formulation of the psycho-physical problem. It cannot be disputed out of existence so smoothly, though this would certainly save quite a lot of trouble. Also derived from the positivistic ideology is the idea that the conversion of words furnishes the main source of error. It would seem here that the problem lies deeper down with the elementary condition that an originally a-rational experience has to be rationalized in the process of science.

If it is the task of psychology to give a picture of man, the objective approach yields an image clearly deprived of almost everything that can be indirectly comprehended through the concept of civilization. It is practically devoid of those particular phenomena which have, since the time of the Greeks, been considered the specific quality which makes man human. Although this is in *Pratt's* judgment the emotionalized opinion of laymen, there is evidence in this belief, vague though it may be, that the approach of objectivism is in some way not the right one.

Psychologists, as one might visualize them from *Pratt's* definition of psychology, would somehow appear as a group of intellects which investigate the shadowy image of man in a space bare of any other relation than their own abstract interest. A logic of psychology, of course, cannot be supposed to reach over into the immense psychological and sociological problems with which everything in the living body of society is infinitely linked up. But something of this, of the existence of psychology within a social reality, should be felt even on the ground of a strictly logical discussion of the ends and means of psychology. Thus, the casual way in which applied and educational psychology are dealt with, and the way the problem of psychotherapy is passed over, in elegant diction, as just a miracle, are strong arguments against the basic philosophy of this book.

Ulich's Fundamentals of Democratic Education are laid out as a more than empirical approach to the understanding of education as a phenomenon

of civilization. A philosophical groundwork has to be prepared in order that with its help education may be viewed in relation to other functions of society. Man cannot be understood through one principle only. His existence is biological as well as social, psychological as well as metaphysical, and is ultimately to be traced back to basic factors which defy further explanation. "The essence of man lies in his desire for life but as something which is worth having and which provides a reality which he can love for its inherent values."

The necessity for, if not the actual existence of values is one of the fundamental presuppositions of Ulich's philosophy. Ethical behavior is not arbitrary but natural and necessary; it is not artificially added to man's natural behavior but has its origin in our basic vital energies. Comprehension and consolidation of divergent aspects into one universal view, as in this case, may be seen as the working methodological principle of this book.

Discussing the values that should underlie every action in education, Ulich subjects pragmatism, the philosophical theory of the progressivists in education, to a thorough criticism. If the aims of the conditioning process in education are derived only from such ideas as happen to be ruling in the milieu, they may be modified or changed whenever there is any force strong enough to do so. Against this circumstantial interpretation of values, Ulich holds that the moral is the "normalcy of man." Since it is not any longer possible for us to accept the ethical position of the old idealistic schools, and since pragmatism did not succeed in building a coherent moral philosophy, the merits of both should be unified in what Ulich calls a "self-transcendent empiricism" which accepts the naturalist view as a foreground position but also points beyond man to the universal system of which he is a part. The urgent task for practical education is to find the right combination of growth and form. A new concept of education has to expand in the horizontal beyond the individual to the group, and in the vertical beyond the immediate biological existence, to man's interrelation with a system of values and superpersonal principles. "Education can discharge its obligation to modern man only if it succeeds in inculcating in him an ethical attitude that combines the spirit of experimentalism with a profound faith in a deeper meaning of life."

Opposing demands are made upon the teacher by state and by society. Ideas cannot be conveyed in a spiritual vacuum; free discussion and expression of opinion should not be restricted among students or teachers. Ulich recognizes the serious cultural and educational problem which is presented by the inadequate development of the emotional capacities of modern man. Here lies the great social importance of religious experience and metaphysical systems. After their decline in modern times their function has not been replaced by any other integrating force.

Education is not a solitary enterprise. The future of freedom makes the task of a constant reevaluation more imperative than ever before. It will be the common obligation of educators and statesmen, of scientists and parents to gain more and better insight into the dynamics of freedom in order that the failure of an utopian liberalism may be overcome by a deeper understanding of human relations. The spiritual future of democracy is visualized in the endeavor of "increasingly humanizing society by absorbing into it as

many constructive elements as possible." The contribution that education can make is to transcend a quantitative and merely scientific understanding by a profound conception of humanity.

There are some basic points in Ulich's book which, brought to bear upon present educational thinking, with its predominant pragmatist and behaviorist orientation, is bound to arouse intense antagonism. There is his rejection of pragmatism and operationalism, and of the "scientific" attitude in education and psychology. Against his philosophy of values and the elements of irrationalism, the adherents of naturalism and experimentalism will bring forward the charges customarily projected against those who dare storm their sanctuaries. Many of Ulich's positions will be scorned by the dogmatists of either radical or conservative beliefs. And there is, to a lesser extent, some reason to fear that a hypocriptic obscurantism may derive arguments from some of his critical discourses—entirely against Ulich's belief, as one may safely assume. For in its basic character this philosophy is liberal, in the sense of the word which is not discredited by the defaults of a historical ideology.

There is no question that science, or the specific way of doing science, has not lived up to its claims and has not proved to be capable of helping us in our most ardent problems. But at least part of this failure can be credited to a questionable concept of the task and of the criteria of science. By adoption of operational criteria and inappropriately "objective" methods, psychological sciences, for instance, have paralyzed their advance toward some of the central questions of personality and social existence. A generalized philosophy of measurement, as we have it at present, is very probably the consequence of a fundamental misunderstanding of the scope and the peculiarity of psychological sciences. A much wider concept is feasible which, conscious enough of the specific nature of its task, will have to anticipate in its framework such experiences as do not submit to complete rationalization.

In a final analysis the feeling prevails that Ulich has left the nature of the fundaments of his philosophy in suspense, as if he wanted to leave it open for either a universalistic (yet essentially immanent) or a metaphysical interpretation. One would wish that this position might be clarified in a future discourse. Ulich's criticism of the almost exclusive position of method in present educational thought will have little popularity in many educational quarters. Yet it should be highly appreciated that he has questioned a course of thought which had been considered almost self-evident. The importance of methods can not be doubted but it is of great value just now that the personality of the teacher is emphasized as the most intrinsic factor of education. It would have been interesting if Ulich had gone more into the acrimonious problem of reconciling the necessity for equipping the student for an existing reality—that is, for successful adjustment—and the ethical imperative to endow him with the desire to improve existing conditions of life. To the problem of the teacher Ulich has devoted a penetrating chapter and many excellent remarks. Yet one would wish that the specific psychological and social position of the teacher had been further analyzed.

Ulich's book is an important event in contemporary educational thinking, if it were only for the fact that somebody undertook to set a positive and

fruitful criticism against the dominance of a scientific approach which in spite of its undoubtable merits betrays a need for reconsideration and re-evaluation. In a very fortunate way Ulich has defined education as "the cultural conscience of man." This is, in fact, the leading motive of his book. From this point of view it is important that Ulich propounds the necessity of assigning to the quantitative study of education a more definitely circumscribed position; that he advocates the universality of methods and philosophies, and a firmer and more comprehensive frame of reference for our scientific endeavors; in short, that he deals with his problem from a universal point of view giving more attention to the grave problems below and beyond science than has been done before.

A philosophy like Ulich's, of which the fundamental tenet is universalism and the synthesis of different ideas, is bound to overlook conflicts which it may be essentially impossible to reconcile. But as a regulative one his principle is beyond question, particularly in a time when the debacle of all intellectual endeavors lurks behind a growing tendency toward indoctrination. It is the personal quality which gives human importance to scientific thought, no matter how clever. In this sense tribute should be paid to the gentleness and sincere modesty as well as to the intellectual courage and universal justice displayed in this book.

Smith undertakes to look into the conceptual framework and into the logical validity of the fundamental assumptions in educational measurement. "In far too many instances the results of experimental studies are conflicting and unconvincing," he says, "indicating that the sterility of much of educational research is due not to lack of precaution on the part of experimenters but to something more basic and subtle." Reconsideration, therefore, is indicated of the specific method upon which most educational research is based.

Smith defines measurement in general as "the quantitative evaluation of a property by means of an instrument which is constructed in accordance with certain general principles." A quality that is to be measured must be quantifiable in such a way that it satisfies the axiomatic conditions of measurement, namely those of order or series, and those of equality. Only practical experience can show whether a certain quality is amenable to these conditions or not.

It is to be regretted that Smith confines his investigation only to achievement tests. Transferred to the specific conditions of other instruments of psychological measurement his analysis would doubtlessly yield very fruitful results. He distinguishes two types of achievement tests: achievement tests proper, which measure the level of achievement or the intellectual growth of a person, and quality scales, dealing with subjects which can not be judged in terms of "right" or "wrong," but only in terms of "better" and "worse." Smith finds that "equality" and "order" have not been established genuinely in achievement tests and that assumptions and mathematical operations have been substituted for the experimental interpretation of the axioms of addition. A quantitative concept of learning is realized to be the principle upon which achievement tests have been developed. Knowledge in this sense is a stock of accomplished data; the process of its acquisition means an increase in data, not a change in personality. The demonstration of this principle in

testing represents a circular conclusion; there is, first, the preconceived principle of the quantitative character of learning upon which the test is founded. The results, in turn, which have been gained by means of this assumption are used to justify the principle.

With regard to quality scales, the claim of equal units rests on two assumptions. The one is that judgment of differences can be treated as errors of observation, allowing for statistical manipulation according to the normal law of error. This idea, originally going back to the Webner-Fechner law of psychophysics, was developed by Galton and Cattell, and given the formulation by Thorndike that differences noted equally often are equal. He implemented this principle in his Writing Test which has since set the pattern for quality scales. In this process of thought the idea of "merit," as expressed in the judgment of differences of quality, is given a quantitative meaning, suggesting that variations of judgment indicate different amounts of merit. But the judgment of merits is an extremely complex process; different persons may merit different things under seemingly identical terms, so that variations of judgment are more likely to express different qualities of merit than quantities.

The future development of educational measurement is seen in two directions. One points towards a refined elementarism. The systematic exploitation of factor analysis may surrender elements of behavior more apt for quantitative treatment than the ones now in use. On the other hand, quantitative measurement may be abandoned for the sake of a qualitative evaluation which is promoted by the increasing acceptance of an organistic philosophy.

Smith's study is a genuine contribution to educational, and beyond that, to psychological research in general. The philosophical platform, largely positivistic in its origin, upon which the argument is conducted, shows certain limitations if applied to the wide issue of psychological measurement. However, it proves of undoubtable value in the definitions of the axioms of measurement. The process of learning and its effect, as it is viewed here, is not entirely convincing. The interpretation of these phenomena would have gained if it had not been built strictly on Mead's concept of the self and on the concepts of Gestalt psychology. The most important and most regrettable limitation of this fine study is connected with the general concept of the mind which it utilizes. Proceeding from the axioms of measurement, Smith establishes with great clarity the incompatibility of the units in present educational measurement. But his appraisal does not lead to a principle and consequently admits of the possibility that qualities more adequate for measurement may be found. It is here that a general investigation into the aptness of psychological phenomena for genuine quantification should have been initiated in order to lead eventually not only to a methodological, but to an essential clarification of the problems of psychological measurement.

These questions, however, do not impair the significance of the fact that in Smith's book the premises of educational testing have been made subject to a comprehensive logical analysis. In recent years, a number of studies by G. W. Allport, Lawrence Frank, Mark May, and others have dealt with some of the principal aspects of testing. Smith has presented the first systematic investigation into the basic assumptions of educational measurement.

FREDERICK WYATT (Cambridge, Mass.).

Fuller, Lon L., *The Law in Quest of Itself.* Julius Rosenthal Foundation, Northwestern University Lectures. The Foundation Press, Chicago 1940. (147 pp.; $2.00)

Radin, Max, *Law as Logic and Experience.* Yale University Press, New Haven 1940. (171 pp.; $2.00)

Llewellyn, K. N., *The Normative, the Legal and the Law-Jobs:* The Problem of Juristic Method. The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 49, 1940. (pp. 1355-1400)

Baumgarten, Arthur, *Grundzüge der juristischen Methodenlehre,* Huber. Bern 1939. (192 pp.)

Bodenheimer, Edgar, *Jurisprudence.* McGraw-Hill, New York and London 1940. (357 pp.; $3.50)

Legal theory must, obviously, serve two masters: the one is the lawyer (judge, counsel or administrator), the other is the theory of society. In its first function, legal theory becomes a mere technique, a pragmatic enterprise directed towards the fulfillment of specific and necessary ends. At best it is then jurisprudence or *Allgemeine Rechtslehre,* that is, a body of maxims derived from generalizations of specific codes. It defines notions like right, duty, objective and subjective law, definitions that have, of course, no philosophical validity, though they may be extremely useful. As a part of a theory of society, legal theory will primarily discuss the philosophical validity of the basic legal concepts and will be compelled to lay bare the relation between law and morality as well as to analyze the formal structure of the law and to develop the function of law in society.

American jurisprudence is by far the most enterprising and challenging discipline as far as the first task is concerned; and the most backward where genuine philosophical discussion is in question. Except for Morris R. Cohen's incisive criticisms and William Ernest Hocking's attempt to redefine the relation between law and morals, the theory of law has not advanced a step beyond the heritage of German idealism.

Professor Fuller's book seeks to fill this gap through an attempt to lay the foundation of a new legal philosophy. He starts from two competing directions of legal thought, the one positivism, the law that is; the second, natural law, the law that ought to be. The deficiencies of positivism and of its purest form, namely Kelsen's theory of law, and of the American realist school are set out in a series of brilliant observations. Fuller's own legal philosophy, however, may be open to some objections. He seems to overstep himself in attacking the divorce between legality and morality and in maintaining that natural law denies the possibility of such rigid distinction and "tolerates a confusion of them." Indeed, the theory of law will have to abdicate if a line cannot be drawn between morals and law.

On the other hand, there is no doubt (and Professor Radin's book again draws attention to this fact) that moral evaluations enter the legal system at many points, especially through equity and, as far as continental law is concerned, through the legal standards of conduct. No positivist will deny that. He will, however, and rightly so, maintain that in such cases the moral evaluations become legal principles subject to specific legal considerations. The rigid distinction between the *is* and the *ought* is a highly progressive

principle, today especially. It makes it impossible to surround any existing system of positive law with the halo of a moral order. Today, when we are facing a frontal attack against the foundations of law in its protective function, we should be careful before we abandon the one principle of our liberal legal system upon which this very protection rests, namely the rigid separation of legality from morality. It is not for nothing that National Socialist legal theory and practice have ultimately done away with this dividing line.

It is, of course, true that this distinction does not absolve us from searching for the philosophical criteria of right. But it is doubtful whether the confrontation of an "is" by an "ought" and the identification of the "ought" with natural law will help to achieve this aim. It is methodologically and historically difficult to assert that natural law is a philosophy of the "ought." At some times it was, at others it certainly was not. Natural law can very well be the philosophic basis of positivism, indeed, nearly all of our liberal legal concepts, especially that cornerstone of positivistic thought, the concept of sovereignty, have been fully and admirably developed by the rationalistic natural lawyers. I heartily agree with Professor Fuller that the contributions of the natural law theorists (he mentions only Ahrens) should be read and studied, but they will readily disclose that rationalistic natural law was definitely the philosophy of the "is" and not of the "ought." For Pufendorff the law of nature lacks the *vis coactiva,* and Christian Wolff considers moral obligations to be mere counsels. Further, to oppose positivism solely with natural law implies that natural law is identical with legal philosophy, whereas it is in fact but one branch within it, attacking the philosophical problem with one specific method.

The division of the world into an is and an ought is philosophically a rather doubtful affair. By accepting this division, Professor Fuller remains on the very ground of positivism, merely reversing the positivistic position, with the consequence that his own doctrine suffers, with positivism, the reproach of being arbitrary. Legal philosophy today cannot overlook the fact that we possess in Hegel's Philosophy of Right a contribution which attempts, by means of the dialectic method, to overcome the isolation in which each specific doctrine finds itself. Natural law, positivism, the historical approach, the realistic position, all are embraced in Hegel's legal philosophy. It is regrettable that Hegel's philosophy of right has been presented to the Anglo-American public in so unattractive a translation, because it appears to me that legal philosophy ought to build on Hegel's foundation by developing the basic concepts of our legal system from the "nature of things," that is, from the very structure of our society. It will then have to allocate each of the doctrines to its place in the final system, according to the amount of truth which each contains. Professor Fuller deserves our gratitude for having reopened a discussion that has long been overdue.

The lack of a philosophic foundation becomes very clear in Professor Radin's rich and extraordinarily stimulating book. He rejects every attempt to connect law with a philosophical principle. Law is a mere "technique of administering a complicated social mechanism." I would have no objection to any such pragmatic definition if the author were really to stick to it. But, unfortunately, philosophic problems enter Professor Radin's discussion on almost every page. To give but two examples, he rightly rejects the notion that "the law sees only artificial constructions before it, one man *qua* citizen,

another *qua* father. Human beings, for the purposes of law," ought not to be considered as "bundles of legal capacities. . . . They are . . . flesh-and-blood creatures." Very true, but impossible to maintain for a jurisprudence which is a mere technique. Why, if the social mechanisms make it necessary, should the law not consider man only in so far as the social mechanism requires it? The contrary can be maintained only if we accept a philosophy of law which starts from man as a rational creature. The second instance is his treatment of the equity problem, where considerations of justice enter directly into legal consideration. At the very end of his lectures, Professor Radin is compelled to admit that "humanity is, after all, the business of the law." What that really means has not been made clear. If humanity is the law's business, the law might not very well fit into an existing social mechanism. It might even become evident that the theory of law, if it is a true theory, will turn into an eminently critical theory denouncing the existing social mechanisms as incompatible with the tenets of the legal theory.

These critical remarks must, however, not detract from the great value of the sociological and historical analysis of Professor Radin's book. It is brilliantly written and richly illustrated. As for the opinion it holds that arbitration is superior over rational judicial decisions, I do not share this view. I rather maintain that rational law and legal positivism in our period, however defective they may be, are superior to equitable considerations, to the weighing of antagonistic interests instead of the deciding of conflicting claims. The little rationality which the law still has gives a minimum of the liberal guarantees which are in the process of disappearing and which Professor Radin recognizes as essential for criminal law.

A considerable advance on the part of American juristic thought is to be found in Professor Llewellyn's article which has been included in this review because it is the first systematic statement of the leader of the American realistic school on the nature of his juristic method. Unfortunately, the article is written in Professor Llewellyn's peculiar style which, though charming, is nevertheless extremely difficult to read and understand. If we succeed in piercing through his terminology we find, surprisingly enough, a rather conservative theory of law. This is in no way a reproach but rather a compliment. Professor Llewellyn very impressively states the need of divorcing law from morality, so that law "may be seen sharply as not enough for any decent system to rest content with." To his great merit, he has broken down the task of the lawyer into four different heads: that of litigation (the disposition of trouble cases); that of "preventive channelling and the reorientation of conduct"; that of "allocation of authority . . . which legitimatize action as being authoritative"; and finally that of the organization of society as a whole. It is thus clearly to be seen that the theory of juristic method must ultimately lead into political philosophy, which alone can deal with the legitimacy of obedience, and into a theory of society which alone can solve the problem of the best organization of society.

Professor Baumgarten's little book, written for young students, sums up his well-known empiricist theory of law. Though well written it is completely undocumented.

Dr. Bodenheimer's *Jurisprudence* has a misleading title. The book does not deal with jurisprudence but rather surveys specific philosophical doctrines concerned with basic concepts of law (law and justice, law and power, law and the state, natural law, law shaping forces, etc.). A jurisprudence

must analyze the concepts with which the lawyer and sociologist daily operate, namely sovereignty, administrative act, property, contract, tort and crime. The weakness of the rather ambitious attempt Dr. Bodenheimer makes is that the problems he discusses are not problems of law as it operates in society but problems of the history of ideas about law. Dr. Bodenheimer, for instance, considers law as a mean "between anarchy and despotism." Such definition, which has been developed before, is meaningful only if an attempt is made to show in historical and sociological studies the swing of the pendulum between anarchy and despotism. This is not attempted. Instead, theories like the theory of natural law, of the classical school, of institutionalism and so on are discussed. But the discussions move in the sphere of a certain unreality. For instance, in his analysis of institutionalism, Dr. Bodenheimer cannot but observe the connection of institutionalism with modern collectivism. Had the book been centered around the fundamental problems of law, like property and contract, the author might have seen that institutionalism becomes the legal theory of monopoly capitalism and has thus to be rejected in spite of the fact that it contains a limited amount of truth. The role which the various theories of law play today can much more easily be grasped from the analysis of the basic concepts of our legal system than from a discussion merely of the content of the various doctrines. Since the book is very carefully planned and scarcely overlooks a relevant theory it will well serve as an introduction to the main doctrines about the law for young students.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN (New York).

Propaganda Analysis. Volume I of the Publications of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis. New York, 1938. (XVI + 84 pp.) (A)

Alfred McClung Lee and *Elizabeth Briant Lee* (editors). The Fine Art of Propaganda. Harcourt, Brace & Co. New York, 1939. (XI + 140 pp.) (B)

Lavine, Harold, and James Wechsler, *War Propaganda and the United States.* Yale University Press. New Haven 1940. (X and 363 pp.; $2.75) (C)

Bartlett, F. C., *Political Propaganda.* Macmillan. New York and London 1940. (X and 158 pp.; $1.25)

Carr, E. H., *Propaganda in International Politics.* Farrar and Rinehart. New York 1939. (30 pp.; $0.15)

Chakotin, Serge, *The Rape of the Masses.* Alliance Book Corporation. New York 1940. (X and 310 pp.; $3.00)

Taylor, Edmond, *The Strategy of Terror.* Houghton Mifflin Company. Boston 1940. (278 pp.; $2.50)

Most recent writers on propaganda search less for an objective analysis than for methods of fighting its totalitarian forms. It is assumed that propaganda is one of the greatest dangers threatening democratic society. The proposed methods to further or combat propaganda, the views on its function and efficacy in the processes of social change, its very definition, depend, as

they must, on the various authors' views on what society is and what it should be. Only when this dependence is clearly recognized—this is not always the case—can confusions be avoided.

The Institute for Propaganda Analysis (the first three items reviewed are published under its auspices) has played a prominent role in making the American public aware of the existence of propaganda. The sociological assumptions on which the work of the Institute rests are stated in the prefaces written by Clyde R. Miller and Eduard C. Lindeman. According to these writers, democratic societies originally proceeded by "discussing and thinking together"; but today the country has grown large, the communities composing it are highly interdependent, and "we find ourselves becoming part of powerful pressure groups that have leaders who speak on behalf of large segments of the population" (B, p. 4). Pressure groups are not pernicious as such; indeed, they are necessary "in a large-scale democracy," and some of them are "admirable organizations: our churches, our trade and professional associations, our political parties, our patriotic societies, etc." (ibid.). But other pressure groups are dangerous, for they seek "to lead those who believe in them over paths other than those they announce. To such men, little matters except the power they obtain through the uses of rabble rousing propaganda" (ibid. p. 5).

The direct destruction of anti-democratic pressure groups would be contrary to the rules of the democratic game. "In a relatively free society it is to be assumed that each individual or each group which has a purpose also has the right to propagate that purpose. . . . We do not assume, at least at the outset, that those who believe in force rather than education are inferior to us either intellectually or morally" (C, p. VIII). The existence of "competing propagandas" is even described as a necessary feature of free societies (C, p. X). In this competition, however, only the anti-democratic forces enjoy complete laissez-faire freedom; those who fight for democracy are warned against "meeting dangerous propaganda with direct counter-propaganda" (B, p. VIII), for this would only focus unwarranted attention on the utterances of the enemies of democracy and stimulate their influence. What is recommended is defensive skirmishing—"the candid and impartial study of the devices and apparent objectives of specialists in the distortion of public opinion" (ibid.)—in the belief, which has so often been contradicted by experience, that once a trick is exposed it does not work any more. This is termed the "way of democratic education" (ib. p. IX), and the propaganda analyst's purpose is thus defined as merely to help the thoughtful citizen "to distinguish and choose rationally between rival propagandas" (C, p. VIII).

The Institute's definition of propaganda as "expression of opinion or action by individuals or groups deliberately assigned to influence actions of other individuals or groups with reference to predetermined ends" (B, p. 15) has been criticized for taking in too much, for leading to an uncritical rejection as propaganda of every appeal to act and to an ensuing collective indecision. To some extent these criticisms are justified: the Institute's opposition of propaganda to science, which is defined as "the discovery of new facts and principles" (B, p. 15) whereby the scientist has no desire to "put anything across" (ibid.) implies a depreciation of all forms of persuasion, allowing only purely factual evidence to be submitted to the public on the

basis of which each individual has to reach his decision alone. But the identification of propaganda with persuasion is consonant with the Institute's view that "in a democracy freedom of speech necessarily means freedom to propagandize" (A, p. IV). The absence of a dynamic conception of democracy leads to emphasizing the democratic form at the expense of democratic content, and this in turn determines not only the Institute's conception of propaganda and the methods advocated to combat it, but also the content of its analyses. They evidence an almost exclusive preoccupation with the technique of misrepresentation and misinformation, and with the apparent content of the propagandists' utterances. The readers of the Institute's Bulletins have even been offered exercises in formal logic as a prophylactic measure against seduction by logical fallacies. The more complex methods of totalitarian propaganda or the purely physical devices—like the constant reiteration of a slogan that may be, formally, a true factual statement—seem to escape these analysts. In practice, the wide definition, which includes "actions" as well as "opinions," is disregarded; propaganda is considered as a form of persuasion that plays on the emotions rather than the intellect. The simplicity of the solution only reflects the considerable simplification of the problem.

A good illustration of the Institute's treatment of propagandistic material can be found in "The Fine Art of Propaganda," where Father Coughlin's speeches, closely studied, are revealed to contain all possible forms of falsehood and emotional appeal. The devices used by the tricky demagogue are classified in seven groups, each group is given a name and a pictorial symbol, and a Coughlin speech is reprinted with the unmasking symbols in the appropriate passages. And there the analyst's task ends: propaganda having been conceived as an insubstantial shadow, as an aggregate of fascinating gestures and words, honest intellectual exorcism is deemed sufficient to dispel the charm.

"War Propaganda and the United States" by *Harold Lavine* and *James Wechsler* is for the most part a descriptive account of the various attempts to influence the American attitude toward the present war during its first six months. It devotes much more space to the "interventionists" than to the "isolationists." This is partly explained by the authors' obvious anti-war bias, but more so perhaps by their preoccupation with the direct forms of persuasion in which the British could indulge, thanks to the American sympathy to their cause, at the expense of the indirect and covert forms of action used by the Germans because of the different nature of their objective and because of hostile public opinion. The authors' attention is so strongly focused on the war issue that they often overlook important overtones and implications of the polemics they analyze: for example, they consider London's view of Roosevelt as a "real friend of democracy . . . who would be willing to fight for it but is held in check by his responsibility to his country" to be "fundamentally the same" as Berlin's explanation that he is "a tool of the plutocratic Jewish warmongers being restrained only by Aryan Americans" (p. 48).

Because the authors have a tendency to neglect analysis for the sake of description and compilation, they assumed that the "philosophy that guided French censorship was simple and logical . . . the fundamental purpose of censorship was to prevent the publication of news that might help the enemy" (p. 166). A more objective comparison between French propagandas in this

and the First World War would have revealed that this time French censorship was interested in suppressing democratic opinion almost as much as information helpful to the enemy. Instead, the authors merely note that Allied propaganda was often "inept." (In contrast, they clearly discern that in the battle of propagandists around the Finnish war the ostensible issues were only a pretext for diverting public feelings into anti-Soviet channels: "no other adversary could have united Rabbi Wise and Father Coughlin" (p. 324).)

The failure to discover concrete relations between the propagandists' ostensible activities around the war issue and more basic social and economic problems was bound to produce a negative result. The last chapter of the book seems to deprecate the role of propaganda: "Propaganda would help to shape the verdict. . . . But events themselves would do much to determine the outcome of propaganda war" (p. 325). Economic processes influence people more than conscious attempts: "factories bulging with unmarketable goods would be the most powerful propaganda of all" (p. 344). And, directly contradicting the statement made in the opening paragraph of the book, that "in our time public opinion is primarily a response to propaganda stimuli," its last paragraph concludes with the remark that "the great bulk of the people, as in most wars and in most eras, seemed to be watching the enactment of a drama in which their role had already been fixed. They neither clamored for war nor cried for peace. They waited and the words rolled over them" (p. 355). This remark seems to reduce propaganda to an epiphenomenon. But if it is meant to stress the determining role of automatic processes in our society, the propaganda analyst's task should begin here instead of ending.

F. C. Bartlett's little book on "Political Propaganda" represents views essentially similar to those expressed by the writers for the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, and a similar honest desire to preserve democratic institutions. Propaganda is described as an attempt to influence opinion and conduct by non-intellectual means, as an organized and public form of suggestion, as "whipping up emotion and excitement directly, by violent exaggeration and by manufactured crises," as relying "upon symbol and sentiment" (p. 66). The author makes many valuable distinctions—such as between short-range and long-range propaganda, and between propaganda directed to an enemy country and propaganda for home consumption, and tries to refute the legend that the Nazis' successes are based on a scientific analysis of the mass mind. He vigorously opposes the idea of imitating Fascist methods of propaganda for democratic purposes and thinks that "the basis of all effective propaganda in a democracy is a reliable news service." He expects a great deal for the success of democratic political organization from "a genuine knowledge of those human factors that determine friendliness and unfriendliness between differently organized social groups"—a knowledge that is only at its initial stages.

In his lucid little pamphlet *E. H. Carr* represents the ideas of liberalism gone "realistic." He compares the prejudice against propaganda with the prejudice against state control of industry. But the "hard fact" is that "the mass production of opinion is the corollary of the mass production of goods" (p. 7). Apparently the author's attitude toward "facts" is that of a blind beggar toward coins: he accepts them even if they are only analogies. It is not surprising that, according to him, "some control by the State, however

discreetly veiled, over the instruments of propaganda has become unavoidable if the public good is to be served and if the community is to survive" (p. 8), the sole reservation being that "this power is exercised for recognizably national, and not merely party, interests" (p. 9). Thus the categories of "the public good" and "the national interest"—probably the oldest ideological disguises—have once again performed their usual function.

Most democratic writers believe that the democracies must avoid using totalitarian propaganda methods. "The Rape of the Masses" by *Chakotin* is a systematic attempt to justify the opposite view. The author pursues a double aim: he wants to bare the essential mechanism of fascist propaganda and indicate a method of action which will realize socialism without violence. His excellent remarks on the technique of propaganda and his clear insight into the nature of the modern masses are unfortunately marred by grave theoretical misunderstandings which lead him to advocate the paradoxical plan of manipulating mankind into reason and freedom.

The author's confusion about the relations between biology and "culture" is especially noteworthy and no doubt helps to explain the rest. The two spheres are conceived not only as essentially dualistic: "Material benefits do not exhaust man's desires: when he secures them he aspires to higher things, to purely spiritual satisfactions and raptures, and these are inconceivable without freedom" (p. 3), but "instinct" and "social feeling" (= culture) are regarded as incompatible: social ideas are "anti-biological" (p. 296) and "culture leads us ultimately to destruction" (p. 298). In this conflict the author chooses the side of "culture" for the compensations it offers us in the form of "spiritual felicity" (p. 298) and calls his philosophy "compensated pessimism." At least this bluntness has the merit of laying bare one of the roots of all pessimistic doctrines: the academic conception of "culture" as a purely hedonistic enjoyment of the products of art and science.

A great part of his confusion may be traced to his biological conception of culture and psychology. He believes that "human action is nothing but a consequence of biological processes, indeed nervous processes, which take place in each individual" (p. 12) and even "political action is primarily a form of biological behavior." Conditioned reflexes founded on four basic instincts, those of struggle, nutrition, sexuality and maternity, explain all behavior and determine the propagandist's art of influencing people. The most important instinct is the first, identical with that of self-preservation, which is sublimated into fear, depression, aggressiveness and enthusiasm.

Whatever the general objections against this biological psychology, its appropriateness in describing the contemporary scene is striking. Our age, Chakotin justly observes, is not the age of the crowds, but of masses—and dispersion and isolation are precisely the characteristics of the "masses." "The mass is generally dispersed; its individuals are not in touch with one another" (p. 46). Of these masses only 10% are capable of a conscious active attitude; the remaining 90% are "lazy-minded, or tired out, or their whole attention is absorbed by the difficulties of everyday life" (p. 176)—that is, they are reduced to a biological level. This result of social developments is interpreted by the author as a biological law; for this reason it is natural that he should advocate "the bringing to heel" of the passive 90% "by dint of attention to their particular receptivity" (p. 128). This is what the Nazis did in Germany: according to Chakotin, Hitler's propaganda, which appealed to the instinct of struggle, was superior to the Social Democratic

propaganda, which appealed exclusively to the instinct of nutrition. Thus Hitler's triumph appears as the triumph of a propaganda that was not met by his own, "scientific" methods.

To corroborate this view the author produces "experimental" evidence: an anonymous report of a Socialist propaganda expert is quoted entire in chapter VII, from which we learn that "scientific" methods applied by the Social Democrats in one town produced excellent results. A more careful reading of the same report, however, shows that the crux of the matter was not propaganda, and that certain conditions are required before successful propaganda can even be applied. Attempts to spread the "scientific" methods to the whole of Germany failed because they were sabotaged by the leaders unwilling to accept the necessary corollary to the appeal to aggressive instincts: the actual readiness to risk and to fight. After July 20th 1932, we are told, "symbols were used; they had become official; but there was no enthusiasm, no spirit, no faith in the party slogans or in the ability of the party to put up a fight" (p. 243). It is clear that enthusiasm, courage and faith must come first—and even they are not sufficient, at least according to Chakotin, for on page 283 he tells us that "power is the first requisite," power for the democratic elements to safeguard the community. Thus, by the author's own admission, a minority seems unable to use the methods of propaganda he advocates, and his thesis is finally reduced to a pious wish that the "truly" democratic elements, once in power, should do their utmost in order to spread faith in human progress and the ideas of the true, the good and the beautiful. It is difficult to suppose that truly democratic elements could assume power without beginning the process of overcoming the present dispersal and isolation of the individual in the mass—and there is no doubt that once this stage is attained "violent methods of propaganda" based on biological urges will be obsolete. But even at our own stage no real insight into propaganda seems possible if it is detached from the social complex that defines its concrete content.

The inadequacies inherent in the purely technical approach to the problem of propaganda are clearly illustrated in *Edmond Taylor's* "Strategy of Terror"—an excellent first-hand document describing how French public opinion between 1938 and 1940 reacted to the continuous barrage of Nazi propaganda. At every stage of the process this propaganda reveals itself as a means of potential or actual warfare; the factor of communication is subordinated to the factor of force and in the end is entirely replaced by it. Exactitude or inexactitude of information play a minor role: instances are quoted to show that the German propagandists took care to deny false information they had previously issued themselves. "The Nazis," writes Taylor, "do not simply wage psychological warfare on a larger scale and more unscrupulously, but they coordinate their attacks in the way a good general coordinates all the arms in his command to attain precise objectives. Propagandists in the democratic countries still seem hypnotized by the conception of propaganda as a thing in itself, and do not see in true perspective its place in the strategy of total war" (p. 203). This true character of Nazi propaganda is misunderstood both by those who want to fight it by counter-propaganda and by those who think that a critical appraisal of the propagandists' utterances is a sufficient weapon. For in both cases propaganda is regarded as a form of communication, or persuasion by arguments; in fact it is persuasion by violence, or violence simulating persuasion. Those who are "persuaded"

by such methods are not really converts, they do not succumb to arguments; they merely adhere to the cause that, in their belief, is the winning one.

Like many others, Mr. Taylor is deeply disturbed by what he calls the fundamental problem of every democracy: "How can men be made to work together without thinking alike?" (p. 220). He fails to see that if this were really the problem, the solution would be simple: once people do work for a common purpose, they usually do think together—or when they do not it is more of an advantage than a drawback. What actually happened in the European democracies was that the governments tried to impose a unity of thought without first removing essential divisions of interest.

NORBERT GUTERMAN (New York).

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., *Radio and the Printed Page.* An Introduction to the Study of Radio and its Role in the Communication of Ideas. Duell, Sloan and Pearce. New York 1940. (XXII and 354 pp.; $4.00)

This is by far the most competent, informative, and generally important study of the subject indicated in the title that has yet appeared. In addition to a wealth of new data gathered and analyzed by the Office of Radio Research (Columbia University), of which Dr. Lazarsfeld is the director, this study brings together and summarizes also the results of numerous other studies on the subject. The result is a research monograph of unusual interest both from the standpoint of methods employed and the results achieved.

The general justification for an inquiry of this sort has been well stated in the introduction: "The United States points with pride to its small and declining illiteracy rate. But at the same time science makes such rapid progress that the proportion of what a person does not know to what he knows is probably much greater nowadays than it was when very few knew how to write or to read. In fact, if literacy is defined as competence to understand the problems confronting us, there is ground for suggesting that we are becoming progressively illiterate today in handling life's options. And since it is no longer possible to make major decisions in local town meetings, the future of democracy depends upon whether we can find new ways for the formation and expression of public will without impairing our democratic form of government."

The importance of the radio and the newspaper as factors in the formation and expression of public opinion has, of course, been the subject of an extensive literature, largely of a speculative type. The present volume deals definitely with a variety of specific questions centering perhaps around the central theme of who listens to (or reads) what, and why. The answers are based on thousands of detailed interviews with people of all types throughout the country, as well as on other data drawn from the experience of advertising agencies, advertisers, broadcasting companies, and such organizations as the Book-of-the-Month Club.

A considerable portion of the book is devoted to the question of what cultural level of people listen to the different types of broadcasts and how this compares with newspaper reading habits. Briefly the findings show that "as we go down the cultural scale, there is more and more radio listening but less and less serious listening" (p. 43). For this reason, "the whole contention that *serious* broadcasts are so much more accessible than print is prob-

ably erroneous" (p. 44). Accordingly "the idea that radio is at this moment a tool for mass *education*, for considerably increasing *serious* responses in the community is groundless" (p. 48. Italics mine). The mass of evidence assembled (especially in Chapter 4) in support of this conclusion as well as the competence of the methods of inquiry leaves little escape from this and many other important findings.

It would be easy to fill many pages with interesting results of this exceptionally readable and informative monograph. Comparisons of the radio listening and newspaper reading habits of people by age, sex, education, economic condition, rural and urban residence, and illuminating cross-classifications and inter-relations of these and other factors provide a gold mine of information as to the type of public reached by different kinds of programs and materials. To present material of this kind in a style which will hold the interest of the general reader is itself somewhat of an achievement. Any appraisal of the implications of radio as a social influence will have to draw heavily upon this volume. It is to be hoped that the author and his able assistants will at some future time give us an equally illuminating analysis of the biases and discriminations which characterize the selection of programs and material of the "serious" broadcasts.

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG (Bennington College).

Hobson, Wilder, *American Jazz Music.* W. W. Norton & Company. New York 1939. (230 pp.; $2.50)

Sargeant, Winthrop, *Jazz Hot and Hybrid.* Arrow Editions. New York 1938. (IX and 234 pp.; $5.00)

Wilder Hobson's volume presents a survey of the history of jazz—or, more precisely, the "story" of it—intended for popular consumption. His point of departure is the thesis that jazz is a "language," not a mere agglomerate of tricks. The basis of this idea is not indicated in detail. The language of jazz is praised as being natural, original and spontaneous, without any attempt being made at an historical or pragmatic analysis of its elements. The notion of spontaneity is applied to the folk music features of jazz, particularly those taken from the musical store of the American Negro.

Hobson's folkloristic persuasion permits him to draw a sharp dichotomy between genuine jazz and the standardized mass article—current entertainment music is not covered in the plan of the book. However, the actual existence of a clear-cut distinction between spontaneous folk music and commercialized mass production is as problematic as it is alluring. Any attempt to abstract jazz from the features of commodity production inherent in it is prone to fall prey to that type of romanticism which is fostered by the music industry in order to increase its sales figures.

Hobson has not altogether escaped this danger. For him, the existence and success of jazz suffice to justify it, although with many reservations. The lack of critical perspective is responsible for the fact that in its latter part the book resolves itself more and more into a series of monographical sketches of the established band musicians, from Armstrong, Beiderbecke and Henderson to the heroes of swing. Incidentally, it is just these sketches which are somewhat vague. They do not contain any precise technical characterization

and are sometimes all too similar to the trade-marks under which today's bands are marketed.

Winthrop Sargeant's book has much more serious scientific intentions and is much more adequate to the subject matter. It offers very careful, minute descriptions of the technical peculiarities of jazz, especially its rhythm and melody. The penetrating analyses of the supposed jazz idiom yield the insight that jazz is far from a language. As a matter of fact, its superficial freedom and its improvisatory lack of restraint can be reduced to a few standardized formulas or "patterns": "Jazz, at its most complex, is still a very simple matter of incessantly repeated formulas" (Sargeant, p. 90). As early as 1905 and 1910 these formulas, particularly the rhythmical ones, were completely assembled in the ragtime-style—that ragtime style from which current opinion, shared by Hobson, is so eager to sever jazz. It may be concluded from Sargeant's book that there is as little fundamental difference between ragtime and jazz as between jazz and swing. What is called the development of syncopated popular music actually consists of presenting that which is always identical as something ever new. The styles commercially promoted at any given time are scarcely more than crude attempts to add a new glitter to shopworn material by changing its label and make-up.

Sargeant regards it as his main task to show the origins of jazz patterns in the forms of Negro folk music. This tendency seduces even him at times to overrate the improvisatory freedom of jazz production, although as soon as he carries through his technical analyses he becomes fully aware that it is not true freedom.

He regards it as the decisive difference between jazz and European art music that jazz is not molded according to the categories of "composing" and particularly of musical notation, but rather according to those of performance and immediate sound. This thesis is open to discussion. First, jazz improvisation is largely an interchangeable substitute for regular, fixed and written musical structures, and Sargeant as a musician knows this very well. The authority of the written music at any moment is still apparent behind the liberty of the performed music. Further, there are limits to the possibility of notating art music as well as folk music. A performance of a Beethoven quartet that conveyed exclusively what was prescribed in the music would not make sense. Finally, the art of rhythmical notation has been so far developed in advanced European art music, that these improvisations, which Sargeant regards as beyond the possibility of being written, fall strictly within the scope of notation. The idea that a solo chorus by Armstrong could not be written down, whereas a quartet by Webern could, is a somewhat shaky one to maintain—not to mention the difficulty of determining where and when improvisation still exists in actual jazz practice.

Both books avoid societal conclusions. Hobson consciously remains on the level of reportage, and Sargeant is understandably irritated by rubber-stamp phrases such as "jazz as the music of the machine age," or as "the stimulant of metropolitan vice" (cf. Sargeant, p. 9). He tries to escape beyond the boundary of such notions and to settle within the more secure borders of technological and ethnological scrutiny. Yet it is precisely the facts gathered here which almost force a societal interpretation.

With regard to the theoretical views represented by this periodical, especially in the matter of jazz and listening habits in the field of popular music, it may be appropriate to go into some of the details of both books.

First of all, it must be admitted that there is an undeniable connection between jazz and the folklore of the American Negro, although the commercialization of the concept of primitivity casts doubt on primitivity itself. Indeed, the interconnection is itself far from completely clear. Hobson says, "that there is a close connection between the Negro folk music and jazz is obvious; but it is not open to what might be called exact scholarship." (Hobson, p. 29.) One generally regards the Negro spirituals as a pre-form. However, there is at least a possibility that their melodies are of white origin and were merely transformed by the Negroes of the South (Sargeant, p. 25). There can be at best only negative proof of the Negro origin of jazz; the folk music of white Americans shows none of the characteristic elements of jazz (Sargeant, p. 103). On the other hand, even in the light of Sargeant's presentation, the results yielded by a comparison of American and African Negro music are so modest that an ethnological tracing of jazz is hardly feasible (Sargeant, p. 189f). Thus one is necessarily led to consider societal conditions. It may well be imagined that even the Negro spirituals which divert the impassioned outpourings of slaves and their grandchildren to Christian authority and subject them to this authority, reveal something societal. The pattern of pagan fetishism, Christian submissiveness and commodity-mindedness is clearly discernible in such scenes as the "evolution of a spiritual" described by Natalie Curtis-Burlin in her Hampton Collection of Negro Folk Songs (Sargeant, p. 19 f). The most decisive feature of today's current jazz, the fitting in of the break into the norm, can be spotted in the hymn singing of the South: "each singer would start off on a little vocal journey of his or her own, wandering up, down or around in strange pentatonic figures, but coming back at the appointed instant to common ground" (Hobson, p. 33—quotation from Abbe Niles' preface to W. C. Handy's Blues).

The Negro spirituals are vocal music; the apparent spontaneity of jazz is due largely to the transference of vocal particularities to instrumental media (Hobson, p. 31). Effects such as the laughing trumpet and the baby cry are vocalizations. They imitate inflections of the human voice in singing and speaking (Hobson, p. 43 f; Sargeant, p. 6). The instrumental music behaves as if it were vocal, the mechanism as if it had a voice of its own. Even in present-day swing, the pseudo-morphosis of speaking, singing and playing is highly significant. It has not escaped Hobson's attention (Hobson, p. 46). If there is a specific difference between jazz and ragtime, it lies within this pseudo-morphosis. Ragtime was exclusively instrumental, in fact, limited to the piano. Sargeant rightly defines the piano as the instrument of the ragtime epoch. The pseudo-vocalization of jazz corresponds to the elimination of the piano, the "private" middle-class instrument, in the era of the phonograph and radio.

The vocalization of instrumental sound means the introduction of certain irregularities into the realm of the instrumental. The characteristic "dirty tones" (Hobson, p. 45) and "worried notes" (Sargeant, p. 132) are effects of the deceptive "humanization" of the mechanism.

At this point the inadequacy of a merely descriptive method becomes obvious. Such a method cannot discover anything about the gratification associated with "dirty" and "worried" tones, which replace the normal tones and still allow them to be felt. This gratification is sadistic. It is the lust that the oppressed individual experiences when he mutilates the language in slang

and when he distorts the musical norm in jazz. This is his revenge for being subject to the objective media of communication without ever being allowed to command them himself. The false notes in jazz correspond socio-psychologically to the black teeth drawn by naughty pencils to deface the grinning beauties in subway advertisements. A two-fold protest is here, directed against the individual himself no less than against the trickery and the false promise of the object. The naughtiness is ready to submit to any punishment. The plaintiveness of its sound expresses the longing for such submission. The vocalization of the instrumental serves not only to produce the appearance of the human, it serves also to assimilate the voice into the realm of the instrumental: to make it, as it were, an appendage to the machine.

Hobson calls the "dirty tones," "sonorities suggestive of hoarse or harsh vocal effects." There is no historical doubt as to whose voice the hoarse one is: "the lost origins of these songs . . . were among 'barroom pianists, nomadic laborers, watchers of incoming trains and steamboats, streetcorner guitar players, strumpets, and outcasts' " (Hobson, p. 34). In this sphere of origins the more radical, unpolished jazz has its abode even now. Hobson says, ". . . its chief market was in big, lower-class dance halls, mostly Negro, where the dancers really meant business, and perhaps its only sizable 'respectable' market was at the more intoxicated college house parties of the Prohibition period" (Hobson, p. 131). Today's mass music stems from the *lumpenproletariat,* and it appears that it fufills its promises only there, while it cheats the masses as soon as it holds them in its grip. Hence the reproach of pornography has been present from the very beginning and one might think sometimes that jazz invites it itself, masochistically aiming at its own liquidation. Simultaneously, the element of ill-repute assists commercial exploitation. It reflects, among other things, the prevailing social attitude toward the Negro and "in this connection it may be noted that despite the large number of brilliant Negro instrumentalists, there are none regularly engaged as radio 'house men' or in the motion picture studio orchestras. The inequality of opportunity for the negro is nowhere more clearly marked than in this field where he is often so specially talented" (Hobson, p. 172).

The tendency of jazz to satisfy the suppressed desires of the listeners by mutilating its own musical patterns reveals the aspect of jazz that once appeared to be modernistic. Jazz is prone to draw the supposedly noble—of which one knows oneself to be cheated—into the dirt; it tends to surrender altogether the magic language of music to the world of things, to permeate it with practical objects of all sorts which one scorns by denying them their actual function. This explains the intercommunication between jazz, certain cubistic manifestations and Dadaism. These intercommunications lie at hand in the *lumpenproletariat* atmosphere. "In the early years of the century Negro dance musicians played in the New Orleans bordellos, and the New Orleans City Guide states that the theatres and saloons of the city were ballyhooed by a white band, with a leader called Stale Bread (one of the players was known as Family Haircut), which improvised so-called 'spasm music' on such instruments as cigar-box violins, horns, pebble-filled gourds, and rude bass viols made out of half-casks" (Hobson, p. 38). But even from the West End of London comes an account of a jazz band of 1919 "consisting of piano, violin, two banjos, concertina, cornet, and . . . a 'utility man' playing traps, gongs, rattles, railway whistle, and motor hooter" (Hobson, p. 106). When jazz finally becomes tame these tendencies are softened into penchants for

articraft; e. g., the use of picturesque percussion instruments which no longer have functional value within the music itself (see Sargeant, p. 198) and the preference for extra-musical objects falls into line with the general trend of debunking the dance. Hobson's explanation of this trend is well worth consideration: the will to make dancing easier for middle-aged people. "And if the ragtime two-steps or one-steps had been somewhat rapid for many of the middle-aged, that objection had been overcome in 1914 by the dance team of Jeanette Warner and Billy Kent, who had introduced the fox trot, the music for which, as Vernon Castle explained, was 'an ordinary rag half as fast as . . . the one-step'" (Hobson, p. 97). The triumph of the fox trot is the triumph of an apparently loose, irregular walking. This tendency is amalgamated with that towards vocalization. The "spoken" melody represents, as against the musical-symmetrical, the contingency of daily life. Sargeant says of the solo exhibitions of trumpet: "From the abstract musical point of view they are often chaotic, resembling recitative or even prose inflection. And the recitative and prose usually bear a close resemblance to Negro speech in their intonations" (Sargeant, p. 64). Music based upon the use of whiskey jugs as instruments tends toward prose (Hobson, p. 96).

That all these ambitions, however, stay within narrow limits, that they remain within the conventional and are themselves becoming conventionalized, is corroborated by Hobson as well as by Sargeant. The unremitting basic convention is the identical groundbeat: ". . . for those who enjoy jazz the beat has become a convention; the attention is naturally given to what the convention makes possible" (Hobson, p. 48). The excesses of jazz can be understood only in relation to the groundbeat. ". . . the polyrhythmic designs of a jazz band depend on the rocksteady maintenance of basic rhythmic suggestions on and around the 4-4 beat" (See Hobson, p. 52). Hobson raises the question of why the convention of the groundbeat is always observed. His answer is the common-sense one that it is difficult enough for most ears to understand improvisation within an established framework; without such a framework the listener would be altogether disorientated. In other words, the sacrifice of jazz liberty to convention springs from the postulate of easy understandability and therewith from the desiderata of the market. It is precisely at this point that the commodity character of jazz reveals itself as the very core of the whole *genre*. Moreover, the more the cross-rhythms are developed and the more the accents of the groundbeat are suspended, the more the cross-rhythms tend to become symmetrical in themselves as "pseudo-bars." They form a sort of second convention, a derivative, as it were, of the first one. The ground rhythm is projected obliquely upon the system of syncopation (see Hobson, p. 53). This regularization of improvisation is one of the main characteristics of swing and is evidently bound up with the total commercialization of improvising (Hobson, p. 87). Similar considerations lead Sargeant to formulations such as that about the pseudo-primitive orgies of juvenile jitterbugs (Sargeant, p. 5). Sargeant is prepared to be very skeptical about the spontaneity of improvisation in today's jazz: "Most of what is popularly known (even among swing fans) as 'hot jazz' belongs to this category of remembered and repeated, partially rehearsed, music" (Sargeant, p. 31).

The standardization of freedom has its technological as well as its societal aspects. Technologically it occurs as soon as the attempt is made to develop the cross-rhythms beyond their rudimentary single appearances. The ex-

pansion of the bands has an analagous effect. ". . . the more intricate the individual rhythms become, the fewer the players must be if the articulation of the whole is not to be lost, especially in jazz 'counterpoint,' where the players must be able to hear each other as they play" (Hobson, p. 71, cf. Sargeant, p. 200). However, the necessity to draw out the cross-rhythms as well as to expand the bands, is again prescribed by the market. "The natural music, as these men play it for their own pleasure, has a limited public market. Hence most of them make a living in the big business of popular dance music, all of which has been generally known as 'jazz,' and most of which, similarly, is rapidly coming to be known as 'swing' " (Hobson, p. 74). This desideratum of the market involves the predominance of the hit tune over the specific jazz treatment. "It is the popular tune which is important and this is stressed. As the pianist Arthur Schutt has said with some eloquence, in Metronome: 'By all means make the melody of any given song or tune predominant. . . . There is no misunderstanding when commercialism reigns supreme' " (Hobson, p. 85). In spite of his disregard of social influences, Hobson notes the following observation: "There is thus a constant pressure on the players to please the audience at the expense of relaxed invention—which they can practice at home, anyway. And under this pressure, also, the ensemble ease and sympathy are likely to disappear" (Hobson, p. 155). These are the very tendencies which are opposed by the swing "culture" of small, highly trained ensembles such as Benny Goodman's trio and quartet. The latter serve a small audience of expert, sportsmanlike enthusiasts who function as the vanguard and as propagandists among the majority of listeners. The rest of the music labeled as jazz belongs to that *juste milieu* visualized by Hobson as a product of commercial decay, by Sargeant as an inescapable and necessary "hybrid."

As far as the technique of composition is concerned, both books have certain contributions to make. Hobson calls the simultaneous improvisation of several instruments jazz counterpoint. However, he has insight into the deceptive character of this counterpoint: jazz knows genuine polyphony as little as it knows genuine melodic freedom and genuine polyrhythm. The so-called counterpoints merely circumscribe the basic harmony: "But many of the appalled have probably not understood that the basic harmonic progression, as it always is in jazz, is known to all the group improvisers. On this basis, each invents a melody guided by his own feeling and the sound of his fellows" (Hobson, p. 59). Sargeant draws the full implication of this discussion of the contrapuntal nature of jazz improvisation: "Jazz . . . is not essentially a contrapuntal type of music—not, at least, in the sense that that term applies to European music. The blues, and subsequent jazz, employed the conventional four-voiced polyphonic structure of European music only sporadically. This Negroid idiom involved a sustained melody moving over a throbbing rhythmic background. Melodic basses and sustained inner voices were not an essential part of blues, or of jazz, structure" (Sargeant, p. 196 f).

He is no less critical of the so-called harmonic innovations. He knows that jazz harmony is borrowed from the European, particularly from the harmony of the impressionists. It is necessary to note here that American folk music, particularly the so-called hillbilly and cowboy songs of the whites, has crystallized certain harmonic formulas similar to those of the impressionists. They are characterized by the actual rejection of any har-

monic "progression" according to the steps of the key, and rather glide from dominant to dominant—a sort of folklorist *faux bourdon* effect. This is called "barber shop harmony" (See Sargeant, p. 168ff). It would be important for any theory of jazz to analyze the origin and significance of this harmony. It may be characterized by a general "lack of resistance," and has the tendency to let itself glide without positing definite harmonic relationships. In the barber shop chords the general submissiveness of jazz permeates its harmony as well.

Sargeant takes particular note of the melodic structure of jazz and its system of coordinates. He constructs a scale with blue notes at two points, neutral third and neutral seventh, respectively, with the possibility of alternating the big third with the small third and the big seventh with the small seventh (Cf. Sargeant, p. 134). This scale defines the norm of the dirty tones as opposed to the norm of occidental music. And it is in this scale that Sargeant sees the main Negro heritage of jazz. Of course, it applies more to jazz treatment than to the tunes subject to this treatment, the indifference and meanness of which are unequivocally stated by Sargeant.

As far as the *form* of jazz in its more specific sense is concerned, both authors concede the variation character of jazz. The variation form of jazz, however, leads nowhere to intrinsic motifical work, but to mere paraphrasing of the harmonic-melodic skeleton: "There has been almost no extended thematic writing, or contrapuntal writing, for jazz bands" (Hobson, p. 70). Sargeant speaks about a very simple type of variation form; ". . . considered as we consider 'musical form' in Western music, jazz has a rather elementary structure. The hot ensemble simply presents a theme, which may be improvised or taken from some popular melody, and proceeds to make a series of rhythmic and melodic variations on it. The harmonic structure of the theme is not altered in the variations. The formula is that usually expressed in theory books as A-A″-A‴ etc.; in other words the simple theme-and-variation type of structure" (Sargeant, p. 211 f). It is obvious that such a mechanical attitude toward form from the very beginning contradicts the idea of improvisatory freedom. This should suffice to exclude any romanticization of jazz. Oddly enough, however, the most essential element of jazz form appears to have escaped the attention of both authors—namely, that its conventional form-attitude tends to suspend consciousness of form (in this respect again a parody of impressionism), tends, as it were, to spatialize music.

Jazz is governed by simultaneity. That is to say, the temporal sequence of events is not involved in the sense of the musical phenomena. In principle all the details of jazz are interchangeable in time and Sargeant observes quite rightly that any jazz piece could end at any given moment. This technique, hailed above all else as being rhythmical, is in reality neutral in regard to musical time. That is probably why virtuosi jazz musicians, such as Ellington and Basie, as far as possible avoid caesuras which might hint at any temporal articulation of form. In jazz one substitutes the immobility of an ever-identical movement for time.

Hobson defines *jazz* itself as "a more or less vocalized, personal instrumental expression whose melodic and harmonic, as well as percussive, elements move in stress-and-accent syncopation in subtle momentums which are the products of an instinct for suspended rhythm" (Hobson, p. 72). One cannot say that this definition leads very far. Certain hints as to the

origins of the *word* jazz are more fruitful. Probably it stems from the French still spoken in New Orleans and is derived from *jaser*, meaning to chat, babble. This would suggest the relation to the "melody of speech" as well as to the contingencies of everyday life. Or it can be related to an old term familiar in American minstrel shows, *jasbo*, "meaning antics guaranteed to bring applause" (Hobson, p. 94). This etymology calls to mind the element of trickery in jazz and the commercial interest present in its very origin. At any rate, in the beginning the word had a sexual meaning and appears to have come into common use among anti-jazz competitors who promoted it as an abusive term for the new fad in New Orleans. As early as 1914, however, the word functioned as an advertising slogan. "In 1914, when the jazz bands had their first, faddish success, the word jazz was immediately taken over for its novelty value by dance musicians whose playing had little or no relation to the natural music" (Hobson, p. 75).

Some light is thrown upon the earliest pre-history of jazz in Sargeant's chapter, "The Evolution of Jazz Rhythm in Popular Music." His examples date back as far as 1834. At that time there were popular ditties such as "Turkey in the Straw" and "Old Zip Coon" in characteristic cakewalk rhythm, which contain in a rudimentary form the jazz idea of the pseudo-bar (Two-fourths becoming 3/16 plus 3/16 plus 2/16). The relation of jazz to military band music is mentioned only occasionally. During the first World War numerous American military bands which went to France had their jazz ensembles with them (Sargeant, p. 105). Sargeant recalls the role of the saxophone in the military band and the use of military marches as two-steps. "Military marches often did duty as two-steps during the later decades of the nineteenth century" (Sargeant, p. 195).

For the inevitable concept of *swing*, Hobson cites the following definition: "a band swings when its collective improvisation is rhythmically integrated" (Hobson, p. 16). This definition is problematic in every respect, because of the over-emphasis laid upon the improvisatory elements as well as upon the simultaneity of different improvisations. Later Hobson conceives of swing as a counter-tendency against commercialization, more or less in the same sense in which the small highly syncopated ensembles withdrew themselves from the broad stream of musical mass consumption. But even this does not suffice as a definition, because, as events have shown, the commodity character of popular music at once gets a hold on the specialized articraft for which swing stands. "The word 'swing' has become completely ambiguous. In some quarters 'swing' even seems to be regarded as if it were some sort of standardized commodity, such as the new-model Buicks, which could be judged from any given sample" (Hobson, p. 84). Finally, Hobson appears to incline toward the opinion that swing must be regarded as a mixture of jazz tricks and current hit music. "The 'swing' fad, which still continues as this is written, has largely been built on the commercially salable mixture of a certain amount of jazz playing and a great many of those compromise, popular melody-and-jazz orchestrations referred to in the chapter on commercial and concert jazz" (Hobson, p. 152).

Sargeant's results fundamentally agree with those of Hobson: swing is a counter-movement against the standardization of jazz, which quickly falls victim itself to this standardization. "The swing fad has, of course, been a reaction against the studied product of the large ensembles, and toward the primitive art of Negroid improvisation. Like most fads it too has

become sophisticated and conventionalized. As this book goes to press the term 'swing' is being universally applied to a ubiquitous variety of noise in which real improvisation has about as much place as it has in a logarithmic table" (Sargeant, p. 201).

There remains only the question of whether standardization is actually an injustice done to swing, or whether the supposed counter-movement against standardization itself inherently implies standardization. Sargeant's analysis of the patterns of improvisation heightens such a suspicion.

The counter-concept of swing, *sweet,* is not much more lucid. Sargeant summarizes as follows: "Small differences aside, then, we have distinguished for our present purposes two general types of jazz both of which represent types of performance rather than types of composition. They are 'hot' jazz and 'sweet' or sophisticated jazz. The former is more purely Negroid, more purely improvisatory, and comparatively independent of composed 'tunes.' The latter is the dance and amusement music of the American people as a whole. The tunes on which it is based issue from Tin Pan Alley, the centre of the popular song-publishing industry. These tunes are, some of them, purely Anglo-Celtic or Central European in character, some of them pseudo-Negroid" (Sargeant, p. 235 f). If this is correct, there ranges under the category of sweet the great mass of entertainment music that uses jazz elements but does not indulge in more complicated rhythmical formulas or appeal to expert listeners. Apparently the historical tendency is toward this type in spite of the manipulated swing fad. The once aggressive has become harmless. "'Sweet' commercial jazz today is different in many respects from the ragtime of 1910. It is orchestral where ragtime was jerky and boisterous. Its melodies are vocal, based on tunes that are originally created as songs. Its composers and, what is more important, its arrangers, are likely to be eclectic in their choice of musical material. Its harmonic and orchestral effects are often borrowed from the romantic and impressionistic composers of Europe. Its general character is more romantic and sentimental, less primitive, than that of ragtime" (Sargeant, p. 117). It must be noted that sophisticated here means not rhythmically refined, but, rather, "polished" and "civilized" and therefore even more primitive, in its more strict technical sense.

The connection between jazz and the eccentric clown is conspicuously neglected, although discussions about tap dancing lead to the very threshold of this relationship. Yet there is no lack of material, particularly from the earlier period of jazz: "Within a few months after the Dixieland arrived in New York, the word jazz merely meant any rackety, acrobatic dance music" (Hobson, p. 76). A patriarch of jazz, Ted Lewis, is described as an eccentric. "Lewis at his best was a sort of loony apotheosis of the ragtime spirit, strutting, twirling a baton, offering burlesque histrionics with a dancer's sense of pace and posture" (Hobson, p. 81). What is actually of the utmost interest is that Hobson associates the element of the eccentric with that of the castrated. He quotes a passage from Virgil Thompson, who describes Armstrong, the eccentric trumpet player par excellence, as a master of musical art comparable only ". . . to the great castrati of the eighteenth century" (Hobson, p. 121). A description of the band of Mike Riley identifies eccentricities as acts of mutilation committed against the instruments: "The band squirted water and tore clothes, and Riley offered perhaps the greatest of trombone comedy acts, an insane rendition of Dinah during

which he repeatedly dismembered the horn and reassembled it erratically until the tubing hung down like brass furnishings in a junk shop, with a vaguely harmonic honk still sounding from one or more of the loose ends" (Hobson, p. 161). Against the background of such acts the theory of the "jazz subject" developed by the reviewer might appear less lofty.

If the eccentric features of jazz are somewhat neglected, the representative of the eccentric in the technique of compositoin—the *syncope* in its relation to the basic rhythm—is focussed the more sharply. Hobson takes only the first step in the direction of a theory of syncope. "For those who like psychoanalytic suggestions, it might be said that the ragtime public enjoyed being moved out of the rut of the established beat" (Hobson, p. 26). For it is decisive against this supposition that the established beat is reestablished constantly and even that it remains effective during the syncopation as the inherent measure of the latter. Hobson feels a legitimate suspicion against this measure, which, however, he attributes somewhat maliciously to the "modernists" instead of making it his own case: "The ultra-modernists in composition go so far as to pronounce taboo upon rhythm, and even omit the perpendicular lines on their bars of written music, so that the risk of a monotonous pulsation is done away with" (Hobson, p. 107 f). Here the insight into the merely pseudo-modern character of jazz, its false freedom, the uniformity of its supposedly multifold rhythm lie at hand.

Sargeant's analyses lead more profoundly to a theory of syncope. To be sure, the two basic types he enumerates, namely simple syncopation and the formation of pseudo-bars, are not ultimately distinct from each other, because, according to Sargeant's own explanation, even the simplest syncopation contains within itself elementary pseudo-bars. However, his interpretation of the syncope as a mere substitution of the down beat, is all the more important. It localizes the fictitious character of jazz in the very center of the technical procedure. "A syncopation often gives the impression of anticipating a normal beat, as the ear tends to expect a normal one, and accepts the appearance of the abnormal one as its hurried or advanced representative" (Sargeant, p. 38). The syncopation is a living "as if." The substitution theory gives significance to Sargeant's interpretation of the "umpateedle" rhythm (Sargeant, p. 54). The punctuation reinforces the effect of the down beat and thus indirectly the effect of the syncope contrasting the groundbeat. The law of syncopation, as formulated by Sargeant, actually conceives of the syncope as a function of the strength of the very groundbeat with which it does *not* coincide. The power of the break is, as it were, drawn from the power of the convention itself. "A syncopation, or syncopative accent, is striking in direct proportion to the weakness of the metric beat on which it enters. Hence the effect, through 'umpateedle,' has been intensified" (Sargeant, p. 55).

Further, it is a new discovery that the relation between groundbeat and syncope has to be understood as involving an historical process. The groundbeats have defended themselves against the submissive scorn of the syncope as well as they could. But the driving force of the malicious trick proved to be stronger: "Even in the rags of the early nineteen hundreds a certain reluctance to override these beats with syncopation and polyrhythmic cycles persisted. The prim, four-square structure of the old reels and horn-

pipes, put up a valiant defense against the new influence. But the development of polyrhythmic freedom was not to be denied indefinitely, even though the Anglo-Celtic tradition and the structural peculiarities of the European notational system were pitted against it. By the turn of the century the besieged strong beats began to yield here and there" (Sargeant, p. 108).

Sargeant's final theory of the syncope largely coincides with that of the reviewer. "The interruption of rhythmic regularity produces a feeling of unrest. The listener's rhythmic faculties are thrown off balance, and he gropes instinctively for a re-orientation. His groping is attended by a certain sense of stimulation or excitement. A resumption of regularity is greeted with a feeling of relief" (Sargeant, p. 203). He aptly describes the syncope as "rhythmic discord longing for its solution." The ritual of revelation by which the "jazz subject" becomes aware of its identity with the social power of the groundbeat to which it believed itself opposed, is thus identified by Sargeant: "The listener is thrown for the moment on unmapped and confusing ground. The basic rhythm ceases to offer its familiar thumping landmarks. The solo dangles dizzyingly without support, and then, just as the listener has about abandoned hope of re-orienting himself, the fundamental rhythm resumes its orderly sway, and a feeling of relief ensues" (Sargeant, p. 205).

At this point Sargeant becomes aware of the illusory character of the whole process: "In this process the fundamental rhythm is not really destroyed. The perceptive listener holds in his mind a continuation of its regular pulse even though the orchestra has stopped marking it. And when the orchestra resumes its rhythmic function, it continues the series of mentally sustained pulses, its entrance coinciding precisely with one of them. The situation during the silent pulses is one that challenges the listener to hold his bearings. If he has any sort of rhythmic sense he will not be content to lose himself. If he does not feel the challenge, or is perfectly content to lose himself, then he is one of those who will never understand the appeal of jazz" (Sargeant, p. 206; cf. Hobson, p. 49). To comprehend this appeal of jazz means only to be ready to find the gesture of freedom while actually there is no freedom. The achievement of the expert listener is limited to his not being confused by any subjective temptation while obeying the rhythmical law.

Sargeant correctly compares the kind of integration achieved by jazz with the happy ending of the moving picture. Whereas everyone knows the ideological role of the ending of a film, Sargeant for the first time brings the same phenomenon to the fore in the field of musical mass communication. Jazz is "a 'get together' art for 'regular fellows.' In fact it emphasizes their very 'regularity' by submerging individual consciousness in a sort of mass self-hypnotism. . . . In the social dimension of jazz, the individual will submits, and men become not only equal but virtually indistinguishable" (Sargeant, p. 217). This is an astonishing statement from a musician who does not intend to raise any sociological questions. The link between the societal and the aesthetic process, however, is the technique of mechanical reproduction. Jazz and the radio match each other as if they were patterned in the same mold. One might almost say that jazz is the sort of music which in its life performance already appears as if it were trans-

mitted by radio. Sargeant grasps even this relation: "already the flexible idiom of jazz has found a strong foothold in the technologically changed situation" (Sargeant, p. 222).

T. W. ADORNO (New York),
with the assistance of EUNICE COOPER.

Abbott, Wilbur Cortez, ed., Writings and Speeches of Oliver Cromwell. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. 1937, 1939. Vol. I: 1599-1649. (759 pp.; $5.00) Vol. II: 1649-1653 (806 pp.; $5.00)

Petegorsky, David W., *Left-Wing Democracy in the English Civil War.* A Study of the Social Philosophy of Gerrard Winstanley. Victor Gollancz. London 1940. (254 pp.; 7s. 6d.)

Professor Abbott's edition of *Cromwell's Writings and Speeches* gives us far more than the title indicates. It is, in fact, a comprehensive biography of Cromwell and his times, interspersed with Cromwell's utterances, verbal or written. The task which Professor Abbott has performed is stupendous. The quality of the edition is outstanding and its value for the final elucidation of this period, so decisive for European and American history, can hardly be overrated. The first volume covers the years 1599 to 1649, that is, Cromwell's early life and the civil war until the king's death. The important sections of this volume are primarily those dealing with Cromwell's early parliamentary activities. Professor Abbott's interpretation and the documents which he reproduces make it clear that Cromwell's chief concerns during that period were religious problems. I also consider of high value the chapters dealing with Cromwell's activities as Lieutenant General.

The second volume, comprising the years from 1649 to 1653, reaches from the beginning of the Commonwealth to the dissolution of Parliament. This volume also contains an excellent index to the first two volumes, indispensable in a book of this kind. The wealth of information contained in volume two is so overwhelming that, in a short review like this, it is impossible to select any problem for discussion. The very detailed analysis of the military campaigns is perhaps not so important as the documentation of Cromwell's emergence as a dictator. In order fully to evaluate the relation between democracy and the dictatorship, we shall have to wait for the remaining two volumes. That connection is of paramount importance not only for the study of the puritan revolution but for that of the French revolution and even of National Socialism.

Professor Abbott's historiography keeps well within the great tradition of Gardiner and Firth. The method has definite advantages in that it allows us to learn the political, religious, and military movements. Yet it has its drawbacks in that it neglects to put the religious and political struggles in the framework of the great social movements which tore English society asunder during the civil war. We would be able fully to understand the significance of the profound political transformation during that period only if we possessed an economic history of the civil war of the same precision and wealth of information as that contained in the writings of Gardiner, Firth and Abbott. Some preparatory work has been done by the two German socialists, Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky. Their work, however, though very stimulating, does in no way fulfill the condition of an economic history.

Professor R. H. Tawney has promised us in the not too distant future an economic history of the puritan revolution.

Mr. Petegorsky's book is an important contribution to a very much neglected aspect of the puritan revolution, the digger-movement and its leader Gerrard Winstanley. The author, a Canadian who now teaches at Antioch College, has written this book as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of London and under the supervision of Harold Laski. The influence of Laski and of R. H. Tawney is clearly discernible in the fact that the political theories are throughout interpreted in terms of the class antagonisms of English society. The book is well written and very well documented. The author profoundly disagrees with the only existing analysis of Winstanley's thought, Lewis H. Berens' book, *The Digger Movement* (London 1906). He distinguishes five stages in the development of Winstanley's political and social theory: a mystical period (Summer 1648), the theological tracts of 1648, the transition to secular revolutionary thought (1649), the tracts written during the digger experiment, and finally the Law of Freedom in which an elaborate plan of English society based on common ownership is drawn up. The author thus definitely asserts a break within Winstanley's thought, a development away from mystical and religious thought to a purely secular theory, although the latter is clothed in a deistic philosophy. Winstanley aims at securing individual freedom through social equality, that is, through common ownership of the land. The author admits, a little reluctantly, a reversal of Winstanley's revolutionary position in the fifth stage, during which he developed his utopia. Whereas, previously, Winstanley had appealed to the poorest and most exploited classes in society for revolutionary uprising and for the destruction of the traditional forms of society, in his Law of Freedom his trust in the people seems to be badly shaken. It is replaced by an appeal to Cromwell to carry out the changes which Winstanley advocated. Winstanley's proposals show, indeed, a considerable insight into the class-structure of 17th century England, an insight which no English writer of that period, with the exception of Hobbes and Harrington, possessed. Both Levellers and Diggers gave to the common people a vision of a better world. However, their influence had no long duration. English society was certainly not ripe for such revolutionary transition. In consequence, the role of these rational movements was soon taken over by irrational, chiliastic outbursts, like the Fith Monarchy Men.

In his conclusions, the author follows the development of socialist thought from Abbe Meslier to Babeuf. This short survey indicates the value of this book which is thus a challenging and even daring interpretation of the English civil war. The rich documentation from the British Museum, the MacAlpin and the Seligman collections makes the analysis extremely convincing. Happily enough, Professor George Sabine of Cornell will shortly publish a collection of Winstanley's political tracts so that one will be easily able to verify or to reject Mr. Petegorsky's interpretation.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN (New York).

Cole, Charles W., *Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism*. 2 vol. Columbia University Press. New York 1939. (XII, 532, 675 pp.; $10.00)

Of French economic history in the seventeenth century we already possess the thorough presentations of Boissonnade, Levasseur, Sée, and others, while

the general problem of Mercantilism has been extremely well handled by Heckscher. In spite of this, the author of the two volumes under review has been able to bring rich material and new viewpoints to light. Particularly the colonial problem (as we would call it today) and industrial policy are here for the first time treated in their most minute detail. As regards labor policy, the author correctly stresses the mixture of economic and ecclesiastic motives for the formation of the "hopitaux generaux," although it would perhaps have lain within the framework of the task he set himself to investigate more thoroughly the question of how far these "hopitaux generaux" contributed or aimed to contribute to the introduction of new labor processes. The widening of the gulf between workers and those who owned the means of production is correctly expounded as one of the consequences of Colbert's economic policies. It is regrettable that Cole has not given the same extensive treatment to Colbert's financial policies, about which he states in the first volume (p. 301) that of all Colbert's policies they were of foremost interest to Louis XIV. Such a treatment would of course have had to include the conflict which has been well known ever since Richelieu wrote his political testament,—that between the crown, the financiers, and the noblesse de robe, and would certainly have enriched with new problems and perhaps also with new answers the author's judgment of Colbert's mercantilism which is somewhat colorless when compared to the minuteness of detail in the work proper.

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER (New York).

Brogan, D. W., *France.* The Development of Modern France. 1870-1933. Harpers. New York 1940. (744 pp.; $5.00)

The predominant place which political history occupied in the 19th century it lost in the 20th;—economic, social and cultural history crept in and the history of political institutions and constitutional history absorbed most of the material usually put forward in political history proper. The results of this division of labor, while inevitable, were not always satisfactory.

Deslandres' recent work on French constitutional history, for example, is an inexhaustible mine of material, but falls short of providing a satisfactory description of dominant political forces and their modes of action. Where the professionals had to direct their attention into special fields, belles lettres and lawyers replaced them, sometimes not without considerable success, as in the case of Bainville, Benda and Zevaes, but without being able, however, to treat the subject with the completeness and thoroughness it merits.

Brogan too writes political history proper. His book is written for a wider public and has no scientific apparatus of annotations, yet it treats the history of modern France both brilliantly and exhaustively, and there is no statement in the book which does not indicate wide knowledge as well as deep insight into the problems of this period.

He has drawn heavily on the peculiar mixture always present in the structure of the French mind, a mixture of a deeply satiated love of western culture and an incessant scepticism of contemporary institutions. From this his description derives its peculiar charm and pervasive wit. Who, for instance, would not admire his two word description of the impact the Panama affair had on the French peasant's mind: "never confess."

Never have the French developments of the last decades been narrated with such a minimum of partisanship, nor have events and personalities ever been presented with such photographical fidelity.

If criticism of such a chef-d'œuvre is at all called for it would have to question the adequacy of the photographical method itself. The book is a splendid sequence of narratives, rather than an analysis which would enable us to pick from the multiplicity of factors apparent in recent French history the dominating ones.

The survival of old-fashioned merchant capitalism, which distinguishes France so sharply from its Eastern neighbor, seems to be significant as a more general explanation of the French political scene with its well institutionalized graft, at least up to the first world war. Yet even for this period, a closer analysis of the problems facing French agriculture and of the cleavages between different categories of landowners would have been instructive. What we specially miss is an explanation of how and to what extent this merchant and finance capitalism put its imprint on a largely agricultural society—after having once disposed of the dangers inherent in the Paris Commune. The history of *causes célèbres* gives some working samples and some glimpses into, but no analysis of this process. And when our author truly describes the divergent position taken by Jaurès and Guesde in the Dreyfus affair, he omits to ask himself to what extent Guesde's scale of evaluating historical events had peculiar merits for a historical analysis. He rather takes the dramatic highlights, in which French political history is so rich, as a compass, and if he does not always follow traditional interpretations, he at least accepts the place and the weight usually ascribed to such events.

Large scale industrial capitalism made rapid advances, perhaps somewhat more rapid than the author was willing to admit, in the postwar years, and consequently the left wing political victories became much more difficult to reconcile with the economic power structure. Transfer of the ashes of republican heroes to the Pantheon wouldn't effect a reconciliation any more—even if they were the ashes of Jean Jaurès. It is doubtful whether even people better versed in financial matters than Herriot—our author follows in his evaluation the path of the perhaps not altogether unbiased judgment of the Governor of the Banque de France in 1924—could reconcile the glowing disparities of the progressive politics and conservative economics of the French system.

During the last period, the thirties, these contradictions lay quite in the open and are symbolized in the struggle around the Banque de France.

The photographic method of historical writing focusses its attention on the description of momentaneous situations dealing with the actions of social groups when and insofar as they come into the limelight of history. Brilliant and illuminating as the description appears in Brogan's case, it stimulates our desire still more to get down to a closer analysis of the main social forces, their attitudes and role, which would allow us to explain with a reasonable degree of accuracy the inner history of the French tragedy.

Otto Kirchheimer (New York).

Schumpeter, Josef A., *Business Cycles.* A theoretical, historical and statistical analysis of the capitalist process. 2 vol. McGraw-Hill Book Company. New York 1939. (1050 pp.; $10.00)

Schumpeter's new book is an inexhaustible source of information on the economic facts and theories relevant to business cycles, and as such it is a meritorious work, certainly above the average. He is no newcomer to the

realm of theory; his present work must therefore be judged in the light of his previous theoretical studies.

Schumpeter is an adherent of the subjective theory of value, even though his first book, "The Nature and Content of Economic Theories" (1908), did not show in detail how a science of economics would be built on subjective valuations. Psychic data are intensive magnitudes and hardly appropriate to serve as primary cells of an exact scientific structure, and Schumpeter in that earliest work emphatically refused to explain economics through an analysis of the psyche and the motives of economic activity (p. 77). He preferred to build an "exact discipline of human economy" (ibid. p. 117), a mathematical-functional theory, on the basis of objectively existing market phenomena, the objective relations of exchange. He sought to formulate "pure" economics "in a way similar to that in which mechanics describes motions" (ibid. p. 128), and to show that "it is possible to conceive it exactly and indisputably and that scientific correctness in the physicist's sense is not unattainable in our domain too" (ibid. p. 131).

This exact basis of exchange relations could, according to him, be expressed in a "girdle of equations" (ibid. p. 132) that would describe the problem of equilibrium at the center of statics (ibid. p. 118). Schumpeter realized that "statics" was nothing but a theoretical fiction. The reality was to be treated in the next book, "The Theory of Economic Evolution" (1912, second edition 1926). The book, however, turned out to be but a temporary and preliminary sketch, the elaboration of which has come only with the present book. Here Schumpeter has moved still further from the Austrian School, and especially from the conception that the consumer—man and his needs—is the initial factor in the study of economic phenomena and that the direction of the productive process and its changes are nothing but a reaction to the changes in the demand. "Railroads have not emerged because any consumers took the initiative in displaying an effective demand for their service in preference to the services of mail coaches. Nor did the consumers display any such initiative,—wish to have electric lamps or rayon stockings, or to travel by motor car or airplane, or to listen to radios or to chew gum. There is obviously no lack of realism in the proposition that the great majority of changes in commodities consumed has been forced by producers on consumers who, more often than not, have resisted the change and have had to be educated up by elaborate psychotechnics of advertising." (Business Cycles, p. 73.)

If this is true, however, the whole subjective theory of value is done away with. For the value of the productive factors is not and cannot be deduced from the value of the final product given as the degree of satisfaction of the demand. The relation between the final product and the productive factor is reversed and the basis of the prevalent doctrine is thus abandoned. Since Schumpeter does not present a new theory of economic phenomena, what he offers here is not a general theory attempting a causal explanation, but at best a partial theory of a special domain. All it aims to be is a positivistic description of the phenomena, in an "exact" mathematical disguise, nothing but a protocol statement: "it is thus and so."

But the book just published is remarkable for still another reason. The Schumpeter of 1908 planned to construct an "exact" mathematico-functional theory of exchange relations and he owes his renown as a theoretician to precisely that intention; the Schumpeter of 1912 did not apply this principle

to dynamics, but broke with his previous method. He did not succeed in passing from statics to dynamics while maintaining his "exact" conception of exchange relations. The strict method of statics proved inapplicable to dynamic problems. For that reason Schumpeter took refuge, in his second work, in the method which he had previously deprecated as "motivative" and "psychological." The promises of the first book were not fulfilled. The dynamic forces were not conceived "exactly," in terms of exchange relations or "a girdle of equations," but were deduced from the capitalist's psyche, from his constant urge for innovations: his "joy of forms," his "daring because of his very difficulties," his "will to victory" in the "financial boxing match," in brief, from "economic activity considered as a sport." (Theory of Economic Evolution, p. 138 et seq.) Thus, Schumpeter's scientific fame as an exponent of "exact" economic science was founded not on the accomplishments of his second book, but on the unfulfilled promises of his first.

The Schumpeter of 1939 revolutionizes his methodological foundations for the third time: the motive force of all economic changes is no longer to be found in exact exchange relations nor in the capitalist's heroic personality, but in his banal, prosaic quest for profits, already stressed so much by Ricardo and later by Marx: the only thing that counts is the magnitude of profit and its changes. The capitalist no longer functions as the original dynamic force which spontaneously works changes. His activity is itself merely a result and he himself a mere stopping point in the automatic workings of the entire mechanism, aiming to restore a vanished rentability. Methodologically it is interesting that through this inner tendency toward accumulation, and excluding all external influence, Schumpeter tries to explain both the expansion and the depression that follows. He rejects the opinion that the impulse towards the change and expansion of the economic mechanism, originally conceived as static, comes from the consumer and the change in his needs.

The author has many intelligent things to say here (pp. 76-77) about differences between saving, not spending, accumulation, investment, and real investment; his exposition is often more correct and clearer than, for example, similar passages in J. M. Keynes. He attempts a conceptual analysis of dynamic reality, choosing the methodological procedure, customary since J. S. Mill, which begins with a stationary, constantly reproduced system excluding all external disturbing influences. Then, the path to reality is sought by successive approximations. Schumpeter is interested above all in the real source of the dynamic changes, the "prime mover in the process of internal economic change" (p. 72). The stationary system is so defined that there are no savings in it, and therefore no loans either; the rate of interest is thus equal to zero; lastly, there are no profits. Into this stationary phase the factor of savings is first introduced and the factor of accumulation, then inventions; the influence of each of these elements on the course of the process of reproduction is then examined.

As his first approximation, Schumpeter thus takes for his point of departure "a society, stationary in every respect except in that it displays a positive rate of saving." The productive functions follow the same course year after year; there are no external disturbances. The only form of investment opportunity that exists is that of loans to enterprises. Thus, credit exists only in the form of credit for productive ends. The only source of this credit and of the monetary capital offered for it is real savings. The

creation of credit is thus excluded. It is true that credit expansion through the creation of credit is one of the chief sources of enterprising activity and therewith of the secondary wave of industrial and speculative activities, but Schumpeter is here endeavoring to reveal only the primary sources of cyclical motions, and the creation of credit must remain excluded. Within this pattern the means of payment is real gold passing from hand to hand in each transaction (p. 79). A state of competitive equilibrium exists at the beginning and Schumpeter's schematic model is intended exclusively, *ceteris paribus*, to show the effects of the factor of saving and of investment, and in particular to clarify the question whether savings as such can cause depression.

It is true that an influx of new savings offered to the enterprises would result in a constant expansion of the industrial apparatus through the constant addition of new plants or new machines. But as long as these machines and plants would be of the same type as the ones previously used, under the assumption of an unvarying technical and organizational set-up, this growth in the industrial apparatus would be accomplished in a relative equilibrium. True, this equilibrium would constantly be disturbed by the influx of new capital savings. But granted a given rate of savings the economic mechanism would continuously "adapt" itself to this rate, i.e. would continuously absorb the disturbances. As a result of the savings, the rate of interest would necessarily drop, and therefore new investment opportunities would arise, opportunities which had not existed at the previous, higher rate of interest. On the other hand, the enlarged productive apparatus would "certainly" find new buyers of merchandise,—because every saving, just as it creates its own investment opportunities, also creates its own demand for the additional products manufactured in the new plants.

The proof of this wonderful harmonic development, however, is the author's bare assertion of it. The matter treated is eminently quantitative: the additional workers receive additional wages and additional purchasing power, and the new plants produce an added mass of commodities for the market. The problem consists in finding out whether the additional mass of values and the additional purchasing power can coincide. Here is a brilliant occasion for showing in an "exact" mathematical manner, by means of a "girdle of equations," how such an equilibrium could arise from the disequilibrium admitted by Schumpeter, how the consumer's social purchasing power each time just suffices to dispose of the increased mass of products thrown on the market by the producers. Instead of a proof, however, Schumpeter is content with a mere statement that the system has "adapted" itself to the new savings rate; but he says nothing about how this "adaptation" takes place, simply assuring us, "the new producers' commodities are sure to find their buyers" (p. 79).

With a method such as this all the problems in the world could be solved on paper. Schumpeter has arrived at the old harmonistic theory of Investments and "Débouchés" of Ricardo and J. B. Say without supporting it by any new argument or weakening the 150 year old critique of it.

So far, we have not taken into account the internal contradictions of Schumpeter's construction. It starts with the equilibrium and assumes an increase of production in a society which otherwise is "in every respect stationary"; in particular it presupposes "that production functions are invariant," that is, that the technical-organizational basis remains unchanged,

or, in other words, that "the same types of plants and machinery" are used as before (p. 79).

It is evident that these presuppositions are contradictory. We begin with a state of equilibrium in a stationary society wherein all the means of production and all the workers are occupied. If we assume an invariant technical-organizational basis, the additional plants and machines can be put into motion only by an additional number of workers. But in Schumpeter's stationary model the population, too, is stationary, for he counts the "variations in population among external factors" (p. 74), which are excluded from his stationary model (p. 79). Clearly no increase of production is possible in this model at all. In the second place Schumpeter assumes that in passing from the stationary phase to that involving increased production, the producers of consumers' goods suffer no losses. Every producer therefore will at all times be ready to absorb additional capital for an increase of production: "this process can go on indefinitely" (p. 80), so long as the rate of interest has not fallen to zero. This is again an unproved assertion, which is clearly false because every rearrangement of the stationary economy in the direction of increasing production necessarily restricts the production of consumers' goods and therefore also causes losses to the owners of the enterprises concerned.

But Schumpeter holds that even in the latter case no disturbance would ensue and the prices of consumers' goods would not fall. Accepting the famous Tugan-Baranovski merry-go-round which forty years ago was demonstrated as theoretically untenable, he believes that the equilibrium would be reestablished because the increased production of production goods would take the place of the restricted production of consumers' goods. "The demand from the increased incomes in the machine industries steps into the place of the demand discontinued by savers," he says (p. 82). Thus, when there is a displacement of the demand for consumers' goods, the total amount of consumption does not have to fall. And even if one is willing to grant—for the sake of the argument—that the asserted displacements actually take place, one finds that Schumpeter has not attempted to investigate the quantitative problem of the demand for substitutes and of the time factor, and that he has not tried to show that the missing consumption of one consumer group can be replaced in the same unit of time by the new demand of another group; also that the new demand, originating in the machine industry, is quantitatively equal to the previous demand in the consumers' goods industry. Yet, it is known (only, Schumpeter does not take this into account) that machine industry occupies considerably fewer workers (the total amount of investments being the same) and therefore also creates less demand for consumers' goods than does the consumers' goods industry.

Since the savings process is not a single act, but continuous, the need for rearranging industry and increasing the production of means of production would not be a single act—this according to Schumpeter's own presuppositions—but would provoke a wave of successive rearrangements; in short, it would constitute a permanent disturbance.

Schumpeter solves all these theoretical difficulties with a word, "adaptation." He never describes the process of adaptation. The desired result of it —the equilibrium—is introduced as a *deus ex machina*. If this "adaptation" takes place, the system functions "satisfactorily," and we are in "equilibrium."

The latter concept plays a fatal role in the whole exposition. At first, equilibrium is a sort of system of reference which enables us to measure how far removed the real system, afflicted with chronic disequilibrium, is from an ideal point of reference (p. 69). Schumpeter, however, does not stick to this ideal "theoretical norm," but assumes a really existing tendency toward equilibrium (p. 70), to which he ascribes great diagnostic significance, though the equilibrium itself is never reached: "the system approaches a state which would—if reached—fulfill equilibrium conditions" (p. 71). The mode of argumentation runs somewhat as follows: if we had to deal not with our reality, but with an imaginary world, then the conditions of equilibrium would easily be achieved! Schumpeter carries this unrealistic conception so far that he speaks of the constantly growing significance of the concept of equilibrium for economic theory! Here, too, Schumpeter is a victim of self-delusion. For more than 150 years—from the physiocrats, Smith and Ricardo, to Walras, Marshall and Pareto—the concept of equilibrium lay at the basis of all economic theories. The result was that everyone spoke of the failure of economic theory, because it progressively lost all relation to reality and was no longer able to explain it. This sad state finally brought about a reaction; a theoretical opposition against the concept of equilibrium recently arose, an opposition which regarded the concept not only as superfluous but even as harmful and responsible for the retarded development of economic theory as such. Schumpeter has not considered this development in economic theory but continues to represent old, untenable views.

We do not want, however, to dwell any further on these important, though merely preliminary arguments. We shall now examine his main theory: the concept of business cycles. In contrast to the previously considered model of a stationary economy, this theory treats the problem of change as such: "How the economic system generates evolution." Here, too,—for the sake of argument—the author starts from a stationary economy without savings and profits in order to determine how "evolution" arises in such a model. We have seen above how he methodologically isolated the factor of savings and accumulation and tried to demonstrate that the influence of this factor alone would result in an "increase," but an increase which would not disturb the equilibrium. This time he wants to isolate another factor (though both are in reality connected and mutually influence one another), which is responsible for all the disturbances of the equilibrium and is at their root. This factor is "Innovation," by which Schumpeter means not only technological improvements, but all other organizational improvements (new methods in the production of the same goods, the introduction of new articles, the discovery of new markets or new sources of raw materials) (p. 84). "Innovation" is always merely the economic reaction of the system to a specific situation of the economy—non-profitability—and for that reason is, according to Schumpeter, the internal factor in the economic history of capitalist society (p. 86). To him production is nothing but a combination of various production factors. He builds his theory on the following assertion: "the physical marginal productivity of every factor must (in the absence of innovation) monotonically decrease." The monetary expression of this situation, if the prices of the production factors are constant, is increasing cost as compared to decreasing returns (p. 88), as a result of which the profitability of the enterprises falls or, in limit cases, vanishes entirely. Thus, falling profitability, which characterizes the depression, is discussed without the help of external

influences, it is true, but in a naturalistic-technical manner. In this central point of his theory—falling profitability—Schumpeter gives no proof, but dismisses the problem in the few words just quoted. At this point the innovation sets in. It is the capitalist's reaction to vanishing profitability. Its task is to restore profitability by a reorganization of productive factors. The innovation interrupts the falling curve of returns, replacing it by another which begins on a higher level, only to fall again later. Wherever the cost of a commodity or a particular productive factor has decreased, we have a sign that the innovation has taken place. But, Schumpeter assures us, the costs will never fall constantly; there is no law of falling costs,—such a law is but an optical illusion (p. 91). In reality costs fall only at intervals. For once the innovation has been introduced generally, it ceases to be an innovation (p. 89); its efficacy is exhausted, and cost begins to rise again. ("Law of Increasing Cost.") Thereby non-profitability breaks through anew (p. 90).

Thus Schumpeter believes he has arrived at one cause to explain, if not the periodicity, at least the process of alternating phases of prosperity and depression (p. 193), which he later differentiates into the four well known phases of the cycle. He directs his criticism particularly against the so-called "self-generating theories," according to which depression arises out of prosperity and prosperity out of depression. He denounces this theory as a theoretically inadmissible *perpetuum mobile* (p. 139). (This has been done before him, Cf. Grossman, *Das Akkumulationsgesetz*, p. 229). This endogene cyclical process develops only in the industrial sphere. As regards the Stock Exchange, the starting point of the depression, the falling of stock and bond prices is exogenous, provoked by the impulsion coming from the industrial sphere (p. 152).

Schumpeter seems convinced of the great originality of his innovation theory. The expert, however, will see at once that Schumpeter remembers on this point—and despite all other differences—more of Mill's and Marx's explanations of the cycle than he would care to admit, that capitalist production operates not for use, but for profit. When profitability disappears, the capitalist mechanism of production, and capitalist accumulation, come to a standstill and can be revivified only by a rearrangement of technical and organizational bases. The theory is not made any more original when the name of "innovations" is assigned to what Mill and Marx called "counter-tendencies."[1] Nor is the theory made more original by projecting the innovations, which in Mill and Marx are objective reactions of the economic mechanism to a specific situation, into the realm of personality and by presenting them and glorifying them as the special merit of the capitalist, as his creative function. While Marx, on the basis of the law of value, deduces the periodic drop in profitability from the social process of accumulation, that is, from the increasing organic composition of capital, Schumpeter takes refuge in an untenable naturalistic-technical explanation, whose model he has found in the obsolete Ricardian doctrine of the decreasing yield of the soil and which he has merely transposed from agriculture to industry.

Schumpeter's theory of the falling profit is an *ad hoc* theory, unintegrated into any larger doctrine. Moreover this theory cannot be theoretically

[1]Cf. the exposition of the "counter-tendencies" in Mill and Marx in my book "Das Akkumulationsgesetz." Leipzig 1929. pp. 112-117 and 287-530.

grounded on Schumpeter's own premises. It is therefore unnecessary to dwell on Schumpeter's effort to illustrate the theory by statistical and historical data.

In recent years, just as 120 years ago, the center of the discussions has not been the problem of the business cycle. Ricardo and, later, John Stuart Mill and Simonde de Sismondi disputed not only about the causes and the inevitability of depressions, but about a wider question, that of the economic structure changing in the course of its contradictory development, that is, they discussed the tendencies in the evolution of capitalist economy. The question that interested them was thus whether this economic system is durable or whether it approaches its end as a result of its inner structural changes. This decisive problem, which has become even more important after the great depression of 1929, is not discussed by the author; not even the question of increasing "structural" unemployment which may become the tragic fate of the existing economic order. On the contrary, Schumpeter tries to avoid a direct answer to such questions, in order to deal with them by the détour of his peculiar definition of "evolution." Economic "evolution" is conceived in "a quite narrow and particular sense, abstracting from all the concrete content of evolution" *(The Nature and Content,* ibid. p. 95). If this definition were to hold, of course there could be no definite direction of evolution in the sense indicated above. What would remain would be the abstract empty idea of a "something" moving without any direction, and "evolution" would here be identical with "change."

Nor does the new book go beyond that result. It is hence to be expected that Schumpeter would slur over such an important problem as that of over-accumulated capital which cannot be profitably invested, a problem particularly pressing in the U. S. A. The fact that many billions of dollars remain idle for many years in the banks of the U. S. A. would not result from the objective situation of American capitalism, from a definite change in structure during a late phase of development, or from a saturation of the economy with capital for which no new and sufficiently profitable investments are at hand. Schumpeter hardly examines this problem—according to him, this is no problem at all. Instead, he describes how the bad government policies of the New Deal victimized the capitalists, declaring that the Roosevelt government has shaken the confidence of the capitalists as a result of its gigantic spending policy, its oppressive taxation and, above all, its open threats against the industrial middle class (pp. 1044-1049), thus contributing to the paralysis of all creative enterprises without putting anything in their place. Here, instead of analyzing the objective structure of American capitalism, Schumpeter offers us accusations against the government. He does not make the simple reflection that similar phenomena of over-accumulation could also be observed in Europe (England, France, Switzerland, etc.) where the relations between government and industry were very different from those in the U. S. A.

This central problem, which the author does not see, disappears in a mass of secondary details; he always deals with particular equilibria, for example, those between a producer and a buyer in an otherwise competitive society; the "cases" are split into "subcases," and each case must be treated separately, until the author finally gets lost in purely private considerations of the profitability of particular firms. For instance, when he takes up a bilateral monopoly he inquires under what conditions a monopolistic workers' union can obtain a maximum of wages and he believes he has proved that "perfect

equilibrium may . . . be compatible with the existence of unemployed resources" (p. 59).

It is evident that the concept of equilibrium is being abused here. A "perfect equilibrium" involving unused production factors is an obvious contradiction, not to mention the significant omissions of the author, his failure to deal with the general equilibrium of the entire system, or even with a particular equilibrium of a particular market or industry branch, but only with the maximal profitability of two concerns!

Schumpeter's predilection for casuistry is demonstrated, for instance, in the treatment of the problem of monopolies. Capitalist reality reveals a general trend toward the concentration of enterprises and the formation of a few large monopolies dominating entire branches of industry. Thus the question spontaneously arises, how a society would function in which such monopolistic tendencies triumphed in all industrial branches so as to form a "universal monopoly." This problem has a great theoretical significance. But Schumpeter has his sympathies and antipathies: he does not like the New Deal, nor anything that means planning and organized economy. For that reason he dismisses this real and important problem with the bare assertion that such a universal monopoly "would be inactive" (p. 57). He prefers to illustrate capitalist monopoly by the example of Nansen and Johansen who, during their polar expedition, were left with only one remaining sled and could not agree about the direction of their voyage, but finally had to reach a compromise (p. 62).

We have seen that Schumpeter fights the theory of the shrinking of capital investment opportunities and sees the cause of the evil in the disastrous government policy. It is true that he is not certain whether capital investment would flourish again if after the 1940 elections men more friendly to business were to assume power; and he says: "The practical implications of our diagnosis do not differ much from those of the theory of vanishing investment opportunity in its usual acceptance" (p. 1050). A similar lack of logic is revealed in Schumpeter's criticism of the government's currency and credit policies, in particular of its "spending" program. According to him, these policies have not achieved their desired effect, they had nothing to do with restoring prosperity in the years 1935 to 1937, because this prosperity took place independently of government measures (p. 1031). But a few pages later we read, to our surprise, that "even government spending as a permanent policy could be rationally defended on our diagnosis" (p. 1050).

If it is true that science consists in subsuming the complex mass of phenomena under general laws which express the true nature of things, then Schumpeter has not made use of a real theoretical idea. In spite of his great erudition and many stimulating details he loses himself in a bewilderment of detail.

Henryk Grossman (New York).

Grabowsky, Adolf, *Der Sozialimperialismus als letzte Etappe des Imperialismus.* Forschungen zur Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft. Heft 1. Weltpolitisches Archiv. Basel 1939. (X and 126 pp.)

Hobson, J. A., *Imperialism.* Third edition. George Allen & Unwin. London 1938. (XXX and 386 pp.; 8s. 6d.)

Loveday, A. a.o., *The World Economic Future.* Sir Halley Steward Lectures 1938. George Allen & Unwin. London 1938. (134 pp.; 4s. 6d.)

Staley, Eugene, *World Economy in Transition.* Council on Foreign Relations. New York 1939. (XI and 341 pp.; $3.00)

Salter, Sir Arthur, *Security, Can We Retrieve It?* Reynal & Hitchcock. New York 1939. (XVI and 391 pp.; $3.50)

Knight, A. W., *What's Wrong With the Economic System?* Longmans, Green & Co. New York and London 1939. (X and 179 pp.; $2.40, 8s. 6d.)

Ginzberg, Eli, *The Illusion of Economic Stability.* Harper & Brothers. New York 1939. (XI and 275 pp.; $3.00)

The subject matter of the books reviewed here is the political and economic insecurity that is challenging both the established social structure and individual liberty. The authors agree on one point: that general insecurity is the manifest characteristic of society and economic life today, making this a period of transition. In their search for the roots and the outcome of this transitional period, the writers disagree as to how transition will take place: one group expects all from a necessary evolution, the other sets its hope on planned action.

The books of *Grabowsky* and *Hobson,* which belong to the first group, search more for an interpretation than for a way out of the present social entanglement. Both authors consider the present crisis a stadium of modern imperialism. *Grabowsky* differentiates three phases of imperialistic evolution: feudalistic, commercial and "social" imperialism. After the World War of 1914-18, imperialism entered its last phase which has been characterized by a maximum rationalizing of "living spaces." The process of rationalization expresses itself in planned economy and in the control of the productive forces through "total mobilization." The "social imperialism" (we regret that Grabowsky does not offer any definition of this term) is rooted in the specific social conditions of the post war era which have produced the fear that there remains no way out of the permanent business depression. Stricken with this fear, nations have handed all power over to the government, and the government, stricken with the same fear, has overstrained its power. The government's misuse of the productive forces by way of total mobilization will lead to the government's breakdown. What will follow the collapse of the totalitarian state is unpredictable. Socialism is not necessarily the heir to the totalitarian regime,—it would be such only if the fundament of imperialism were exclusively an economic one; in reality imperialism involves an "etatistic" and a "rationalistic" component too. Socialism, therefore, appears only as one of several possible outcomes of totalitarianism. Unfortunately, the empiric data by which Grabowsky attempts to prove his theorems lack sufficient theoretical foundation to be convincing.

One of Grabowsky's theses is that in recent years new and specific social tasks have devolved upon imperialism. We find a similar idea in the latest edition of Hobson's pioneering book on the subject. He, too, sees a new component to have arisen in the evolution of imperialism, the diversion of the domestic struggle for a democratic economy into the channel of a struggle

for foreign markets; but, differently from Grabowsky, he thinks it simply an added element that has not changed the fundamental character of imperialism during the last decades. Hence he believes himself justified in issuing this new edition of his book, first published in 1905, with only a few additions in principle. He also asserts that while the economic factor is not the only factor in imperialism, yet, in his opinion, it sufficiently explains the present imperialist conflicts. The preference given to English exports in the markets of the British empire and the presence of political control over former German colonies have evoked German and Italian aggression, while Japan's fight for political control over China is nothing but a consequence of Japan's expansive capitalism. Whereas the struggle had to be fought out in the West, Japan in the East can choose either to compromise or to compete with the old imperialist powers.

Whatever differences in detail exist between Hobson and Grabowsky, both have attempted to give a uniform and all-embracing explanation of the current social situation. By contrast, the *contributors to the Halley Steward lectures* and *Staley* and *Salter* lack any common or universal point of view in approaching sociological problems and are more concerned with solving the political and economic insecurity of the present day than with unearthing its roots. Five well-known statesmen and economists contributed to the Halley Steward lectures on "The World Economic Future," A. Loveday, director of the Economic Intelligence Service at the League of Nations, S. de Madariaga, former Spanish delegate to the League of Nations, Professor Condliffe of the University of London and Professors Heckscher and Ohlin of the University of Stockholm. According to their common conviction, the economic future will be determined by tendencies already in effect or becoming apparent. Heckscher points out that since the end of the 19th century the technical progress of production has led to increasing commercialization, manifesting itself on the one hand in a decrease of the rural population and of the number of industrial workers, and on the other in an increase in the number of commercial and technical employees. The decline of the general population coincident with the aforesaid development, and increasing incomes, have, in Loveday's opinion, caused a shift from the production of non-durable goods to that of durable ones. Due to this fact the whole economic structure has grown more susceptible to recurring crisis: the consequent periodic unemployment and social insecurity have induced governments to avoid dangerous eventualities by steady interventions into the private economy. Professor Ohlin thinks such control of the economic life is not perilous under all circumstances, provided the centralization of the economy remains flexible to a certain degree, in that the productive mechanism, instead of being surrendered to political red tape, remains under the rule of private initiative. Since these problems are common to countries all over the world, international cooperation appears inevitable. As to who will organize or lead it, nobody can say today; Professor Condliffe ventures the guess that it will not be Britain nor any other of the European powers, all of which are plagued with decreasing populations and stagnant productions, but the United States with its youthful population, its superior natural resources and higher degree of specialization. One premise of this kind of international collaboration, says Madariaga, would be to relinquish all dogmatism—liberalism, communism, fascism, religious and international tendencies—and to formulate a spiritual attitude embracing all the doctrines men-

tioned (except the communistic) and thus subduing them. With the exception of Madariaga, the authors have kept clear of theoretical constructions and generalizations.

Staley's book too, rich in observations and knowledge, sees the world economy at present as one ruled by the conflict between the expansive tendency of technology, favorable to human welfare, and the restrictive tendency of politics that hampers welfare. Technology has opened to the world new possibilities for the rapid change of goods and for the employment of men and science; nationalistic politics, minded as it has been to customs barriers, and to imperialistic domination, has prevented the full use of these possibilities and has subjugated technology to a war-economy destructive of all aims at higher standards of living. Nevertheless, the nationalistic countries have pointed the method in which technology has to be exploited—for whatever purpose—and this is planning. There appears to be only one way to cure the world economy that has been shaken by the conflict between technology and politics, and that is to replace the present system of world economy by another which would be dedicated to raising the standard of living. In order to achieve this goal all countries interwoven in the world economy would have to strive toward political understanding and toward a planful solution of their economic problems. An entire set of preliminary achievements would be necessary: a system of collective security that would bring about the peaceful frame for economic collaboration; a super-governmental authority, taking in the non-totalitarian as well as the totalitarian systems, that would plan the exchange of goods and capital; a planned currency policy that would aim at softening the business cycles; a commercial policy that would seek a better distribution of raw materials and would develop countries with minor industrializations; and a capital policy that would place investments in countries needing advancement. The United States would have to play an important role in preparing peaceful cooperation between the countries. Staley has based his diagnosis, as well as his program, on the abundant material collected by the League of Nation's services and has also taken account of the possible resistances against these plans. Still, a good deal of the utopian remains in his thought, stemming from the too immediate application of his abstract antithesis to very complicated sociological structures.

Salter has devoted a voluminous book to the idea of collective security as a condition for international economic relations. His thoughts, too, are conditioned by the atmosphere of Geneva: the League's failure in the past, of course, does not set aside the truth of his conceptions. In the future only mutual understanding among peaceloving nations will secure peace, whether the form will be an international union or not. This will be even more the case after a war between "democracies" and "dictatorships," which Salter, writing in the spring of 1939, considered imminent. A war of this kind would bring a solution only if the "democracies" would offer a program to remedy the needs of the dictatorships. Salter draws a blue print of the coming peace: no "war guilt-clause" should stand in the way of a really democratic basis for international relations. The recognition of Germany's "sphere of influence" in Central Europe and her access to internationally controlled colonies would remove her economic difficulties.

In approaching the economic troubles of our day, *A. W. Knight* has employed a method very different from that of the above reviewed books. While the others tried to penetrate the whole network of world economic and

political entanglements, he gets down to the fundamentals of the economic system. He sees its main flaw in the lack of an equilibrium between saving and investment, a view for which he is indebted to Keynes. This equilibrium is deeply anchored in the nature of our individualistic and uncontrolled economic system and may lead to ever sharper depressions involving dangerous consequences for political democracy. There seems to be only one remedy as far as the author is concerned: the democratic communities have to plan their economy. There should be a "planning commission" to control the stream of investments and incomes in such a way that a disequilibrium between saving and investment should never again arise. This commission should be a democratic institution installed not by a political but by a spiritual evolution, which implies voluntary renunciation of profit as the motive of the economic mechanism and its replacement by the ideal of "the maximum amount of material well-being." Knight's book is not merely a program for a planned economy, nor is it merely a pure theoretical investigation into the causes of economic disequilibrium; both aspects are treated in a way that combines the strictest method of theoretical analysis with statistical concreteness, thus furnishing the reader with a sort of "blue print" for an American planned economy.

It is one of Mr. Knight's merits to have shown that planned economy is not conceivable as long as the profit motive guides the productive forces. The other authors may have understood this tacitly; Mr. Knight expressly points out that this motive is the very condition limiting the possibilities of a practical realization of planned economy. And if any doubt should remain as to the truth of this theoretical conception, *Ginzberg* produces the historical proof that stability remains an illusion under present economic and social conditions. His evidence is the experience of American business within the last forty years. The American public from the end of the 19th century up to the New Deal was imbued with the illusion that its economic life had stability. This illusion did not arise by chance, nor did it always exercise such force as it did during the "New Era" of the twenties: it was born, matured and died like an organic being. Ginzberg has written the biography of this being in brilliant language. Tracing its roots in the economy and depicting its effect on it, he has rendered a work on American economic history. The outlines are these: the relatively quiet and steady expansion of American business from the depression that came toward the end of the last century until the outbreak of the World War produced an atmosphere of optimism which steadily gave nourishment to faith in the stability of economic foundations. The short crisis of 1920-21, instead of serving as a warning, was, mainly due to its brevity, considered a confirmation of this faith. An obviously weak spot in these stable foundations, unemployment, offered a welcome opportunity for progressive entrepreneurs to secure employment in the face of cyclical and seasonal fluctuations. During the prosperity of the twenties the illusion grew into a popular dogma and became the guiding star of governmental policy. Three sign-posts of prosperity lent a veil of reality to the illusion: wage rates were at a high level, prices failed to fluctuate, and the rate of profit remained almost unchanged, while the size of production expanded, income of labor grew and profits mounted. The rising purchasing power of the masses resulting from the concurrence of high wages and stable prices seemed to offer a sufficient reason and guarantee that the "New Era" would endure. Even the depression of 1929 to 1932 could not at the beginning destroy the

illusion which made for the high wage policy and the hesitancy to liquidate on the part of the entrepreneurs, most of whom hoped for an early return of prosperity. The longer the depression lasted the weaker grew the faith in economic stability, and it staged no full comeback in the upswing of 1932-37. Nevertheless, a good deal of this faith in the stabilizing effect of high wages and stable prices is still alive in the "New Deal" conception, but deficit financing has in practice taken over the function of stimulating and maintaining a high level of business activity. Ginzberg thinks the illusion has in effect died and is going to be replaced by a new ideology which will subjugate the economy to military aims. The illusion of economic stability has not only vanished historically, but has to disappear because of its theoretical untenability. Stability, in the sense of full and efficient use of human and material productive factors, is an impossible goal as long as it contradicts technical progress and the psychology accompanying it and makes it difficult for the banking system to control the credit policy. As long as these three factors and the mechanism of prices defy any rigid control the economic instability might be modified, but it will never be eliminated.

JOSEF SOUDEK (New York).

Studies in Philosophy and Social Science is published three times a year by the Institute of Social Research, 429 West 117th Street, New York City.
The price of a single issue is $1.00, and the annual subscription is $3.00.
Editorial communications should be addressed to the Institute of Social Research, 429 West 117th Street, New York City.
Subscriptions and business communications should be sent to William Salloch, 344 East 17th Street, New York City.

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

PUBLISHED BY
THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

MORNINGSIDE HEIGHTS
NEW YORK CITY

Vol. IX 1941 No. 2

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PREFACE

The articles in this issue deal with some problems implied in the transition from liberalism to authoritarianism in continental Europe. During the nineteenth century private industry consisted of numerous independent entrepreneurs who in each country competed with likewise independent traders and bankers for social power. The outcome of this struggle expressed itself in the relative size of the capital controlled by each of them. Dominion over men and things was distributed among the members of this diversified social group according to the rules of exchange. Power had become decentralized; it has been transferred from relatively well-organized privileged bodies to the multitude of proprietors who possessed no other title than their wealth and their resolve to use it. The course of social production was the resultant of their respective business policies. Seigneural ordinances were replaced by anonymous laws and autonomous institutions, by economic, legal, and political mechanisms which reflected the size and composition of the nation's industry.

Competition among independent entrepreneurs eventually culminated in the giant concerns of monopolist industry. Under their hegemony competition assumed a different form. Their urge to compete with equals within the nation declined, and with it the motive for increased investment and full employment. The great leaders of business and other avenues of social life found their peers only across the various national borders. Rivalry among equal powers shifted more and more to the international scene alone. The transition affected culture as a whole.

With the advent of fascism, dualisms typical of the liberalistic era, such as individual and society, private and public life, law and morals, economy and politics, have not been transcended but obscured. Individuals have become less and less independent of society, while society has fallen to the mercy of mere individual interests. With the decline of the individual, moral feelings that stood against authoritarian law have lost their force, while authoritarian law has been entrusted to a perverted moral sense. Rigid discipline such as ruled inside the factory has now spread throughout the hinterland, borne forward by élites who in their composition and function have combined economy and politics. The leaders of

industry, administration, propaganda, and the military have become identical with the state in that they lay down the plan of the national economy as the entrepreneur before them had laid down policy for his factory. At the same time the state manifests its private character in that the enormous power wielded by the élites inevitably segregates them from the whole as bearers of very special interests. Theirs is an extraordinary standard of living, a unique technical and political experience, and a streamlined unconcern for material and ideal barriers, distinguishing them from the mass of the governed. These common traits, however, do not endow the ruling group with a real solidarity. The big industrialists attack the fuehrers for their expensive political apparatus; the fuehrers blood purge the underfuehrers because of their radical claims; the generals would like to get rid of all of them. To counterbalance their antagonisms, no common faith exists, as among the medieval clergy, no belief in chivalry and princely blood, as among the seigneurs of absolutism,—ideals which had combined with their material interests to hold these groups together. The unity of fascist leaders is cemented merely by their common fear of the people they tyrannize, by their dread of ultimate doom. This clique does not become the dupe of its own ideologies; it shuffles them about freely and cynically according to the changing situation, thus finally translating into open action what modern political theory from Machiavelli and Hobbes to Pareto has professed.

These are the basic features of authoritarian society as it took shape after the debacle of European liberalism, and most typically in Germany. Under National Socialism the distribution of goods is carried on by private means, though competition has become even more one-sided than in the era of the 200 families. Intra-national competition turns into oppression. Only those on top may prosper; the amassing of new fortunes is precluded by taxation. The victors of the competition have their free play.

As long as its power had been decentralized, industry, propelled by its self-interest, had to cater to the needs of the population and, willy-nilly, promoted technical, political, and social progress, at least to a certain degree. But under its totalitarian set-up big industry is in a position not only to impose its plan upon its former competitors, but to order the masses to work instead of having to deal with them as free parties to a contract. Popular needs determine production far less than they did through the market, and industry converges on the production of instruments of destruction. Planned waste of intelligence, happiness, and life succeeds the plan-

less waste caused by the frictions and crises of the market system. The more efficiently authoritarian planning functions and the more smoothly nature and men are exploited,—the more are subjects and objects of the plan dominated by dead matter and the more senseless, exorbitant, and destructive becomes the whole social apparatus which is maintained for the perpetuation of power exclusively.

Nowhere under fascism can the planful organization of social life follow out its own inner logic, for it can nowhere shape society according to human needs and potentialities. The plan, conceived and executed in the interest of private economic groups, is constantly obstructed by the changing necessities of power politics within and without, while the popular needs it pretends to satisfy are frustrated—notwithstanding the vaunted accomplishments in *Wehrpsychologie,* dive-bombing, intelligence service, pincer movements, underground factories, and so on. The blind calculative rationality of business life, so bitterly denounced by fascism, has carried over to the authoritarian society. Formerly, the cleverness of businessmen had not been able to prevent the results of their clever calculations, made in the privacy of their production offices, from developing into the pernicious laws of the business cycle, crisis, and depression. Now, in authoritarian society, this selfsame irrational rationality becomes madness with method. Under this so-called socialism it is not mankind conscious of its common good and solidarity that guides its own destiny; the natural conditions, the pressures of the masses, the rivalries of cliques play themselves off against each other in the sinister hearts of the fuehrers and emerge as the blind laws of fascist economy. During the earlier periods of private industry the achievements of men turned increasingly against them; no masterpiece of engineering, no gigantic factory, no ladies paradise arose without enhancing the power of society as well as its misery. In authoritarian society, technical, social, military advances are the handmaids of doom and disaster. Every frontier torn down by fascism only strengthens the walls separating men from each other, every means of communication it improves only places them farther apart, every scientific invention only blinds them the more to nature.

Progress in the abstract triumphs. The world belongs to the clever, and the devil take the hindmost,—this is true more than it ever was. The principle of letting nothing lie still, of stirring everyone to action, of tolerating nothing that has no utility, in a word, dynamism, is the soul of fascism. Moral taboos and ideals are abolished; true is that which has proved serviceable. Can any-

one dare question the serviceability of the secret police, of concentration camps, blood purges against the insane, anti-Semitism, relentless activization of the people? Fascists have learned something from pragmatism. Even their sentences no longer have meaning, only a purpose.

Fascism feels itself the son, nay the savior, of the world that bore it. That world collapsed, as Marx had prophesied, because after it had reached a certain point in its development, it was unable to fulfill human needs. Technological unemployment has evidenced the crisis which cannot be alleviated by returning to the market system. National Socialism attempts to maintain and strengthen the hegemony of privileged groups by abolishing economic liberties for the rest of society. In tolerating Hitler, the German people went along with the facts; given the prevailing inequality and injustice, it was politic to profit from the weakness of the old world powers and to supplant them. With the world as it was, Hitler seemed more practical than Stresemann. National Socialism became the die-hard competitor on an international scale. And now the question is whether the long established houses can remodel their enterprises fast enough to get rid of it.

The opening article of this issue draws a picture of an authoritarian society that might embrace the earth, or one that is at least autarchic. Its challenging thesis is that such a society can endure for a long and terrifying period. Basing itself on the most recent economic experience, it comes to the conclusion that all technical economic problems that worried the business world can be handled through authoritarian devices. The article attempts to destroy the wishful idea that fascism must eventually disintegrate through disharmonies of supply and demand, budget deficiencies, or unemployment. The study is not confined to authoritarian society alone but conceives the latter as a sub-species of state capitalism, thus raising the question whether state capitalism might not be workable within the framework of democracy rather than terror. For more than eight years the government of this country has attempted to overcome the difficulties of the prevailing economy by incorporating into it the elements of planning, in the industrial as well as the agricultural sector. The alarming predicament of agriculture in Germany under the Weimar Republic was an important factor in the rise of fascism. In this the government of the United States has recognized the danger and has attempted to bring agriculture under its control. The same holds true for other sectors of economic life.

The transition from the old society, however, to conditions under which a real accord among men—and not merely understandings among functionaries—should permeate the whole, will not be achieved without protracted and increasingly bitter struggles. The unprecedented governmental power necessarily associated with state capitalism is now in the hands of a democratic and humanitarian administration. It will be the goal of fascist groups within and without to wrest it away, and it is not too much to expect that the coming years will be marked by such attempts. However the present war may end, men will have to choose between a new world era of consummate democracy or the hell of an authoritarian world order.

While the opening article outlines the economic structure of state capitalism, the articles that follow it study the links between authoritarian society and the past, as well as the disharmonies that dominate its existing forms.

MAX HORKHEIMER.

State Capitalism:

Its Possibilities and Limitations

By Frederick Pollock

Nothing essentially new is intended in this article. Every thought formulated here has found its expression elsewhere. Our aim is to bring widely scattered and often conflicting ideas into a somewhat consistent summary which may form the starting point for a discussion of the workability of state capitalism.

In regard to the method of this study the following points ought to be emphasized. Whether such a thing as state capitalism exists or can exist is open to serious doubt. It refers here to a model[1] that can be constructed from elements long visible in Europe and, to a certain degree, even in America. Social and economic developments in Europe since the end of the first world war are interpreted as transitional processes transforming private capitalism into state capitalism. The closest approach to the totalitarian form of the latter has been made in National Socialist Germany. Theoretically the totalitarian form of state capitalism is not the only possible result of the present process of transformation. It is easier, however, to construct a model for it than for the democratic form of state capitalism to which our experience gives us few clues. One of our basic assumptions is that 19th century free trade and free enterprise are on the way out. Their restoration is doomed for similar reasons as was the attempt to restore feudalism in post-Napoleonic France. The totalitarian form of state capitalism is a deadly menace to all values of western civilization. Those who want to maintain these values must fully understand the possibilities and limitations of the aggressor if their resistance is to meet with success. Furthermore, they must be able to show in what way the democratic values can be maintained under the changing conditions. If our assumption of the approaching end of the era of private capitalism is correct, the most gallant fight to restore it can only lead to a waste of energy and eventually serve as a trail-blazer for totalitarianism.

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[1]The term "model" is used here in the sense of Max Weber's "ideal type."

The Concept "State Capitalism"

In the rapidly growing literature on the coming social order, the word "state capitalism" is eschewed by most authors and other words stand in its place. "State organized private-property monopoly capitalism," "managerial society," "administrative capitalism," "bureaucratic collectivism," "totalitarian state economy," "status capitalism," "neo-mercantilism," "economy of force," "state socialism" are a very incomplete set of labels used to identify the same phenomenon. The word state capitalism (so runs the argument) is possibly misleading insofar as it could be understood to denote a society wherein the state is the sole owner of all capital, and this is not necessarily meant by those who use it. Nevertheless it indicates four items better than do all other suggested terms: that state capitalism is the successor of private capitalism, that the state assumes important functions of the private capitalist, that profit interests still play a significant role, and that it is not socialism. We define "state capitalism" in its two most typical varieties, its totalitarian and its democratic form, as a social order differing on the following points from "private capitalism" from which it stems historically:

(1) The market is deposed from its controlling function to coordinate production and distribution. This function has been taken over by a system of direct controls. Freedom of trade, enterprise and labor are subject to governmental interference of such a degree that they are practically abolished. With the autonomous market the so-called economic laws disappear.

(2) These controls are vested in the state which uses a combination of old and new devices, including a "pseudo-market," for regulating and expanding production and coordinating it with consumption. Full employment of all resources[1] is claimed as the main achievement in the economic field. The state transgresses all the limits drawn for peacetime state activities.

(3) Under a totalitarian form of state capitalism the state is the power instrument of a new ruling group, which has resulted from the merger of the most powerful vested interests, the top ranking personnel in industrial and business management, the higher strata of the state bureaucracy (including the military) and the leading figures of the victorious party's bureaucracy. Everybody who does not belong to this group is a mere object of domination.

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[1]Here understood simply as absence of technically avoidable "unemployment" of all factors of production. For the discussion of this concept see John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. London 1936.

Under a democratic form of state capitalism the state has the same controlling functions but is itself controlled by the people. It is based on institutions which prevent the bureaucracy from transforming its administrative position into an instrument of power and thus laying the basis for transshaping the democratic system into a totalitarian one.

The Heritage of the Market System

We start from the assumption that the hour of state capitalism approaches when the market economy becomes an utterly inadequate instrument for utilizing the available resources. The medium-sized private enterprise and free trade, the basis for the gigantic development of men's productive forces in the 19th century, are being gradually destroyed by the offspring of liberalism, private monopolies and government interference. Concentration of economic activity in giant enterprises, with its consequences of rigid prices, self-financing and ever growing concentration, government control of the credit system and foreign trade, quasi-monopoly positions of trade unions with the ensuing rigidity of the labor market, large-scale unemployment of labor and capital and enormous government expenses to care for the unemployed, are as many symptoms for the decline of the market system. They became characteristic in various degrees for all industrialized countries after the first world war.[1]

The materials collected recently by various government agencies demonstrate how far a similar development has gone in the United States.[2] The disturbances of the market mechanism caused by monopoly have been accentuated by a technical revolution in contemporary farming.[3] A shattering dislocation of the world market since the first world war has blocked the channels of export which were instrumental in overcoming market difficulties during the 19th century. The danger involved in this situation has been recognized and great efforts are being made to solve the problem of creating full employment while freeing the American market system from the forces which strangle it. Analogous developments may reach a point where no measures short of a reorganization of the economic system can prevent the complete disintegration of the social structure. Such a reorganization might take place by a long succession

[1]The best short statement on the "Breakdown of the Market Mechanism" is still Appendix A to the Senate document 13 (74th Congress, 1st Session) on "*Industrial Prices and Their Relative Inflexibility*" (by Gardiner C. Means, 1935). See also the recent books on the decline of competition by Arthur Robert Burns, Edward H. Chamberlin, Joan Robinson).

[2]See F. Weil's review in this issue below.

[3]See P. Massing's review in this issue below.

of stop-gap measures, many of them contradicting each other, without a preconceived plan, and often very much against the original intentions of their authors. Theoretically it is possible to construct an integrated model of the new organization which might replace the outworn system, with a promise of achieving two goals: to guarantee full employment and to maintain the basic elements of the old social structure.

If the market system is to be replaced by another organizational form, the new system must perform certain functions which are necessarily connected with the division of labor. In broadest terms, these "necessary"[1] functions fall into three groups: coordination of needs and resources; direction of production; and distribution; implying

(1) a way of defining the needs of society in terms of consumers goods, reproduction of plant, machinery and raw materials, and expansion,[2]

(2) allocation of all available resources in such a manner that full employment and "utmost" satisfaction of the recognized needs are attained,

(3) coordination and control of all productive processes in order to obtain best performance, and

(4) distribution of the social product.

The basic weaknesses of the market system in performing the "necessary" functions have been discussed again and again as its waste and inefficiency increasingly overbalanced its earlier achievements. Criticism was voiced mainly against the shortcomings of the price mechanism in directing production, the contradictory performance of the profit motive which obstructs the use of the available resources, and the murderous mechanics of coordinating the disequilibrated economy, that is, the business cycles with their cumulative processes of destruction. But while before the first world war the market mechanism was still workable even if it was always far from performing in practice what it was supposed to do theoretically, the intrusion of monopolies with their rigid prices gradually caused the breakdown of the market system in an ever growing sphere.

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[1]They can be defined as those without which even the bare subsistence of society can not be reproduced. The description that follows, however, understands "necessary" functions as those achieving the best results under given historic conditions. This is what liberal theory claims for the market system.

[2]In this simple scheme, luxuries are included in consumers goods and defense materials under machinery.

A New Set of Rules

State capitalism replaces the methods of the market by a new set of rules based upon a combination of old and new means.

(1) A general plan gives the direction for production, consumption, saving, and investment. The introduction of the principle of planning into the economic process means that a plan is to be constructed for achieving on a national scale certain chosen ends with all available resources. It does not necessarily imply that all details are planned in advance or that no freedom of choice at all is given to the consumer. But it contrasts sharply to the market system inasmuch as the final word on what needs shall be satisfied, and how, is not left to the anonymous and unreliable poll of the market, carried through *post festum*, but to a conscious decision on ends and means at least in a broad outline and before production starts. The discussion on planning has come to a point where it seems as if the arguments raised against the technical workability of such a general plan can be refuted.[1] The genuine problem of a planned society does not lie in the economic but in the political sphere, in the principles to be applied in deciding what needs shall have preference, how much time shall be spent for work, how much of the social product shall be consumed and how much used for expansion, etc. Obviously, such decisions cannot be completely arbitrary but are to a wide degree dependent upon the available resources.

(2) Prices are no longer allowed to behave as masters of the economic process but are administered in all important sections of it. This follows from the principle of planning and means that in favor of a planned economy the market is deprived of its main function. It does not mean that prices cannot exist any longer, but that if they do they have thoroughly changed their character. Nothing may seem on the surface to have changed, prices are quoted and goods and services paid for in money; the rise and fall of single prices may be quite common. But the relations between prices and cost of production on the one side and demand and supply on the other, while strictly interconnected in their totality, become disconnected in those cases where they tend to interfere with the general plan. What remains of the market system behaves like its predecessor but

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[1] See for a discussion of the latest literature on the theory of planning: Eduard Heimann, "Literature on the Theory of a Socialist Economy," in: *Social Research*, vol. VI, pp. 87f.; Carl Landauer, "Literature on Economic Planning," in: *Social Research*, vol. VII, pp. 498f.; H. D. Dickinson, *Economics of Socialism*, London 1939.

We do not intimate that a general plan exists in Nazi Germany or has ever existed there. In its place stands the goal of arming as speedily and efficiently as possible, with full use of all resources. Some plan-elements have come into being, while the plan principle, used first as a propaganda slogan in Germany, is rapidly spreading there.

its function has changed from a general manager of the economic process into a closely controlled tool.[1] In the last decades administered prices have contributed much toward destroying the market automatism without creating new devices for taking over its "necessary" functions. They served to secure monopoly profits at the expense of the non-monopolistic market prices. Under state capitalism they are used as a supplementary device for incorporating production and consumption into the general plan.

(3) The profit interests of both individuals and groups as well as all other special interests are to be strictly subordinated to the general plan or whatever stands in its place. To understand the consequences of this principle leads far towards understanding totalitarian striking power. There are two conflicting interpretations of the role of profit interests in Nazi Germany. The one claims that the profit motive still plays the same role as before, the other states that the capitalists have been deprived of their social position and that profit in the old meaning does not exist any longer. We think that both tend to overlook the transformation of such a category as "profit" in modern society. Profit interests may still be very significant in the totalitarian forms of state capitalistic society. But even the most powerful profit interests gradually become subordinate to the general "plan." No state capitalistic government can or will dispense with the profit motive, for two reasons. First, elimination of the profit motive would destroy the character of the entire system, and second, in many respects the profit motive remains as an efficient incentive. In every case, however, where the interest of single groups or individuals conflicts with the general plan or whatever serves as its substitute, the individual interest must give way. This is the real meaning of the ideology *Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz*. The interest of the ruling group as a whole is decisive, not the individual interests of those who form the group.[2] The significance of this state capitalist principle can be fully grasped when it is contrasted with recent experiences in countries where private capitalism still prevails and where strong group interests prevent the execution of many urgent tasks necessary for the "common good." This needs no bad will or exceptional greed to explain it. In a system based upon the self-interest of every person, this principle

[1]For an outstanding analysis of the new functions and the performance of the "pseudo-market" see A. Lowe, "Economic Analysis and Social Structure" in: *The Manchester School*, Vol. VII (1936), pp. 30f. Lowe's arguments pertain to "the pricing process under public ownership." Public control over the means of production, however, has the same economic consequences as state ownership.

[2]Obviously, the first to bear the brunt of subordinating the private to the "common" interest is the "little man" in all spheres of society.

can sometimes be expected to come to the fore in a form that contradicts the optimism of its underlying philosophy. If ever the statement was true that "private vices are public benefits," it could only have been under conditions where the typical economic unit was comparatively small and a free market functioned.

State capitalist policy, which opposes liberalism, has understood that there are narrow limits beyond which the pursuit of private interests cannot be reconciled with efficient general planning, and it has drawn the consequences.[1]

(4) In all spheres of state activity (and under state capitalism that means in all spheres of social life as a whole) guesswork and improvisation give place to the principles of scientific management. This rule is in conformity with state capitalism's basic conception of society as an integrated unit comparable to one of the modern giants in steel, chemical or motor-car production. Large-scale production requires not only careful general planning but systematic elaboration of all single processes. Every waste or error in preparing materials and machinery and in drafting the elements of production is multiplied numerous times and may even endanger the productive process as a whole. The same holds true for society as soon as the previous differentiation between private cost (e.g., wages) and social cost (e.g., unemployment) is replaced by a measurement of the single process in terms of its ability to obtain what the planner considers the most desirable social product. But once this principle of "rationalization" has become mandatory for all public activities, it will be applied in spheres which previously were the sanctuary of guesswork, routine and muddling through: military preparedness, the conduct of war, behavior towards public opinion, application of the coercive power of the state, foreign trade and foreign policy, etc.[2]

(5) Performance of the plan is enforced by state power so that nothing essential is left to the functioning of laws of the market or

[1]An example of the result is the amazing elasticity and efficiency in building up an enormous war machinery in National Socialist Germany. This, however, should not be interpreted to mean that in Germany private property interests do not endeavor to gain precedence. In motor-car standardization, for instance, the private interests of the big concerns determined all the measures taken. Since a general plan of economic policy was never published in Germany, it is impossible to decide to what extent private interests did obtain preference.

[2]It appears that part of the Nazi successes may be better explained as the rational application of the best available methods in all fields (from eliminating important vitamins in the diet of conquered nations to the practical monopoly in international propaganda) than by any innate qualities of a military or organizational character. It is well to recall, in this connection, that German industry originally learned scientific management from America.

other economic "laws."[1] This may be interpreted as a supplementary rule which states the principle of treating all economic problems as in the last analysis political ones. Creation of an economic sphere into which the state should not intrude, essential for the era of private capitalism, is radically repudiated. Replacement of the mechanics of *laissez faire* by governmental command does not imply the end of private initiative and personal responsibility, which might even be put on a broader basis but will be integrated within the framework of the general plan. During the non-monopolistic phase of private capitalism the capitalist (whether an individual or a group of shareholders represented by its manager) had power over his property within the limits of the market laws. Under state capitalism this power has been transferred to the government which is still limited by certain "natural" restrictions but free from the tyranny of an uncontrolled market.[2] The replacement of the economic means by political means as the last guarantee for the reproduction of economic life, changes the character of the whole historic period. It signifies the transition from a predominantly economic to an essentially political era.[3]

Under private capitalism all social relations are mediated by the market; men meet each other as agents of the exchange process, as buyers or sellers. The source of one's income, the size of one's property are decisive for one's social position. The profit motive keeps the economic mechanism of society moving. Under state capitalism men meet each other as commander or commanded; the extent to which one can command or has to obey depends in the first place upon one's position in the political set-up and only in a secondary way upon the extent of one's property. Labor is appropriated directly instead of by the "round-about" way of the market. Another aspect of the changed situation under state capitalism is that the profit motive is superseded by the power motive. Obviously, the profit motive is a specific form of the power motive. Under private capitalism greater profits signify greater power and less dependence upon the commands of others. The difference, however, is not only that the profit motive is a mediated form of the power motive, but that the latter is essentially bound up with the power position of the ruling group while the former pertains to the individual only.[4]

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[1]E.g., new investments no longer flow automatically into those economic fields where the highest profits are made but are directed by the planning board. In consequence, the mechanism known as equalization of the rate of profit no longer works.

[2]See pp. 215 ff. below.

[3]Frank Munk, *The Economics of Force*, New York 1940. Lawrence Dennis, *The Dynamics of War and Revolution*, New York 1940.

[4]See p. 210 below.

Control of Production

A discussion of the means by which state capitalism could fulfill its program must hew closely to the technical and organizational possibilities available today in all highly industrialized countries. We refer not to any future developments but to the use which could be made here and now of the available resources. If, however, it can be shown that a state capitalist system can carry out more successfully than the market does the "necessary" functions required by the division of labor, it seems reasonable to expect that much greater resources could be made available within a short period. State capitalism must solve the following problems in the sphere of production if a rising social product is to result: create full employment based upon coordination of all productive units; reproduce the existing resources of plant, raw materials, management and labor on a level adequate to technical progress; and expand the existing plant. All these tasks must be embodied in the general plan. Given this plan, the execution hinges upon the solution of merely technical and administrative tasks instead of on the economic task of producing for an unknown and largely unforeseeable market. Production is for a clearly defined use, not "commodity" production in the meaning of a market system.[1] The experiences piled up by modern giant enterprises and associations of enterprises in carrying through enormous plans make total production control technically possible. Specific means of control include modern statistical and accounting methods, regular reporting of all changes in plant and supply, systematic training of workers for future requirements, rationalization of all technical and administrative processes and all the other devices developed in the huge modern enterprises and cartels. In addition to these traditional methods which have superseded the occult enterpreneurial art of guessing correctly what the future market demand will be, the state acquires the additional controlling power implied in complete command over money and credit. The banks are transformed into mere government agencies.[2] Every investment, whether it serves replacement or expansion, is subject to plan, and neither oversaving nor overexpansion, neither an "investment strike" nor "*Fehlinvestitionen*" can create large-scale disturbances. Errors which are bound to occur can be traced with comparative ease owing to the central position of the planning board. While they may

[1]See Rudolf Hilferding, "State Capitalism or Totalitarian State Economy" in: *Socialistichesky Vestnik*, Paris 1940 (Russian). It should be understood that "production for use" is not intended to mean "for the use of free men in a harmonious society" but simply the contrary of production for the market.

[2]For an impressive discussion of this trend in Nazi Germany see Dal Hitchcock, "The German Financial Revolution" in: *Harpers Monthly*, February 1941.

amount to sheer waste, their damaging effects may be minimized by charging them off to the economy as a whole instead of to a single enterprise. Besides the banks, many of the organizations developed by business interests (trade associations, cartels, chambers of commerce, etc.) serve as, or are transformed into, government agencies for the control of production. The rigid control of capital, whether in its monetary form or as plant, machinery, commodities, fundamentally transforms the quality of private property in the means of production and its owner, the "capitalist." While a good many of the risks (not all of them) borne by the owner under private capitalism might have been eliminated, only so much profit is left to him as the government sees fit to allow. Regulation of prices, limitation of distributed profits, compulsory investment of surplus profits in government bonds or in ventures which the capitalist would not have chosen voluntarily, and finally drastic taxation—all these measures converge to the same end, namely, to transform the capitalist into a mere rentier whose income is fixed by government decree as long as his investments are successful but who has no claim to withdraw his capital if no "interests" are paid.

The trend toward the situation described in our model has been widely discussed during recent years. An extreme statement is that of E. F. M. Durbin: "Property in industrial capital has wholly lost the social functions supposed to be grounded in it. It has ceased to be the reward for management, and it has largely ceased to serve as a reward for personal saving. Property in capital has become the functionless claim to a share in the product of industry. The institution is worse than indefensible—it is useless."[1] The same phenomenon is criticized in the following comment: "Emphasis of management today is not upon venture, upon chancetaking as capitalism requires, but is upon price control, market division, avoidance of risk. This may be good short-range policy. But: if business isn't willing to take chances, somebody soon is going to ask why it should enjoy profits, why the management cannot be hired by Government, which is called on to do all the chancetaking, and might want to direct industry."[2]

This trend toward losing his social function as the private owner of capital has found its expression in the stockholder's loss of control over the management. It has culminated so far in the new German legislation on joint-stock companies in which the stockholders are deprived by law of any right to interfere with management.

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[1] E. F.M. Durbin, *The Politics of Democratic Socialism,* London 1940, p. 135.
[2] Quoted in the *Report for the Business Executive,* November 28, 1940.

To sum up, under state capitalism the status of the private capitalist is changed in a threefold way.[1]

(1) The enterpreneurial and the capitalist function, i.e., direction of production and discretion in the investment of one's capital, are separated from each other. Management becomes virtually independent of "capital" without necessarily having an important share in corporate property.

(2) The enterpreneurial and capitalist functions are interfered with or taken over by the Government.

(3) The capitalist (insofar as he is not accepted as entrepreneur on the merits of his managerial qualifications) is reduced to a mere rentier.

Here the question of incentive arises. In private capitalism the decisive incentives for the capitalist to maintain, expand and improve production are the profit interest and the permanent threat of economic collapse if the efforts should slacken. The non-capitalists are driven to cooperate efficiently by hunger and their desire for a better life and security. Under state capitalism both groups lose essential parts of their incentive. What new devices will take over their most "necessary" functions? What will prevent stagnation and even regression in all spheres of state capitalistic society? In relation to the majority of the population, those who neither own nor command the means of production, the answer is simple. The whip of unemployment is replaced by political terror, and the promise of material and ideological rewards continues to incite to the utmost personal effort. The profit motive still plays an important role for capitalists and the managerial bureaucracy, since large compensation is granted for efficient investment and management. Personal initiative is freed from obstructing property interests and systematically encouraged.[2] Within the controlling group, however, the will to political power becomes the center of motivation. Every decision is at bottom oriented to the goal of maintaining and expanding the power of the group as a whole and of each of its members. New industrial empires are being built and old ones expanded with this goal in mind. But we also have here the source of the principle that individual interests must always be subordinated to the common (group) interest. This principle in turn contributes decisively to strengthening governmental control, since only a strong government

[1]For the change that actually occurred under National Socialism see pp. 226 ff. below. The interpretation given by Gurland differs from that maintained here.

[2]See Carl Dreher, "Why Hitler Wins," in: *Harpers Monthly*, October 1940.

can integrate conflicting interests while serving the power interests of the whole group.

Control of Distribution

"We have learned how to produce everything in practically unlimited quantities, but we don't know how to distribute the goods." This is the popular formulation to describe the riddle of private capitalism in its latest phase.

Given a general plan and the political power to enforce it, state capitalism finds ample technical means for distributing everything that can be produced with the available resources. The main difficulty of private capitalism is eliminated by the fact that under state capitalism the success of production does not necessarily depend upon finding buyers for the product at profitable prices in an unstable market, but is consciously directed towards satisfying public and private wants which are to a large extent defined in advance. Adjustments which must be made as a result of technical errors in the general plan or unexpected behaviour in consumer demand need not lead to losses for the individual producer and even less to economic disaster for him. Losses easily can be pooled by the administration. The means which are available for carrying over the "necessary" distributive function of a competitive market may be conveniently classified into direct allocation (priorities, quota, etc.) and administered prices. The former applies above all to the distribution of goods to producers, the latter refers mainly to the sphere of consumption. There is, however, no sharp dividing line between the fields of application of the two means.[1] Labor is the outstanding example in which a combination of both methods is applied.

In constructing a rough model of the distributive mechanism under state capitalism, we always have to keep in mind that production and producers' consumption are two aspects of the same process. Since under modern conditions producer and consumer are, as a rule, not the same person, distribution serves as a means of integrating them. The production plan is based on a comparatively arbitrary decision as to how much of the social product is to be available for consumption and how much is to be used for expansion.[2]

All major problems of distribution under state capitalism have been discussed thoroughly in the literature on socialist planning

[1]So far, the nearest approach to the state capitalist model of distribution has been made in Soviet Russia. See L. E. Hubbard, *Soviet Trade and Distribution*, London 1938. The trend in Germany shows the same direction.

[2]As to the limitations placed on the arbitrary character of this decision, see pp. 215 ff. below.

published within the last decade.[1] While all writers in favor of a planned society agree that the tyranny of the market must be abolished, differences of opinion exist on the question of where to draw the limits for the use of a pseudo-market. Some writers recommend that the managers of the socialized industry should "behave as if under competitive capitalism." They should "play at competition."[2] A model partly constructed on the results of this discussion may be used to illustrate how distribution works under state capitalism. The distribution of goods to producers starts from the following situation:

(1) Most productive facilities are privately owned but controlled by the government;

(2) Each industry is organized in cartels;

(3) Prices react to changes in supply and demand as well as to changes in the cost structure within the limits permitted by the plan authority and the monopolies;

(4) A general plan for the structure of the social product is in existence.

Under these circumstances a system of priorities and quotas will guarantee the execution of the plan in its broad lines. These allocations cover reproduction of existing resources, expansion (including defense) and the total output of consumers goods, which every industry shall produce. Within each industry a quota system will provide for the distribution of the resources allocated. The quotas may be distributed according to a more detailed plan or according to expressions of consumer choice. Not much room is left in this set-up for flexible prices. The partial survival of the profit motive will induce manufacturers who are offered higher prices for their products, to bid up in turn the prices of their "factors." But the "office of price control" will not permit prices to go higher than is compatible with the general plan. Since all major units of production are under the control of cartels, the propensity to keep prices flexible should not be overestimated. Governmental control will be immensely facilitated by the enormous role of public works necessary to maintain full employment under all circumstances.

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[1]See note on p. 204 above. The latest important publication is that of E. F. M. Durbin, *op. cit.* Most of those who advocate the superiority of a deliberately "manipulated" market confined "within the strait-jacket of planned objectives" have given little attention to the fact that planning is far from being identical with socialism. That is why their work, important as it is, appears even more as a contribution to the theory of state capitalism.

[2]L. Robbins, *Economic Planning and International Order*, London 1937, p. 208.

Full employment in the strict sense of the word can be achieved in regard to labor only. Due to technological facts, it is not possible in the case of plant and equipment. New plant and new machinery constructed according to the latest technical development require a minimum size of plant which as a rule leads to temporary overcapacity at the moment of their completion. If no ways for using this overcapacity can be found speedily, some idleness of capital will arise. This might happen with entire durable goods industries (e.g., machine tools) if the need for their product is temporarily saturated. Neither this nor other "maladjustments" can produce the cumulative effects so vicious under the free market system,[1] for the capital owner might be compensated for his loss out of pooled profits or public sources, and provision for a constant reserve in planning the labor supply will take care of the displaced workers. Technological unemployment will be handled in a similar way. It has been shown that the opposite case, periodical shortage of capital, can be avoided in a planned society.[2]

Labor under state capitalism is allocated to the different sections of production like other resources. This does not prevent the planning authorities from differentiating wages. On the contrary, premiums in the form of higher real wages can be granted wherever extra efforts are demanded. The slave driver's whip is no workable means for extracting quality products from highly skilled workers who use expensive machinery. This differentiation in wage schedules, however, is not the outcome of market conditions but of the wage administrator's decision. No entrepreneur is allowed to pay higher wages than those fixed by this agency.

With absolute control of wages, the government is in a position to handle the distribution of consumers goods with comparative ease. In cases of severe scarcity, as in wartime, direct allocation of consumers goods might be the only adequate means for their distribution. In such a case consumer choice is very limited but not entirely ruled out.[3] If, however, a somewhat more adequate supply of consumers goods is available, the consumer may be as free or, with the greater purchasing power created by full employment, even more free in his choice under state capitalism than he is now. In order to achieve this goal with the means now at hand, a pseudo-market for consumers goods will be established. The starting point for its operation is a clearly defined relation between purchasing

[1] See Gottfried von Haberler, *Prosperity and Depression*, Geneva 1937.

[2] See Carl Landauer, *Planwirtschaft und Verkehrswirtschaft*, Munich 1931.

[3] See, e.g., the "point" system for the distribution of textiles in Germany and England.

power which will be spent for consumption and the sum of prices of all available consumers goods. Both sums must be equal. In other words, the total income paid out to consumers, minus taxes, compulsory and voluntary savings, must be the same as the price sum of all consumers goods which are for sale. If the "net" consumers income should be higher, a scramble for goods and a bidding up of prices would result (under our definition that "net" income excludes saving). If it should be lower, only part of the products could be distributed. The first step toward distributing the consumers goods is therefore to make the "net" income of all consumers in a given period equivalent to the sum of consumers goods output as decided by the general plan and the available inventory. This first step will prove insufficient for two reasons:

(1) The consumers' voluntary savings may deviate from the plan,—they may save either more or less than was expected in calculating the equilibrium. Both cases may be remedied by the use of the market laws of demand and supply, which will create inflationary or deflationary price movements to "clear the market,"—if the price controlling agencies permit it.

(2) The consumers' choices may deviate from the calculations of the planners,—they may prefer some products and reject others. Here again the old market mechanism may be allowed to come into play to enforce higher prices for goods in greater demand and to lower prices where and as long as an oversupply exists. A system of subsidies and surtaxes will eliminate serious losses as well as surplus profits which could disturb the functioning of the plan. The distributive agency may completely "overrule" the consumers' choice for all practical purposes by fixing prices either extremely high or disproportionately low. So far the price mechanism obeys the same laws as in the free market system. The difference becomes manifest in the effects which changing prices exercise on production. The price signals influence production only insofar as is compatible with the general plan and the established public policy on consumption. Price movements serve as a most valuable instrument for announcing differences between consumers' preferences and the production plan. They can not, however, compel the planning authority to follow these manifestations of consumers' will in the same way they compel every non-monopolistic producer in a free market.[1] Under private capitalism the monopolist, in resisting the market signals, disrupts the whole market system at the expense of all non-monopo-

[1]For this whole set of problems see Oskar Lange, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism*, edited by E. Lippincott, Minneapolis 1938.

listic market parties. Under state capitalism the disconnection between price and production can do no harm because the function of coordinating production and consumption has been transferred from the market to the plan authority. Much attention has been given to the question of how consumers' choice can be calculated in advance. No "God-like" qualities are required for the planning board. It has been shown[1] that freedom of consumers' choice actually exists only to a very limited degree. In studying large numbers of consumers it becomes evident that size of income, tradition and propaganda are considerably levelling down all individual preference schedules. The experiences of large manufacturing and distributing concerns as well as of cartels contribute a most valuable supplement to the special literature on planning.

Economic Limitations of State Capitalism

In raising the question of economic limitations we point to those which may restrict the arbitrariness of the decisions in state capitalism as contrasted with other social structures in which they may not appear. We are not concerned with limitations that apply to every social set-up, e.g., those which result from the necessity to reproduce the given resources and to maintain full employment and optimum efficiency. The first and most frequent objection against the economic workability of a state capitalistic system is that it is good only in a scarcity economy, especially for periods of war preparedness and war. For a scarcity economy, so runs the argument, most of the economic difficulties against which private capitalism struggles do not exist. Overproduction and overinvestment need not be feared, and all products, however inefficiently produced, and however bad their quality, find a ready demand. As soon as the temporary emergency has passed, however, and a greater supply becomes available in all fields, state capitalism will prove utterly inadequate for securing the best use of available resources, for avoiding bottlenecks in one product and overproduction in others, and for providing the consumers with what they may demand at the lowest possible cost. Even if all means of production are under governmental control, efficient planning is possible only under conditions of emergency. The argument advanced for this view can be boiled down to the following:[2] in a planned economy costs cannot be accounted for, the

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[1]See the studies of the National Resources Planning Board on *Consumer Incomes* and *Patterns of Resources Use*, reviewed in this periodical 1940, pp. 483-490.

[2]The best survey of the history and details of the argument is *Collectivist Economic Planning*, edited by F. A. von Hayek, London 1935. For a refutation see Oskar Lange, *op. cit.*

free choice of the consumers must be disregarded, the motives for efficient production and distribution disappear, and as a result a planned economy must under modern conditions be much less productive than a market economy.

We think that anyone who seriously studies the modern literature on planning must come to the conclusion that, whatever his objections to the social consequences of planning, these arguments against its economic efficiency no longer hold. All technical means for efficient planning, including the expansion of production in accordance with consumer wants and the most advanced technical possibilities, and taking into account the cost in public health, personal risks, unemployment (never adequately calculated in the cost sheet of private enterprise)—all these technical means are available today.

Another counter-argument holds that as soon as state capitalism turns from concentrating upon armaments to a genuine peace economy its only alternative, if it wants to avoid unemployment, is to spend a very substantial part of the national income for the construction of modern "pyramids," or to raise considerably the standard of living. No economic causes exist which could prevent a state capitalistic government from doing so. The obstacles are of a political nature and will be dealt with later.[1]

A third argument points in the opposite direction. It objects that state capitalism necessarily leads to a standstill in technics or even a regress. Investments would slow down and technical progress cease if the market laws are put out of operation. As long as competitive armament continues, the contrary will probably be true. Besides the profit motive, the vital interests of the controlling group will stimulate both investment and technical progress. In the effort to maintain and extend its power the controlling group will come into conflict with foreign interests, and its success will depend upon its military force. This, however, will be a function of the technical efficiency. Any slackening in the speed of technical progress might lead to military inferiority and to destruction.[2] Only after all possible enemies will have disappeared because the whole world will be controlled by one totalitarian state, will the problem of technological progress and capital expansion come to the fore.

Are there, one may ask, no economic limitations at all to the existence and expansion of state capitalism? With its rise, will a

[1]See pp. 218 f.

[2]The German experience shows that probably never in the history of industrialism were new inventions put into application so quickly or such an enormous percentage of the national income used for investments (see pp. 210 f. above).

utopia emerge in which all economic wants can easily be fulfilled if political factors don't interfere? Did not the liberal theory also believe it had proved that the market system will guarantee its constituents the full use of all resources if not interfered with? And did it not become apparent later that inherent forces prevented the market system from functioning and ushered in growing interference by private monopolies and the government? Forewarned as we are, we are unable to discover any inherent economic forces, "economic laws" of the old or a new type, which could prevent the functioning of state capitalism.[1] Government control of production and distribution furnishes the means for eliminating the economic causes of depressions, cumulative destructive processes and unemployment of capital and labor. We may even say that under state capitalism economics as a social science has lost its object. Economic problems in the old sense no longer exist when the coordination of all economic activities is effected by conscious plan instead of by the natural laws of the market. Where the economist formerly racked his brain to solve the puzzle of the exchange process, he meets, under state capitalism, with mere problems of administration. There are indeed limitations to state capitalism, but they derive from natural conditions as well as from the very structure of the society which state capitalism seeks to perpetuate.

Natural and Other Non-Economic Limitations[2]

(1) To be fully workable, state capitalism needs an adequate supply of raw material, plant and labor of all kinds (technicians, administrators, skilled and unskilled labor), characteristic for a highly industrialized country. Without a plentiful supply of raw materials and the outfit in machinery and skill of a modern industrial society, great waste must accompany state capitalistic intervention, possibly greater than under a market economy. For the first limitation, inadequate supply of raw materials, a typical example is offered by Nazi Germany. The enormous machinery which had to be built to compensate for the insufficiency of the raw material basis—too small to cope with the armament program—and the diffi-

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[1]This also applies to the falling tendency of the rate of profit which, according to Marxian theory, plays havoc with private capitalism. If expansion of capital is subject to a general plan which is itself approved by the controlling group, the percentage of surplus value in ratio to invested capital could fall close to zero without creating any disturbances. This fall, however, is most effectively counteracted by the enforced maintenance of full employment. We shall not enter upon the discussion of whether state capitalism itself emerges under the pressure of the falling rate of profit, nor how far it makes sense to speak in terms of "value" beyond the limits of a market economy.

[2]Most of the arguments that follow refer to the totalitarian form of state capitalism only.

culties for the producer to obtain raw materials and, in consequence, new machinery,[1] cannot be attributed to the system itself but to the fact that one of its main prerequisites was lacking from the very beginning.

On the other hand, many of the Soviet Russian economic failures may be traced back to the lack of both raw materials and adequate development of the productive forces. Lack of trained technicians, skilled workers, and of the qualities known as work discipline, all of which are plentiful in highly industrialized countries only, go a long way in explaining the slow progress of rearming, reorganizing the transportation system and raising or even maintaining the standard of living in Soviet Russia. But even here a government controlled economic system has shown the power to survive under conditions where a system of free enterprise would have collapsed completely. Government controlled foreign trade and the development of an industry for "Ersatz" materials may overcome the limitations of a too narrow basis of raw materials. Filling the gap between a fully industrialized and a chiefly agricultural economy is a much more painful and drawn out process.

(2) Differences in vital interests will crop up in the group or groups controlling the state. They can stem from different positions within the administration, different programs for maintaining or expanding power, or the struggle for the monopoly of control. Unless adequate provisions are made for overcoming these differences, bad compromises and continuous struggle will arise.

(3) Conflicting interests within the ruling class might thwart the construction of a general plan embodying the optimum of all available resources for achieving consistent chosen ends. The choice of the ends itself represents a major problem as long as no common will has been established. In our discussion we started always from the assumption "given a general plan." This means a plan for certain ends which must be chosen from among a variety of possible ones.

Once the minimum requirements for consumption, replacement and expansion are fulfilled the planners have a great deal of leeway. If their decisions do not converge into a consistent program, no general plan for the optimum use and development of the given productive forces can be drafted.

[1]See Guenter Reimann, *The Vampire Economy.* Doing business under Fascism. New York 1939.

(4) Conflicting interests, however, do not operate in the ruling group only. Since totalitarian state capitalism is the expression of an antagonistic society at its worst, the will to dominate from above and the counter-pressure from below cut deeply into the pseudo-liberty of the state capitalist planners. The planning board, while vested with all the technical means for directing the whole economic process, is itself an arena of struggle among social forces far beyond its control. It will be seen that planning in an antagonistic society is only in a technical sense the same tool as that used by a society in which harmony of interests has been established. Political considerations interfere at every step with the construction and execution of an optimum plan. The following paragraphs will offer some examples.

How will expansion of production and technical progress be motivated after fear of aggression or objects for new conquest have vanished? Will not under such conditions the dreaded technological standstill make its appearance, thus spoiling all chances of reducing the drudgery of labor while raising the standard of living?[1] A case could be made out for the view that a new set of motivations will arise under totalitarian state capitalism which will combine the drive for power over men with the will to power over nature and counteract the development toward a static economy. But this is such a distant perspective that we may leave the question open, the more so since under totalitarian capitalism there are serious reasons to keep the productive forces static.

Under a state capitalistic set-up, will the general standard of living rise beyond narrow limits if the expansion program permits? This question can be answered in the affirmative for the democratic form of state capitalism only. For its authoritarian counterpart, however, the problem is different. The ruling minority in a totalitarian state maintains its power not only by terror and atomization but by its control of the means of production and by keeping the dominated majority in complete spiritual dependence. The masses have no chance of questioning the durability and justi-

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[1]Julian Gumperz, *The Expansion of Production and the Totalitarian System* (unpublished), makes the point that after property "becomes a semi-sovereign function of rights, privileges, prerogatives, transactions, that is, more and more dissociated from the active and actual carrying forward of production, this latter function creates a new class and is appropriated by it . . ." This class "represents a depository of skills, abilities, knowledges, traditions, that moves the organization of economic society from one point to another, and organizes the new level of production accomplished . . . Overproduction from which economic society has been suffering is centered to a large extent in the overproduction of this progressive class . . . and it is therefore not accidental but essential that a totalitarian economy stop, at its source, the production and reproduction of these skills . . ."

fication of the existing order; the virtues of war are developed and all "effeminacy," all longing for individual happiness, is rooted out. A rise in the standard of living might dangerously counteract such a policy. It would imply more leisure time, more professional skill, more opportunity for critical thinking, out of which a revolutionary spirit might develop. It is a widely spread error that the most dangerous revolutions are instigated by the most miserable strata of society. The revolutionary craving for liberty and justice found its most fertile breeding ground not among the paupers but among individuals and groups who were themselves in a relatively better position. The ruling group in totalitarian state capitalism might therefore decide that from the point of view of its own security a low general standard of living and long drudging working hours are desirable. An armament race and the excitement over threat of foreign "aggression" seem to be appropriate means for keeping the standard of living low and the war virtues high while maintaining full employment and promoting technical progress. Such a constellation, however, would furnish a striking example for a political limitation of productivity.

The highly speculative question might be permitted, what would happen if totalitarian state capitalism were embodied in a unified world state in which the threat of aggression had disappeared for good? Even public works of undreamed scope could not prevent the general standard of living from rising under conditions of full employment. In such a case the most clever devices of ideological mass domination and the grimmest terror are unlikely to uphold for a long period a minority dictatorship which can no longer claim itself to be necessary to maintain production and to protect the people from foreign aggression. If our assumption is correct that totalitarian state capitalism will not tolerate a high standard of living for the masses and cannot survive mass unemployment, the consequence seems to be that it cannot endure in a peace economy. As long as one national state capitalism has not conquered the whole earth, however, there will always be ample opportunities to spend most of the productive excess capacity (excess over the requirements for a minimum standard of living) for ever-increasing and technically more perfect armaments.

Why can the policy of aggression not come to a standstill before one state has conquered the entire world? Even after a totalitarian state has acquired full autarchy within its own territory, "preparedness" and foreign wars must go on at a rapid pace in order to protect against aggression from outside and revolution from within. A democratic state capitalism, while safe from within, is

menaced by totalitarian aggression and must arm to the teeth and be ready to fight until all totalitarian states have been transformed into democracies. In the last century it became evident that a society based on slave labor could not exist side by side with one organized on the principle of free labor. The same holds true in our day for democratic and totalitarian societies.

Control of the State under State Capitalism

If state capitalism is a workable system, superior in terms of productivity to private capitalism under conditions of monopolistic market disruption, what are the political implications? If the state becomes the omnipotent comptroller of all human activities, the question "who controls the comptroller" embraces the problem of whether state capitalism opens a new way to freedom or leads to the complete loss of it as far as the overwhelming majority is concerned. Between the two extreme forms of state capitalism, the totalitarian and the democratic, numerous others are thinkable. Everything depends upon which social groups in the last analysis direct the decisions of a government whose power has in all matters—"economic" as well as "non-economic"—never been surpassed in modern history. The following is intended as a rough sketch of the social structure under totalitarian state capitalism.

(1) The government is controlled by, and composed of, a new ruling class. We have defined this new class as an amalgamation of the key bureaucrats in business, state and party allied with the remaining vested interests.[1] We have already mentioned that inherited or acquired wealth may still play a role in opening a way to this ruling group, but that it is not essential for participating in the group. One's position in the economic and administrative set-up, together with party affiliations and personal qualification, are decisive for one's political power. The new ruling class, by its grip on the state, controls everything it wants to, the general economic plan, foreign policy, rights and duties, life and death of the individual. Its decisions are not restrained by any constitutional guarantees but by a set of rules only, designed for maintaining and expanding its own power. We have seen what control over the gen-

[1]This holds true for Germany and Italy where semifeudal landowners and big business are still in existence and form part of the ruling clique. The situation is different in Soviet Russia where the old vested interests have been wiped out. Since in Russia property in the means of production has changed hands completely from private owners to the state and no longer exists even in its modified and reduced form discussed above, it is somewhat doubtful whether our model of state capitalism fits the Soviet Union in its present phase.

eral economic plan involves: all the basic decisions on how to distribute the "factors of production" among producers and consumers goods, on the working day, labor conditions, on wages and prices. To sum up, control of the general economic plan means control over the standard of living. Antagonisms of interests among the groups within the ruling class might lead to serious difficulties. The class interest of maintaining the new status, however, will probably be strong enough for a long time to overcome these antagonisms before they can turn into a menace to the system. The persons who form the ruling class have been prepared for their task by their position in, or their cooperation with, the monopolistic institutions of private capitalism. There, a rapidly growing number of decisive functions had become invested in a comparatively small group of bureaucrats. The leader and follower principle flourished long before it was promulgated as the basic principle of society, since more and more responsibility had been centralized in the top offices of government, business, trade unions and political parties.

(2) Those owners of capital who are "capitalists" without being managers and who could exercise great political influence during the whole era of private capitalism no longer have any necessary social functions. They receive interest on their investments for as long a time and in the measure that the new ruling class may be willing to grant. From the point of view of their social utility they constitute a surplus population. Under the impact of heavy inheritance taxes, controlled stock markets and the generally hostile attitude of the new ruling class against the "*raffende Kapital*," these "capitalists" will probably disappear. The widespread hatred against them could develop only because the economic laws of capitalism had transformed their social role into that of parasites.

(3) A semi-independent group, not belonging to the ruling class but enjoying more privileges than the *Gefolgschaften*, are the free professions and the middle and small business men (including the farmers) carrying on their own business under governmental control. Both will disappear wherever a fully developed state capitalism corresponding to our model is reached. The process of concentration which gains unprecedented momentum under state capitalism absorbs the independent small and medium enterprise. The trend towards socialization of medicine, of journalism and other free professions transforms their members into government employees.

(4) The great majority of the people fall into the category of salaried employees of all types. They are subject to the leader principle of command and obedience. All their political rights have

been destroyed, and carefully planned atomization has simplified the task of keeping them under strict control. Labor's right to bargain collectively, to strike, to change jobs and residence at will (if its market position permits) is abolished. Work becomes compulsory, wages are fixed by government agencies, the leisure time of the worker and his family is organized from above. In some respects this is antithetical to the position of labor under private capitalism and revives many traits of feudal conditions.

(5) The new state openly appears as an institution in which all earthly power is embodied and which serves the new ruling class as a tool for its power politics. Seemingly independent institutions like party, army and business form its specialized arms. A complicated relation exists, however, between the means and those who apply them, resulting in some genuine independence for these institutions. Political domination is achieved by organized terror and overwhelming propaganda on the one side, on the other by full employment and an adequate standard of living for all key groups, the promise of security and a more abundant life for every subject who submits voluntarily and completely. This system is far from being based upon rude force alone. In that it provides many "real" satisfactions for its subjects it exists partly with the consent of the governed, but this consent cannot change the antagonistic character of a state capitalistic society in which the power interests of the ruling class prevent the people from fully using the productive forces for their own welfare and from having control over the organization and activities of society.

We have referred here and there to what we think are particular traits of the democratic form of state capitalism. Since no approaches to it have so far been made in practice, and since the discussion of it is still in a formative stage,[1] no attempt will be made here to construct a model for it.

The trend toward state capitalism is growing, however, in the non-totalitarian states. An increasing number of observers admit, very often reluctantly, that private capitalism is no longer able to handle the new tasks. "All plans for internal post-war reconstruction start with the assumption that more or less permanent government controls will have replaced *laissez-faire* methods both in the national and the international sphere. Thus the choice is not between totalitarian controls and return to 'free enterprise'; the choice is between totalitarian controls and controls voluntarily accepted by the

[1]Charles A. Beard, *Public Policy and the General Welfare*, New York 1941, marks an important step in this discussion.

people of each country for the benefit of society as a whole."[1] It is the lesson of all large-scale measures of government interference that they will contribute to the disruption of the market mechanism if they are not coordinated into a general plan. If government is to provide for all the items recognized as mandatory in the more serious post-war reconstruction programs,[2] it must be vested with adequate powers, and these might not stop short of state capitalism.

It is of vital importance for everybody who believes in the values of democracy that an investigation be made as to whether state capitalism can be brought under democratic control. The social as well as the moral problem with which the democracies are confronted has been formulated as follows: ". . . How can we get effective use of our resources, yet, at the same time preserve the underlying values in our tradition of liberty and democracy? How can we employ our unemployed, how can we use our plant and equipment to the full, how can we take advantage of the best modern technology, yet, in all this make the individual source of value and individual fulfillment in society the basic objective? How can we obtain effective organization of resources, yet, at the same time retain the maximum freedom of individual action?"[3] Totalitarian state capitalism offers the solution of economic problems at the price of totalitarian oppression. What measures are necessary to guarantee control of the state by the majority of its people instead of by a small minority? What ways and means can be devised to prevent the abuse of the enormous power vested in state, industrial and party bureaucracy under state capitalism? How can the loss of economic liberty be rendered compatible with the maintenance of political liberty? How can the disintegrative motive forces of today be replaced by integrative ones? How will the roots from which insurmountable social antagonisms develop be eliminated so that

[1]Vera Micheles Dean, "Toward a New World Order" in: *Foreign Policy Reports*, May 15, 1941, p. 55.

[2]"A British fact finding group, composed of progressive economists, businessmen, civil servants and professors, known as PEP (Political and Economic Planning), included the following items in its preliminary program prepared in 1940: maintenance after the war of full economic activity based on complete use of man power and resources, 'regardless of obsolete financial criteria'; assurance of a minimum standard of life, based on scientific standards of nutrition and proper provision for dependents; assurance of a minimum standard of housing, based on a socially planned program of housing and social amenities; provision of medical care and a reasonable measure of economic security, covering the hazards of employment, accidents, ill-health, widowhood and old age; the provision of equal opportunities for education in every country and the re-establishment of a European system of higher learning and research open to students of proved ability from all parts of the world; the provision of cultural and recreative activities and the establishment of organizations for the training and leisure of youth on a European scale." (Vera Micheles Dean, *op. cit.*, p. 55).

[3]National Resources Committee, *The Structure of the American Economy*, Washington, D. C., 1939, p. 3.

there will not arise a political alliance between dissentient partial interests and the bureaucracy aiming to dominate the majority? Can democratic state capitalism be more than a transitory phase leading either to total oppression or to doing away with the remnants of the capitalistic system?

The main obstacles to the democratic form of state capitalism are of a political nature and can be overcome by political means only. If our thesis proves to be correct, society on its present level can overcome the handicaps of the market system by economic planning. Some of the best brains of this country are studying the problem how such planning can be done in a democratic way, but a great amount of theoretical work will have to be performed before answers to every question will be forthcoming.

Technological Trends and Economic Structure under National Socialism

By A. R. L. Gurland

In the discussion revolving about the problems of totalitarian economy it has repeatedly been said that economic dynamism has come to an end in our time; that where there is no dynamic economy, there is no capitalism. Technological changes are still supposed to occur but they no longer engender significant variations in the economic rhythm and thus no longer occasion any considerable shifts in the set-up of society.[1]

The fact that technological revolutions do occur under totalitarian rule would not as such invalidate the argument. It could be held that technological reconstruction is made by totalitarian dictatorships and thus does not derive from, or give rise to, an economic dynamism *sui generis*. But if it can be shown that the technological revolution under totalitarian rule follows lines drawn by the pre-totalitarian economic development and fits into a pattern set by economic factors intrinsic to the inherited dynamics of capitalism, then, of course, the consistency of the reasoning would be impaired.

If there was a point in correlating the economy of competitive capitalism to technics based on the steam-engine, and the economy of non-competitive capitalism to technics based on the use of electric power, there might be no less a point in ascribing the economy of capitalism under totalitarian control and regimentation to the preponderance of chemical processes in the technological foundations of economic life. Important technological changes have taken place in the German economy, changes closely connected, indeed, with the advance of chemical processes. There has been an important technological transformation of industrial production, and this is enough to reject the thesis that technological dynamism has come to an end.

[1]Lawrence Dennis' roll-call for a revolution in the United States, for example, originates from the assumption that "as a capitalist dynamism the industrial revolution is over" (*The Dynamics of War and Revolution*, New York 1940, p. 66), and that therefore only a political revolution can perform changes in the economic set-up: "Technological change continues. But such change is neither dynamic nor constructive for capitalism any longer. The great capitalist democracies are already industrialized. Further industrial or technological change in them will go on but will not prove helpful to capitalism as a source of increased total demand." (*Ibidem*, p. 49.)

Economic Causes and Conditions of the Technological Change

Within the technological framework, as it had been built up during the previous development of the capitalist economy, Germany, more than any other capitalist country, had failed to find the way out of the great industrial post-war crises. The capitalist automatism no longer operated to overcome stagnation and unemployment. Too many commodities were facing too small a buying capacity. Monopolistic price-pegging prevented the aggregate value of commodities from being expressed in less money-units. Creation of additional buying capacity (through investments, more employment, higher wages and increasing productive demand) encountered the resistance of "vested interests" as expressed in invested capital's claim to at least "normal" return on capital outlay. Either the investor's, the creditor's, or the commodity-owner's claim for just return was to be turned aside, or the crisis was to go on and on. The monopolies paralyzed the automatism of capitalist dynamics.[1]

On the given technological basis new profits were not to be had unless the old investors' claim of profits was nullified. Capital that had become valueless but still held title to profits had to be revalued in a new technological set-up. There is the example of the leading coal and iron combines. They certainly were in want of outlets to market their products at a good price. Yet, the necessity of paying interest on invested capital prevented them from cutting down prices, converting bonds and reducing the capital stock, or even closing down mines and mills that could not stand such "deflationary policy." So they had to find new ways of utilizing their coal and of processing their iron. Now, the production units that would be most fit to use new technological opportunities would be the ones that possess the most diversified scope of manufacture. Whereas a coal-mining enterprise would benefit only by new outlets for coal, a "mixed" iron and coal combine would have new marketing possibilities for steel and plates and sheets, and would smelt more iron-ore and coke more coal to feed its own blast-furnaces.[2] A mining and metallurgi-

[1]The specific rigidity of the German economic system prior to the Nazi revolution has been the topic of numerous studies, monographs and book publications. Most of the evidence available is to be found in the hearings of the investigation committee set up by the German Reichstag: *Enqueteausschuss zur Untersuchung der Erzeugungs- und Absatzbedingungen der deutschen Wirtschaft.* See also Robert A. Brady, *The Rationalization Movement in German Industry*, Berkeley 1933.

[2]The combination of iron and coal within one production unit is one of the most characteristic features of the German economic set-up. Most of the leading "heavy-industry" concerns are "mixed" enterprises: Krupp, Gutehoffnungshütte, Hoesch, Mannesmann, Vereinigte Stahlwerke, Flick, etc. For details see, for example, *Deutsche Montan-Konzerne 1929*, Spezialarchiv der deutschen Wirtschaft (publications sponsored by the Dresdner Bank), Berlin 1929. The fact that the Hermann-

(footnote continued on next page)

cal combine owning engineering plants as well would be still better off; in turning out machinery for newly-created productions it would create additional demand for coal and iron produced "in the shop," whereas new steel and iron orders necessitated by the new requirements of machine-building plants (e.g., for the construction of hydrogenation equipment or cellulose-wool spinning machinery) would reach other concerns only belatedly and through intermediary channels.[1] On the other hand, the use of new methods of coal-processing must favor concerns that need less coal for their own coke-ovens and blast-furnaces and that at the same time control chemical factories, plants for the chemical utilization of by-products, or gas plants combined with grid distribution nets.[2]

The grafting of new productions upon the old over-capitalized production units rendered a technological reconstruction possible without infringing upon the old set-up of property rights and profit claims. There was no need to break up monopolies in order to clear the field for technological changes; these very technological changes were fitted to the economic structure so as to meet the profit requirements of monopolistic combines.

Another feature must be added here. It has often been said that Germany's economic recovery was essentially due to rearmament. Yet, rearmament orders constitute but a quantitative change. They mean more employment but they do not mean employment on a new basis so as to provide altered conditions for earning returns on invested capital. Neither the problem of realizing the profit claims of technologically obsolete plants nor the problem of making profits within a system of rigid and inflexible costs of production can be solved through more employment by rearmament unless there is a

Göring-Werke combine had not been endowed with a "coal basis" of its own when it was created in 1937 engendered one of the most significant conflicts within the totalitarian set-up. It came to an end only with the expropriation of the Thyssen interests (see below).

[1]The combination of coal-mining, metallurgy and engineering (including machine-tool building) is another specific feature of the largest German combines, such as Krupp, Mannesmann, Gutehoffnungshütte. It constitutes the skeleton of the biggest and most powerful of the existing German industrial combines, the Flick-Konzern, which equals and perhaps already surpasses in economic and political power the giant Dye Trust (IG-Farben). In the "struggle for coal" the Göring-Werke combine, though victorious in robbing Thyssen's Steel Trust (Vereinigte Stahlwerke), did not manage to outmaneuver Flick but had to content itself with a compromise most profitable to the latter (June, 1940). The Flick enterprises are worth mentioning because, having started some 15 years ago as a "pure" machine-building concern, they now control the major part of German lignite production, own a controlling interest in the government-founded and government-supervised lignite hydrogenation trust (Brabag), and through interlocking directorates participate in the control of potash production and chemical industry.

[2]On the connection of coal-mining concerns with the chemical industry see, e.g., *Die grossen Chemie-Konzerne Deutschlands*, Spezialarchiv der deutschen Wirtschaft, Berlin 1929.

chance to reverse the entire structure of manufacturing calculation and introduce new elements of cost-cutting through manifold and combined application of new processes, new equipment, new labor-saving machinery. Capital itself, as embodied in the industrial apparatus, must undergo a structural transformation to make investments pay. Rearmament, since it is another aspect of pump-priming, eases the way of technological reconstruction, but it by no means renders the latter superfluous or avoidable.

The entire technological structure of German industry, on the level of concentration and combination that had been attained prior to 1933, was based, as pointed out above, on the agglutination of different groups of production, processing and manufacture within the largest and most important organizational production units.[1] This not only gave the producers the opportunity to dodge difficulties and to avoid collapse during the depths of the crisis, but also enabled them to find adjustments in the course of the technological reconstruction, to make up for expenditure incurred with new investments, to compensate for risks undertaken with the opening-up of new fields of production, the construction of new plants, etc.

In the course of reconstruction, production must be set afoot in fields where it cannot be profitable at the beginning. Production tasks must be undertaken that require huge investments and do not by themselves guarantee any return on the capital invested. Experiments in processing and manufacturing must be carried through, involving tremendous costs. Compulsion is an easy expedient. But it can be dispensed with where risks can be leveled down or compensated at the expense of surplus earnings available in other fields within the same production unit. If experiments in the manufacture of synthetic gasoline have to be begun when there is no market for products of chemical industry, the chemical trust which has to face this problem will needs give up gasoline or freeze the experiments at an early stage. But if, on the contrary, all operative divisions of the trust are in full action, if not only all old products of the concern are salable at good prices but new products are also being manufactured that can be marketed with profit (plastics, e.g.), there will be an excellent opportunity to start hydrogenation processes, to take the risk of investing huge amounts of capital in this new production, and to wait for the profits to come some day.[2] Giant com-

[1]See Herbert von Beckerath, *Modern Industrial Organization*, New York and London 1933; and Hermann Levy, *Industrial Germany*, Cambridge 1935; also Brady, quoted *supra*.

[2]On the great variety and diversity of productive tasks that might be undertaken within a single production unit under conditions prevailing in the German chemical industries, see Claus Ungewitter, *Chemie in Deutschland*, Berlin 1938.

bines covering a multitude of different productive operations, enjoying great financial power, and connected with, or controlling, other industries will be in the most favorable position to go ahead with the technological reconstruction. Others will have to follow.[1]

This frame of interrelationships into which technological reconstruction had to fit itself shows a close weave of organizational, financial and economic elements. The economic situation is characterized by a very high degree of concentration. In no other country had cartels, the "horizontal" organization of industry, achieved such progress as in Germany. In no other country was there such an intimate intertwining of production units both within the individual industries and across the boundaries of the individual trades. In no other country had the centralized organization of both capital and commodity flow reached a similar level of completeness and tightness. At the same time, each and every industrial enterprise had become dependent upon the other enterprises; every industry was affected by changes or disturbances in every other industry.

The manifold interdependence of the economic units accounts for their particular instability, for their immediate response to any shock, any disturbance, any disruption of economic equilibrium. Difficulties encountered by a concern of some importance have to affect the whole of the economic process, and do so at once. There is no bankruptcy that would not implicate numerous apparently sound enterprises. A bank cannot close down without involving several other banks, a whole set of big, medium and small industrial enterprises, numerous wholesale and retail shops, and in the end even transport undertakings and public utilities.[2] To prevent social disturbances from generating under this hyper-sensitivity of the economic apparatus, state interventionism is called for at an early stage. In the parliamentary set-up of Imperial Germany, as well as

[1]The leading German potash combine Wintershall, to cite an example, was able to engage in the construction of a hydrogenation plant at a time when hydrogenation prospects were dubious. It enjoyed a kind of risk-insurance because it controlled potash mining, combined chemical processing of potash, coal and metal ores, had financial connections and interlocks with lignite mining, oil production, and the manufacture of arms and ammunition. Contrariwise, the Thyssen combine, confined to metallurgy and engineering and experiencing a downward trend ever since the Nazi *coup d'état*, was virtually blown up when compelled to finance and construct a hydrogenation plant of its own (Gelsenberg-Benzin). Tied up financially in hydrogenation, and in need of capital to finance the plant, Thyssen could not resist the Göring-Werke combine's assault on his Austrian iron mines and steel works and had finally to surrender the Alpine Montan-Gesellschaft with all its holdings; the next assault—on Thyssen's coal—ended with the expropriation of Thyssen's personal holdings in the Steel Trust (Vereinigte Stahlwerke), which, however, did not mean expropriation of the Steel Trust itself.

[2]One ought to recall that the great crisis of 1931 that turned out to be Hitler's springboard to power was unloosed by the collapse of Jacob Goldschmidt's Darmstädter und Nationalbank.

in the democratic structure of the Weimar Republic, it was the non-capitalist groups whose interests required intervention to protect the continuance of work and to preclude catastrophes. The intervention was a forced one, but it gave the state machinery the appearance of an independent umpire imposing his will upon recalcitrant business interests.

Yet, the "umpire" state was never free to act against the interests of big business. To prevent economic disruption it could not simply refloat a collapsing concern and make big business pay for it; it had to secure the consent of the predominant interests before taking action.[1] In setting itself up as an entrepreneur in its own right, in taking over more and more private industrial and utility concerns,[2] the state could not dispense with the approval of big business interests, and had to pay for it "in cash and in kind": tax reductions, subsidies, preferential treatment in foreign trade, reduced transportation and utility rates, etc.—hence the permanent and intimate cooperation between the management of the big industrial concerns and the industrial "Spitzenverbände"[3] on the one hand, and the government officials and managers of the government-owned enterprises on the other. State interventionism finds solid foundations in the close connection of bureaucracy and big business.

The financial situation of German industry was no less instrumental in enhancing the importance of the state in economic life. The very centralization of industrial enterprise contributes to increasing enormously the amount of capital needed for any single investment in large-scale industry. Moreover, as the technological level of industrialization becomes higher, invested money becomes "fixed capital" to a greater extent; technological change then presupposes new construction expenses on a vast scale or most expensive re-building of the industrial apparatus together with the scrap-

[1]The Brüning government, for instance, was prevented from refloating Goldschmidt by the veto of the other big banks and the coal and iron magnates. The assets and liabilities of the Darmstädter und Nationalbank were transferred to the Dresdner Bank and the latter taken over by the government, not to be "re-privatized" until September, 1937, when its controlling stock was distributed among several big industrial combines.

[2]This not only applies to the taking-over of collapsing concerns such as the Darmstädter und Nationalbank or Thyssen's Steel Trust (turned back to the Thyssen group at the beginning of the Nazi era) but also to the expansion of government business activities in general (transportation, public utilities, mining, aluminum production, etc.). I abstain from giving data on the extent of government participation in business. Such data, as far as available, require a more detailed discussion. On the amount of capital involved see "Kapitalbildung und Kapitalmarkt in Deutschland seit der Stabilisierung" by Dr. Wolfgang Reichardt (President of the Reich Statistical Office) in: *Probleme des deutschen Wirtschaftslebens*, Berlin and Leipzig 1937, pp. 585-618.

[3]See Robert A. Brady, "Policies of National Manufacturing Spitzenverbände," I and II, in: *Political Science Quarterly*, LVI, 2, pp. 199-225; 3, pp. 379-391.

ping and writing-off of immense investments.[1] Every new or auxiliary investment requires such amounts of capital as cannot possibly be raised by individual enterprises, not even by big ones.

Ever since the prosperity peak of 1929 there was much ado about what was called the investors' strike. This "strike" has but one objective: to get guarantees that would make investments less risky and easier to accomplish. Actually, a triple guarantee is called for. The investor must have the freedom to cut down the costs of labor, i.e., he must be freed from any monopoly in the labor market. He must have the opportunity of using the modern devices of money and credit manipulation to expropriate competitors both at home and abroad, to impose the burden of pump-priming, experimenting and market-dumping, if need be, upon the shoulders of other social groups, and he must be able to act on the legitimate assumption that the increased economic power of the state, which he contributes to establishing by the use of such devices, will not turn against him. Finally he must have individual investments guaranteed by the government through subsidies and non-competitive prices, and he must have large-scale government orders to provide for a permanent outlet.[2] Once this threefold guarantee is ensured, the investors' strike comes to an end. That is exactly what happened in Germany when the totalitarian regime came into power.[3]

For all that, economic and organizational trends were not the only ones to bring about state interference with business on a large scale. The technological development did so, too. As an example the need for new processes of utilizing coal has been mentioned above. But new methods of production and new outlets could only

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[1]See E. Schmalenbach, *Finanzierungen*, revised edition by R. Bethmann, Leipzig 1937.

[2]Where such guarantees have to be granted and enforced by the state, the government machinery will of necessity acquire substantial economic and financial power and the authority to supervise business and to control investments. I do not share the view propounded by Frederick Pollock in this issue, pp. 201-7, that this means the abolition of the market economy. I intend to discuss this topic in a separate study.

[3]As late as 1941 the German capitalists still make their decisions upon impending investments subject to whether they are or are not given government guarantees, and have to be taught a lesson by Reich Minister Funk, the Nazi "business dictator," on the principles of capitalist economy: "The endless clamor for Reich guarantees is a downright *testimonium paupertatis* to private initiative and to private business' willingness to bear responsibilities. There surely remain today, and will remain in the future, tasks that may not be undertaken or carried through except as collective tasks. In the fulfillment of such tasks private business must be given a big share. Besides this, however, a vast domain for private business and the private businessman to exert their efforts will not only be preserved but will also to the very largest extent be found anew after the war." (Funk to the stockholders of the Reichsbank on March 12, 1941, see *Frankfurter Zeitung*, March 13, 1941.)

be found in the chemical processing of coal.[1] The same applies to any other raw material, be it wood or straw, nitrogen, oil, metal, or what not. The entire technological reconstruction centers upon the chemical industry.[2] Chemical synthesis has become the paramount trait of industrial technology in well-nigh every sphere of production. As connected with large-scale industrial production, it has economic features of its own. The new aspect of this field is mainly the transformation of the structure of high-molecular combinations in order to produce out of a given substance one or several new substances whose molecules have an identic atomic composition but cluster in differently constructed groups (polymers), i.e., form different chemical bodies that have different properties and can be used to serve different technological and manufacturing purposes. Such "polymerization" processes presuppose, as a rule, high-pressure action of hundreds of atmospheres and involve huge expenditure even at the beginning of the experiment, the outcome of which cannot be known beforehand.[3] Though one might theoretically deduce what substances will be produced, nobody can foretell the proportion of the different substances obtained. This last depends on the catalytics used and on circumstances that might vary during the catalytic process itself.[4]

Not only are huge investments involved but at the same time risks are multiplied because of the unpredictability of the polymeric synthesis. When the experiment is put to test without the government guaranteeing the capital affected, it must needs be confined to mere laboratory processes, handled with caution and timidity, and stretched over a long time in order to lessen the risks and the financial responsibility of the investor. The situation can be reversed at once where the government guarantees or subsidizes the production.

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[1]See Ferdinand Friedensburg, *Kohle und Eisen im Weltkriege und in den Friedensschlüssen*, Berlin and Munich 1934; *idem*, *Die mineralischen Bodenschätze als weltpolitische und militärische Machtfaktoren*, Stuttgart 1936; Dr. Rudolf Regul, "Die Entwicklung des Wärme- und Energiebedarfs" in: *Glückauf*, 1938, Nos. 39 and 40.

[2]The value of production turned out by the German chemical industry proper (not including rayon, cellulose wool, or synthetic productions connected with coal mining, etc.) rose from RM 2.4 billion in 1913 to RM 3.0 billion in 1934 and RM 5.75 billion in 1938 (data of the Economic Group Chemical Industry in Ungewitter, *Chemie in Deutschland*, and *Frankfurter Zeitung*, August 4, 1939).

[3]In the hydrogenation of coal or in the cracking of heavy oils the same high pressure involving the same vast expenditure must be used whether the outcome be mostly valuable gasoline (or other light oils), or heavier and less valuable lubricants of different composition and different properties.

[4]See, e.g., the paper read by M. Pier, one of the chief chemists of the Dye Trust, at the International Chemists Convention in Rome on May 21, 1938, in: *Technik und Betrieb*, June 10, 1938; also Dr. A. Hagemann, "Katalytische Druckhydrierung," *ibidem*; "Zum Jubiläum des ersten Bergiuspatents" in: *Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung*, August 9, 1938.

In this case there is no need to wait for the perfect synthetic to be born since even its embryonic forerunners will find a buyer—the government—or limitless protection against the competition of natural products, regardless of what they might cost.[1]

At an earlier stage the consequence of the investments required in chemical production was that the chemical producers merged their interests into giant combines,[2] leaving only a baker's dozen of independent concerns outside. At the present stage the specific conditions inherent in chemical synthesis as it enters the field of industrial technology[3] make the giant chemical combines themselves call for government protection both in production and in the market, and thus contribute toward the expansion of the interventionist machinery.

Technological Revolution and War Economy

It is hardly possible at the present time to paint a comprehensive picture of the effects of the technological revolution in totalitarian Germany, or to express its scope in statistics and figures. What in 1933 did not seem to be practicable until a rather remote future, has been accomplished under the impact of the totalitarian regime. Whatever one thinks of the processing of coal and crude oil, the replacement of wool and cotton by artificial filaments, or the advance of light metals—the chances have been taken under centralized supervision, the risks ventured on the basis of government guarantees, investments made with capital partly levied through government compulsion at the expense of the smaller enterprise or at the expense of industries not favored by the general trend of technological reconstruction.[4]

To give some features: The problems of the mining industry, which had suffered from a chronic crisis up to 1933, have been

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[1]Different patterns of government participation in the risks of new investments or in raising capital for new industrial processes have been designed in the course of Germany's industrial reconstruction. To give an outline of the various devices used would be tantamount, however, to presenting the general picture of the enterpreneurial set-up of business in all industries concerned, i.e., chemical, textiles, coal (incl. lignite) and oil, rubber, automobiles, etc. This cannot be done here and will be reserved for special discussion.

[2]IG-Farben in Germany, Imperial Chemical in England, Kuhlmann in France, Du Pont de Nemours in the United States, etc.

[3]See Albert Sulfrian and Josef Peltzer, *Betriebs- und gesamtwirtschaftliche Probleme der chemischen Produktion*, Stuttgart 1938.

[4]Lack of space prevents me from describing the various devices used to transfer the small and medium investors' and producers' money to the treasuries of the private industrial combines upon whom had been bestowed practically the exclusive privilege of large-scale investment.

solved; Germany no longer produces too much, but not enough coal.[1] This is due to the fact that coal is not any longer used mainly for fuel, but has become the basic substance for raw and auxiliary materials in numerous industries. Coal is used for hydrogenation, i.e., for the production of gasoline and other oils.[2] It is the basic element in the production of synthetic rubber, "Buna," which is a combination of butadene, a carbon polymer, and sodium.[3] The manufacture of plastics, which serve multifarious purposes, including the construction of automobiles,[4] is based on coal tars and phenols. Coal is one of the materials used in producing artificial textiles (although the manufacture of "Nylon," a pure carbon filament, has scarcely spread in Germany, having been outrun by rayon, cellulose wool and "Pe-Ce," a carbon and chlorine derivative). Finally, coal enters into numerous other combinations derived from other substances, minerals, metals, acids, etc.

Coal is a typical example. The creation of a giant industry of hydrogenation, or of artificial rubber, would not have been possible but for the fact that other industries were being created or thoroughly reorganized to manufacture machines, machine-tools and plant equipment for the production of oil and rubber synthetics. On the other hand, both synthetic gasoline and "Buna" serve the purposes of the "motorization" program. Motorization, however, does not so much mean the shifting of transportation from rail to road, from steam-engine to motor-car,[5] as it does the building-up of aeronautical transportation (both civil and military), i.e., the construction of an airplane and airplane motors industry.[6] In addition,

[1]Yet, the output of coal has risen (in millions of metric tons) from 163.4 in 1929, and 104.7 in 1932, to 186.4 in 1938. The output of lignite totaled 174.5 in 1929, 122.6 in 1932 and 194.9 in 1938.

[2]Peace-time production of gasoline, benzene and other oils from German raw materials would have reached about 3.6 million metric tons in 1940 as compared with 0.83 in 1933, 1.9 in 1937, and 2.7 in 1938. (These are estimates computed from different sources. See data of General Loeb in: *Der Vierjahresplan*, 1938, No. 2; Eicke [member of the Reichsbank Board], *Warum Aussenhandel*, 5th ed. 1939; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 18, 1939; *Der Bergbau*, June 9, 1938; *Halbjahrsbericht zur Wirtschaftslage*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, 1938/39, 1.)

[3]The only statement I could ever find on the volume of "Buna" production was that it must equal one quarter or one third of the total German requirements for rubber in 1939; this would make for an output of 33,000 or 50,000 metric tons. (See "Chemiebilanz 1938" in: *Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung*, January 1, 1939.)

[4]See Ungewitter, *Chemie in Deutschland*, pp. 86f.; General Loeb, "Die Kunststoffe in der deutschen Wirtschaft" in: *Der Vierjahresplan, 1938*, No. 3, pp. 133f.

[5]See Trost, "Erzeugung und Absatz von Kraftfahrzeugen" in: *Der deutsche Volkswirt*, February 17, 1939; Dr. Reinhold Stisser, "Die deutsche Kraftfahrzeugindustrie, ihre Exportprobleme und ihre Wettbewerbslage" in: *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, Vol. 48, No. 1, July 1938.

[6]Dr. Heinrich Koppenberg (general manager of Junkers), "Deutschlands Luftfahrtindustrie ist Grossindustrie" in: *Der Vierjahresplan*, 1939, No. 1/2, pp. 74f.

trends toward transforming the entire system of distribution and production of power must sooner or later result from the motorization of the national economy.[1] All this taken together with the chemical processing of coal and other minerals accounts for a rapid expansion of the engineering and machine-tool building industries, of the manufacture of electric appliances and precision instruments: new industries cannot be created, and old ones cannot expand, unless they can get enough machinery and equipment to start with.[2] This in turn accounts for the expansion and technical reorganization in building, and last but not least for the rise of the chemical industry proper.

As compared with the innovations deriving from chemical synthesis, other features of the technological revolution are not essentially new in their economic purport. They are, nonetheless, connected with several new processes, new manufacturing lines, new products. The new metal constructions ought to be mentioned, the replacement of iron and steel by light metals (aluminum and magnesium in the first place), new metal alloys, the use of non-metal substances (plastics, glass,[3] wood derivatives) for metal construction. Mention ought to be made as well of the entire domain of artificial textiles (insofar as not based on coal), starting, of course, with the manufacture of rayon,[4] which is not new, but culminating in the manufacture of "cellulose wool,"[5] a rapidly expanding field of production based on the use of materials hitherto unknown in the manufacture of textile filaments (wood previously unused, straw and, more recently, potato stalks).[6] It goes without saying that here,

[1] Dr. Rudolf Regul, *Energiequellen der Welt*, Schriften des Instituts für Konjunkturforschung, Sonderheft 44, Berlin 1937; Carl Krecke, "Die deutsche Energiewirtschaft," in: *Probleme des deutschen Wirtschaftslebens*, Berlin and Leipzig 1937, pp. 381-405.

[2] The production index-number in the German machine-building industry (1928=100) reached the peak at 147.7 in 1938, as compared with 40.7 in 1932. (*Statistik des In- und Auslands*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, 1939/40, No. 2.)—The value of output (at current prices) rose from RM 1.4 billion in 1932 to 5.5 in 1938, as compared with 2.8 in 1914 and 4.0 in 1929. (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, December 29, 1938, and *Halbjahrsbericht zur Wirtschaftslage*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, 1939/40, No. 1.)

[3] "The glass industry is actually passing through its second industrial revolution"—says Dr. Otto Suhr, "Umwälzungen in der Glasindustrie" in: *Die Wirtschaftskurve*, 1940, II, p. 83.

[4] Output of the rayon industry totaled 67,000 metric tons in 1938, as compared with 31,000 in 1932 (*Wochenbericht*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, March 9, 1938, and March 15, 1939). It was estimated at 70,000 metric tons for 1939 by E. H. Vits, general manager of the Glanzstoff combine, in: *Der Vierjahresplan*, 1941, No. 7.

[5] From 3,000 metric tons in 1932 the output of "cellulose wool" (staple fiber) rose to 162,000 in 1938 (*Wochenbericht*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, March 9, 1938, and March 15, 1939). It was to attain 200,000 tons in 1939 and 275,000 in 1940, according to Hans Kehrl, Chief Consultant in the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, speaking at the Reich convention of textile manufacturers, June 3, 1939 (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, June 4, 1939).

[6] Friedrich Dorn, "Die Zellstoff- und Papierwirtschaft in und nach dem Kriege" in: *Der Vierjahresplan*, 1940, No. 23, pp. 1033f.; W. A. Chatelan, "Textilindustrie einmal anders gesehen," *ibidem*, 1941, No. 7, pp. 423f.

too, new machinery and new industrial equipment is needed. It has become unavoidable not only to expand the capacity of production in the manufacture of machines, machine-tools, instruments, vehicles, and metal ware, but also to reorganize all the industries concerned, to institute labor-saving devices, to standardize the products, to extend the assembly-line system and uniform mass production.

Revolutionary though they are, the technological changes as pictured here have not succeeded in alleviating the shortage in metals and metal-ore, a particularly weak spot in Germany's economic armor. The metal supply has considerably increased.[1] Still, a tremendous deficiency remained in iron ore, and special measures had to be enacted to correct the situation. The most famous example is the mining of hitherto neglected German iron-ore deposits.[2] Though generally associated with the setting-up of the "Hermann-Göring-Werke" combine, mining of low-grade ores is not limited exclusively to this government-controlled enterprise. Private combines have followed the Göring example.[3] This is not the only new feature in metallurgy. In fact, the activity of the Göring combine is focused not on mining but on processing, the Göring enterprise being the first in Germany to introduce oxygenation into the smelting process.[4] Together with these developments, the construction of the first giant rolling mills for continuous manufacture of steel-sheets was begun, inaugurating a new era in the continental iron and steel industry.[5]

[1]German pig-iron output rose from 15.3 million metric tons in 1929 to 18.5 in 1938 (after 6.8 in 1933). Steel production increased during the same years from 16.2 million metric tons to 23.3 (after 7.6 in 1933). Between 1933 and 1937 the foundry output of lead increased from 116,600 to 162,400 tons, of copper from 49,800 to 65,500, of zinc from 50,900 to 103,300, of aluminum from 18,900 to 127,500 (and 175,000 in 1938).

[2]Output of iron-ore from German mines (aggregate output, not metal content) totaled 11,150,000 metric tons in 1938, as compared with 6,373,700 in 1929 and 2,590,000 in 1933.

[3]Two private enterprises have been set up to exploit the German ore deposits: the Doggererz-Bergbau-GmbH. pooling the interests of Burbach, Dillingen, Neunkirchen, Völklingen, and Halberg (all of them private concerns) in the Zollhaus Blumberg iron fields, and the Gewerkschaft Damme for the Osnabrück ore deposits, the latter with the participation of Krupp, Mannesmann, Hoesch, Klöckner and Thyssen's Steel Trust. These are Göring's competitors in his particular domain.

[4]Eduard Houdremont, "Einige Aufgaben der deutschen Metallurgie" in: *Stahl und Eisen*, 1938, No. 44; Dr. Lenning's paper at the convention of the German blast-furnace enterprises, in: *Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung*, November 6, 1938; Dr. A. Wilhelmi, "Kosten der Verhüttung eisenarmer Erze" in: *Mitteilungen des GHH-Konzerns*, November 1938; Paul Goerens (general manager of Krupp's), "Fortschritte der Eisenhüttentechnik" in: *Der Vierjahresplan*, 1939, No. 4, pp. 365f.; H. A. Brassert (chief consulting engineer of Göring's), "Erfahrungen in amerikanischen und europäischen Hüttenwerken" in: *Der Vierjahresplan*, No. 4, pp. 370f., and No. 6, pp. 472f.

[5]Giant continuous strip mills, until a few years ago known in the United States only, have been built by the Steel Trust (Bandeisenwalzwerke in Dinslaken) and by Neunkirchener Eisenwerk A.-G. (Stumm combine). Two other plants are under construction by Hoesch and Röchling. In the Dinslaken plant one unskilled hand is said to turn out as much as 5 to 10 highly skilled workers had been able to in old-

(footnote continued on next page)

To sum up, the technological changes we have reviewed amount to an enormous increase in productive capacity. This could not be achieved but through curtailing consumption. In consequence, the major long-term change in the economic structure amounts to a considerable shift from consumers to producers goods[1] or, considering the structure of capital, from manpower to machinery. From this angle, innovations in armament proper are less important by themselves. The strength of the German war machine is in the combination of weapons and vehicles. The center of gravity has moved from arms to locomotion, and the transportation problem has become the central problem of warfare. Motorized lightning war, however, is but one of the aspects of motorization as a whole. The new technology of coal and oil, outgrowing the confines of steam and rail, has brought about motorized transportation (on the ground and in the air) and reversed the technological conditions of war.

Preparedness for motorized *Blitz* warfare implies that the whole of economic activity must serve the purpose of constructing and motorizing the machinery of military transportation. Once set up as an end to attain, however, motorization of warfare conflicts with the "civil" requirements of technological reconstruction from which it issued. Actually, Germany's technological revolution has been carried on under conditions of a continuous crisis of transportation, time and again verging on downright collapse of the transportation system.[2] In practice, motorizing transportation was confined to the military domain, while motor truck transportation of freight is still of no account. The newly constructed motor roads have thus far no "civil" economic significance. There was no extension of the railroad network and no increase in the rolling stock. The tonnage of river craft increased inadequately, and motorization hardly progressed at all. Commercial use of aviation is unimportant. Canal construction has been insufficient to connect the new industrial areas with navi-

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styled thin-plate works. (Hans Cramer, manager in Dinslaken, "Die erste vollkontinuierliche europäische Breitbandstrasse" in: *Der Vierjahresplan*, 1939, No. 16, pp. 972f.; Dr. Konrad Hofmann, assistant to Herr Brassert, "Die moderne Blecherzeugung," *ibidem*, No. 15, pp. 918f., No. 16, pp. 964f., No. 17, pp. 1017f.

[1]From 1928 to 1938 production of consumers goods increased only by 7 per cent, as compared with 35.9 per cent increase in the production of producers goods; within the category of producers goods, production of durable investment goods increased by 40.3 per cent (*Wochenbericht*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, February 22, 1939).

[2]See *Wochenbericht*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, September 14 and October 26, 1938, February 15, 1939; H. O. Philipp, "Der Verkehrsapparat—das Rückgrat der Wirtschaft" in: *Der deutsche Volkswirt*, January 27, 1939; "Verspätungen im Eisenbahnverkehr" in: *Der deutsche Volkswirt*, January 6, 1939; Dr. Trierenberg, paper delivered at the Thuringian Civil Service Academy, in: *Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung*, March 11, 1939; H. O. Philipp, "Reichsbahn vor den Herbstaufgaben" in: *Der deutsche Volkswirt*, August 18, 1939.

gable waterways, while existing connections cannot be made full use of for lack of cargo tonnage.

This is where war economy, a product of technological reconstruction itself, obstructs reconstruction. In hampering the reorganization of civil transportation, military motorization served to postpone indefinitely any serious attempt to electrify both transportation and industry.[1] To a considerable extent the crisis of transportation is due to the fact that the bulk of industrial power is derived from combustion of coal, and nearly half the freight-load conveyed by railroad is coal.[2] No large-scale electrification was carried through; neither in industry nor in agriculture.[3] There was, of course, a considerable increase in the production of electric power;[4] synthetic processes require a tremendous amount of electricity,[5] and technological reconstruction is, theoretically, propitious to, and would in turn be propelled by, electrification. But to focus the entire power supply of industry and agriculture on electricity would have meant huge investments by the government which would have conflicted with the priority of chemical synthesis and motorization. Motorization, as connected with military preparedness, had to rank first in the priority list.

Yet, was there any economic necessity at all for combining technological reconstruction with the rebuilding of the war machine? Technological conditions as explained above made military and economic rearmament take the shape of motorization, chemical synthesis, and chemical technology in the widest use of the term. In this way rearmament certainly did influence the progress of technological revolution, but it did not determine the direction the changes took. It was but an element and a consequence of technological reconstruction, the roots of which were deeply embedded

[1] *Wochenbericht*, Institut für Konjunkturforschung, February 2, 1938, and May 17, 1939; *Elektrotechnischer Anzeiger*, October 20, 1938.

[2] *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich*, 1933-1938; Dr. Werner Fischer, "Die Schlüsselstellung der Kohle" in: *Der deutsche Volkswirt*, August 4, 1939; *Der Wirtschaftsdienst*, September 2, 1938; *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1938, No. 18.

[3] "Betriebsausgaben der Landwirtschaft" in: *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1937, No. 20, 1938, No. 21; Hans von der Decken, "Die Mechanisierung der Landwirschaft" in: *Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung*, 1938/39, No. 3; Günter Hünecke, *Gestaltungskräfte der Energiewirtschaft*, Leipzig 1937.

[4] Production of electric power totaled 55.0 billion kilowatt-hours in 1938, as compared with 30.7 in 1929 and 25.7 in 1933.

[5] Consumption of electric power per metric ton of product amounts to 40,000 kilowatt-hours in the production of Buna, 22,000 to 25,000 in the production of aluminum, 18,000 to 20,000 in the production of magnesium, 7,000 in the rayon and staple fiber manufacture, as against 3,800 in the manufacture of natural textiles, or 100 to 200 in the iron production. (*Deutschlands wirtschaftliche Lage an der Jahreswende 1938/39*. Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft, Berlin 1939; *Frankfurter Zeitung*, August 21, 1938.)

in the entire economic and technological set-up of production in pre-Nazi Germany.

"Capitalism" and "Anti-Capitalism" in the Totalitarian Set-Up

Although resulting from the entirety of economic conditions, the development that has been going on since 1933 was by no means automatic. The trends that have since taken definite shape did not appear equally necessary and desirable to all parties that enter into the picture. The interested parties and the actual actors and promoters were not identical throughout the period considered, and more often than not were surprised and disappointed at the results. The monopolists certainly did favor the prohibition of unions, the abolition of parliamentary rule, the establishment of a "strong government." They did not favor the setting-up of a political power machinery that would encroach upon their interests. Industrial capitalists certainly did crave rearmament orders and pump-priming to refloat collapsing business. They did not crave a totalitarian regime where all economic activities would be under control and the interests of the individual enterprise would be sacrificed to totalitarian militarism. The middle-classes certainly did advocate an economic recovery which would ensure full employment, industrial expansion and even the widening of the bureaucratic sphere in order to provide jobs and offices. They did not advocate an economic set-up where full employment would mean the allocation of foreign exchange, raw materials, labor and capital according to the productive capacity of the enterprise, and where medium and small-size business would be spoliated.

There are other such discrepancies between hope and fulfillment. The thoroughly anti-middle-class policies of the Nazi regime must not obscure the fact that the active ranks of the Nazi revolution had been recruited from the middle-classes, and that the machinery of political control and mass domination which constitutes the skeleton of the Nazi state still is a middle-class machinery. It does not suffice to say that the "*élite*" is made up of dispossessed members of the upper middle-class.[1] It must be added that the active rank and file, though unemployed, did not consist of people without a definite profession but mostly of people connected with some kind of business.[2]

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[1]Officers of the army and navy; sons of high-placed bureaucrats, judges, professors, officers whose career had been broken up by the dwindling of their assets during the inflation; young intellectuals who had no chance to climb as high as the upper strata since the economic crisis barred their access to any professional career, etc.

[2]Owners of factories and shops; managers in industry and commerce; business employees; salesmen; engineers; farmers; employees of big rural estates; "independents" and employees in professional work; officials and employees of manufacturers' associations, chambers of commerce, agricultural associations, etc.

The *élite* of *déclassés* drew its active support from the group connected with the owners, managers and leading personnel of independent medium and small-size business,[1]—and the most active ones were the sons of these people.

The Nazis have made plenty of anti-capitalist propaganda. But this "anti-capitalism," attracting hundreds of thousands of labor votes, did not frighten or alarm or alienate Hitler's big and small capitalist supporters. It has been said that this propaganda was merely demagogic, and that the Nazis were, and are, but paid tools of Big Money. Obvious though it seems, this explanation does not account for the paramount fact that business has participated in "anti-capitalism" not only as a demagogic device but also as a far-reaching government practice of infringements upon traditional property rights.[2]

What the average businessman and shopkeeper stood against was very accurately expressed in the National Socialist ideology and propaganda. His foe was Big Business profiting from prosperity as well as from crisis, getting government subsidies and preferential treatments, obtaining credits and loans to refloat unsound investments, and engendering crises that ruined the others. In the "anti-capitalism" of the average businessman there was a profound yearning for security first, and what he blamed Big Business for was that it ruined his chance of making profits and rising through profits to the very apex of the social pyramid.

In adhering to "anti-capitalism" the small and medium businessman did not mean to advocate the abolishment of the capitalist system, nor did he stand up against concentration or mergers and amalgamations as such. In opposing monopolies he did not mean to vindicate prohibition of trusts, combines and cartels; he merely loathed becoming their victim instead of participating in their rise. As long as he is a victim of Big Money himself, he hates monopolies and banks as he hates Jewish competitors and labor unions. But once he has a share in the general recovery of business, he will not

[1]During the post-inflation period several political parties arose in Germany claiming to represent the interests of small and medium business and soliciting business votes as "Business Party," "Revalorization Party," etc. They had considerable success up to the 1929-1930 crisis when all of a sudden they were swept away by the National Socialist wave. Election statistics prove beyond doubt that it was the enterpreneurial middle-class that sent the first sizable Nazi squads to parliament.

[2]After this paper had been completed, Erich Fromm presented *Escape from Freedom*, New York and Toronto 1941. In analyzing the character structure of man, particularly of the middle-class individual, on the eve of totalitarian society and within the latter's framework, Dr. Fromm (see especially pp. 207ff.) arrives at conclusions very similar to (in part almost literally identical with) those drawn in the following paragraphs. His investigation into the psychological situation corroborates the results of my analysis of the economic facts.

fight to preserve the insecurity of free, unhampered competition, but will rather have his security guaranteed and enforced through control of competition as exercised by a government he trusts.

Being a little man, he stands against the big ones. He does not want them free to crush him under heel. But he claims for himself the freedom to become big. As long as his security is threatened he will favor measures to enhance control over Big Business, and be oblivious of the danger that his freedom will be overrun as soon as the control begins to operate. He craves protection by someone who would prove bigger than the big, but he will pathetically execrate any system that should deny him the chance to climb to the top. In securing employment for big capital the totalitarian regime seemed to restore security for the small and medium entrepreneur; it apparently did so through instituting a system of government controls. This very regimentation, which was to strangle him later, made the middle-class businessman take security for granted. He might be forced to close his shop some day or become a mere retailer for some big combine; but still he would feel secure within a system where there is both government control and free initiative, both regimentation and private enterprise.

Alleged "demagogy" boils down to an accurate expression of the ambiguous reality that the middle-class capitalists[1] have to face. Government control is identified with security. It makes no difference that in the end security widens the gulf between the rich and the poor and finally changes previously independent producers and traders into salaried employees. Where there is full employment, there is a chance for "economic men" to become successful.[2] To the "little fellow," generalization of totalitarian controls means equalization of chances. Everybody perforce becomes a member of an organization that interposes itself between the individual and the centralized power of the state. Everybody's fealty becomes mediatized. Monopolies lose their frightening aspect when subject to equal organizational coercion and control, granted even that their power increases and small business forfeits all of its independence.

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[1]This applies as well to such sections of the middle-class as are not directly engaged in business, *viz.* professional men, teachers, lawyers, civil servants. The world they live in is as ambiguous as the middle-class capitalist's. So is their ideology. Theirs is this very same ambiguous "anti-capitalism" which is based on the belief in free initiative and private enterprise within the framework of totalitarian control and regimentation.

[2]General regimentation implies certain equalitarian tendencies. There is no doubt that the Nazi regime abolished the last remnants of feudal relationships. This meant not only the weakening of the social importance of certain conservative groups opposed to the "revolution of nihilism" but also the annihilation of caste boundaries and caste taboos which the Weimar Republic had not been able to get rid of.

Now there is a "mediatization" of dependency.[1] In his very atomization the individual experiences a pseudo-annihilation of his defenselessness and insecurity in that he becomes part of a whole wherein he is given security and protection.[2]

To break up the political and social barriers that obstructed the path of the technological revolution the monopoly magnates had need of the active support of an "anti-capitalist middle-class movement." So the political machinery called upon to smash the institutional order of the Weimar Republic became highly instrumental in eliciting both the institutions and the power transmission mechanisms of the new set-up. This in turn gave the political machinery the opportunity to preserve and widen the power it had acquired. But this power is still contested by the capitalist monopolies. With their economic strength increasing, and bound to increase further as the industrial reconstruction continues, they will not relinquish the pressure they have been used to exercising in the political field.

From this derives the division of power between the Nazi political machinery and Big Business, which from the very beginning has overlain an ever latent conflict. Within this division of power which is obscured by interfering and conflicting interrelationships with other groups (e.g., different layers of bureaucracy) the party machine is, of course, not an organized representation of middle-class interests. It merely represents their traditional claim for security, and since security can only be maintained in an ever expanding economy which through expansion avoids crises, the party machinery stands for expansion first. As the claim of small business people for security is wedged into monopoly capital's claim for expansion, the latter swallows the former. The claim for security, however, gives the party machinery additional weight to throw into the balance, gives it greater authority to influence the drift of expansion.

It does not matter whether any given particular interest of small business is being protected, or whether the small businessman is "combed out" or his quota canceled from the list of those entitled to raw materials or labor supply.[3] What matters is that the hidden

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[1]For details see pp. 278-83 below.

[2]This is the source of all "corporativist" tenets in National Socialism and the reason why the National Socialist revolution, although violently assaulting monopolies, became instrumental in enhancing the economic power of monopoly capital.

[3]I refer the reader to O. Kirchheimer's analysis of the facts in this issue. Several examples are quoted there to show that the discretionary power lies with the economic "self-administration" bodies controlled by the monopolists. Among the examples quoted I want to emphasize the recently enacted "profit stop" measures (the Price Commissar's instructions "regarding the operation of the profit stop according to article 22 of the War Economy Decree" and his ruling "concerning the enlargement of the powers attributed to the Price Supervision Boards" of March 11, 1941). Destined to give the community

(footnote continued on next page)

fatality of blind market or stock exchange forces will not be the one to forge the destiny of the individual capitalist, but that the latter will be entrusted to the state that warrants security (or to its agents).[1] The state thus gains power to advance the concentration of capital and the centralization of enterprise at the expense of small business, without being doomed to encounter serious resistance.

It is highly important in this connection that the social position of the political machine which runs the state—the party—has meanwhile undergone considerable changes. First, the *élite* is no longer a gang of *déclassés* but has become the leading group of organizers within the governmental set-up. Second, the active rank and file's claim for security has been fulfilled; the party supporters participate in the universal prosperity as capitalists, managers or corporation officers, or have been put on the payroll of the civil service, the police, the economic administration or the party itself. Their vital interest is no longer a nebulous longing for security and recovery, it is now a very specific interest in the maintenance of prosperity, i.e., in technological revolution, war production, imperialistic aggression.

This collective interest of the party machine (called "common interest" or "political necessity" or "national imperative") coincides with the capitalist monopolies' interest in expansion and implies in the long run the spoliation and subjugation of the small businessman. On the other hand, in every individual instance the political machine's collective interest in abstract economic progress may easily antagonize particular interests of the capital magnates and become identical with the average capitalist's, manager's, official's yearning for more business, more profit, more power at the expense of yesterday's *grands-seigneurs.* This change in the social function of the political machine is still going on. But there is a *hiatus* in the

a share in "unjustifiable" war profits, these measures institute a retroactive control of profits earned which are to be checked with "patterns of appropriate profits." Yet, the setting-up of such patterns has not been referred to the jurisdiction of an independent arbitrating body but entrusted to the "self-administration," i.e., to the organizational agencies of big business. In the future they will be the ones to fix the profit margin not only for every industry but also for every individual enterprise, and the leading principle is not to be social equity but the appropriateness of the profits to the requirements of industrial expansion (with a differential rate of profits to reward the technologically fittest). See "Die Durchführung des Gewinnstops" in: *Frankfurter Zeitung,* March 15, 1941; "Kriegsverpflichtete Preise und Gewinne" in: *Soziale Praxis,* April 1, 1941; "Die Anweisungen zur Preissenkung und Gewinnabführung" in: *Der Vierjahresplan,* May 5, 1941.

[1]It is comforting and reassuring for the individual capitalist to know that big concerns like Stoehr, the leading textile combine, are fined RM 1,500,000 for having neglected one of the countless rulings of the Price Commissar, or that a tycoon like Thyssen has his assets turned over to the state for having disagreed with the Fuehrer. The very use of equalitarian and leveling devices enables the state machinery, on the other hand, to act as an executioner of small fry in behalf of the big.

trend when the party machine's specific goals shift from the struggle for security to the struggle for the conquest of additional economic power, for the invasion of the monopoly citadel.[1]

From this time on division of power between "political machine" and "business" changes its character. Those in charge of the political controls endeavor to penetrate into the economic sphere. They start to build new industrial combines that they are going to own or to control.[2] They see to it that individual party functionaries get into the managing boards and directorates of industrial enterprises.[3] On the other hand, the emphasis put on economic advance and expansion expedites the setting-up of an all-embracing organization of the economy. The concentration of business through mergers, amalgamations and interlocks is being urged, and at the same time the "self-administration" organs of the economy have their powers widened and increased to supervise and to check on all economic activities of individual entrepreneurs and corporate enterprises.[4]

Since the self-administration is controlled by big business from the very beginning,[5] the widening of its power and organizational scope results in improving and strengthening the position of the capitalist monopolies as against the political machinery. This in turn calls for a parallel extension of the governmental network of

[1]This occurs when full employment is about to be reached (around 1937). Different features of the economic set-up which have since taken more definite shape, e.g., demand permanently exceeding supply, have been associated with characteristics of preparedness economy. Yet, scarcity is no necessary implication of preparedness. Scarcity forcibly results from continuous expansion after the limits of full employment have been reached. Expansion on the basis of full employment produces a dynamism of its own.—For further discussion of this topic see below.

[2]Besides the "Hermann-Göring-Werke" combine mention ought to be made of the "Wilhelm Gustloff Foundation," ammunition and machine works in Thuringia, title to which is held by the National Socialist Party, and the manifold enterprises of the German Labor Front embracing banking, insurance, etc.—Contrary to what has been stated in the Berlin dispatches of American correspondents, the newly-founded Kontinentale Oel-Aktiengesellschaft, a giant corporation to exploit continental oil resources, is not a party undertaking but a joint enterprise of several privately controlled industrial combines.

[3]It makes no difference in the result whether private concerns hire Nazi dignitaries to protect them against bureaucratic interference, or whether directorial seats are granted to officials of Supervisory Boards as a compensation for services rendered, or whether specific groups within the party hierarchy obtain such controlling positions in business through more or less overt political blackmail.

[4]In its present form the "self-administration" of the economy rests on the decree of the Reich Minister of Economic Affairs concerning the "reform of the organization of industrial economy" of July 7, 1936, and on the Cartel Decree of November 11, 1936. (See Eberhard Barth, *Wesen und Aufgaben der Organisation der gewerblichen Wirtschaft*, Hamburg 1939, pp. 30f.) The legal set-up was moulded on the eve of "full employment."

[5]As will be explained below, the self-administration is but the continuation of the former manufacturers' associations. Its executive organs have been recruited from the associations' personnel, and the advisory committees are made up of the heads of the most representative private concerns. See Barth, quoted *supra*, pp. 64-68.

controls and checks. The process began with the reorganization of the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs,[1] and continued with the enlargement of the Supervisory Boards,[2] and the creation of the District Economic Boards.[3] It is still in progress.

It turns out to be impracticable, however, to set up an organizational machinery to duplicate and supplant the machinery of business itself. More and more supervisory functions, therefore, are ceded to business' self-administration, and even the distribution of raw materials, which could have become the most important device for intruding upon the decisions of the individual enterprise, is to an ever growing extent being entrusted to the organizational bodies of business itself.[4] What then is left to the political bosses but to build up business enterprises of their own, which would make them rank as high as those of the monopolies, and to bolster up these newly-acquired positions with loot secured in conquered territories?

Profit, Money and Credit Under Regimentation

The success of industrial reconstruction has certainly hinged to a large extent on the smoothness of the organizational set-up of busi-

[1]Dismissal of Dr. Schacht, merger of the Ministry with Göring's Four-Year-Plan Office. See Paul Koerner (Under Secretary in the Four-Year-Plan Office), "Führung und Wirtschaft" in: *Der Vierjahresplan,* 1938, No. 2, pp. 66f.; "Anordnung zur Neuorganisation des Reichs- und Preussischen Wirtschaftsministeriums," *ibidem,* p. 105. The reorganization was enacted on February 4, 1938.

[2]Shortly before the outbreak of the war, the Supervisory Boards for the control of foreign trade were transformed into supervisory bodies covering all economic activities. They are now called Reich Boards (Verordnung über den Warenverkehr vom 18. August 1939, *Reichsgesetzblatt* [quoted *infra* as RGB] I, p. 1430).

[3]These District Boards (paralleled by Food Boards for agriculture) are destined to provide an organizational infra-structure for the machinery of the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs (in the case of agriculture, for the Ministry of Agriculture). Their legal set-up is based upon the "Decree on Economic Administration" as amended on November 28, 1939 (RGB I, p. 2315). Article 5 of the Regulations of September 22, 1939 (RGB I, p. 1872) explicitly stipulates that the Boards' tasks in the maintenance of production and the regimentation of business shall not be taken care of by the governmental agencies themselves, but be delegated to the self-administration bodies, i.e., to business organizations. Only the organization of rationing devolves upon the District Boards. The same applies to the District Food Boards under the decree of August 27, 1939 (RGB I, p. 1521). They are made up of two divisions each, a division A supervising production and marketing and identical with the board of the district organization of the farmers, and a division B—the only one to be run by civil servants —for the rationing of food and its distribution. (See Posse-Landfried-Syrup-Backe-Alpers, *Die Reichsverteidigungsgesetzgebung,* Vol. III, section Allg. V, pp. 1-48.)

[4]For more details on the role of the "self-administration" see pp. 275 ff. below. This development only generalizes organizational patterns that could be found previously in the distribution of textile raw materials (law on spinning materials of July 5, 1938, RGB I, p. 833). There already the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, subdivisions of the self-administration, were entitled to grant exemptions from the prohibition against new concerns. After the outbreak of the war, when the entire textile industry was subjected to regimentation, the distribution of raw materials was conferred upon newly founded Distribution Boards set up within the framework of the self-administration. (See Posse-Landfried-Syrup-Backe-Alpers, *op. cit.,* Vol. II, Section Spinnstoffwirtschaft Allg., pp. 11-21.)

ness, the potentialities of influencing and "steering" the economic automatism. The entirety of economic life is geared to produce the maximum yield and to exploit available resources as economically and efficiently as possible.[1] This cannot be done unless the general direction of economic activity has been agreed upon and a large degree of coordination has been secured in the day-to-day functioning of business.[2] It is true that the general direction of economic life, though determined by the potentialities of the production apparatus, was to some extent influenced by political decisions. Business activities of the individual enterprises are being coordinated "from without," and their decisions as to what ought to happen within the enterprise are subject to restrictions.[3] What determines the character and scope of such restrictions?

Regimentation, to begin with, does not abolish the profit motive within the industrial enterprise. Notwithstanding that volume and nature of production may be prescribed, the individual enterprise has no other purpose in producing but to produce commodities salable at a profitable price. In an economy where the flow of com-

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[1] "An increase in Germany's economic power can still be achieved through improvements in the set-up of the productive plants, the means of production and the methods of manufacture as well as through raising the working capacity of those employed in the German economy. The measures to be taken to this effect require a uniform guidance if they are to be carried through." (Wording of the rationalization mandate bestowed by Hermann Göring upon Reich Minister Funk on December 12, 1938, in: *Frankfurter Zeitung*, December 15, 1938.)

[2] Coordination of activities, not elimination of private management: "Still bigger tasks than those that he has, in our view, to perform in peace-time devolve upon the head of the enterprise in the war economy. It is understood that the war demands thorough planning in the use of manpower, raw materials and productive capacity, and thus imposes upon business certain planifying restrictions. However, this kind of planned economy must never lead to a situation wherein the initiative and the impulse to work of the industrialists should be hampered by executive agencies of the authorities. Extensive elimination of free market production does not mean obstructing enterpreneurial initiative; on the contrary, the more active, resourceful and daring the head of the enterprise proves to be, the more he will be able to fulfill his war task." (General Georg Thomas, Chief, Staff Division of Defense Economy, Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, in: *Der Vierjahresplan*, 1939, No. 20, pp. 1178f.)

[3] "It is not so much the compulsion to economize in the use of manpower and financial means as such that causes frictions with the businessman; it is much more the fact that the public administration today has become . . . . an invisible member of the management of the shop and thus considerably restricts the latter's freedom of disposition. This, however, is a condition which cannot be dispensed with if governmental steering of the economy is to be carried through when scarcity governs the supply in numerous fields. The task of rationing these steering devices can therefore consist only in this: to prevent the individual enterprise from becoming—like St. Sebastian—a target for the arrows of each and every administrative body; to minimize as far as possible the burden which the effects of such measures impose upon the enterprise, and to do so in canalizing them." *(Der deutsche Volkswirt*, November 11, 1938.)—Such was the task of "rationing" and "canalizing" regimentation which the editorial writer of *Der deutsche Volkswirt* took pleasure in assigning to the then newly-appointed leader of the Reich Group Industry, Herr Zangen, president of the Mannesmann iron, steel and machine-building combine.

modities is punctuated by a series of transactions which are money transactions, not to make profits or to incur losses means to be barred from continuing production. This has not been altered in the totalitarian set-up and still applies to private enterprise as well as to government-owned enterprise. Moreover, since the maintenance of production depends on occupying a favorable position in relation to the supply of raw materials, labor, machinery and equipment, and the procurement of such a favorable position depends in turn on the capacity to produce and to expand production—which again is a question of the financial overlay—, profit-making and profit-amassing becomes more imperative than ever. Fixed prices, unfavorable delivery conditions, difficulties in securing raw materials and other ingredients of the manufacturing process, or high taxes, duties, levies and contributions of all kinds, render the earning of a surplus more difficult, and this cannot but sharpen the sting of the profit motive instead of neutralizing it.[1] It then often becomes a question of life or death to obtain preferential treatment and influence government agencies, supervisory bodies and political go-betweens in order to get such preferential treatment.[2]

Since the main interest of the government is maximum efficiency and maximum production, preferential treatment is most easily obtained where there is maximum expansion of enterprise. On the other hand, expansion of enterprise improves the competitive position and thus provides for more profit. Expansion guarantees the realization of the profit motive, and the profit motive stimulates expansion. Far from being nullified, the profit motive as condensed and multiplied in the impulse towards expansion becomes more

[1]"The profit is, like the wage, a factor hampering and furthering buying capacity; hampering it as an element of the price, furthering it as the basis of demand. It must be held in balance between these two functions so as to preserve its third *(or first)* function as a stimulus to enterpreneurial activity." *(Soziale Praxis*, April 15, 1941.)

[2]Where profits are threatened by price-fixing or severe delivery terms, the enterprise will have to gain influence with the price-fixing authority or the board that determines when, how and in what condition products are to be delivered. Where profits are threatened by marketing restrictions and sales quotas, one will have to gain influence with the cartel or self-administration body that assigns marketing quotas to the individual shops, or to try to purchase the other fellow's quota, or to strangle him so he will sell out, etc. Where at last profits are threatened by hindrances in the supply of raw materials, equipment, etc., there will be the imperious necessity to establish a "pull" with the body that distributes and subdivides the "contingents."—The organizational set-up which governs the distribution of "contingents" is discussed in Kirchheimer's article in this issue. The trend he emphasizes as being in progress, a trend towards entrusting the "self-administration" agencies with the regimentation of supplies, is paralleled by similar trends in the allocation of priorities for government orders, the allocation of subsidies to enterprises which are under the compulsion to close down or to restrict production, etc. See Friedrich Landfried (Under Secretary in the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs), "Zusammenarbeit von Staat und Organisation der gewerblichen Wirtschaft in der Kriegswirtschaft" in: *Der Vierjahresplan*, 1939, No. 23, pp. 1320f.

than ever the stimulus underlying every economic activity.[1] Government interference with business activities actually results in augmenting the impulses to make profits and to grow bigger and stronger in order to be able to make them. Regimentation and control only spurs that progressive widening of the scope of profit-making which is the main characteristic of capitalist production.

The dynamics of profits are, of course, not identical with the dynamics of prices, and stabilizing prices does not mean eliminating the movement of profits. Actually, totalitarian controls did not even succeed in stabilizing commodity prices.[2] Besides, there was no attempt to stabilize the price of capital, either liquid or invested in industrial plants. Even if the prices of commodities were totally freed from the impact of supply and demand, they would still have plenty to do with the costs of production. But the costs depend on the possibility to obtain capital and means of production. In turn the prices of these elements of the costs are governed by the ratio of supply and demand which crystallizes in the market value of contingents, quotas, permits, etc. on the one hand, the price of shares, patents and licenses, controlling interests, and entire plants and enterprises on the other hand. Here is the decisive limitation on government control of prices and profits.

It may be objected, however, that the government as a major purchaser, customer and distributor of manufacturing orders is in a position to fix prices arbitrarily and to disrupt existing correlations of prices and profits. Actually this is not the case. The regulation of prices for government purchases follows closely the lines of the general price control and obeys the requirements of the profit-bound economy of expansion.[3] It could not be otherwise because the gov-

[1]Of course, the industrial capitalist in totalitarian Germany is not free to restrict or to expand production *ad lib.* But restricting production as a weapon to improve the competitive position is preposterous anyway in an economy based on the maximum use of productive capacity. At the same time the check on expansion resulting from the permanent excess of demand over supply does not weaken but on the contrary highly increases the incentive to expand and to overthrow all barriers that hamper expansion.

[2]The general scarcity resulting from "full employment" makes the prices of all commodities display an upward trend. Where the government strives to prevent prices of all commodities from going up (in order to circumvent inflationary chaos), it naturally has to "stop" prices at a given level in stabilizing all of the existing price correlations. In this the Nazi government did not succeed. In fact, the Price Stop Decree of November 26, 1936 (Verordnung über das Verbot von Preiserhöhungen, RGB I, p. 955), enacted on the eve of full employment, has been supplemented and widely supplanted by a complicated system of regulating flexible and fluctuating prices, a system too intricate to be presented here in its working details.

[3]Leitsätze für die Preisermittlung auf Grund der Selbstkosten bei Leistungen für öffentliche Auftraggeber (LSÖ), November 15, 1938; Richtlinien für die Preisbildung bei öffentlichen Aufträgen (RPÖ), November 15, 1938; Preisbildung bei öffentlichen Aufträgen, Circular instruction of the Price Commissar, November 24, 1938; Leitsätze für die Preisermittlung nach LSÖ und LSBÖ bei mittelbaren Leistungen für öffentliche Auftraggeber, March 11, 1941.

ernment is not free to contract or expand its demand at will. Arbitrary contraction of government demand is impossible unless made up for by a corresponding increase in the demand of private business—or else expansion must stop, full employment come to an end, and the entire structure of the regime face collapse. Arbitrary expansion of the purchasing power of the state would be tantamount to inflation; expansion is limited by the actual volume of production and the speed of the commodities flow.[1] Where a given productive capacity is in full use, printing money will not increase production though it might canalize the flow of commodities and affect distribution.

The actual financial sovereignty conferred upon the government lags behind its increased technical potentialities. The flow of capital and credit may certainly be directed to one or several industries that the government selects. But once driven in a given direction, it creates additional employment, additional output and more profits. It increases the volume and speed of accumulation in the concerns which benefit by this additional financing. Subsequently, they are enabled to retain the profits earned, to amass them and to finance further investments and further expansion "from within." Internal financing makes them almost independent and necessarily checks the government's interventionist tendencies and volitions.[2] Manipulation of currency and credit then cannot continue except with the consent of those very industrial monopolies whose financial power has been strengthened through government financing. It happened thus in totalitarian Germany. Once the decision was taken to finance synthetics, coal-processing and rearmament first,[3] the subsequent financial development was bound to follow the lines drawn by the intra-industrial accumulation, i.e., by internal financing.[4]

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[1]According to recent estimates by the Reich Statistical Office (*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 6) the aggregate turnover of all commodities in Germany was RM 225.4 billion in 1929, 163.3 in 1935, and 250.0 in 1938. Money circulation at the end of these years totaled RM 6.6 billion in 1929, 6.4 in 1935, and 11.0 in 1938. Creation of buying capacity did not arbitrarily outdistance the creation of moneyable commodities, i.e. aggregate production marketed.

[2]"Internal financing creates seemingly unsupervised capital and thus obstructs the investment steering that has become necessary under the sign of super-employment." (*Soziale Praxis*, April 15, 1941.)

[3]Not even this decision was an arbitrary one. It has been pointed out above that the course of industrial reconstruction was pre-determined by the technological structure and the economic set-up of pre-Nazi society.

[4]As late as 1941 the Nazi government is still unable to prevent internal financing which goes on at the expense of financing government expenditure. In addressing the Reichsbank stockholders on March 12, 1941, Reich Minister Funk most emphatically scored internal financing as threatening the government's tax revenue, and ostentatiously announced measures to cut profits and to preclude further amassing of capital in business hands. (See *Frankfurter Zeitung*, March 13, 1941.) He undoubtedly succeeded

(footnote continued on next page)

In directing a huge part of national income into the financing of technological reconstruction and rearmament the totalitarian government naturally had to engage in large-scale spending of its own. Various schemes were concocted to this effect, either to drain or canalize the capital market. Private business up to 1938 was practically barred from capital stock issue[1] and pushed towards internal financing.[2] In other words, the very fact that the government had the opportunity to divert the flow of capital towards one or another sphere and at the same time to widen the scope of public spending has led to a considerable limitation of the government's financial sovereignty.

This does not mean that no financial decisions can be made by the government. It still has to decide how to provide funds for public spending, whether to increase taxation, or to expand public credit, or to compel industrial treasuries to take in government bonds, etc.[3] In manipulating currency a totalitarian regime cannot overdraw its potential credit any more than a parliamentary regime could do. Where the monetary saturation point is passed, inflation starts. This only the market will reveal. A totalitarian regime is undoubtedly better equipped than any other regime to foresee developments in the market and to act accordingly. That's what accounts for the "finance miracles" it is said to have performed.

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in provoking quite a slump in the German stock market. But the actual content of the sensational measures (enacted on June 21) boils down to additional taxes on dividends exceeding 6 per cent of the nominal stock value, and to granting all corporations the power to revalorize the face value of their capital stock. According to *Bank-Archiv* (April 1, 1941), "the status of the minority stockholders will once more be weakened" as a result of these measures. This amounts to saying that undivided profits, instead of being cut, will keep growing as ever. There is obviously no way to suppress internal financing as profits continue to flow.

[1]Government issue as percentage of total stock and bonds issue amounted to 70.0 per cent in 1933, 39.7 in 1934, 64.8 in 1935, 70.8 in 1936, and 70.9 in 1937. (*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1938, No. 5.)

[2]According to recent estimates by the Reich Statistical Office, aggregate undistributed earnings of German corporations in 1938 totaled RM 3,420 million as against 1,200 in 1935 and 175 in 1933 (*Bank-Archiv*, 1941, No. 8). Aggregate capital stock of German corporations in 1938 amounted to RM 18.7 billion (*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1940, No. 21); dividends paid out averaged 6 per cent (*ibid.*, 1939, No. 15). Aggregate dividends must have amounted to about RM 1,100 million. Out of the profits earned 25 per cent were allotted to the shareholders.

[3]Such decisions are certainly influenced by the conflicting interests of the industrial and financial groups concerned. The financial policy of the Third Reich has been the result of conflicts in this sphere. To quote an example, a few weeks after the government had announced that it was going to "stop profits" the comments of the German press were pointing out that "the Price Commissar shows less interest in curtailing profits than in reducing prices" (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 24, 1941). "What actually does interest him [the Price Commissar] as regards the balance-sheets of the corporations is not what part of the profits he may collect as excess profit to cream the milk, but to what extent prices can be cut down in the future without endangering the profitability of the enterprise" (*Frankfurter Zeitung*, March 30, 1941). "The question of creaming the profit milk is being assigned the minor part which is its due" (*ibidem*).

Yet, how to circumvent danger points in monetary policies is the object of political decisions which lie with political bodies in any regime whatsoever. Divergent interests have to be taken care of. There was a plurality of conflicting interests to decide upon both the content and the technicalities of government finance under Dr. Schacht, and there is still a plurality of interests to mould the final decisions under Dr. Funk.[1] There is the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, the War Ministry, the Finance Ministry, the Reichsbank, etc. There are the giant banks cooperating with the Reichsbank, and the big industrial combines closely connected with the banks. They all have their say in the formation of decisions on financial policy, as have the central organizational bodies of the political party machine. Since political power is concentrated with one monopolistic machinery and all political activity outside this machinery is curbed, interests of individual groups or particular sections of society cannot express themselves except through the channels of the monopolistic political organization. The monopoly of political power implies the plurality of authority and decision as regards any particular step within the general limitations drawn by the sovereign decisions of the party machine.[2]

The decisions are based on, and reached by, compromise. They have to cope with the general trend. As a rule, they are not taken in opposition to the capitalist monopolies but with their consent. Still, there remain countless technicalities which someone or other has to decide upon. Who? None other than the bureaucracy of the Reichsbank and other government agencies,[3] the officialdom commissioned to cut thousands of Gordian knots as business goes on. With this officialdom not only the bureaucratic tradition but also the notions of fiscal correctness, clean accounting, balancing assets and liabilities, solvency of those to be dealt with, still prevail. No abstract motivations are to be considered, only prices, interest, ex-

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[1]It is characteristic of the Nazi government set-up that the Reich Finance Ministry takes no active part in determining the features of the financial policy. In practice, the economic administration has more authority in discussing and preparing the financial decisions. It exerts its influence through the personal union established between the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Presidency of the Reichsbank both under Schacht and under Funk.

[2]As pointed out above (pp. 243 ff.), the monopoly of political sovereignty rests upon the division of power between the political machine and the leading business groups who hold the economic key positions. Such equilibrium must be unstable and subject to daily shifts in the distribution of power. This accounts for the plurality in the source of decisions and for the social struggle going on around each particular measure and each practical step to be taken.

[3]Important decisions which presuppose a compromise between the main interests concerned will have to be made by the Reichsbank President, who is the Minister of Economic Affairs, and who as a representative of the party machinery has authority to arbitrate. But this applies to important and consequential decisions only.

change rates. The bulk of the decisions to be made concern only the priority of the applicants for credit.[1] In a non-totalitarian regime the decision normally lies with a syndicate of issuing banks, whereas under totalitarian rule it is the Reichsbank that arranges the order of applicants in the priority list. The principles underlying the decision are identical in either instance: under equal conditions of capitalization and issue rates, preferential treatment must be bargained for, and the one wins who has the most trumps (political influence not excluded) to play.

The Bureaucratization of the Economy

The main direction of economic life is given by the political machinery and conforms to the "automatic" tendencies of technological reconstruction. But the day-to-day practice is regimentation and coordination of the totality of individual economic activities, implying continuous interference with the decisions of the individual producers, permanent encroachment upon the domain of the independent economic units.

A comprehensive system of economic regimentation did not crystallize in Germany until full use of the existing productive capacity was ensured. Certainly no perfect or complete system was introduced, but the framework at least was set in operation when full employment was about to be reached.[2] The coincidence was not fortuitous. Economic activity in Germany is geared to guarantee maximum efficiency and optimum yield in the sphere of armament in the broadest use of the term, i.e., in the industries of producers goods. But when existing productive capacity in the manufacture of producers goods is used at its fullest, shifts and changes in the use of the industrial wheelwork must be brought about to guarantee ex-

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[1]Since private business has been given access to the capital market there is no industrial stock or bond issue that would not be over-subscribed within a few days. Therefore, the question as to the commercial advisability of a projected issue does not even arise. The only thing to be decided upon is: who goes first? For the Reichsbank as the operating body (a supreme supervisory authority is the Reich Commissar for Banking whose department has recently been merged with the Ministry of Economic Affairs) it does not make any difference whether the capital-seeking concern is the Mannesmann combine, for instance, or the Rheinmetall-Borsig, a subsidiary of the Göring combine, or some other enterprise. To illustrate, during the three months ending March, 1941, new stock issue on the German capital market totaled RM 192,950,000. Out of this amount RM 112,950,000 were issued by privately-owned concerns, and RM 80 million by the newly-founded privately-owned but government-supervised giant combine Kontinentale Oel-Aktiengesellschaft. Yet, the major part of the Konti-Oel issue, *viz.* RM 50 million, never reached the market but was taken over by the founders. Thus, out of an actual issue of RM 143 million only RM 30 million were being issued by a corporation at least partly government-controlled. No government-owned concern was among those allowed to approach the market. (See *Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 8, 1941; *Der deutsche Volkswirt*, April 4, 1941.)

[2]See p. 245 above (note 1).

pansion. Since surpluses and resources can be multiplied but on a limited scale, selective decisions must be made which presuppose coordination. Someone must decide which among the desirable investments are to be granted priority, what is to be produced or built first, and who is to get machines, raw materials and labor where there is not enough of everything to go around. Expansion no longer propagates itself automatically. Where there are no idle plants to put into operation or labor to operate them, building and re-building must be subject to organized direction and control.

On the other hand, the problem of outlets and markets disappears. When the whole of production is geared to yield the maximum supply of means of destruction for a virtually unlimited market, and all other industries must supply machinery, equipment and materials to this single sphere whose potential demand is boundless, total production must lag behind the producers' and the consumers' demand for both producers and consumers goods. Scarcity becomes law. Maintaining production, which in itself depends upon expansion, becomes a question of organizing the distribution of means of production. Coordinative regimentation must ensue. Stopping the expansion would mean curtailing the demand of the armament sphere. But the sphere of armament or war economy extends to most large-scale industries. Curtailment here would result in a general economic breakdown. No economic sphere could stand the effects of a check on expansion and none would oppose regimentation where the only alternative is economic collapse. It is, then, not principle that decides who will be commissioned to put into practice the brakes and checks of economic control. Where "business," for all that it suffers from bureaucratic interference, must willy-nilly accept centralized control or face decay, it is not surprising that the exercise of controls should be entrusted to business itself or to its satellites.

Only part of the coordinating and regulating activities are carried on by government agencies.[1] Up to the outbreak of the war there existed only a central machinery of economic administration without any regional network to rely upon. The new Economic District Boards do their work mainly through the organization of busi-

[1] "If the enactment or the execution of measures requires continuous action with regard to the enterprises affected and if such action cannot be expected to succeed unless a close contact with the enterprises has been established, the government shall entrust the enactment or the execution to the Organization of Industrial Economy"—says Dr. Barth, Ministerial Councillor with the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs, in: *Wesen und Aufgaben der Organisation der gewerblichen Wirtschaft* (Hamburg 1939, p. 21), an official commentary prefaced by Rudolf Schmeer, Chief of Department III, Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs.

ness itself.[1] The central machinery, however, has important functions to perform as it deals with priorities, distribution of raw materials, and in particular instances, direct control of the volume of production. Who then, one must ask, are the men in charge of the economic administration?

The top officials entrusted with the control of economic life come from the ranks of both business and bureaucracy. There are capitalists and industrial managers among them as well as career-officials, mainly from the ranks of the fiscal departments, the Reichsbank, the customs and the mining administration, and finally managers of state-owned industrial and utility concerns. There is not much difference between the latter and the managers of private business firms.[2] As to the career officials in the ministerial and supervisory bodies concerned with economic life, most of them are law graduates (or economists and engineers) who have followed the normal civil service career, are *ex officio* pledged to serve an abstract "common weal," and dwell in categories of order, correct accounting and auditing, and civil law. In dealing with economic life they may not be interested in the well-being of an individual businessman or in the success of his undertakings. But, as a rule, they are used to respecting established rights, property titles and privileges. They are rather reluctant to making discretionary decisions affecting other people's property claims; where such decisions must be the outcome of regimentation, they favor the transfer of the discretionary power to the organization of business itself. Either certain spheres of control and regimentation are legally assigned to the jurisdiction of the "self-administration"; or government agencies, permanently or for a time, confer upon mandatories of business the execution of measures they are in charge of.

This is one of the reasons why the actual operation of government controls lies to a very large extent with the Organization of Industrial Economy, the Reich Groups and their subdivisions, and the regional infra-structure of the "self-administration," the Economic Chambers and the Chambers of Industry and Commerce.

[1]See p. 245 above (note 4) and p. 246 (notes 3 and 4).

[2]They are university people: engineers, chemists, scientists, lawyers, economists. Most of them belong to the enterpreneurial middle-class, some of them are even sons of big capitalists, several come from families with an old bureaucratic tradition. The ties which connect them with the groups they came from have never been severed. In the upper strata of management changing over from government-owned to privately-owned enterprises and the reverse has always been usual in Germany, and is being continued under Nazi rule. It also often occurs that high-ranking civil servants enter the ranks of management (in private and public enterprises) after having climbed as high as the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy; it occurs as well that eminent industrialists are offered, and accept, positions in government-owned concerns, and advance therefrom to bureaucratic careers.

The self-administration, endowed with public authority, covers all of the enterprises in any given district or trade. There is no democratic set-up, no election of officers. But the organization cannot function unless it is in close, permanent and working contact with the enterprises it is supposed to represent. On the other hand, the organizations really representing the "rank and file" of business are the cartels, still private organizations devoted to specific business tasks, above all to eliminating competition and organizing the market. Legally, cartels are subject to supervision by the "self-administration" and do not even enter in its organizational set-up.[1] In practice they are the basic units of the self-administration, its very wheelwork, and all that is done within the scope of the Organization of Industrial Economy, either in the latter's own competence or in very wheelwork of the cartels.[2] As contrasted to all of the other the public functions it performs by deputation, is done through this organizations integrated into the state structure of totalitarian Germany, the cartels are the only ones to be allowed a democratic set-up, to make decisions through votes and to elect their executive bodies.

This is essential for the functioning of the self-administration whose official structure is framed differently and whose officers are appointed by the government. However, even this method of selecting the officers of the self-administration does not alter the paramount fact that there is not one single president of a Chamber of Industry and not one single leader of a Reich Group or its subdivisions who has not been chosen out of the ranks of the leading industrialists. The chiefs of the organizations which interfere with the daily activities of the individual concerns are themselves heads of industrial or commercial enterprises, banks and insurance companies—as a rule, of the biggest, the most influential, the most highly capitalized concerns.

This applies to the leadership of the self-administration. But who then makes up the operative personnel that does the work, co-

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[1]See Eberhard Barth, official commentary quoted *supra*. There is the fact, for instance, that the government agencies keep warning the "self-administration" not to tolerate personnel identity with the staff of the cartels. Thus far the warning has been of no avail.

[2]It is impossible to give here a catalogue of the various tasks and functions assigned to the cartels by government agencies or by the economic self-administration. A great many particulars as well as single data can be found in the publications which try to comply with the thankless task of gathering and codifying myriads of laws, decrees, rulings, instructions and injunctions dealing with the regimentation of economic life. I refer to Posse—Landfried—Syrup—Backe—Alpers, *Die Reichsverteidigungsgesetzgebung*, thus far 4 volumes; Dr. Carl Moelders, *Das gesamte Recht des Vierjahresplans*, 2 volumes; *Die Anordnungen zur Durchführung des Vierjahresplans*, 3 volumes. Besides, ample evidence is furnished by *Kartell-Rundschau* and other periodicals. An accurate analysis of a particular sphere is given by Leonhard Miksch, "*Bewirtschaftungskartelle*" in: *Die Wirtschaftskurve*, 1940, No. I, pp. 24f.

ordinates and guides economic activity, technically and practically interferes with the "economic man?" This economic bureaucracy proper (from which the personnel of the cartels cannot possibly be segregated) is the focal point of all regimentation of business. Here is a body of officials and executives which is welded into an indissoluble unity from top to bottom, intimately connected likewise with the officialdom of the government agencies in charge of economic affairs,[1] the live texture of the organizational machinery of economic controls, that which makes a whole out of a legion of separate agencies, boards, offices.

This bureaucracy of the economic organizations, though less often spoken of than the officialdom of the government agencies, is much more important and much more concerned with the daily functioning of the economic mechanism. It is, besides, not a product of the totalitarian regime. Originating in the specific conditions that had determined the development of capitalism in Germany, it is the skeleton of institutions which were set up by business to take care of interests outgrowing the sphere of the individual enterprise. With the spread of big industry, with the progress of technology, with the growing importance of political decisions and social antagonisms, organizations had been built to represent producers, manufacturers, traders where they had interests in common as regional, professional, social groups. Rapid concentration promoted equally rapid amalgamation of such associations into more and more influential and powerful groups.[2]

The work of this supra-enterpreneurial and inter-enterpreneurial machinery had to be done by full-time officials, executives, organizers, lawyers, economists, statisticians, consulting engineers. They were, of course, but an instrument of the totality of individual enterprises, yet a common instrument, an authority outside and above the individual enterprise. In many an instance the individual capitalist had long ago transferred his sovereign authority to the organization of his industry, his district, his social group. The scope of the functions that had to be performed in common, of inter- and supra-enterpreneurial tasks that had to be fulfilled, widened enormously as the technological revolution (and rearmament) went into effect,

[1]Government agencies not only delegate functions and jurisdiction to executive bodies of the self-administration or of cartels but also quite often appoint officials of both to act as officers (commissioners, superintendents, etc.) on their own staff. It must be noted that being appointed to such a public office hardly ever implies resigning from the offices held in business or business organizations. The contrary is common usage and, as a rule, the condition of the appointment.

[2]See the brilliant study by Robert A. Brady, quoted *supra*.

emphatically tightening the interdependency of all economic activities.[1]

The bureaucratization of the economy consists not only of the increase in bureaucratic functions (supervision, accounting, statistics, office work, research, etc.) within the enterprise. It also consists of the projection of organizational functions beyond the limits of the enterprise, and creates a new bureaucracy which necessarily must infringe from without upon enterpreneurial privileges.[2] This supra-enterpreneurial bureaucracy, albeit that it is linked with managerial bureaucracy inside the enterprise, is not identical with the latter. Its working field is not the individual enterprise. The organizational bureaucrat experiences no scruples in sacrificing one or several concerns to the requirements of industry as a whole. Yet, though his virtual boss is the collectivity of concerns his organization represents, his actual boss is but a small group of industrial magnates who run the organization. Manufacturers' associations have always been governed by the biggest interests within them.[3] This is obvious with regard to cartels where votes are determined by the "quota"; it is also true of the larger supra-enterpreneurial organizations in whose set-up the economic influence, the social position and the financial power of the big industrialists are necessarily given precedence. It is all the more so within the organizational framework of the actual German self-administration of business.[4]

The economic bureaucrat, who was to serve the interests of the totality of business enterprises, becomes an agent of big business interests as concentration of capital progresses. The "common weal" he is pledged to observe boils down to the well-being of one particular group. He will easily sacrifice the particular interests of small and medium business to favor the big, and he will be capable

[1] "Compliance by the entire industry with the dicta of the coopted 'self-governing' cliques invólves a rationalization of cartel-like patterns of control for all industries" (Brady, *loc. cit.*, p. 390).

[2] In Germany this development has been going on for decades at a particularly rapid pace, undoubtedly resulting from the rapid progress of industrial concentration as well as the bureaucratic set-up of society inherited from the cameralist and autarchic beginnings of capitalism in the Prussian military citadel. Economic bureaucracy of this kind is thus far but embryonic in the remaining democratic countries.

[3] ". . . Here leadership is taken by a cooptative *'élite'* dominated by the huge corporate combines and communities of interest" (Brady, *ibid.).*

[4] Plenty of evidence can be adduced to prove that the bosses of the self-administration are the leading industrial magnates. This I must refrain from doing here. To quote some examples: leader of the Reich Group Industry is Herr Zangen, president of the Mannesmann combine; his predecessor was Herr Dierig, major stockholder and president of one of the biggest German textile combines; leader of the Reich Group Banks is Herr Fischer, formerly president of Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft, the finance institute of the government-owned enterprises, now banker in his own right in Berlin and partner of the Merck, Fink & Co. bank of Munich.

as well of infringing upon the privileges of one or another big combine if still bigger interests are at stake. Whereas the "interest of the state," for which the government official stands, is rather an abstract one and allows of different interpretations, the economic bureaucrat's "interest of the community" is much more concrete and actually does allow of one interpretation only. It takes shape as the "interest of business," more specifically as interest in the expansion of the trusts and combines that control business at its very source. The particular interest of the economic bureaucrat is identical with the general interest of big capitalism, often even with the particular interest of capital as a whole as against the individual capitalist.[1]

Anonymous Capital and Industrial Expansion

The economic bureaucrats introduce a certain amount of bureaucratization and planning into the entire economic set-up. Particular interests of individual concerns may be disregarded, but the idea that profits must be made is a matter of course. These are fundamentals for the economic bureaucrats. These fundamentals anticipate the interests, desires and ideas of those who are in charge of the capitalist monopolies.[2] The characteristics of these monopolists must be discussed now.

Concentration of capital certainly implies changes in the set-up of industrial management, and is but the reverse of the bureaucratization which penetrates the entirety of the economic process. Such changes are by no means a specific feature of totalitarianism, and are not confined to Germany alone. Separation of ownership and actual control is already the case when an enterprise is run by salaried executives instead of the relatives of the old-style entrepreneur who had founded the concern. Concentration of wealth inevitably results in steady growth of the group of business executives whereas the percentage of capital owners among them shows a relative decrease.

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[1]The supra-enterpreneurial function of the economic bureaucrats is adequately attended to by the composition of this group. The specialist in law, economics, statistics, or scientific management who enters the bureaucratic career within the industrial organization is eager to organize, to supervise, to superintend, not to do business. His background, as a rule, is the intellectual middle-class, and in most instances he has never been in business himself. He has had university training instead, and his intellectual heritage is an ideology wherein the notions of "State" and "Nation" stand for economic development, and the notion of "Economic Development" stands for unlimited (and traditionally imperialistic) expansion.

[2]There is, of course, no absolute identity between the interests of the economic bureaucrats proper and the *grands-seigneurs* of business. The economic bureaucrats could, if such emergency occurred, serve other masters. As far as their social position is not threatened by the political machine, they are not necessarily bound to oppose it.

But centralization of enterprise and increase in the size of the plants and in the minimum amount needed for investment purposes subsequently produce a further development. Stocks of big concerns are scattered among numerous shareholders, large quantities of shares are deposited with banks (that in Germany may exercise voting power on behalf of the depositors), voting power is exercised by proxy, the majority of the capital stock is not required to secure control. This was the situation in pre-Hitler Germany; it did not change under totalitarian rule.[1]

Separation of stock ownership and stock control becomes all the more obvious where the control of a giant industrial edifice, as secured by a chain of interlocks, is being exercised by an anonymous group of managers of a bank, or of a holding company, or of some other combine, instead of an individual peer of industry. It does not matter whether the springboard for the industrial or financial executive is furnished by the ownership of capital, or profitable social and family connections (e.g., the opportunity to marry into an influential concern), or a high rank in the political hierarchy. Nor does it matter how much capital he has a legal title to. What does matter is how much of other people's capital he is in a position to control. This is not separation of capitalist ownership and salaried management, but separation of the entirety of the capitalist's function from the legal title to property. Outweighing legal claims, ownership becomes a function of control. Capital definitely becomes anonymous.[2] The factual capital relation continues even when the

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[1]Whereas the new German corporation law aims to disclose the real owners of corporate capital, the actual development shows an opposite trend: "In reality there is a definite tendency towards an extraordinary increase in that part of the stock which is represented without disclosure of the owner's name, i.e., of the stock deposited with banks. In a recent stockholders' meeting the presence of 86 per cent of the capital stock was called a 'record' by the chairman of the corporation. The real 'record' was, however, in the additional statement that only 1.5 per cent of the capital stock was entered in the name of stockholders . . . The actual intention of the legislator to disclose the real ownership is being circumvented; the leading principle which made the legislator oppose the anonymity of capital is being counteracted. If the development continues in the direction drawn by such contagious examples, then the entries of capital registered at stockholders' meetings will within a few years portray an anonymity of capital as never had been heard of before." *(Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung*, July 28, 1939, under the heading "The Invisible Stockholder.")

[2]"Anonymization" is the natural consequence of "internal financing" which, as pointed out above, originates in the failure of management to distribute accumulated profits: "The policy of retaining profits in the shop, as it has been practised on a large scale up to now, must gradually lead, if it should become common, to a change in the structure of our enterpreneurial economy. As profits cast off their character of being private profits, the capital of the corporations ceases to be private capital. Although the corporation stocks are legally owned by the shareholders, they are becoming more and more a kind of trustee property at the disposal of the management, according to the decrease of the stockholders' share in the aggregate profits. In this sense the much decried transformation of the shareholder into a mere rentier is given another impetus,

(footnote continued on next page)

links tying up economic control with property inherited or legally acquired, are loosened.

Those who control the means of production are the actual capitalists whatever they may be called.[1] In speeding up the process of concentration the totalitarian regime has contributed to reducing the number of those in control and to degrading numerous members of the old capitalist class from active executives of capitalism to mere consumers of a more or less fixed income.[2] Control of the means of production thus becomes equivalent to the power to cut the income of those legal owners who have no say in the management.[3]

Profit earned, instead of being distributed to the shareholders, is to an ever increasing degree used to expand investment. Augmentation of capital is going on, but no adequate increase in the titles to dividend or interest acknowledges this trend. Big Business realizes higher rates of accumulation and finds more and more opportunity to invest surplus as capital grows anonymous and government furthers the authority of the monopolists. This again leads to more concentration.[4] The "common weal," as represented by the political machinery, demands the permanent widening of the productive capacity, whereas the interest of the monopolists dictates the spolia-

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whereas management has to face an increasing responsibility towards the economic interests of the community, and thus is drawing closer to the sphere of the public functionary." *(Bank-Archiv,* July 15, 1940, p. 270.)

[1]If James Burnham *(The Managerial Revolution,* p. 92) is right in assuming that "where there is no control, there is no ownership," he ought to conclude that his "managers" are the actual capitalists of today. This he refrains from doing although he agrees that "those who control are the owners" (p. 94). No matter whether some capitalists have retired from business and become rentiers deprived even of "preferential treatment in distribution," or whether others still take an active part in operating the concerns which they are stockholders of,—in fact only those of them who actually control are performing the functions of "capitalists."

[2]Adaptation of the corporate stock value to the capital accumulated "internally," which was to be effectuated through higher capitalization, was announced by Reich Minister Funk (quoted *supra)* as a measure to protect the small shareholders. It now develops that this measure is not to be compulsory but will be left to the discretion of the corporations themselves, i.e., of the management. (See *Bank-Archiv,* April 1, 1941; *Der deutsche Volkswirt,* April 4, 1941; *Frankfurter Zeitung,* June 22 and 23, 1941.)

[3]As to persons who have a say in the management, there is no difference between "capitalists" like Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, president of Krupp's, who, by the way, is a former diplomat and only an in-law to the founder of the concern, and mere "managers" like Zangen, president of the Mannesmann combine.

[4]Lack of space prevents me from giving even a summary of the process of concentration and combination in German industry. I intend to prepare a survey of these developments later on. As yet, the best (though still not complete) survey of concentration trends is to be found in Dr. Günter Keiser, "Der jüngste Konzentrationsprozess" and "Die Konzernbewegung 1936 bis 1939" in: *Die Wirtschaftskurve,* 1939, No. II, pp. 136-156 and 214-234.

tion of the shareholders[1] and requires that as little profit as possible be withheld from expansionist investment. Here again the interests of the party machine and the capitalist monopolies coincide and multiply each other. Their congruence guarantees the smooth functioning of the capitalist machine within the scope of continuous expansion.

It has been asserted that the "managerial" masters of anonymous capital cannot be considered capitalists since they do not hold any title to dividends and their social position therefore does not hinge upon profits. This argument cannot be upheld. The managers' income is drawn from profits and depends on total profit, whether dividends are distributed or not. Moreover, all monopolists' economic power is a function of the competitive position of the industrial units they control. In turn, this competitive position is determined by the opportunities the respective enterprises can secure to expand, to operate technological changes, to make new investments, and to acquire additional quotas and contingents according to the larger scale of productive potentialities they have been able to pile up. Increase in accumulation which becomes the primordial goal of the masters of anonymous capital is conditional upon the size of profits they can make.

The motives that underlie the economic activities of those in control of anonymous capital do not differ, then, from the motives of the capital-owners who had been their own managers. The only difference is that profit-hoarding (which, however, never was decisive) is being definitely supplanted by profit accumulation, by expansion. The economic expansion motive clearly coincides with the motive underlying the economic policies of the party machine that runs the state, and their concordance accounts for the immensity of the productive and destructive apparatus hammering the world.

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[1]In addressing the stockholders of Kronprinz Aktiengesellschaft für Metallindustrie in Ohligs, a subsidiary of the Mannesmann combine, Herr Zangen seconded the subsidiary's complete merger with the parent company, a merger which was opposed by Kronprinz minority stockholders, and said: "The Kronprinz concern that was founded back in 1897 is one of those enterprises built up by the initiative and efficiency of single individuals. In the meantime the ideas on business professed by these men who personified their enterprises have been supplanted by ideas bent on national economy, ideas originating both in intrinsic ideological shifts and in the factual development. It is a feature of this development that now enterprises such as those I just described press closely together. . . . Today you have to produce where production seems the most profitable from the viewpoint of both national and private economy, that is to say, where you have to use minimum manpower and materials to obtain maximum volume and quality of production. . . . Now then it is inevitable that you give one enterprise what you take from another, and conversely, and there is no way of adjusting a balance equitable for all. . . . The idea of balancing and compensating must not be allowed to hamper technological and economic development, even if the measures to be taken imply a new set-up which might hurt particular interests." *(Deutsche Bergwerks-Zeitung,* July 26, 1939.)

Yet, in this very configuration arises the conflict of the two social groups that have built the gigantic machine. Whereas the monopolists in controlling the means of production hold the key to economic life, the political masters are reduced to the role of mere organizers and superintendents of the social set-up. Of course, handling the coercive machinery of society gives them the power to infringe upon the privileges of the capitalist magnates, to attempt inroads into the latters' domain. They could even try to snatch the key positions the monopolists hold, to appoint themselves masters of anonymous capital, were it not for the danger of causing social disruptions that they might not be able to stop. The automatism of economic expansion set to work by the technological revolution and in turn propelling the industrial transformation protects the condominium, maintains the pluralism in the social and political set-up, and preserves the inconstancy of the balance of power.

Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise

By Otto Kirchheimer

Modern political theory has established a close relationship between political compromise and government in a developed industrial society.[1] In this context, compromise means that the foremost political decisions are reached by agreement among individuals as well as among social groups. The following remarks will not evaluate this definition but will try to analyze the conditions and nature of compromises as far as they influenced the European political system under liberalism, mass democracy and Fascism. To the latter stages correspond three different types of agreement which have characterized European constitutional history: to liberalism corresponded the complex of working agreements among parliamentary representatives and between them and the government; to mass democracy, the agreements between voluntary associations; and to Fascism, the pacts by which the heads of the compulsory estates distribute power and booty.

I. Compromise Under the Representative System and Under Mass Democracy

In his reflections on the French revolution, Burke, with characteristic vehemence and pointedness, depicts the shift in the location of power to the plutocratic oligarchies, a development which, according to him, had been initiated by the revolutionary policy of confiscation. The "volatilization of property," of which this representative of the English landed aristocracy accuses the revolutionary legislators, is responsible for the creation of a commonwealth founded on "gaming," in comparison with which, in Burke's opinion, the "known scandals of history amount to comparatively little."[2]

The all-embracing medium of money profoundly conditioned the political institutions of the era. Today we are accustomed to regard money more in its role as one technical means of domination among many. But this purely technical role of money is a phe-

[1] See, for example, H. Kelsen, *Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie*, 2nd ed. Berlin 1929, and more recently E. P. Herring, *The Politics of Democracy*, New York 1940.

[2] E. Burke, *Collected Works*, 5th ed., Boston 1877, 3, pp. 485 ff.

nomenon which did not appear until the monopolistic period. In any case the nineteenth century saw the incontestable application of the sociological thesis that the personal security derived from the possession of money was the most concrete form and expression of confidence in the public order.[1]

Possession of money was just as important for the political weight of an individual within the nation as the degree of creditworthiness is for the nation's position in the international concert. Legal equality of citizens and equality of states before international law were the juristic premise for the working of the free exchange process.[2]

An integral part of the representative system was the conception of an agent who was no longer bound by the estates but who at the same time had not yet become a spokesman tied to definite group interests. The French constitution of 1791, Sect. III, Art. 7, by denying the admissibility of binding instructions given by the electorate to the representatives, marks the final transition from the *mandat impératif* of the estates to the representative system of the nineteenth century.[3] Theories of public law have taken the opportunity to stress the element of freedom contained in the condemnation of the *mandat impératif*, this condemnation being the very basis of the representative system.[4]

In its relatively pure form, the representative system did not prevail in Europe for a particularly long period. Even at the beginning it was alloyed by elements of absolutism and by elements of the still older estate system. Its period of fruition occurred in the second and third quarter of the nineteenth century when it combined with the doctrine of public opinion. Its territorial extension was confined to those states "where there is no honest poverty, where education is diffused and political intelligence common,"[5] that is to say, to the sphere of developing capitalist economy. With the decline

[1]Georg Simmel, *Philosophie des Geldes*, 5th ed., Munich 1930, p. 165.

[2]Bagehot, *Collected Works*, ed. Barrington, vol. VI, p. 14. "Lombard Street, 1873": "It is sometimes said that any foreign country can borrow in Lombard Street *at a price*, some countries can borrow much cheaper than others; but all, it is said, can have some money if they choose to pay enough for it. Perhaps this is an exaggeration but confined as, of course, it was meant to be to the civilized nations, it is not much of an exaggeration." As regards the conceptions of civilized and commercial, which are used synonymously, see Kunz, "Zum Begriff der *Nation Civilisée*" in: *Zeitschrift für Öffentliches Recht*, vol. 7, 1928, p. 86.

[3]See the excellent exposition of this point in K. Loewenstein, *Volk und Parlament nach der Staatstheorie der französischen Nationalversammlung*, Munich 1922, pp. 191 ff., especially p. 200.

[4]For the best account of this see G. Leibholz, *Das Wesen der Repräsentation*, Berlin 1929.

[5]Bagehot, *op. cit.*, I, 345.

of the central position of money as a universal measuring rod and with the effacement of the correlative independence of representation by the monopolizing society, the remnants of the representative system were becoming rapidly submerged. This process characterized the period of mass democracy.

The political system of mass democracy had, as one of its decisive characteristics, the antagonism between public control of government and private control of central banks. The latter had most important public functions. When the central bank legislation of the nineteenth century took shape, there was no doubt as to the political significance of the administration of this type of joint-stock company, "on whose wisdom it depends whether a country shall be solvent or insolvent."[1]

Robert Peel, when he introduced the Bank Charter Act of 1844, described the sphere of influence which the domination of the credit apparatus brings with it, and his words show a tendency to reification typical of the period: "There is no contract, public or private, no engagement internal or individual which is unaffected by it [the bill]. The enterprises of commerce, the profits of trade, the arrangement made in all the domestic arrangements of society, the wages of labor, pecuniary transactions of the highest amount and of the lowest, the payment of the national debt, the provision for the national expenditure, the command which the coin of the smallest denomination has over the necessities of life are all affected by the decision to which we may come."[2] This administration of the central bank, by far the most important office in Great Britain of those "outside the gift of the Crown,"[3] is carried on by officials elected from among the ranks of the banking community. If Brook Adams appears to have been too pointed in his opinion that the Bank Act of 1844, by yielding the control of the currency to bankers, marked a definite transfer of sovereignty to Lombard Street,[4] it is only because in the nineteenth century there was no serious conflict between Whitehall and Lombard Street. Since throughout the nineteenth century the restricted parliamentary franchise did not permit of any disharmony between the interests of the financial community and those of parliamentary government, the relation between the central bank and the government was equally unproblematic, whether the central bank had statutory independence or whether it was to some extent subject to govern-

[1]Bagehot, *op. cit.*, VI, 32.

[2]Hansard, vol. 74, p. 720.

[3]*The Economist,* March 29, 1941, p. 399.

[4]Brooks, Adams, *The Law of Civilisation and Decay,* New York 1895, p. 283.

mental regulation. This state of affairs was only rarely interrupted; symptomatically, interruption occurred in 1870 when the defeatist interests of the upper middle class, anxious for the rapid termination of the Franco-Prussian war, found themselves faced by the credit requirements of a government presided over by Gambetta and having a policy of resistance *à l'outrance.* But even in this period the respect for the reputation of the *Banque de France,* which was supposed to represent public credit, was very high, as may be seen from the humble restraint of the Paris *Commune's* delegate to the bank.[1] Even the change in the governorship, effected by Gambetta when he returned to power in 1882, had no real significance.[2]

In the post-war period of mass democracy, it becomes generally recognized that the complete independence of the central bank as a transmission belt for the financial community can be profitably used to hold the government and parliament in check. One of the earliest resolutions of the Council of the League of Nations insists on the independence of central banks from governmental interference.[3] The more the respective countries were dependent on outside loans, the more stringent were the requirements for the non-interference of governments in the central banks, which in their turn were subjected to a system of mixed control exercised by private national and international financial interests. Thus the degree of independence of a small country was basically conditional upon whether it had to deal with a unified creditor pool—as Austria had to do with its creditors, pooled under the auspices of the League of Nations—or whether political competition between prospective creditor nations left the governments with a greater amount of liberty of movement in their foreign policy—as in the case of the Balkan nations. The desires and demands of the home banking community were reinforced by the backing of international banking organizations which, in the persons of financial commissioners and representatives, resided in the respective capitals themselves, and this was one of the decisive factors favoring or obstructing changes in the political balance in those countries.[4] In Germany the Bank Law of 1924 took most of the powers which the government formerly had exercised and transferred them to the Board of

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[1] Charles Beslay, *Mes Souvenirs*, Paris 1873, Chapter "Ma délégation à la Banque."

[2] A. Dauphin-Meunier, *La Banque de France*, Paris 1936, pp. 220-27.

[3] The resolution is quoted in Kisch-Elkan, *Central Banks*, London 1932, p. 17.

[4] Cf. the lucid exposition of the tie-up between international loans and retrogressive tendencies of governmental policies in post-war Austria and Hungary, in P. Szende, "Der Staatshaushalt und das Finanzsystem Oesterreichs und Ungarns" in: *Handbuch für Finanzwissenschaft*, Tübingen 1929, vol. 3, pp. 206-09, 220.

Directors of the *Reichsbank*—and to a much lesser degree to the internationalized "*Generalrat*" and the stockholders.[1] In this new fortified position the presidency of the *Reichsbank* very soon became the cohesive organism about which gathered the big financial and industrial interests. It acted as a channel of communication for them and as their accredited representative in their dealings with the government. In this function, for instance, *Reichsbank* president Schacht was instrumental in barring the cities from further access to the foreign loan market in order to prevent the extension of their successful competition with the privately-owned public utilities.[2]

This intervention was also felt in the case of the so-called "Hilferding Loans," and it was of primary importance in the German crisis of 1929 which led to the downfall of the last parliamentary government. When MacDonald replaced the second Labor Cabinet with his National Government, it was likewise the administration of the Bank of England that was instrumental in provoking this change by asking for budget cuts known to be unacceptable to most of the labor leaders.[3] The strategic position of the Bank was enhanced by the very fact that had its demands been refused, the necessary loans would not have been forthcoming.

In many aspects, post-war France represents a special case. In Germany or England the strategic position of the central banks was only made use of as a last resort. In contrast to this restraint, the *Banque de France* and the parliamentary government represent the two opposite poles around which the whole social and political life of the nation revolved in the twenties. Several factors worked together to create this situation. The extraordinarily large public debt, which was carried over from the war and which was not wiped out by such a thorough inflation as in Germany, was an adverse condition to start with. It was aggravated by the inability to obtain sufficient tax revenue from the defective system of income taxes, which, in itself a symbol of middle class selfishness, was effectively supplemented by what was probably the lowest level of tax morality known in modern history. These conditions reduced the govern-

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[1]See H. Neisser, Die alte und die neue Reichsbank, in: *Strukturwandlungen der deutschen Volkswirtschaft*, vol. 2, Berlin 1929, p. 293, and *Deutschland unter dem Dawesplan*, Bericht des Generalagenten (December 22, 1928), Berlin 1929, p. 116.

[2]See, e.g., Otto Braun, *Von Weimar zu Hitler*, 2nd ed. New York 1940, p. 217, whose testimony is valuable on account of his position at the time as head of the Prussian Government.

[3]See, e.g., Philipp Snowden, *An Autobiography*, London 1934, vol. II, pp. 945-47, who quite naturally, given his role at the time, tries to play down the influence of the Bank of England and of the Federal Reserve Bank, without, however, being able to deny that they asked for cuts in the social services. See also L. Mc Weir, *The Tragedy of Ramsay MacDonald*, London 1938, pp. 349-57.

ment to a state of perpetual dependency upon the bankers, whether for bridging a temporary shortage of cash for some weeks or months, or in order to place new loans. Under these conditions the help of the *Banque de France* was indispensable either for rediscounting the treasury bonds taken over by private banking institutions, for conducting a generous nation-wide campaign in favor of new loans through its system of branches, or for procuring a foreign loan. The strategic advantage which the chronic difficulties of the government gave to the private regents of the bank, whose attitude was shared by the government-appointed governor, was invariably used whenever an undesirable government had to be outmaneuvered.

The story repeats itself over and over again in 1924, 1928, 1932, and 1936. The electorate shows tendencies to the left and puts into power some government combination shaped according to this image. But scarcely has the government begun to develop a timid program of social reform when the *crise de confiance*, with all the well-known features of the fall in the value of government bonds and the export of gold and foreign exchange, gets into full swing. The government finds it difficult to obtain even short-term credits, and with the depreciation of its long-term credit, the *deus ex machina*, the new long-term loan or, what is the desire of each successive minister of finance, the conversion of interest rates, is out of the question. With a little help from the governor and regents of the bank, who chastise the wrong set and are prepared to oblige the right set of politicians, the untrustworthy government disappears, *la rente* goes up, and all reforms are forgotten.[1] In the twenties this system worked fairly smoothly—apart from the fact that in 1928 the *Banque de France* forced on its own hero, Poincaré,[2] a much too low stabilization level for the franc, and that this later proved a distinct disadvantage. In the thirties, however, this process of "correcting" the popular will ran into difficulties. The *Banque de France* then tried to force its deflationary policy *à*

[1]The best insight into this process is given by the memoirs of Governor Moreau: "Le relèvement financier et monétaire de la France" in: *Revue des deux Mondes*, March 1, March 15, April 1, and April 15, 1937. See here especially his characterization of the Herriot ministry, pp. 55 ff.: when he wants to get rid of a cabinet, he decides "*de crever l'abcès*" (p. 58), in the opposite case he speaks of "*les intrigues de certains parlementaires*" (p. 30) against the government he wants to stay in office.

See also the already cited Dauphin-Meunier and Bopp, "Government and the Bank of France" in: *Public Policy*, II, 1941, pp. 3 ff.

For a general judgment by a politician who experienced some rather rough handling by these institutions see Caillaux in: *Sénat*, session ordinaire, July 23, 1936, p. 814: "It was always in the atmosphere of this institution to consider the notes of the Banque de France as independent of government credit and to believe that the Banque de France was not created to come to terms with the government."

[2]Cf. Moreau, quoted *supra*, pp. 825-827.

l'outrance on successive political combinations. It succeeded only at the third attempt with the accession of Laval to the premiership. From this time on, the revision of the statute of the bank and the synchronization of its administration with the political leadership became the catchword of the formative period of the *Front Populaire*. But significantly enough, when the victorious *Front Populaire* abolished the overlordship of the *Banque de France* and tried, according to the popular slogan, to transform it into the *Banque de la France*, it did not have enough power to stop the flight of the franc. When the French republic was already drawing its last breath, the financial community reserved its *liberum veto* against the government decree-powers by prohibiting close scrutiny of the "*éternels mobilisés de l'armée Condé*,"[1] i.e., by refusing to put the principle of exchange control into effect. Paradoxically enough, the Enabling Act, given by Parliament to the Chautemps cabinet on June 30, 1937,[2] marks precisely the point at which the private manipulators of the financial apparatus retained their leadership while destroying the political fabric as a whole. This act enables the ministry to take all necessary measures but refuses it the most essential means for their execution. It orders the ministry "to assure the suppression of attempts to undermine public credit, to fight against speculation, to further economic recovery, price control, budget balancing, and, *without control of exchange*, to defend the gold holdings of the Bank of France." France is an extreme case. In no other country was the conflict between political democracy and private command over the sources of credit allowed to develop so far as to lead to the complete breakdown of the whole social organism.

Successive devaluation in different countries, the control of foreign commerce and exchange, and the abandonment of the cherished doctrine of budget equilibrium in favor of deficit spending have done away with the dependence of the government upon the whim of private bankers. To a certain extent the so-called "investors' strike" in the privately-owned section of the economy—that is to say, the increasing difficulties in the profitable employment of capital—has contributed to this turn of events by establishing exceedingly low interest rates for government loans, especially in the United States. At any rate, the political importance of this change is evident. The government which has developed into the

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[1]Vincent Auriol in: *Chambre*, session ordinaire, 1937, pp. 1964 f. He compares the manipulators of capital flight, always eager to stab their government in the back, with the French *émigré* nobility who, under the leadership of Prince Louis-Joseph Condé, tried at every turn of the French revolution to stage a comeback.

[2]See *Journal Officiel*, July 1, 1937, and especially the deliberation of the Senate on June 30, 1937, in: *Sénat*, session ordinaire, 1937, p. 718.

largest customer of industry, often buying more than 50 per cent of the national output, is today in a strategically much more advantageous position than any other competitor for power. The possibility which always hung in suspense over the heads of previous governments in the pre-crisis period, that the financial interests might exercise their veto to throw the currency system out of gear, now seems remote and perhaps even non-existent.[1]

But at the same time there is apparently a fairly wide-spread belief that the new system of government spending and the more or less complete abandonment of the doctrine "that natural forces may produce recovery" is intended to uphold the system of "production of wealth by private activity and enterprise."[2] In other words, the abandonment of the supremacy of money as an automatic regulator of social relationships is not supposed to cause a serious break in the scale of social evaluations prevalent in our society. But to what degree the desires which accompany the changes in the relationship between the government and the financial and industrial community may be fulfilled, modified, or entirely thwarted, depends upon the relationship between the various social forces and the form they assume under the changed conditions. The relationship that persisted between the financial community and the government up to the last crisis may illuminate the degree to which political power was exercised in the form of indirect power. The symbols of politics appealed and appeared to us with the entire emotional apparatus which we were accustomed to find on the front page of newspapers. Yet, for the realities of political power, their evaluation and appreciation, we had to turn to the financial page. We were certain that the deterioration we could see there would rapidly spread to the front page until a change in symbols would reestablish a balance between both.

In our day, the balance is definitely shifting in favor of government, marking a world-wide tendency that has been consummated in the authoritarian countries. Fascist authors have been quick to conclude that in these countries all indirect power has been replaced by direct power. If this transition from indirect to direct power has a more than merely technical meaning, it implies that the antagonism between state and society, and with it the compromise structure of the state, has permanently disappeared in civil affairs, and

[1]See the remarks of Berle, *New Directions in the New World*, New York 1940, p. 121.

[2]See, e.g., the interesting discussion between governor Eccles, Federal Reserve Bank, the representative of the school of government spending as a means of upholding the existing private property relationships, which he in turn regards as the surest safeguard of democracy, and Senator Byrd of Virginia, representative of an old-fashioned "balance-the-budget" school, in the *New York Times*, December 20 and 27, 1938.

that there is no longer any contradiction between the social content and the political form of a society. In reality, however, the contradictions continued to prevail unabated, and what changed was only the form and structure of the compromise. The general tendency of this change leads away from the liberalistic form of compromise, which was essentially a delimitation of spheres between the individual and the government, to a compromise among conflicting power groups. This tendency may be illustrated by the shifting emphasis in the ideology of compromise.

In the liberalistic period, it was Herbert Spencer who gave an evolutionary superstructure to the doctrine of political compromise.[1] Political compromise was the vital condition of a society which marched toward ever higher forms. John Morley's[2] distinction between legitimate and illegitimate compromise furnished the specifically liberalistic element. The legitimacy of the compromise, he wrote, consists in the right of the outvoted individual or minority to uphold and advocate publicly the principles which the majority has rejected. The essence of the compromise thus lies in the guarantee of dissent which is regarded as the guarantee of a liberal system of government. This characteristically individualistic argument, however, recedes in John Stuart Mill's famous *Considerations on Representative Government.*[3] Here, the compromise becomes a group compromise. Mill declares that the very existence of representative government requires it to maintain a balance between capital and labor and their respective satellites. His idea of compromise betrays a desire to avoid the possibility of one social group gaining predominance over the others. In general, the justification of the idea of compromise varies with the social and political affiliations of its advocates. One of the last forms of the doctrine is to be found in the Austro-Marxian theory of the provisional equilibrium between the social classes.[4]

What was the reality which corresponded to the changing ideology of compromise? In a strictly technical sense the sphere of compromise expanded with the transition from competitive to monopoly capitalism. The growth of huge social units which accompanied the modern industrial process had a dual impact upon organizational developments. While destroying the older personalized form of association, it prepared the way for an intricate

[1]H. Spencer, *The Study of Sociology*, 1st ed., New York 1874, p. 396.

[2]J. Morley, *On Compromise*, 2nd ed., London 1877, p. 209.

[3]London 1876. See especially Chapter VI: "Of the Infirmities and Dangers to which Representative Government is Liable."

[4]Otto Bauer, *Die Österreichische Revolution*, Wien 1923, p. 196. Cf. Gurland's critique in *Marxismus und Diktatur*, Leipzig 1930, pp. 95 ff.

framework of working agreements among the monopolies which emerged victorious from the liberal era. The day-to-day compromise which the politically independent representative in liberalistic society concluded with the government and with his colleagues has given way to the compromise between large social and political organizations in the "pluralistic" state. What seems most interesting from a constitutional point of view is the transformation of the liberal rights of the individual—John Morley's guaranteed right of the individual to dissent as premise of the working of the compromise itself—into a set of guarantees for the existence of the accredited social groups, the partners in compromise. This process of absorption of individual rights by monopolistic groups, although noticeable throughout the whole world, was especially apparent under the Weimar Constitution, where the mixture of traditional liberties and *status quo* guarantees under the misleading title of fundamental rights offered an excellent legal starting point for such developments.[1] Property rights became a protective screen for the process of monopolization, freedom of religion was used to strengthen the existing religious corporations, and freedom of speech and association had to be supplemented by strong protecting organizations in order to obtain recognition. It was the social group, as far as it was recognized by other groups, that got protection, not the individual. A member of a group found the authorities willing to protect him as against his group only in extreme cases or if the degree of social legitimacy of the group was rather problematic. And if one of the traditional rights of the individual was challenged, it could prevail only in the form of a group guarantee.[2] The individual was thus forced into the group, and this fact, in turn, consolidated the status of the group. The functioning of political compromise became increasingly dependent upon the workability of pacts among the predominant associations of capital and labor as well as among the organizations within each of these categories.

II. Compromise Under National Socialism

With the disappearance of the old compromise structure and its accompanying internal checks in Europe, a new type of government is emerging of which, at first glance, greater independence and

[1]Schmitt, *Freiheitsrechte und institutionelle Garantien der Reichsverfassung*, Berlin 1931, and Huber, "Bedeutungswandel der Grundrechte" in: *Archiv für öffentliches Recht*, vol. 23, 1932, pp. 1-98.

[2]N.L.R.B. *vs.* Chicago Apparatus Co. (C. C. A. 7, Dec. 1940) 116 F. 2 d. 753. See also Charles Killingsworth, "Employer Freedom and the N.L.R.B." in: *Wisconsin Law Review*, March 1941, pp. 211-38.

power seem the outstanding characteristics. The new type is found in various more or less transitional forms. The automatic integration of the political structure by money in the nineteenth century and the systematic use of the credit apparatus to this end in the period of mass democracy has given way to forms of domination by institutionalized monopolies. These changes have occurred in their most pointed form in Germany.

The German economic system consists of various monopolies in which the competitive elements have only an "oasis" character.[1] The monopolies are of three kinds: the government's labor monopoly, the private monopolies in industry, and the Food Estate. The character of these monopolies must be defined in terms of their relationship to the public authorities and in terms of their inner structure. Whereas the monopoly for industrial and agricultural labor is a public monopoly under joint state and party control, allowing few opportunities for self-expression to individuals, the industrial monopolies and those in the Food Estate are administered by private interests which have been given a public character.[2] As such they form the backbone of a new system of guarantees which has taken over the role of the checks and balances inherent in the social structure under the older compromise system.

The first of these guarantees applies to the privileged groups in general. The abolition of institutional fluctuations produced by the democratic process of elections and the replacement of this process by a "strong government" has dispensed with the need to rely on the pressure potentialities of credit control. Greater security is calculated not only to outweigh the restrictions in the possible choice of investments, especially the inability to diminish risks by investing abroad, but also to counterbalance the diminished degree of personal freedom. There is an increased economic security for the propertied and professional classes as a whole to replace the smaller degree of individual liberty and arbitrariness which the individual finds in the totalitarian state. For various reasons the democratic government of the Weimar Republic distributed unsystematic favors and, although not having promised to do so, was forced to take over the bulk of losses in the realm of banking and heavy industry. The economic policies of the Fascist government,

[1] W. Neuling, "Wettbewerb, Monopol und Befehl in der heutigen Wirtschaft" in: *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatswissenschaften*, vol. 99 (1939), p. 316, speaks of scanty "oases" of competition in the realm of the Food Estate.

[2] According to the estimates of the Institut für Konjunkturforschung, *Weekly Reports*, vol. 9, 1936, p. 198, at the end of 1936 all internally produced raw materials and semi-finished goods, and assuredly half of the industrial finished goods, were bound by agreements. This figure does not define the kind of agreement, whether direct monopolies or only regulatory procedures.

however, have not only reduced these risks almost to nil, but have enabled big industry to make investments which are required by conditions of modern technology, but to which, because of the risks involved, it was formerly unable or unwilling to commit itself.[1] A further guarantee lies in the active encouragement of the process of monopolization and cartelization and the transformation of a private power position that was only tolerated by law into a monopoly that remains private, yet is vested with public power.

This monopolization takes two forms: first, cartelization is extended through the establishment of a complete network of market regulating bodies in every sphere,[1] and second, the number of independent units in a given field is progressively reduced. Both processes are intimately interrelated. The cartel policy of National Socialism shows three stages of development. At the beginning, in 1933, we find a policy of active help granted to private market organizations in two ways, first, by considerably restricting the jurisdiction of the Cartel Tribunal, and second, by making cartelization compulsory and compelling outsiders to attach themselves to existing cartels. Even at this stage we can see a process which is significant for the new relationship between industry and the public authorities. Every increase in organizational power granted to the private industrial and trade associations is accompanied by an increase in the supervisory power of the corresponding government agencies. Whereas "state sovereignty" is used to "give the cartel power it could not obtain on a voluntary basis,"[2] the government builds up its own apparatus which acts as an organ to harmonize the group interests of business with the interests of other recognized social groups. The second stage occurs when the official organization of industrial self-administration, which has replaced the earlier *Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie* and its branches, emerges as an active agent in the process of cartelization. In theory, the system of industrial groups and chambers now formed is specifically excluded from any tasks pertaining to market regulation, although its jurisdiction embraces almost all other fields of industrial policy and organization. But in practice it is inevitable that the cartels, the supervision of which is one of the main tasks of this new organization, soon begin to dominate these official organizations. In the years 1936 and 1937, when attacks were being launched against the price level produced by this thoroughgoing cartelization, and when

[1]See Gurland's article in this issue, pp. 227-34.

[2]C. Russell, "Die Praxis des Zwangskartellgesetzes" in: *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatswissenschaften*, 1937, vol. 97, p. 500.

the office of the Price Commissioner was created, there was a kind of sham battle against this growing identity between the official groups and the private organizations which regulated the market. But in this battle no use was ever made of the coercive machinery of the government, and the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs contented itself with issuing orders asking for reports and justifications of this identity of personnel and with promulgating general lines of direction.[1] Even this sham battle soon subsided, and in 1939 we reach the third stage in which the cartels, in their role as executive organs of the Reich Boards, are officially recognized as "all-embracing organs of market regulation."[2] As mandatories of the Reich Boards, which, in their turn, are independent legal personalities though subordinate to the Ministry of Economic Affairs, they now to an increasing degree regulate the distribution of both raw material and finished products.[3] Thus the process of cartelization has reached its logical conclusion in the final merger of private power and public organization.[4]

The process of concentration which accompanied thoroughgoing cartelization was accelerated for many reasons. The necessity for maximizing the speed of all deliveries pertaining to armaments required the use of labor-saving devices which, in their turn, depended on substantial investments—a need which became more and more evident with the increasing scarcity of labor. The shortage of raw materials worked against the small firms which had few import and bureaucratic connections of their own, and the expropriation of the Jews led in the same direction. In commerce, and

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[1]An acknowledgment of the thoroughgoing identity of personnel in both organizations is given by Neuling, quoted *supra*, p. 304, n. 1. For the organization in industry in general see Kuehn, "Der vorläufige Aufbau der gewerblichen Wirtschaft" in: *Archiv d. öffentl. Rechts*, 1936, vol. 27, pp. 334-363, and the official commentary by the official of the Ministry of Economics, E. Barth, *Wesen und Aufgaben der Organisation der gewerblichen Wirtschaft*, 1939. As regards the relationship between cartel and official organizations see Kley, *Aufbau und Rechtscharakter der Neuorganisation der gewerblichen Wirtschaft und ihr Verhältnis zu den Kartellen*, Kölner Dissertation, 1938.

[2]"Kartell im Staatsdienst" in: *Deutscher Volkswirt*, Jan. 12, 1940, p. 447, and "Entlastung der Reichsstellen" in: *Deutscher Volkswirt*, July 12, 1940, p. 1452. For a rationalization of the impossibility of separating the functions of official groups and cartels, see Merkel, "Wirtschaftslenkung und Kartellrecht" in: *Kartell-Rundschau*, 1939, p. 397, and H. Drost, "Der Krieg und die Organisation der gewerblichen Wirtschaft" in: *Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht*, 1940, pp. 25-26.

[3]That the persons who function as mandatories of the Reich Boards are often identical with the personnel of the cartels may be seen from the regulations for paper and wrapping material in: Posse-Landfried-Syrup-Backe-Alpers, "*Die Reichsverteidigungsgesetzgebung,*" vol. 2, IV, Papier, pp. 83-88.

[4]An isolated but vigorous protest against this development may be found in F. Boehm, *Die Ordnung der Wirtschaft als geschichtliche Aufgabe und rechtsschöpferische Leistung*, Stuttgart a. Berlin 1937, whose main arguments closely parallel those of the American antitrust movement.

especially in retail trade and handicraft, firms with the largest turnover increased their competitive advantages as they were able to obtain a greater supply of goods for distribution. They were also able better to withstand the reduction of the profit margin, necessitated by the rather rigid control of prices for consumers goods.

The economic pressure leading to concentration is accompanied by direct legal pressure. This has been used most vigorously against the owners of small shops and workshops. Pressure by powerful competitors who want to increase their sales in order to balance other unfavorable developments in cost factors has been aided and abetted by the government's desire to force marginal shop-owners into the factories. At first there was a process of indirect strangulation by governmentally approved exclusion from discounts, if the small shops did not reach a certain sales figure, and pressure was exercized in the same direction through a closer supervision of smaller plants by the social honor courts. This was soon followed by legislation aimed at a wholesale combing-out.[1] The slow disappearance of the small businessman is speeded up; shops are closed if they are deemed unnecessary for the national economy, the debts, as far as is thought advisable, are paid by official organizations, and the former shopkeepers and businessmen are sent off to the factory.

For industry as such, the direct legal measures furthering concentration are of a double nature. In the first place, the process of compulsory standardization of types carried on from 1938 deprives many producers of their independent status and thrusts them down to the level of specialized departments of larger units by restricting them to the production of parts of the finished product. This was especially the case in the automobile industry. The war has given new force to this development by causing the compulsory closure of the technologically more backward factories. Some of the owners of these have been entirely removed from the field and have become mere rentiers, others have been temporarily degraded to the level of wholesalers in their respective fields, receiving a special "colleague discount" which had to be given to them by the more fortunate members of the industry.[2] Whatever the manifold

[1]Somewhat neglected so far, this role of the social honor courts, the supervision of small and medium-sized shops, is frankly acknowledged in *Soziale Praxis*, 1940, p. 1459. For the approval of those restrictions see the decision of the Cartel Tribunal of April 26, 1939, in *Kartell-Rundschau*, 1939, p. 420, which, already employing the terminology of the combing-out legislation, stipulates that a business which cannot, without endangering its existence, withstand a decrease of RM 50 in its annual profit cannot enjoy legal protection.

[2]See, e.g., the regulations for the soap industry given by Posse-Landfried, quoted *supra*, vol. 2, IV, Seife, Introductory Remarks.

individual variations in the various industries, it is clear that, in spite of a somewhat contradictory ideology, the mergers that have thus been brought about tend to become permanent and tend permanently to eliminate the units which were closed provisionally.[1]

The stronger the organizations, the greater the degree of liberty they have in administering the regulations that apply to their members. At the bottom, in handicraft, where the head of the organization lives more from his proved devotion to the National Socialist cause than because of the weight of his economically and financially weak organization, the administration's direct interference is comprehensive. The head of the organization simply acts as an executive organ of the state bureaucracy in combing out the weaker members.[2] In the sphere of large-scale business the transformation of positions of private power into public organs of economic "self-administration," though accompanied by the transfer of legal omnipotence to the supervisory ministries and special boards, has increased rather than decreased the power of those who dominate the organizations. Behind the legal screen of the leader-principle which requires that the group leaders be appointed by the public authorities, the absolutistic principles governing monopolized business groups continue unabated, especially since the complete demise of the stockholders as a supervisory organ. Even the legal prescriptions have to take this reality into account, and the group leader is required to submit to annual votes of confidence by his advisory boards. A negative vote would not legally be followed by his dismissal but, as the official commentator says, would only necessitate inquiries by higher bodies.[3] But, of course, the social function of this vote of confidence cannot be obscured by placing it in the context of the new constitutional phraseology. It expresses the state of affairs which prevails throughout the organizational set-up of German industry. The advisory board is constituted as an oligarchical body dominating through the same persons both private cartels and official trade organizations. Under the officially sanctioned leadership of one of the industrial lords, who is *primus inter pares* so far as the monopolists are concerned and who is leader so far as the plebeian rest is concerned, the professional bureaucratic personnel administers the law for the whole group. Consequently, this personnel has the task of adjusting the various interests within the group, either

[1]As regards the ideology, see the wording of the decree on Gemeinschaftshilfe der Wirtschaft, February 19, 1940, *R.G.Bl.* I, p. 395, which starts with the supposition that the shut-down is only of a temporary character.

[2]Before the great combing-out of April 1, 1939, there were still 1,471,000 handicraft units employing less than 6 employees as compared with 1,734,000 in 1933.

[3]Barth, quoted *supra*, p. 67.

as the agency of last resort, or, as is increasingly the case, as a kind of preliminary sifting organ whose reports provide the raw material for the official decisions of the Reich Ministry of Economic Affairs. It represents, so to speak, the group interest as against the interest of the individual concern. Although this function served to strengthen the independence of the group bureaucracy as against individual concerns, this process did not go very far. The constitutional framework governing the organization of the group makes the group administration partial to the big interests within its jurisdiction no less than did its forerunner under the Weimar Republic. Every big concern has its own specialists who zealously and competently watch the work of the representative of the group. Significantly enough, the democratic element, a remnant of earlier estate ideas,[1] which would have required a vote of confidence from all members, not only from the advisory board, was already removed from the statute book by executive order in 1935,[2] and the relations between leadership and small and medium-sized producer have been adapted to the German reality. The status of the smaller producers has been changed from that of active participants into that of objects of propaganda. The war has not altered any part of this organizational structure. On the contrary, the building up of District Economic Boards has only established these characteristics the more firmly. At the same time, when the provincial and regional state bureaucracy was given supervisory power over the distribution of consumers goods for the whole population, the presidents of the regional organizations of trade and industry, of the Chambers of Industry and Commerce, saw themselves raised to the rank of Reich commissioners with the duty of seeing to it that the tasks of production were carried through.[3] And when the most recent legislation tried to reduce war profits, it likewise to a large extent placed the power to determine what is to be considered appropriate profit in the hands of the groups whose members were the very ones to make the profit.

To a large measure the governing ranks of the Chambers of Industry and of the Economic Groups are the ones that, either directly or by the weight of the advice which their experts set before the state bureaucracy, decide on the chances of making profits from any given means of production.[4] This method of determining the

[1] T. Cole, "Corporative Organization of the Third Reich" in: *Review of Politics*, vol. 2, 1940, pp. 438-62.

[2] Barth, quoted *supra*, p. 68.

[3] Decrees on "Wirtschaftsverwaltung," August 27, 1939, Nov. 28, 1939, *R.G.Bl.* I, pp. 1495 and 2315, with regulations of Sept. 20, 1939, *R.G.Bl.* I, p. 1872.

[4] See, Gurland's article, pp. 256-58.

use to which a given means of production will be put has become the rule rather than the exception. Many owners have been totally or partially deprived of the possibility of making use of their machinery. The measures by which these expropriations have been carried through have a dual aspect. In most of the cases covered by the government's authority, quota restrictions and other measures have been actually carried through by the career group officials who have been vested with public authority, the profit of such operations accruing to certain members of the group. In the case of Jewish expropriation the question of indemnity for the damaged person does not arise.[1] In the other cases interference with private property invariably raises the question of indemnity. Under the Weimar Republic the courts that had jurisdiction over expropriation claims gave a very extensive interpretation to the concept of expropriation by public authorities. It was to be expected under Fascism that such an interpretation, as well as the insistence on full compensation, would be upheld by the courts in all cases where the physical property was left intact but where its profitable use was excluded in consequence of a governmental authorization or decree. The government therefore decided to throw the traditional procedures overboard. The differences arising from the transformation of the apparatus of production were to be treated as a pure intra-group concern and there was to be no appeal to an outside authority.

So we can see that the tendency already mentioned as characteristic of mass democracy, the absorption of individual rights in group rights, reaches its extreme form. This tendency was already visible in the cartel legislation of 1933, which prevented the Cartel Tribunal from interfering in disputes arising between members and the cartel. The principle of refusing to grant access to regular courts was also soon employed in numerous decrees, especially in those concerning the Food Estate (agriculture). These ruled that the parties have to content themselves with the decision of an intra-group arbitration court or, as far as questions of quotas are concerned, with committees of complaint provided for by their respective organizations.[2]

[1]We can see the curious spectacle of the government running behind the private experts in Aryanization and trying belatedly to snatch a share of the loot, thus squeezing out the small businessman who had acquired Jewish property but did not have sufficient capital to run it, or, especially in the field of real estate, to preserve part of it for the warriors when they return from the victorious war. See the decree on the reexamination of Aryanization acts of June 10, 1940, *R.G.Bl.* I, p. 891, where, in case of inappropriate gains through Aryanization, compensation has to be paid to the Reich.

[2]Cf. L. Gebhard and H. Merkel, *Das Recht der landwirtschaftlichen Marktordnung,* 1937, who present an elaborate commentary on the organization of arbitration courts as far as agricultural market regulations are concerned (statute of February 26, 1935, *R.G.Bl.* I, 1293). They remark (III, p. 25) that appeals against the decisions of the

(footnote continued on next page)

The same state of affairs has prevailed in regard to the compensation granted in the case of compulsory shut-down of plants for the duration of the war. Here, too, the economic groups have sole jurisdiction in deciding whether and what indemnity should be given, and appeal is possible only to the Reich Economic Chamber, the coordinating body of these organizations. The remarkable feature of this legislation is, first, the abandonment of the principle, accepted throughout the liberal era and still acknowledged by the regular courts in Germany, that the individual should not suffer any loss through the acts of expropriation, that he should receive either a full or at least an "appropriate" indemnity.[1] If an indemnity is granted, it is granted by equity and not by law, and to say, as does the official language, that the "vital necessities of the whole region have to be considered before the interests of the individual" is only another way of justifying the redistribution of property.[2] But even more important than the degree of indemnification granted on account of the loss of professional and economic status is the fact that these rules deny access to the courts and, by so doing, close the iron ring which the new economic constitution of the monopolistic society places around the less favored members of a business or trade group. They are prevented from combining with other social groups or airing before a public forum their grievances against the monopolist dominating the group. The increasing factual subservience to the command of a monopoly-dominated group has now become a legalized subservience.

Industry and agriculture are not the only realms in which the dominant forces of the group have seized the right of decision in intra-group controversies—even where these controversies only thinly veil the life-struggle of marginal firms against monopolies. The same process is to be found elsewhere in the German political structure. One might almost determine the status of the different groups in Germany by the degree to which they have attained the *privilegium de non appellando,* to adopt a well-known concept from German constitutional history. That is to say, one might determine their status by the extent to which they have succeeded in depriving the

committee of complaint to the arbitration court would have a chance of success only in very exceptional cases. See also W. Weber and F. Wieacker, *Eigentum und Enteignung,* Hamburg 1935, pp. 26-33, for a list of the expropriation features in the various decrees. As regards the elimination of ordinary courts in general, see the remark of Wieacker in *Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht,* 1937, p. 466.

[1]See, e.g., the decision of the Prussian Supreme Administrative Tribunal of March 29, 1935, vol. 100, p. 329.

[2]The practice of the arbitration courts of the Food Estate has been discussed in P. Giesecke, "Entschädigungspflicht bei marktordnenden Massnahmen" in: *Festgabe für Hedemann,* 1938, pp. 368-81.

individual member of the group of the possibility of appealing to external bodies against group decisions. This *privilegium de non-appellando* exists in its most concentrated form in the army. The army command is made absolute master over every individual in its service by virtue of denying any separation between the personal and the professional status of its members. Business does not need to strive for such a position; it is satisfied to control the social and economic functions of its members. As regards members of the state bureaucracy and of the party and its affiliated organizations, we have to differentiate between the direction of public affairs and the task of controlling the population. Insofar as this first function is concerned, no judicial interference is allowed. The ever expanding lists of activities which, by legislative order, are excluded from any judicial examination, make the discussion of whether the judiciary may itself decide which acts are to be included in the category of political acts and therefore to be exempted from examination, a mere theoretical squabble.[1] The judiciary has thus been degraded from the rank of an arbiter of inter-group conflicts to that of an "assistant"[2] of the administration. The judiciary competes with the various administrative services[3] as an organ to enforce discipline in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy, in the party, and among the population at large. The "taylorized" methods adopted especially in the administration of criminal law largely through granting the public prosecutor a dominant position over the procedure, and allowing a quick and "satisfying" disposal of a maximum of cases unhampered by procedural quirks,[4] have torn away

[1]For the status of the controversy see G. Ipsen, *Politik und Justiz,* Hamburg 1937, and S. Grundmann, "Die richterliche Nachprüfund von politischen Führungsakten" in: *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatswissenschaften,* vol. 10, 1940, pp. 512-44.

[2]Cf. Under Secretary of the Treasury Reinhardt in: *Deutsche Steuerzeitung,* 1935, p. 485; see also G. Schmoelders, "Die Weiterbildung des Wirtschaftsrechts" in: *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatswissenschaften,* vol. 101, 1941, p. 78. The organisation of a Supreme Administrative Court for the whole Reich carries the new status of the judiciary to its logical conclusion when it prescribes that the judges can be removed from the Court at the end of the fiscal year. See *Frankfurter Zeitung,* April 22, 1941. As regards the small part played by the labor courts in determining the relationship between employers and employees, see Cole, "National Socialism and German Labor Courts" in: *Journal of Politics,* vol. III, 1941, p. 196.

[3]As regards the civil liability of the party for offenses committed by party functionaries, see the party point of view in A. Lingg, *Die Verwaltung der NSDAP,* Munich 1940, pp. 257 ff. The right of the courts to pass on this question is upheld by S. Grundmann, quoted *supra,* pp. 541 ff., and the decision of the *Reichsgericht* of February 17, 1939, in: *Deutsches Recht,* 1939, p. 1785. The lower courts, however, more exposed to party pressure, do not seem to follow the Supreme Court. The criminal liability of party members for embezzlement is at times enforced in the courts—provided that one of the numerous amnesties does not intervene. But the secrecy of the procedure and the absolute prohibition of reports on such trials deprive them of any function of control. See E. Roper and C. Leiser, *Skeleton of Justice,* New York 1941.

[4]See O. Kirchheimer, "Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany" in vol. 8 (1940), pp. 444-63, of this periodical.

the sanctity of the judiciary[1] and have deprived the government of the moral and propagandistic value inherent in the services of the judiciary. It becomes less important as a problem whether the regular judiciary or a service bureaucracy is chosen to carry out these functions, and the field is left open for minor rivalries. However, even here the observed tendency to acquire as far as possible the *privilegium de non appellando* is always noticeable throughout the administrative services of party and state bureaucracy.

Within the constitutional framework of the Weimar Republic, it became the function of the bureaucracy continually to keep under scrutiny the relationship between big business and labor, but also to preserve the *status quo* of agriculture and small-scale business. The cohesive element which united the bureaucracy was the preservation of its social status against encroachments from the outside and, whenever feasible, the desire to extend its activities. The ideological emphasis on its impartial service to the nation as a whole hid the fact that, as far as the object of its policies was concerned, the unity was more apparent than real. The controversies between the social groups reappeared in somewhat mitigated form, free of propagandistic tinge, in the relationship between the various divisions of the public services. When we try to assess the impact of the changes in the political power structure on the bureaucracy and on its relationship to the National Socialist party, we realize that the unity of the bureaucracy was shaken still more. In part it lost its identity through its steady permeation by, and association with, the party machine, and in part its general negative attitude to outside control lost its *raison d'être* in the new and much less controlled set-up.[2] Thus we are confronted with the strange picture of an intense centralization within each administrative unit going hand in hand with certain tendencies to departmentalization. Each of the highest subleaders jealously guards against a loss of status by being subjected to anybody's command but the *Führer's*. As in older systems, what counts is the individual's proximity to the supposed fountain of the

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[1]Reich Minister Frank speaks of "taylorism" in criminal procedure in his somewhat melancholy reflections on the fate of German criminal law under present conditions in "Die Aufgaben der Strafrechtserneuerung" in: *Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht*, 1941, p. 25. See also G. Dahm, "Richtermacht und Gerichtsverfassung im Strafrecht" in: *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatsw.*, 1941, vol. 101, pp. 287-308.

[2]The remaining control organ over the bureaucracy, the Rechnungshof (Court of Accounts Control), never very effective in the observations which it issues on expenditure incurred years before, has under the Third Reich become a repository for high officials from the Weimar period who prove their right to the salary they have drawn in their former positions by checking accounts "as soldiers *in Zivil* imbued by the spirit of the leader." (H. Mueller, "Die Stellung des Rechnungshofs im 3. Reich" in: *Finanzarchiv*, vol. 7, 1940, pp. 193, 205.)

charisma itself, not the fact of belonging to the rational council of government. In consequence, "the position of Ministers of the Reich has undergone a fundamental change. They do not form a collegium, an organizational unit."[1] The number of administrative organizations under the direct command of the *Führer* and exempt from any other supervision is steadily increasing. And the interpenetration of party and bureaucracy leads to jurisdictional regulations compared with which the most difficult intricacies of federal problematics are relatively easy to follow. Thus, for example, we have such a figure as the *Reichsführer SS* who, as head of the police, is administratively incorporated in the Reich Ministry of the Interior without, however, being subject in his decisions to the approval of the Reich Minister.[2]

The official constitutional theory likes to regard the relationship between state and party as one between a technical apparatus and a political movement, the former following the directions of the latter, which is supposed to be the immediate expression of national life and will. The official ideology, therefore, sees the party as an indissoluble unit. In reality the structure of the National Socialist party and its place in the political power structure of modern Germany can only be understood in terms of its dual function. First, the National Socialist party arose as a mass party and as such is the heir to the other mass parties which existed during the era of mass democracy. Second, the party and the state bureaucracy together constitute an organ of mass domination. It is a competitor of, and later an heir to, the left-wing mass parties. It not only tries to cater to the economic desires of its followers but also incorporates in its structure some vision of a new political order. The fact that its following is a heterogeneous one makes necessary a constant shift in the ideology, a greater emphasis on the purely political elements of the new order as against the economic basis, and heavier emphasis on propaganda—lest its following dissolve into its separate social components. When the trade unions and left-wing political parties were destroyed, the new mass organizations of the National Socialist party took over at least some of the social functions of the

[1] U. Scheuner, "Deutsche Staatsführung im Krieg" in: *Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft*, vol. 5, 1940, p. 26. For earlier formulations in the same direction see R. Höhn, *Wandlungen im staatsrechtlichen Denken*, Berlin 1934, p. 39.

[2] The same exempt position within the foreign and labor ministries is held by the Reich leader of the Germans abroad and by the Work Service leader of the Reich. As regards the structure of the Youth Organization, see H. Dietze, "Die verfassungsrechtliche Stellung der Hitler-Jugend" in: *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatsw.*, vol. 100, 1940, pp. 113-56, who comes (p. 154) to the conclusion that the youth movement is an institution which does not belong exclusively to the party or to the government, cannot be measured by conceptions of party law or constitutional law, and thus is subject only to those of the Reich law.

defunct groups. The numerous individuals who, both before 1933 and to a certain extent afterwards, transferred their loyalty to the National Socialist organization, helped to establish this continuity.[1] In the conditions of party pluralism under the Weimar Republic, in order to balance the heterogeneity of its membership, the National Socialist party had not only to adopt a special vehemence in the competition for political power but also to establish the principle of an unquestionable faith in its leadership. Having achieved predominance in the state, but being without a clearly defined social program, the party followed the line of least resistance. It confirmed the titles of business and the army but at the same time hastened to build up a competitive apparatus of its own, gradually reinforcing it with the services of the technically efficient state bureaucracy.

This process changed the structure of the party itself and brought the party's ever present bureaucratic element sharply to the fore. The party proved no support for the independent middle classes in their struggle for survival but, instead, actually hastened their final decline more than any other single factor in modern German history. On the other hand, the capture of the state machinery by the party, the vast extension of this machinery, and its duplication in many cases by a corresponding party bureaucracy, though depriving many of the middle class elements of their position in the process of production, gave them in compensation economic security and social standing.[2] The fact that, although many of the new functionaries have come from the independent middle classes, this same middle class was crushed as never before with the active help of the new bureaucracy shows how far and fast this new social group has already traveled in its alienation from its earlier basis. Besides demonstrating that the new group was becoming separated from its earlier social interests, this also testifies to its adaptation to the various (often far-flung) new tasks with which it has been entrusted, jointly with, or in addition to, the state bureaucracy. Whereas the party official rises to a position of equality with the government official and even in some cases succeeds in entering the ranks of the

[1]The inherited elements in the National Socialist party are naturally effaced if the party is contrasted with the somewhat literary and artificial political styles of nineteenth century representation instead of with the mass parties of mass democracy. Cf. Ipsen, "Vom Begriff der Partei" in: *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatsw.*, Vol. 100, 1940, p. 406.

[2]There are no figures available for the period since 1935, but even up to then, with the process of aggrandizement going on, the proportion of officials in the total membership of the National Socialist party increased from 6.7 per cent in 1933 to 13 in 1935. Cf. Gerth, "The Nazi Party, Its Leadership and Composition" in: *The American Journal of Sociology*, 1940, vol. 45, p. 527. Some of this increase, however, may only be apparent, as, e.g., in the case where the party acknowledges the right of a wife to transfer her low party membership number to her husband though he himself refrained from openly joining the party while he was an official. See Lingg, quoted *supra*, pp. 172-73.

business group, the lower party member only holds honorary and onerous office and becomes almost indistinguishable from the ordinary non-party citizen as a zealously watched object rather than a subject of political power.

The new legislation concerning administrative leadership in the "*Landkreise*,"[1] which has been given much attention in Germany,[2] must be understood as a rearguard action which, for propagandistic aims, attempts to revive the theoretical conception of the unified party as an independent entity in its relationship to the state bureaucracy. It starts from the principle that leadership over persons *(Menschenführung)* is exclusively the task of the party. The competent party official is responsible to his party superior for the conduct and attitude of the population. The township president or the mayor, however, is responsible for the orderly execution of all administrative tasks in the framework of legal jurisdiction. Both organs are forbidden to meddle in each other's business. The psychological usefulness of such a regulation is undeniable. It protects the party official against requests from the rank and file of the membership by emphasizing a separation which for all practical purposes does not exist, and after laying down these principles the statute itself has thus to define the different degrees of cooperation between both hierarchies. Though the relation between party and bureaucracy may give rise to ostentatious jurisdictional disputes, it is not in these that we find the deeper-lying conflicts, but within the structure of the party itself. So long as the party has not exclusively become a huge apparatus for mass domination, so long as the desires, fears and wishes of the atomized masses still filter through the numerous channels of party organizations, like the Labor Front and the National Socialist Welfare Agency, which exercise *Betreuungsfunktionen,* duties of a "guardian of the masses," there are still some deteriorated remnants of the earlier form, the mass party. Even in their bureaucratic form, those elements of the party which are entrusted with the care of the masses represent, in some degree, the unrepresented sections of the community who have no independent voice in the balance of power.

By carefully restricting itself exclusively to the military sphere, the army, from the very beginning, was able to uphold the independence it had reestablished under the Weimar Democracy. Busi-

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[1]In spite of its misleading title, which only refers to the "Landkreise" (rural districts), the statute of December 28, 1939, *R.G.Bl.* I, 1940, p. 45, is designed to provide general control over the relationship between the middle ranks of the bureaucracy and the corresponding party officials.

[2]O. Redelberger, "Partei und Staat im Landkreis" in *Reichsverwaltungsblatt,* vol. 61, 1940, p. 47.

ness, trade, and the independent ranks of agriculture became a closed monopoly. Government and party not only accepted its inner power distribution as they found it, but actively helped to drive it still more pointedly in the direction of an oligarchic combine. The relationship of these groups to the army and the party hierarchy is in flux; especially the respective weight of the party bureaucracy and the army is subject to sudden shifts, due to the impact of the war changes, the transitional or permanent character of which is not yet discernible. But one permanent pattern stands out. While sections of the new party and state bureaucracy act as transmission belts for those groups sufficiently vocal in their own right, other parts of the state and party bureaucracy which exercise the *Betreuungsfunktion* represent the unrepresented.[1] The compromise between the more articulate groups and these "guardians of the masses" more often than not resemble the arbitration award of Marshal Balbo who, while permitting a salary reduction asked for by the employers, awarded to the workers of Ferrara the *epitheton ornans* "valiant."[2] One of the chief if not *the* chief compromise they concluded in the name of the unrepresented, the "Leipzig Agreement of 1935," was as farcical as the Balbo award. By this agreement the "Self-Administration of German Economy" became formally affiliated with the Labor Front. No practical consequences, however, were ever drawn from this "liaison."[3] But there is compromise, nevertheless, as in every other society which has a high degree of social stratification.

In the compromise structure of National Socialism as it arose after the disappearance of all independent representation of the masses, the old question is brought to the fore: how can the interest of the various partners to the compromise, the monopolies, army, industry, and agriculture as well as the diversified layers of party bureaucracy, be brought to a common denominator? It is apparent that the *Führer*, or, as we should more appropriately say, the group of persons identified with the *Führer*, has established an authority which acts as an ultimate arbiter in all cases where the respective monopoly groups are not able to reach a decision by themselves. The leadership is able to decide inter-group differences with relative ease, and these decisions are carried through with a minimum of resistance only because the unfolding program of expansion has given the various groups the possibility of extending their activities

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[1]As regards the modified compromise, see the comment of E. Morstein Marx, "Bureaucracy and Dictatorship" in: *Review of Politics*, vol. 3, 1941, p. 101.

[2]This story is related in Rosenstock-Franck, "*Les étapes de l'economic fasciste italienne,*" Paris 1939, p. 233.

[3]Its wording in: W. Mueller, "*Das soziale Leben im neuen Deutschland,*" Berlin 1938, pp. 136-37.

(though on a different plane) and of satisfying their desires without too much need of getting in each other's way.[1] The ultimate decision of the *Führer* group is therefore the more easily accepted the more it takes the form and function of a permanent guarantee of the imperialist order.[2] It is this interdependence between the unquestionable authority of the ruling group and the program of expansion which offers the characteristic phenomenon of the compromise structure of the Fascist order, directs its further course, and decides upon its ultimate fate.

To summarize our remarks, we can describe the changes in political compromise as follows. During the liberal period of modern society, political compromise operated among parliamentarians and between them and the government. Every representative acted on his own, promoting certain financial, business and agricultural interests and changing allegiance from one to another of them according to his own interests and judgment. Thus, through individual agreements the functioning of parliament was constantly kept in harmony with the prevailing economic structure. With the beginnings of "mass democracy" (about 1910-11), the task of keeping political compromise in harmony with the economic structure devolved to a considerable extent upon the central banks. At the same time, the agreements tended to evolve from individual ones into voluntary compacts between the main groups of capital and labor and their subdivisions.

Fascism characterizes the stage at which the individual has completely lost his independence and the ruling groups have become recognized by the state as the sole legal parties to political compromise. Since money, a rather adequate expression of social power during the liberal period, ceased to mediate between economic and political life, another coordinator of public life was sorely needed. There remained only the institution of leadership to arbitrate between the groups. Its power rests on its ability to compensate every

[1]See for the whole problem the semi-official commentary in G. Neesse, *Führergewalt*, Tübingen 1940.

[2]Characteristic of the intimate connection between the establishment of the authority placed in the German leadership and the execution of its imperialist program is a sharp refutation of the conservative writer Triepel who attempted to uphold the view that a state may be called sovereign even if it has no external independence, provided that it controls its own subjects. See H. Triepel, *Die Hegemonie*, Stuttgart 1938, p. 143, rejected by E. Huber in his review in: *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatsw.*, vol. 100, 1940, p. 179. In fact, the form of domination which the large-space *(Grossraum)* imperialism of Germany creates is not very amenable to the fiction of a sovereign restricted to the domestic realm. "The developing large-space order might, contrary to earlier imperialism, constitute a system of direct and open domination"—says E. Huber, "Position und Begriffe" in: *Zeitschrift f. d. ges. Staatsw.*, vol. 100, 1940, p. 143.

group sacrifice with advantages which, however, can ultimately be got only in the international field, that is to say, through imperialist policy.

Art and Mass Culture[1]

By Max Horkheimer

At times in history, art was intimately associated with other avenues of social life. The plastic arts, in particular, were devoted to the production of objects for daily use, secular as well as religious. In the modern period, however, sculpture and painting were dissociated from town and building, and the creation of these arts reduced to a size suitable to any interior; during the same historic process, esthetic feeling acquired independent status, separate from fear, awe, exuberance, prestige, and comfort. It became "pure." The purely esthetic feeling is the reaction of the private atomic subject, it is the judgment of an individual who abstracts from prevailing social standards. The definition of the beautiful as an object of disinterested pleasure had its roots in this relation. The subject expressed himself in the esthetic judgment without consulting social values and ends. In his esthetic behavior, man so to speak divested himself of his functions as a member of society and reacted as the isolated individual he had become. Individuality, the true factor in artistic creation and judgment, consists not in idiosyncrasies and crotchets, but in the power to withstand the plastic surgery of the prevailing economic system which carves all men to one pattern. Human beings are free to recognize themselves in works of art in so far as they have not succumbed to the general leveling. The individual's experience embodied in a work of art has no less validity than the organized experience society brings to bear for the control of nature. Although its criterion lies in itself alone, art is knowledge no less than science is.

Kant examines the justification of this claim. How, he inquires, can the esthetic judgment, in which subjective feelings are made known, become a collective or "common" judgment?[2] Science rejects feeling as evidence, how then can one explain the community of feeling evoked by art works? Current feelings among the masses, to be sure, are easy to explain; they have always been the effect of social mechanisms. But what is that hidden faculty in every in-

[1]These remarks have been provoked by Mortimer J. Adler's book, *Art and Prudence*, New York and Toronto 1937.

[2]Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, translated by F. H. Bernard. §22, p. 94.

dividual to which art appeals? What is that unmistakable feeling on which it relies time and again despite all contradicting experiences? Kant attempts to answer this question by introducing the notion of a *sensus communis aestheticus* to which the individual assimilates his esthetic judgment. This notion must be carefully distinguished from "common sense" in its usual meaning. Its principles are those of a kind of thinking that is "unprejudiced," "consecutive," and "enlarged," that is, inclusive of the viewpoints of others.[1] In other words, Kant thinks that every man's esthetic judgment is suffused with the humanity he has in himself. Despite the deadly competition in business culture, men are in accord concerning the possibilities they envision. Great art, says Pater, must "have something of the human soul in it,"[2] and Guyau declares that art occupies itself with the possible,[3] erecting a "new world above the familiar world . . . a new society which by force of imagination it adds to the society in which we really live." An element of resistance is inherent in the most aloof art.

Resistance to the restraints imposed by society, now and then flooding forth in political revolution, has been steadily fermenting in the private sphere. The middle class family, though it has frequently been an agency of obsolescent social patterns, has made the individual aware of other potentialities than his labor or vocation opened to him. As a child, and later as a lover, he saw reality not in the hard light of its practical biddings but in a distant perspective which lessened the force of its commandments. This realm of freedom, which originated outside the workshop, was adulterated with the dregs of all past cultures, yet it was man's private preserve in the sense that he could there transcend the function society imposed upon him by way of its division of labor. Seen at such a distance, the appurtenances of reality fuse into images that are foreign to the conventional systems of ideas, into esthetic experience and production. To be sure, the experiences of the subject as an individual are not absolutely different from his normal experiences as a member of society. Yet works of art—objective products of the mind detached from the context of the practical world—harbor principles through which the world that bore them appears alien and false. Not only Shakespeare's wrath and melancholy, but the detached humanism of Goethe's poetry as well, and even Proust's devoted absorption in ephemeral features of *mondanité*, awaken

[1] *Ibid.*, §40, p. 171.

[2] Walter Pater, *Appreciations*, London 1918, p. 38.

[3] J. M. Guyau, *L'art au point de vue sociologique*, Paris 1930, p. 21.

memories of a freedom that makes prevailing standards appear narrow-minded and barbarous. Art, since it became autonomous, has preserved the utopia that evaporated from religion.

The private realm, however, to which art is related, has been steadily menaced. Society tends to liquidate it. Ever since Calvinism sanctified man's calling in this world, poverty, contrary to the accepted notion, has in practice been a taint to be washed away only by toil. The same process that freed each man from slavery and serfdom, and returned him to himself, also broke him into two parts, the private and the social, and burdened the private with a mortgage. Life outside the office and shop was appointed to refresh a man's strength for office and shop; it was thus a mere appendage, a kind of tail to the comet of labor, measured, like labor, by time, and termed "free time." Free time calls for its own curtailment, for it has no independent value. If it goes beyond recreation of expended energies, it is regarded as wasteful, unless it is utilized to train men for work. The children of the early 19th century who were taken from workshop to dormitory and from dormitory to workshop, and fed while at work, lived exclusively for their calling, like Japanese factory girls of today. The labor contract, in which this condition was grounded, proved itself a mere formality. Later in the 19th century, the chains became looser, but self-interest subordinated private life to business even more effectively than before, until the structural unemployment of the 20th century shook the whole order. The permanently unemployed cannot reproduce a labor power that is useless, and training cannot improve a career that is closed in advance. The contrast between the social and private is blurred when mere waiting becomes a calling and when work is nothing but waiting for work.

For a few decades broad strata in industrial countries were able to have some measure of private life, though within strict limits. In the 20th century, the population is surrounded by large trusts and bureaucracies; the earlier division of man's existence between his occupation and family (always valid only with reservations so far as the majority was concerned) is gradually melting away. The family served to transmit social demands to the individual, thus assuming responsibility not only for his natural birth but for his social birth as well. It was a kind of second womb, in whose warmth the individual gathered the strength necessary to stand alone outside it. Actually, it fulfilled this function adequately only among the well-to-do. Among the lower strata the process was generally frustrated; the child was left only too early to his own devices. His aptitudes were prematurely hardened, and the shock he suffered

brought in its wake stunted mental growth, pent-up rage, and all that went with it. Behind the "natural" behavior of ordinary folk, so frequently glorified by intellectuals, there lurk fear, convulsion and agony. The juvenile sex crimes as well as national outbursts of our time are indices of the same process. Evil does not stem from nature, but from the violence committed by society against human nature striving to develop.

In the last stages of industrial society even well-to-do parents educate their children not so much as their heirs as for a coming adjustment to mass culture. They have experienced the insecurities of fortune and draw the consequences. Among the lower strata, the protective authority of the parents, which was always menaced, has worn away entirely, until finally the Balilla has slipped into its place. Totalitarian governments are themselves taking in hand the preparation of the individual for his role as a member of the masses. They pretend that the conditions of urbanized life clamor for it. The problem so brutally solved by Fascism has existed in modern society for the last hundred years. A straight line runs from the children's groups of the Camorra to the cellar clubs of New York,[1] except that the Camorra still had an educational value.

Today, in all strata, the child is intimately familiar with economic life. He expects of the future not a kingdom, but a living, calculated in dollars and cents, from some profession which he considers promising. He is as tough and shrewd as an adult. The modern make-up of society sees to it that the utopian dreams of childhood are cut short in earliest youth, that the much praised "adjustment" replaces the defamed Oedipus complex. If it is true that family life has at all times reflected the baseness of public life, the tyranny, the lies, the stupidity of the existing reality, it is also true that it has produced the forces to resist these. The experiences and images which gave inner direction to the life of every individual could not be acquired outside. They flashed forth when the child hung on his mother's smile, showed off in front of his father, or rebelled against him, when he felt someone shared his experiences—in brief, they were fostered by that cozy and snug warmth which was indispensable for the development of the human being.

The gradual dissolution of the family, the transformation of personal life into leisure and of leisure into routines supervised to the last detail, into the pleasures of the ball park and the movie, the best seller and the radio, has brought about the dis-

[1]On the subject of cellar clubs, cf. Brill and Payne, *The Adolescent Court and Crime Prevention*, New York 1938.

appearance of the inner life. Long before culture was replaced by these manipulated pleasures, it had already assumed an escapist character. Men had fled into a private conceptual world and rearranged their thoughts when the time was ripe for rearranging reality. The inner life and the ideal had become conservative factors. But with the loss of his ability to take this kind of refuge—an ability that thrives neither in slums nor in modern settlements—man has lost his power to conceive a world different from that in which he lives. This other world was that of art. Today it survives only in those works which uncompromisingly express the gulf between the monadic individual and his barbarous surrounding—prose like Joyce's and paintings like Picasso's Guernica. The grief and horror such works convey are not identical with the feelings of those who, for rational reasons, are turning away from reality or rising against it. The consciousness behind them is rather one cut off from society as it is, and forced into queer, discordant forms. These inhospitable works of art, by remaining loyal to the individual as against the infamy of existence, thus retain the true content of previous great works of art and are more closely related to Raphael's madonnas and Mozart's operas than is anything that harps on the same harmonies today, at a time when the happy countenance has assumed the mask of frenzy and only the melancholy faces of the frenzied remain a sign of hope.

Today art is no longer communicative. In Guyau's theory, the esthetic quality arises from the fact that a man recognizes the feelings expressed by a work of art as his own.[1] The "life analogous to our own," however, in the portrayal of which our own life becomes visible, is no longer the conscious and active life of the nineteenth century middle class. Today, persons merely appear to be persons; both "elites" and masses obey a mechanism that leaves them only one single reaction in any given situation. Those elements of their nature which have not yet been canalized have no possibility of understandable expression. Under the surface of their organized civic life, of their optimism and enthusiasm, men are apprehensive and bewildered and lead a miserable, almost prehistoric existence. The last works of art are symbols of this, cutting through the veneer of rationality that covers all human relationships. They destroy all superficial unanimity and conflict, which are all in truth clouded and chaotic, and it is only in such sagas as those of Galsworthy or Jules Romains, in white papers and in popular biographies, that they attain an artificial coherence. The last substantial works of

[1]Cf. J. M. Guyau, *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

art, however, abandon the idea that real community exists; they are the monuments of a solitary and despairing life that finds no bridge to any other or even to its own consciousness. Yet they are monuments, not mere symptoms. The despair is also revealed outside the field of pure art, in so-called entertainment and the world of "cultural goods," but this can only be inferred from without, through the means of psychological or sociological theory. The work of art is the only adequate objectification of the individual's deserted state and despair.

Dewey says that art is "the most universal and freest form of communication."[1] But the gulf between art and communication is perforce wide in a world in which accepted language only intensifies the confusion, in which the dictators speak the more gigantic lies the more deeply they appeal to the heart of the masses. "Art breaks through barriers, . . . which are impermeable in ordinary association."[2] These barriers consist precisely in the accepted forms of thought, in the show of unreserved adjustment, in the language of propaganda and marketable literature. Europe has reached the point where all the highly developed means of communication serve constantly to strengthen the barriers "that divide human beings";[3] in this, radio and cinema in no way yield the palm to airplane and gun. Men as they are today understand each other. If they were to cease to understand either themselves or others, if the forms of their communication were to become suspect to them, and the natural unnatural, then at least the terrifying dynamic would come to a standstill. To the extent that the last works of art still communicate, they denounce the prevailing forms of communication as instruments of destruction, and harmony as a delusion of decay.

The present world, denounced though it is by its last works of art, may change its course. The omnipotence of technics, the increasing independence of production from its location, the transformation of the family, the socialization of existence, all these tendencies of modern society may enable men to create the conditions for eradicating the misery these processes have brought over the earth. Today, however, the substance of the individual remains locked up in himself. His intellectual acts are no longer intrinsically connected with his human essence. They take whatever course the situation may dictate. Popular judgment, whether true or false, is directed from above, like other social functions. No matter how expertly public opinion may be inquired into, no matter how elaborate

[1] John Dewey, *Art as Experience*, New York 1934, p. 270.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 244.

[3] *Ibid.*

the statistical or psychological soundings, what they reach is always a mechanism, never the human essence. What comes to the fore when men most candidly reveal their inner selves, is precisely the predatory, evil, cunning beings whom the demagogue knows so well how to handle. A pre-established harmony prevails between his outward purposes and their crumbled inner lives. Everybody knows himself to be wicked and treacherous, and those who confirm this, Freud, Pareto and others, are quickly forgiven. Yet, every new work of art makes the masses draw back in horror. Unlike the Führers, it does not appeal to their psychology, nor, like psychoanalysis, does it contain a promise to guide this psychology towards "adjustment." In giving downtrodden humans a shocking awareness of their own despair, the work of art professes a freedom which makes them foam at the mouth. The generation that allowed Hitler to become great takes its adequate pleasure in the convulsions which the animated cartoon imposes upon its helpless characters, not in Picasso, who offers no recreation and cannot be "enjoyed" anyhow. Misanthropic, spiteful creatures, who secretely know themselves as such, like to be taken for the pure, childish souls who applaud with innocent approval when Donald Duck gets a cuffing. There are times when faith in the future of mankind can be kept alive only through absolute resistance to the prevailing responses of men. Such a time is the present.

At the end of his book on esthetic problems, Mortimer Adler defines the external marks of the great work of art: gross popularity at any one time or over a period of time, and the ability to satisfy the most varied levels of taste.[1] Consistently with this, Adler praises Walt Disney as the great master because he reaches a perfection in his field that surpasses our best critical capacity to analyze and at the same time pleases children and simple folk.[2] Adler has tried like few other critics for a view of art independent of time. But his unhistorical method makes him fall a prey to time all the more. While undertaking to raise art above history and keep it pure, he betrays it to the contemptible trash of the day. Elements of culture isolated and dissevered from the historical process may appear as similar as drops of water; yet they are as different as Heaven and Hell. For a long time now, Raphael's blue horizons have been quite properly a part of Disney's landscapes, in which *amoretti* frolic more unrestrainedly than they ever did at the feet of the Sistine Madonna. The sunbeams almost beg to have the name of a soap or

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 581.
[2] *Ibid.*

a toothpaste emblazoned on them; they have no meaning except as a background for such advertising. Disney and his audiences, as well as Adler, unswervingly stand for the purity of the blue horizon, but perfect loyalty to principles isolated from the concrete situation makes them turn into their very opposite and finally results in perfect relativism.

Adler's book is devoted to the film which he loyally measures according to Aristotle's esthetic principles, thereby professing his faith in the supra-historical validity of philosophy. The essence of art, he says, is imitation that combines the greatest similarity of form with the greatest difference of content.[1] This Aristotelian doctrine has become a *cliché*, the opposite of which—the greatest similarity of content with the greatest difference of form—would do as well. Both belong to those axioms which are so calculated that they can easily be adjusted to the conventional doctrine in each field. The content of such principles, whether favored by metaphysicians or empiricists, will not hurt anybody's feelings. If, for instance, science is defined as the aggregate of all verifiable statements, one may be certain of every scientist's approval. But even an empty generality such as this discloses its double-dealing potency as soon as it is related to the real world, which "verifies" the judgment of the powerful and gives the lie to the powerless. A dogmatic definition of the beautiful protects philosophy no better from capitulating to the powers-that-be than a concept of art derived from the uncritical applause of the masses, to which it bows only too readily.

The dogmatists succumb to relativism and conformism not only in their discussions of abstract esthetic problems, but also in their views of the moral significance of art. "There is no question," says Adler, "that prudence should govern art to whatever extent the work of art or the artist comes within the sphere of morality."[2] One of the main purposes of Adler's book is to discover principles for art education. The concept of morality which he advances for this is, however, as unhistorical as his concept of art. "Crime is only one kind of anti-social behavior. Any behavior which does not conform to established customs is anti-social in essentially the same sense. . . . Men who act anti-socially, whether criminally or contrary to the customs generally prevailing, are in the same sense morally vicious."[3] He recognizes the difficulty arising from the fact that different views and customs prevail in different social strata. But he thinks that the resulting practical difficulties do not impair his

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25 and 450f.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 448.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

principle. The problem simply becomes one of fixing upon which mores are more and which less desirable for society as a whole. This problem, moreover, only exists for him when there is a conflict between the prevailing habits of different social groups; and not when there is a conflict between an individual and all the groups, a situation which incidentally contains within itself the most serious moral problem of all. Thus, with regard to morality, the disparity is obliterated between the principles of metaphysics and those of positivism. Adler is irresistibly led to conclusions drawn long ago by Lévy-Bruhl[1] and other sociologists: what is moral is determined by the positive content of existing customs and habits, and morality consists in formulating and approving what is accepted by the prevailing social order. But even if the whole of a society, such as the coordinated German nation, is of one mind in this regard, it still does not follow that its judgment is true. Error has no less often united men than truth.

Even though truth, of its nature, coincides with the common interest, it has usually been at loggerheads with the sentiment of the community at large. Socrates was put to death for asserting the rights of his conscience against the accepted Athenian religion. According to Hegel, the sentence was just, for the individual "must bend before the general power, and the real and noblest power is the Nation."[2] And yet, according to Hegel, the principle Socrates upheld was superior to this one. Contrariety is even more pronounced in Christianity, which came to the world as a "scandal." The first Christians impugned "the generally prevailing customs" and were therefore persecuted in line with the prevailing law and mores. But this did not make them "morally depraved," as would follow from Adler's definition; on the contrary, *they* were the ones to unmask the depravity of the Roman world. Just as the essence of art cannot be arrested through rigid supra-temporal principles, ideas such as justice, morality, and public cannot be interconnected through rigid, supra-temporal relations. Kierkegaard's doctrine that the spread of Christianity in the public consciousness has nowise overcome the true Christian's wary attitude to the state is more valid today than ever. "For the concept of the Christian is a polemical concept; it is possible to be a Christian only in opposition to others, or in a manner opposed to that of others."[3] Those modern

[1] L. Lévy-Bruhl, *La Morale et La Science des Moeurs*, Paris 1904.

[2] Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, translated by E. S. Haldane (our version), Vol. I, p. 441.

[3] Soeren Kierkegaard, *Angriff auf die Christenheit*, herausgegeben von A. D. Dorner und Christoph Schrempf, Stuttgart 1896, p. 239.

apologists were ill-advised who attempted to validate the attitude of the Church toward witch-burning as a concession to popular ideas.[1] Truth can make no pacts with "prevailing customs." It finds no guiding thread in them. In the era of witch hunts, opposition to the public spirit would have been moral.

Adler's book breathes the conviction that mankind must orient to fixed values, as these have been set forth by great teachers, above all by Aristotle and St. Thomas. To positivism and relativism he opposes sturdy Christian metaphysics. It is true that modern disbelief does find its theoretical expression in scientivism, which explains that binding values exist for "psychological" reasons, because there is need for them.[2] Success, which in Calvinism was not the same as being a member of the Elect, but was only an indication that one might be, becomes the only standard of human life. In this way, according to Adler, positivism grants a charter to Fascism. For, if there can be no meaningful discussion of questions of value, action alone decides. Metaphysics draws from this a conclusion advantageous to itself: since the denial of eternal principles handicaps the struggle against the new barbarism, the old faith must be reestablished. Men are asked to risk their lives for freedom, democracy, the nation. Such a demand seems absurd when there are no binding values. Metaphysics alone, Adler supposes, can give humanity the hold it has lost, metaphysics makes true community possible.

Such ideas misconstrue the present historical situation. Positivism, indeed, articulates the state of mind of the unbelieving younger generation, and it does so as adequately as sport and jazz. The young no longer have faith in anything, and for this reason they are able to shift to any belief. But the fault lies just as much with the dogmatism they have forgotten as with themselves. The middle class confined religion to a kind of reservation. Following Hobbes' advice, they swallowed its doctrines whole, like pills, and never concretely questioned its truth. Religion for modern men tended to be a memory of childhood. With the disintegration of the family, the experiences that have invigorated religion also lose their power. Today, men exercise restraints not out of belief but out of hard necessity. That is why they are so saddened. The weaker they are and the more deeply disappointed, the more violently do they espouse brutality. They have cast aside all ties to the principle of heavenly love. Any demand that they should return to it for reasons of state is not tenable in religious terms.

[1] Cf., e.g., Johannes Janssen, *Kulturzustände des Deutschen Volkes*, 4. Buch, Freiburg i.B. 1903, p. 546.

[2] Cf. R. v. Mises, *Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus*, The Hague 1939, pp. 368f.

Religion has a claim on faith not insofar as it is useful but insofar as it is true. Agreement between political and religious interests is by no means guaranteed. The naive presupposition of such agreement, made by those who defend absolute values, confutes their doctrines. Positivism is as strongly in conformity with our time as Adler thinks, but it contains an element of honesty for that very reason. The young who adopt this philosophy exhibit greater probity of mind than those who out of pragmatic motives bow to an absolute in which they do not quite believe. Uncritical return to religion and metaphysics is as questionable today as the road back to the beautiful paintings and compositions of classicism, no matter how enticingly such havens may beckon. The revivals of Greek and medieval philosophers, such as Adler recommends, are not so far remote from certain revivals of melodies by Bach, Mozart and Chopin in current popular music.

Adler denounces in impressive passages the hopeless spiritual plight of the young.[1] He unmasks "the religion of science and the religion of the state." But it would be a fatal misunderstanding to summon the young away from these doctrines and lead them back to older authorities. What is to be deplored is not that scientific thought has replaced dogmatism, but rather that such thought, still prescientific in the literal sense, is always confined within the limits of the various specialized disciplines. It is wrong to rely on science so long as the formulation of its problems is conditioned by an obsolete division into disciplines. Economy of thought and technique alone do not exhaust the meaning of science, which is also will to truth. The way toward overcoming positivistic thinking does not lie in a regressive revision of science, but in driving this will to truth further until it conflicts with present reality. Illuminating insights are not to be found in high and eternal principles, with which everybody agrees anyway (who does not profess faith in freedom and justice!), or in the routine arrangement of facts into customary patterns.

Preference for static principles was the great delusion of Husserl's original "Eidetics," one of the precursors of Neo-Thomism. Adler seems to fall into the same error. Sublime principles are always abstract—positivism is right in speaking here of fictions or auxiliary constructions—but insights always refer to the particular. In the process of cognition, each concept, which in isolation has its conventional meaning, takes part in forming new configurations, in

[1]Cf. Mortimer Adler, "This Pre-War Generation" in: *Harpers Magazine*, Oct. 1940, p. 524f.

which it acquires a new and specific logical function. Aristotle's metaphysics taken as a whole marks such a configuration, as do the doctrines of St. Thomas on whom Adler draws. The categories become distorted or meaningless unless they enter new, more adequate structures that are required by the particular historical situation in which they play a part. The reason for this is not that each period has its own truth assigned to it, as historical and sociological relativism would like us to believe, or that one can dispense with philosophic and religious traditions, but rather that intellectual loyalty, without which truth cannot exist, consists both in preserving past insights and contradicting and transforming them. Abstract formulations of the highest values are always adjustable to the practice of stake and guillotine. Knowledge really concerned with values does not look to higher realms. It rather tries to penetrate the cultural pretences of its time, in order to distinguish the features of a frustrated humanity. Values are to be disclosed by uncovering the historical practice that destroys them.

In our time thinking is endangered not so much by the wrong paths it may pursue as by its being prematurely cut short. Positivism rests content with the prearranged routines of official science, whereas metaphysics invites intuitions that have their content in the prevailing modes of consciousness. The demand for purity and clarity, applicability and matter-of-factness which is immediately raised to challenge any act of thinking that is not free from imagination, expresses a repugnance to going beyond the limitations of the "statement," to intellectual restlessness and "negativism," all of which are indispensable elements of thought. The truth of ideas is demonstrated not when they are held fast but when they are driven further.

The pedantry of matter-of-factness produces, conversely, a fetishism of ideas. Today ideas are approached with a sullen seriousness; each as soon as it appears is regarded as either a ready-made prescription that will cure society or as a poison that will destroy it. All the ambivalent traits of obedience assert themselves in the attitude to ideas. People desire to submit to them or to rebel against them, as if they were gods. Ideas begin by playing the role of professional guides, and end as authorities and Fuehrers. Whoever articulates them is regarded as a prophet or a heretic, as an object to be adored by the masses or as a prey to be hunted by the Gestapo. This taking of ideas only as verdicts, directives, signals, characterizes the enfeebled man of today. Long before the era of the Gestapo, his intellectual function had been reduced to statements of fact. The movement of thought stops short at slogans, diagnoses and prognoses. Every man is classified: bourgeois, communist, fascist,

Jew, alien or "one of us." And this determines the attitude once and for all. According to such patterns dependent masses and dependable sages throughout the world history have always thought. They have been united under "ideas," mental products that have become fetishes. Thinking, faithful to itself, in contrast to this, knows itself at any moment to be a whole and to be uncompleted. It is less like a sentence spoken by a judge than like the prematurely interrupted last words of a condemned man. The latter looks upon things under a different impulsion than that of dominating them.

Adler appreciates the public as it is, and in consequence popularity is a positive criterion to him. He treats the film as popular poetry and compares it with the theater of the Elizabethian period, when for the first time "writers had the double role of artist and merchant competing in a free market for both plaudits and profits."[1] According to him the middle class theater has been determined by market economy and democracy. Communists or sentimental aristocrats may regret commercialization, says Adler, but its influence on Shakespeare was not so bad. The film must please not merely the masses, but beyond them "the organized groups which have become the unofficial custodians of public manners and the common good."[2] Adler does realize the difficulties encountered by the film, as compared with the theater, because of the size of its public and the differentiated needs of modern society, but he overlooks the dialectics of popularity. Quite against his intention to differentiate and evaluate social phenomena, his static way of thinking tends to level everything. Just as he is tempted to confuse Raphael's and Disney's scenic backgrounds, he seems to identify the Hays Office and the guardians of the Platonic Republic.

His whole approach to the film as an art bears witness to the confusion of entirely different cultural orders. He defends the movies against the accusation that they are not art because of the collective character of their production.[3] But the discrepancy between art and film, which exists despite the potentialities of the motion picture, is not the result of the surface phenomenon of the number of people employed in Hollywood as much as of the economic circumstances. The economic necessity for rapid return of the considerable capital invested in each picture forbids the pursuit of the inherent logic of each work of art—of its own autonomous necessity. What today is called popular entertainment is actually

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 131-32.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 145.
[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. 483-4.

demands evoked, manipulated and by implication deteriorated by the cultural industries. It has little to do with art, least of all where it pretends to be such.

Popularity has to be understood with reference to social change, not merely as a quantitative but as a qualitative process. It was never directly determined by the masses, but always by their representatives in other social strata. Under Elizabeth and even as late as the 19th century, the educated were the spokesmen for the individual. Since the interests of the individual and those of the rising middle classes did not fully coincide, the works of art always contained a critical element. Ever since that time, the concepts of individual and society have been reciprocal ones. The individual developed in harmony with and in opposition to society: society developed when individuals did, and it developed when individuals didn't. In the course of this process, social mechanisms, such as the national and international division of labor, crisis and prosperity, war and peace, strengthened their own independence of the individual, who became increasingly alien to them and faced them with growing impotence. Society slipped away from individuals and individuals from society.

The cleavage between private and social existence has taken on catastrophic proportions toward the end of the liberalistic period. New forms of social life are announcing themselves in which the individual, as he is, will be transshaped unless he is destroyed. But the educated are still indissolubly bound up with man as he existed in the past. They still have in mind the individual's harmony and culture, at a time when the task is no longer to humanize the isolated individual, which is impossible, but to realize humanity as a whole. Even Goethe had to concede that his ideal of the harmonious personality had foundered; in our own time, the pursuit of this ideal presupposes not only indifference toward the general suffering, but the very opposite of the ideal, a distorted personality.

In Europe, representation and leadership of the masses has shifted from the educated to powers more conscious of their task. Criticism in art and theory has been replaced by actual hatred or by the wisdom of obedience. The opposition of individual and society, and of private and social existence, which gave seriousness to the pastime of art, has become obsolete. The so-called entertainments, which have taken over the heritage of art, are today nothing but popular tonics, like swimming or football. Popularity no longer has anything to do with the specific content or the truth of artistic productions. In the democratic countries, the final decision no longer rests with the educated but with the amusement

industry. Popularity consists of the unrestricted accommodation of the people to what the amusement industry thinks they like. For the totalitarian countries, the final decision rests with the managers of direct and indirect propaganda, which is by its nature indifferent to truth. Competition of artists in the free market, a competition in which success was determined by the educated, has become a race for the favor of the powers-that-be, the outcome of which is influenced by the secret police. Supply and demand are no longer regulated by social need but by reasons of state. Popularity, in these countries, is as little a result of the free play of forces as any other prize; in other countries it shows a similar tendency.

In a beautiful passage of his book, Dewey explains that communication is the consequence and not the intention of the artistic work. "Indifference to response of the immediate audience is a necessary trait of all artists that have something new to say."[1] Today even the imaginary future audience has become questionable, because, once again, man within humanity is as solitary and abandoned as humanity within the infinite universe. But the artists, continues Dewey, "are animated by a deep conviction that since they can only say what they have to say, the trouble is not with their work but those who, having eyes, see not, and having ears, hear not."[2] The only hope remaining is that the deaf ears in Europe imply an opposition to the lies that are being hammered at men from all sides and that men are following their leaders with their eyes tight shut. One day we may learn that in the depths of their hearts, the masses, even in fascist countries, secretly knew the truth and disbelieved the lie, like katatonic patients who make known only at the end of their trance that nothing has escaped them. Therefore it may not be entirely senseless to continue speaking a language that is not easily understood.

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[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 104.
[2] *Ibid.*

Spengler Today

By T. W. Adorno

It has been suggested that the history of philosophy does not consist so much in having its problems solved as it does in having them forgotten by the intellectual movements they have themselves set in motion. Oswald Spengler's doctrine has been forgotten, and with the speed that he himself ascribed to world history when he said that it was fast developing the momentum of a catastrophe. After an initial popular success German public opinion very quickly turned against the book. Official philosophers reproached it for superficiality, the specific official sciences branded it incompetent and charlatan, and, during the hustle and bustle of the period of German inflation and stabilization, the thesis of the Decline of the West[1] was none too popular. In the meantime, Spengler had laid himself open to such an extent in a number of smaller studies arrogant in tone and full of cheap antitheses that a negative attitude to him was made easy for those who wanted to go on as they were. When in 1922 the second volume of the main work appeared, it fell far short of attracting the attention that had been given to the first, though the second was actually the volume that concretely developed the thesis of the decline. Laymen who read Spengler as they had read Nietzsche and Schopenhauer before him had become estranged from philosophy. The professional philosophers soon clung to Heidegger who gave their listlessness a more sterling and more elevated expression, ennobling death (which Spengler had decreed somewhat naturalistically) and promising to change the thought of it into an academic panacea. Spengler had had his trouble for nothing. His little book on man and technics was not allowed to be in the same class as the smart philosophical anthropologies of the same time. Hardly any notice was taken of his relations with National Socialism, his controversy with Hitler, or his death. In Germany today he is pronounced a grumbler and reactionary in the manipulated, National Socialist sense of this word. Abroad, he is regarded as one of the ideological accomplices of the new barbarism, a representative of the most brutal type of Prussian imperialism.

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[1]We refer to the translation by Charles Francis Atkinson, Vol. 1, New York 1926; Vol. 2, New York 1928.

But in spite of all this, there is good reason once again to ask whether Spengler's teaching is true or false. It would be conceding too much to him to look to world history, which stepped over him on its way to the New Order of the time, for the final judgment upon the value of his ideas. There is, however, even less occasion to do this, for the course of world history has itself vindicated his immediate prognoses to an extent that would be astonishing if these prognoses were remembered. The forgotten Spengler takes his revenge by threatening to be right. His oblivion bears witness to an intellectual impotence comparable to the political impotence of the Weimar Republic in the face of Hitler. Spengler hardly found an adversary who was his equal, and forgetting him has worked as an evasion. One has only to read Manfred Schroeter's book, *Der Streit um Spengler*, with its complete survey of the literature up to 1922, to become aware of how completely the German mind failed against an opponent to whom all the substantial power of the German philosophy of history seemed to have passed. Pedantic punctiliousness in the concrete, wordy conformist optimism in the idea, and, often enough, an involuntary concession of weakness in the assurance that after all things are not yet so bad with our culture, or in the sophistic trick of undermining Spengler's relativistic position by exaggerating his own relativism—this is all that German philosophy and science could bring to bear against a man who rebuked them as a sergeant-major would dress down a rookie. Behind their consequential helplessness one could almost suspect the presence of a secret impulse to obey the sergeant-major in the end.

It becomes the more urgent to take a stand against this philosophy. Let us try, therefore, first to see the force of Spengler by comparing some of his theses with our own situation; then, to search out the sources of power that give such a force to his philosophy, the theoretical and empirical shortcomings of which are so plainly evident; and let us finally ask, without being assured of a positive answer beforehand, what considerations might possibly be able to hold their ground against Spengler without a false posture of strength and without the bad conscience of official optimism.

In order to demonstrate Spengler's force we shall at first not discuss his general historico-philosophical concept of the plant-like growth and decay of culture, but the way he directed this philosophy of history to the imminent phase of history before us, which he termed Caesarism, in analogy with the Roman Empire period. His most characteristic predictions pertain to questions of mass domination, such as propaganda, mass culture, forms of political manipulation, particularly to certain tendencies inherent in democracy that

threaten to make it turn into dictatorship. In comparison with these elements, specifically economic predictions play but a minor role, in accordance with Spengler's general view that economy is not a basic social reality but rather an "expression" of particular "souldoms." The question of monopoly is not raised, although Spengler is acutely aware of the cultural consequences of the centralization of power. Yet, his insight reaches far enough to disclose certain noteworthy economic phenomena, such as the decline of money economy.

A few trains of thought which relate to civilization in the era of Caesarism have been selected from his second volume. We begin with some quotations on the "physiognomics" of the modern metropolis. Spengler says of the houses of the big city: "They are, generally speaking, no longer houses in which Vesta and Janus, Lares and Penates, have any sort of footing, but mere premises which have been fashioned, not by blood but by requirements, not by feeling but by the spirit of commercial enterprise. So long as the hearth has a pious meaning as the actual and genuine centre of a family, the old relation to the land is not wholly extinct. But when that, too, follows the rest into oblivion, and the mass of tenants and bed-occupiers in the sea of houses leads a vagrant existence from shelter to shelter like the hunters and pastors of the "pre"-time, then the intellectual nomad is completely developed. This city is a world, is the world. Only as a whole, as a human dwelling-place, has it meaning, the houses being merely the stones of which it is assembled."[1] The image of the latter day city-dweller as a second nomad deserves special emphasis. It expresses not only fear and estrangement but the dawning "history-less" character of a situation in which men experience themselves only as objects of opaque processes and in which, between sudden shock and sudden oblivion, they are no longer capable of any continuous sense of time. Spengler clearly sees the interconnection between pauperization and the new type of man that has fully revealed himself in the totalitarian outbreaks: "But always the splendid mass-cities harbour lamentable poverty and degraded habits, and the attics and mansards, the cellars and back courts are breeding a new type of raw man."[2] He knows little about the basic conditions responsible for this poverty. But he sees the more clearly the frame of mind gripping the masses outside the actual process of production, matters usually referred to under the head of "leisure time." "Tension,

[1] II, p. 100.
[2] II, 102.

when it has become intellectual, knows no form of recreation but that which is specific to the world-city—namely, détente, relaxation, distraction. Genuine play, joie de vivre, pleasure, inebriation, are products of the cosmic beat and as such no longer comprehensible in their essence. But the relief of hard, intensive brain-work by its opposite—conscious and practised fooling—of intellectual tension by the bodily tension of sport, of bodily tension by the sensual straining after 'pleasure' and the spiritual straining after the 'excitements' of betting and competitions, of the pure logic of the day's work by a consciously enjoyed mysticism—all this is common to the world-cities of all the Civilizations."[1] Spengler built this idea into the thesis that "art itself becomes a sport."[2] He knew neither Jazz nor Quiz, but if one were to summarize the most conspicuous trends of our present mass culture, one could not find a more pregnant category than that of sport, the hurdling of rhythmical obstacles, and contest or competition either among the performers or between production and audience. The full force of Spengler's contempt is hurled at the victims of the advertising culture of our epoch. The "residue is the Fellah type."[3]

Spengler describes this Fellah type more concretely as resulting from an expropriation of human consciousness through the centralized means of public communication. He still conceives of it in terms of money power, though he foresees the end of monetary economy. According to him, mind, in the sense of limitless autonomy, can exist only in relation to the abstract medium of money. However this may be, his description is fully correct as regards conditions under the totalitarian regime, which has declared an ideological war against both money and mind. One could say that Spengler became aware of traits in the press that were fully developed only later, when the radio came on the scene, just as he raised objections against democracy that attained their full weight only when dictatorship established itself. "Democracy has by its newspaper completely expelled the book from the mental life of the people. The book-world, with its profusion of standpoints that compelled thought to select and criticize, is now a real possession only for a few. The people reads the *one paper*, 'its' paper, which forces itself through the front doors by millions daily, spellbinds the intellect from morning to night, drives the book into oblivion by its more engaging layout, and if one or another specimen of a book does emerge into

[1] II, 103.
[2] I, 35.
[3] II, 105.

visibility, forestalls and eliminates its possible effects by 'reviewing' it."[1] Spengler has a sense of the dual character of enlightenment in the era of universal domination. "With the political press is bound up the need of universal school-education, which in the classical world was completely lacking. In this demand there is an element—quite unconscious—of desiring to shepherd the masses, as the object of party politics, into the newspaper's power area. The idealist of the early democracy regarded popular education, without arrière pensée, as enlightenment pure and simple, and even today one finds here and there weak heads that become enthusiastic on the Freedom of the Press—but it is precisely this that smooths the path for the coming caesars of the world-press. Those who have learnt to read succumb to their power, and the visionary self-determination of Late democracy issues in a thorough-going determination of the people by the powers whom the printed word obeys."[2] The things Spengler ascribes to the modest press magnates of the first world war have blossomed into the technique of manipulated pogroms and spontaneous popular demonstrations. "Without the reader's observing it, the paper, and himself with it, changes masters"[3]—this has literally come true under the Third Reich. Spengler calls it the "style of the twentieth century. Today, a democrat of the old school would demand, not freedom for the press, but freedom from the press; but meantime the leaders have changed themselves into parvenus who have to secure their postion (position em. TWA) vis-à-vis the masses."[4] He prophesies Goebbels: "No tamer has his animals more under his power. Unleash the people as reader-mass and it will storm through the streets and hurl itself upon the target indicated, terrifying and breaking windows; a hint to the press-staff and it will become quiet and go home. The press today is an army with carefully organized arms and branches, with journalists as officers, and readers as soldiers. But here, as in every army, the soldier obeys blindly, and war-aims and operation-plans change without his knowledge. The reader neither knows, nor is allowed to know, the purposes for which he is used, nor even the role that he is to play. A more appalling caricature of freedom of thought cannot be imagined. Formerly a man did not dare to think freely. Now he dares, but cannot; his will to think is only a willingness to think to order, and this is what he feels as his liberty."[5]

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[1] II, 461.
[2] II, 462.
[3] II, 462.
[4] II, 462.
[5] II, 462 f.

The specifically political prognoses are no less astonishing. First of all a military prediction, which, incidentally, may have been influenced by certain experiences of the German army command during the first world war, experiences that have been put into practice in the meantime. Spengler regards the "democratic" principle of universal military service as obsolete, together with the tactical means derived from it. "The place of the permanent armies as we know them will gradually be taken by professional forces of volunteer war-keen soldiers; and from millions we shall revert to hundreds of thousands. But ipso facto this second century will be one of *actually* Contending States. These armies are not substitutes for war"—as was the case, according to Spengler, during the nineteenth century—"they are for war and they want war. Within two generations it will be they whose will prevails over that of all the comfortables put together. In these wars of theirs for the heritage of the whole world, continents will be staked, India, China, South Africa, Russia, Islam called out, new technics and tactics played and counterplayed. The great cosmopolitan foci of power will dispose at their pleasure of smaller states—their territory, their economy and their men alike—all that is now merely province, passive object, means to end, and its destinies are without importance to the great march of things. We ourselves, in a very few years, have learnt to take little or no notice of events that before the War would have horrified the world."[1] But the era to which Spengler refers as that of contending states is followed, according to him, by a period that is "historyless" in a most sinister sense. This paradoxical prognosis is clearly paralleled by the tendency of present economy to eliminate the market and the dynamics of competition. This tendency is directed towards static conditions which no longer know of crises in the strictly economic sense of the term. The labor of others is appropriated, without any intermediary processes, by those in command of the means of production, and the life of those who do the work is maintained planfully from above.[2] What Spengler correctly prophesies for the small states as political units also begins to materialize among men themselves in the large states and particularly among the inhabitants of the powerful totalitarian ones. Here, men have become mere objects. That is why history appears to be extinguished. Whatever happens, happens to them, not, strictly speaking, through them. Even the greatest strategic exploits and triumphal marches retain a touch of illusion and are not quite real. The events take place between the oligarchs and their specialists in murder. They are not engendered by the inherent

[1] II, 429.

[2] cf. F. Pollock, "State Capitalism", in this issue.

dynamics of society but rather subject the latter to an administration which sometimes goes so far as to imply annihilation. Night-bomber attacks on cities which are left practically defenseless even if they put up some sort of defense—this is the sort of history that has been established today. Hitler's edifices in Nürnberg, forsaken as they are on days other than party congresses, have something Egyptian about them which ought to have delighted Spengler. They are like the monuments of a foreign conqueror, strangely isolated in the subjugated country. Even Hitler's voice, sounding as if it came from an ivory tower, has the ring of this isolation.

As objects of political forces men will lose their political will and spontaneity. "Once the Imperial Age has arrived, there are no more political problems. People manage with the situation as it is and the powers that be. In the Period of Contending States, torrents of blood had reddened the pavements of all world-cities, so that the great truths of Democracy might be turned into actualities, and for the winning of rights without which life seemed not worth the living. Now these rights are won, but the grandchildren cannot be moved even by punishment, to make use of them."[1] Spengler's prediction of an essential change within the structure of political parties has been corroborated to the letter by National Socialism: the party has become a mere "following." His "physiognomics" of the party are extraordinarily impressive, visualizing the kinship between the party system and middle class liberalism. "A noble party in a parliament is inwardly just as spurious as a proletarian. Only the bourgeoisie is in its natural place there."[2] He stresses the inherent mechanisms which tend to make the party system turn into dictatorship. Such considerations have from the beginning been familiar ones to the "cyclical" philosophies of history. Macchiavelli in particular developed the idea that the corruption of democratic institutions will in the long run engender dictatorship again and again. But Spengler, who in a certain sense revives at the end of an epoch the position Macchiavelli held at the beginning of that epoch, shows himself superior to this early political philosopher in that he has had experience of the dialectics of history, though he never calls it by name. To him, the principle of democracy develops itself into its opposite by force of its own implications. "The period of real party government covers scarcely two centuries, and in our case is, since the World War, well on the decline. That the entire mass of the electorate, actuated by a common impulse, should send up men

[1]II, 432.
[2]II, 450.

who are capable of managing their affairs—which is the naive assumption in all constitutions—is a possibility only in the first rush, and presupposes that not even the rudiments of organization by definite groups exist. So it was in France 1789 and (in Germany TWA) in 1848. An assembly has only to be, and tactical units will form at once within it, whose cohesion depends upon the will to maintain the dominant position once won, and which, so far from regarding themselves as the mouthpieces of their constituents, set about making all the expedients of agitation amenable to their influence and usable for their purposes. A tendency that has organized itself in the people has already ipso facto become the tool of the organization and continues steadily along the same path until the organization also becomes in turn the tool of the leader. The will-to-power is stronger than any theory. In the beginning the leading and the apparatus come into existence for the sake of the program. Then they are held on to defensively by their incumbents for the sake of power and booty—as is already universally the case today, for thousands in every country live on the party and the offices and functions that it distributes. Lastly the program vanishes from memory, and the organization works for its own sake alone."[1] Pointing to Germany he foresees the years of minority governments that helped Hitler into power: "The German Constitution of 1919—standing by virtue of its date on the verge of the decline of democracy—most naively admits a dictature of the party machines, which have attracted all rights into themselves and are seriously responsible to no one. The notorious system of proportional election and the Reichsliste secures their self-recruitment. In place of the 'people's' rights, which were axiomated in the Frankfurt Constitution of 1848, there is now only the right of parties, which, harmless as it sounds, really nurses within itself a Caesarism of the organizations. It must be allowed, however, that in this respect it is the most advanced of all the constitutions. Its issue is visible already. A few quite small alterations and it confers unrestricted power upon individuals."[2] Spengler speaks of the manner in which the course of history makes men forget the idea and reality of their own freedom. "The power that these abstract ideas"—embodied, according to Spengler, in the Contrat Social and the Communist Manifesto—"possess, however, scarcely extends in time beyond the two centuries that belong to party politics, and their end comes not from refutation, but from boredom—which has killed Rousseau long since and will shortly kill Marx. Men finally give up, not this or that theory, but the be-

[1] II, 452.
[2] II, 457, note 2.

lief in theory of any kind and with it the sentimental optimism of an eighteenth century that imagined that unsatisfactory actualities could be improved by the application of concepts."[1] "For us, too,—let there be no mistake about it—the age of theory is drawing to its end."[2] His prediction that the power to think will die terminates in a taboo on thinking which he attempts to justify on the basis of the inexorable course of history.

This touches upon the Archimedean point of Spengler's scheme. His historico-philosophical assertion that the mind (Geist) is dying away, and the anti-intellectual consequences deriving from the assertion, do not relate merely to the "civilization" phase of history but are basic elements of Spengler's estimate of Man. "Truths exist for the mind, facts only in relation to life. Historical treatment—in my terminology physiognomic tact—is decided by the blood, the gift of judging men broadened out into past and future, the innate flair for persons and situations, for the event, for that which had to be, must have been. It does not consist in bare scientific criticism and knowing of data."[3] The decisive factor here is the gift of judging men, for which the German text has one precise term: *Menschenkenntnis.* We find implicit the Macchiavellian assumption of an unchangeable human nature. One has only to recognize human nature as base once and for all in order to be able to dispose of it once and for all in the expectation that it will ever be the same. The gift of judging men in this sense amounts to contempt for men: they are like that. The guiding interest of this view is domination, and all of Spengler's categories are shaped to fit this concept. No matter what period he deals with, all his sympathy lies with those who rule. The disillusioned philosopher of history, when he discusses the intelligence and the iron will of modern industrial leaders, is apt to flounder like one of the pacifists for whom he professes such stubborn contempt. Kinship with the ideal of domination permits Spengler the deepest insight whenever the potentialities of this ideal are in question and blinds him with hatred as soon as he encounters impulses that go beyond the relationships of domination prevailing in history up to now. The German systems of idealism tended to make fetishes of prodigious universal concepts and, unmoved, to sacrifice human existence to them in their theories. This tendency—which Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, and Marx attacked in Hegel—Spengler enhances to the point of taking undisguised joy in human sacrifice. Where Hegel's philosophy of history speaks in stark

[1] II, 454.
[2] II, 454.
[3] II, 47.

sorrow of "the slaughter-bench of history," Spengler sees nothing but facts; facts, indeed, which according to our temperament and mood we might deplore, but which we should best not trouble about if we are compliant with historic necessity and if our physiognomics take the side of the stronger batallions. "Spengler"—says James Shotwell in his remarkable review—"is interested in the great and tragic drama which he depicts and wastes little idle sympathy upon the victims of the recurring night."[1]

Jumping about among cultures as if they were multicolored stones and operating, quite disinterestedly, with Fate, Cosmos, blood, and mind, the vastness of Spengler's conception itself expresses the motif of domination. He who unhesitatingly strips all phenomena down to the formula that "all this has happened before" thereby practices a tyranny of categories all too closely akin to the political tyranny over which Spengler enthuses so much. He juggles history in the columns of his five thousand year plan the way Hitler shunts minorities from one country to another. At the end there is no remainder. Everything fits, and every resistance offered by the concrete is liquidated. However inadequate may have been the criticism raised against Spengler by the individual cultural sciences, they demonstrated a good instinct on one point. The mirage of Spengler's historical *Grossraumwirtschaft* can be escaped only by the unique elements whose stubbornness defies dictatorial pigeonholing. Spengler, by virtue of his perspective and the sweep of his categories, might be superior to those restricted individual sciences. But he is also inferior to them by virtue of this very same sweep which he achieves by never honestly carrying through the analysis of the interrelationship of concept and detail, preferring to evade it by a conceptual structure that utilizes the "fact" ideologically in order to crush the thought, without ever casting more than a first coordinating glance at the actual fact. There is an element here of the spurious and pompous that is not unlike the Wilhelmian *Siegesallee*. Only when actuality itself changes into a *Siegesallee* does it take on the form Spengler wishes to attribute to it. The superstition that the greatness of a philosophy is a function of its grandiose aspects is a bad idealistic heritage, equivalent to the belief that the quality of a picture depends upon the sublimeness of its subject matter. Great themes do not guarantee greatness of insight. If, as Hegel insists, the whole is the truth, it is the truth only if the power of the whole enters completely into the cognition of the particular. Nothing of this can be found in Spengler. The particular never reveals any-

[1]From *Essays in Intellectual History*, New York and London 1929, p. 62.

thing to him that he would not have been aware of beforehand through the tables of his comparative survey of cultural morphology. He boasts about the physiognomic character of his method. Actually his "physiognomics" are bound up with the pretention to totality inherent in his categories. Everything individual, no matter how remote it may be, becomes to him a cipher of the big, the culture. The world is conceived as being so completely governed by the classification into cultures that nothing is left that would not readily yield to the greatness of the categories and even essentially coincide with them.[1] This contains an element of truth in so far as each historical society up to now tends to crystallize a "totality" which does not allow any freedom of the individual item. Totality may be characterized as the logical form of oppressive society. Spengler's physiognomics have the merit of directing attention towards the "culture" expressed by the individual even where the latter assumes an air of freedom behind which universal dependence is hidden. But this merit is more than counterbalanced. His insistence on the universal dependence of the individual items upon the whole, upon the totality of the culture which they are supposed to express, makes the concrete dependencies which determine the life of men disappear in the broad generalizations of them. Hence Spengler plays up physiognomics against causality. His physiognomics equally dwell upon the passive mass reactions and the concentration of power producing them without stressing their causal interconnection and, perhaps, interaction. If this causal interconnection is dropped, it becomes possible for Spengler to level relationships of social power and dependence down to Destiny and to the quasi-biological hour of the cultural soul. He succeeds in metaphysically burdening the impotent mass-man with the ignominy historically thrust upon him by the Caesars. The physiognomic glance loses itself by coordinating the phenomena with a few headlines functioning as the invariants of his "system." Instead of plunging into the expressive character of the phenomena, he swiftly sells under shrill advertising slogans the phenomena he has uncharitably raked together. For purposes of sale, he rummages through the individual sciences on a grand scale. If one were to characterize Spengler himself in the form-language of the civilization he denounces, one would have to compare the *Decline of the West* to a department store in which the intellectual agent offers for sale dried literary scraps which he has bought up cheaply from the bankrupt estate of culture. Spengler reveals the embittered resentment of a German

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[1] cf. Karl Joel, "Die Philosophie in Spenglers 'Untergang des Abendlandes'" in *Logos*, Vol. IX, p. 140.

middle class scholar who finally wants to make capital of the treasure of his learning and to invest it in the most promising branch of business, that is, in heavy industry. His proclamation of the collapse of culture is wishful thinking. The mind hopes to be pardoned by taking the side of its sworn enemy, power, and by self-denunciation trains itself to provide anti-ideological ideologies. Spengler fulfills Lessing's aphorism about the man who was prudent enough not to be prudent. His insight into the helplessness of liberal intellectuals under the shadow of rising totalitarian power makes him desert them. The introduction to the *Decline of the West* contains a passage that has become famous: "I can only hope that men of the new generation may be moved by this book to devote themselves to technics instead of lyrics, the sea instead of the paint-brush, and politics instead of epistemology. Better they could not do."[1] One might easily imagine the personages to whom this was spoken—with a respectful side glance. Spengler concurs with their opinion that it is high time to bring the young folks once and for all to their senses. He begs for the favor of the same leaders who later became the sponsors of *Realpolitik*. Yet *Realpolitik* does not suffice to explain his wrath against paintings, poems and philosophy. This wrath betrays a deep sense of the "historyless" stage that Spengler depicted with horrified gratification. Where there are no longer "political problems" in the traditional sense, and perhaps not even irrational "economy," culture might cease to be the harmless façade which Spengler moves to demolish, unless its decline can be secured in time. Culture may then explode the contradictions that have apparently been overcome by the regimentation of economic life. Even now the officially promoted culture of Fascist countries provokes the laughter and scepticism of those who are forced to swallow it. The whole opposition against totalitarianism finds its refuge in books, in churches, and in the theater plays of the classics which are tolerated because they are so classical and which cease to be classical when they are tolerated. Spengler's verdict strikes indiscriminately at official culture and its non-conformist opposite. The moving pictures and expressionism are brought together by the same death sentence. The undifferentiated verdict fits in perfectly with the frame of mind of the wardens of National Socialist culture. They scorn their own ideologies as lies, they hate truth and can sleep quietly only when no one dares to dream any longer.

[1]I, 41.—It may be noted that Guillaume Appolinaire wrote in France *Le poète assassiné* elaborating precisely the same thesis by means of the surrealist shock. It may be safely assumed that the German nationalist and the radical French avantgarde writer did not know of each other. Both insist that they drafted their books before the world war.

The special cultural sciences, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon countries, usually visualize Spengler as a metaphysician who is ready to assault reality with the arbitrariness of his conceptual constructions. Next to the idealists, who feel that Spengler has disavowed progress in the consciousness of freedom, the positivists are Spengler's most irritated opponents. There is no doubt that his philosophy does violence to the world, but this is the same violence the world must daily suffer in reality. Formerly, history refused to unfold itself according to the Hegelian scheme. It now appears to be the more willing to freeze according to the Spenglerian one. Whether a philosophy is metaphysical or positivist cannot be decided immediately. Often enough, metaphysicians are only more far-sighted or less intimidated positivists. Is Spengler at all the metaphysician that he and his enemies like to consider him? He certainly is, as long as one remains on a formalistic level. His concepts outweigh the empirical exactitude of his data, their "verification" is difficult or impossible, and the epistemological tools of his method stem from a somewhat rough and primitive irrationalism. If, however, one goes by the substance of these concepts, one always meets positivist desiderata, above all the cult of the "fact." Spengler does not allow any occasion to pass without slandering the transcendent character of truth and without glorifying that which is thus and so and no other way, that which only has to be registered and accepted. "But in the historical world there are no ideals, but only facts—no truths, but only facts. There is no reason, no honesty, no equity, no final aim, but only facts, and anyone who does not realize this should write books on politics—let him not try to make politics."[1] Essentially critical insight into the impotence of truth in previous history, insight into the predominant power that the mere existent has over all attempts on the part of consciousness to break through the circle of mere existence—this degenerates in Spengler into a justification of the mere existent itself. The fact that something which has power and succeeds might yet be wrong—this is an idea utterly inconceivable to Spengler. Or rather, it is an idea that he spasmodically forbids himself and others. He is seized by rage whenever he comes across the voice of the powerless, and yet he has nothing to offer against that voice except the statement that it is powerless once and for all. Hegel's doctrine that the actual is rational becomes a mere caricature. Spengler maintains the Hegelian mood that the actual is pregnant with meaning and rigor and he holds on to Hegel's irony against the reformer of the world *(Weltverbesserer)*, but at the same time his thinking in naked categories of domination robs

[1] II, 368.

reality of the claim to sense and reasonableness on which alone the Hegelian mood is based. Reasonableness and unreasonableness of history are the same to Spengler, pure domination, and fact is wherever the principle of domination manifests itself. He incessantly imitates Nietzsche's domineering tone, though he never absolves himself, as Nietzsche did, from conformity with the world as it is. Nietzsche says at one point that Kant used the means of science to defend the common man's prejudices against science. Something very similar applies to Spengler. With the tools of metaphysics he has defended from the critical opposition of metaphysics the positivist cult of facts, their pliancy to the "given." A second Comte, he made positivism into a metaphysics of its own, submissiveness toward existing fact into an *amor fati*, swimming with the stream into "cosmic tact," and the abnegation of truth into truth itself. From this derives his force.

Spengler stands, together with Klages, Moeller van den Bruck, and also Jünger and Steding, among those theoreticians of extreme reaction whose criticism of liberalism proved superior in many respects to that which came from the left wing. It would be worth while to study the causes of this superiority. It is probably due to a different attitude towards the complex of "ideology." The adherents of dialectical materialism viewed the liberal ideology which they criticized largely as a false promise. They did not challenge the ideas of humanity, liberty, justice as such, but merely denied the claim of our society to represent the realization of these ideas. Though they treated the ideologies as illusions, they still found them illusions of truth itself. This lent a conciliatory splendor, if not to the existent, at least to its "objective tendencies." Their doctrine of the increase of societal antagonisms, or their statements about the potential relapse into barbarism, were hardly taken seriously. Ideologies were unmasked as apologetic concealments. Yet they were rarely conceived as powerful instruments functioning in order to change liberal competitive society into a system of immediate oppression. Thus the question of how the existent can possibly be changed by those who are its very victims, psychologically mutilated by its impact, has very rarely been put except by dialecticians of the Hegelian tradition, such as Georg von Lukàcs. Concepts such as those of the masses or of culture were largely exempt from dialectical criticism. No one cared much about how they were involved within the total process of our society. There was no realization that the masses in the specific sense of the term are not merely the majority of exploited toilers but that their characteristics as "masses" are themselves due to the present phase of class society. Nor was

there acknowledgment of the extent to which culture is changing into a regulative system of class domination. Above all the leftist critics failed to notice that the "ideas" themselves, in their abstract form, are not merely images of the truth that will later materialize, but that they are ailing themselves, afflicted with the same injustice under which they are conceived and bound up with the world against which they are set. On the right, one could the more easily see through the ideologies the more disinterested one was in the truth these ideologies contained, in however false a form. All the reactionary critics follow Nietzsche inasmuch as they regard liberty, humanity, and justice as nothing but a swindle devised by the weak as a protection against the strong. As advocates of the strong they can very easily point to the contradiction between those ideas—ailing as they necessarily are—and reality. Their critique of ideologies is a comfortable one. It consists mainly in shifting from the insight into a bad reality to an insight into bad ideas, the latter supposedly proved because those ideas have not become reality. The momentum inherent in this cheap criticism is due to its firm bond of understanding with the powers that be. Spengler and his equals are less the prophets of the course of the world spirit than its devoted agents. The very form of prognosis practised by Spengler implies an administrative deployment of men which puts them out of action. The theories against which he rages do not, strictly speaking, prophesy at all. To them history is not an eternal interplay of political "power relations"; they seek to put a rational end to this selfsame blind interplay of powers. They expect everything of men and their action, but do not arrange and classify them and figure out what will happen. The latter attitude is an index of the very reification of men which they strive to overcome, and Spengler emphasizes this attitude. He insists that what matters to the true historian is to reckon to the largest extent with unknown quantities. But one cannot reckon with the unknown of humanity. History is no equation. It is no analytic judgment at all. To conceive it as such excludes a priori the potentiality of Novelty, around which the whole of dialectical materialism is centered. Conversely, Spengler's prediction of history ever repeating itself reminds us of the myths of Tantalus and Sisyphus and the oracular responses that always presage evil. He is a fortune teller rather than a prophet. In his gigantic and destructive soothsaying the petty bourgeois celebrates his intellectual triumph. The morphology of world history serves the same needs as graphology in Klages' denunciation of consciousness. The malicious desire of the petty bourgeois to read the future out of handwriting, out of the past, or out of the cards implies the same thing that

Spengler rancorously blames the victims for: the renunciation of conscious self-determination. Spengler identifies himself with power, but his theory betrays the impotence of this identification by its soothsaying attitude. He is as sure of his case as the hangman after the judges have spoken their verdict. The historico-philosophical world formula immortalizes his own impotence no less than that of the others.

This characterization of Spengler's way of thinking may allow of some more fundamental critical considerations. We have endeavored to elaborate the positivist features of his metaphysics, his resignation to that which is what it is and no more, his elimination of the category of potentiality, and his hatred of any thinking that takes the possible seriously as against the actual. On one decisive point, however, Spengler suspended his positivism—so much so that some of his theological reviewers felt entitled to claim him an ally. This point occurs when he speaks of the moving power within history which he views as the "*Seelentum*" (souldom), the enigmatic yet thoroughly internal quality of a special type of man that, quite irrationally, enters history at times. Incidentally, Spengler sometimes calls this quality "race," though his concept of race has nothing to do with that of the National Socialists; one does not belong to a race, he once declared, one has race. Despite all his stress on "facts" and all his skeptical relativism, Spengler hypostatizes the doctrine of cultural souls as a metaphysical principle that serves as the ultimate explanation of the historical dynamic. He often asserts that it is closely related to the concept of entelechy of Leibniz and Goethe, "*geprägte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt.*" This metaphysics of a collective soul which, like a plant, unfolds and dies off makes Spengler a neighbor of the *Lebensphilosophen,* Nietzsche, Simmel and particularly Bergson whom he stigmatizes most ruthlessly. It is easy to see why the talk about soul and life fits Spengler the tactician. It enables him to call materialism shallow when actually he objects to it only because it is not positivist enough for him, the materialists wanting the world to be different from what it is. Yet the metaphysics of souldom has more than merely tactical import within Spengler's doctrine. One might call it a hidden philosophy of identity. With a little exaggeration one might also say that to Spengler world history becomes a history of "style." He considers the historical experiences of mankind to be as much the product of men's inner selves as works of art. The man of facts in this case fails to recognize the part played throughout history by material needs. The relation between man and nature, which engenders the tendency of man to dominate nature, repro-

duces itself in man's domination of other men. This is hardly realized in the *Decline of the West.* Spengler does not see to what degree the historical fate glorified by his approach results from human interaction with nature. The image of history becomes completely esthetic to him. Economy is a "form-world" precisely like art; a sphere that is the pure expression of the specific soul of a culture, essentially independent of the desiderata involved in the reproduction of material life. It is not an accident that Spengler becomes helplessly dilettantish whenever he touches upon economic problems. He discusses the omnipotence of money in the manner of a sectarian agitator denouncing the world-conspiracy of the bankers. He fails to appreciate that the means of exchange never determine the underlying structure of an economy, and is so fascinated by the façade of money, by what he calls its "symbolic power," that he mistakes the symbol for the substance itself. He does not balk at statements such as that the object of the workers' movement "is not to overcome the money-values, but to possess them."[1] As categories, slave economy, industrial proletariat, and machine technics are to him not fundamentally different from plastic arts, musical polyphony or infinitesimal calculus. Economic realities dissolve into mere marks of an internal entity. While the cross-connections thus created between the categories of reality and symbolism often shed a surprising light upon the unity of historical epochs, they lead to complete misstatements about everything that does not originate freely and autonomously from the power of human expression. What cannot be reduced, as a symbol, to sovereign human nature survives in Spengler only in vague references to cosmic interconnections.

Thus, the determinism of Spengler's conception of history appears to yield a second realm of freedom. But it only appears to do so. A most paradoxical constellation arises: everything external becomes an image of the internal, and no actual process occurs between subject and object in Spengler's philosophy of history. His world appears to grow organically out of the substance of the soul, like a plant from a seed. By being reduced to the essence of the soul, history gains an unbroken organic aspect, closed within itself. In this way, however, it becomes even more deterministic. Karl Joel declares in his article in the Spengler issue of *Logos* that it is "the whole illness of this significant book that it has forgotten man with his productivity and liberty. In spite of all interiorization he de-humanizes history and makes it rattle off as a sequence

[1] II, 506.

of typical natural processes. In spite of all animation *(Durchseelung)* he makes history into something bodily *(verleiblicht)* by aiming at its 'morphology' or 'physiognomics' and thus at a comparison of its external appearances, its forms of expression, the particular features of its phenomena."[1] History, however, is de-humanized not "in spite of all interiorization" but by means of it. Spengler's philosophy disdainfully thrusts aside the nature with which men have to struggle in history. Instead of this struggle, history itself becomes a second nature as blind and fated as vegetable life. What we may call the freedom of man consists only in the human attempts to break the rule imposed by nature. If that is ignored and the historical world is made a mere product of human essence, freedom will be lost in the resulting all-humanity *(Allmenschlichkeit)* of history. Freedom develops only through the natural world's resistance to man. Freedom postulates the existence of something non-identical. As soon as it is made absolute and its essence, the soul, is elevated into the governing principle of the whole world, this selfsame principle falls victim to mere existence. The idealist arrogance of Spengler's conception of history and the degradation of man implied in it are actually one and the same thing. Culture is not, as with Spengler, the life of self-developing collective souls but rather the struggle of men for the conditions of their perpetuation. Culture thus contains an element of resistance to blind necessity: the will for self-determination through Reason. Spengler severs culture from mankind's desire to survive. Culture becomes for him a play of the soul with itself. Resistance is eliminated. Thus his very idealism becomes subservient to his philosophy of power. Culture fits snugly into the realm of blind domination. The self-sufficient process that originates from mere inwardness and terminates in mere inwardness becomes Destiny, and history decomposes into that aimless up and down of cultures, that timelessness which Spengler blames upon the late civilizations and which actually constitute the nucleus of his own world-plan. Pure soul and pure domination coincide, as the Spenglerian soul violently and mercilessly dominates its own bearers. Real history is ideologically transfigured into a history of the soul only in order that the resisting, rebellious features of man, their consciousness, might be the more completely subordinated to blind necessity. Spengler once more reveals the affinity between absolute idealism—his doctrine of the soul points back to Schelling—and demonic mythology. His penchant for mythological ways of thinking can be grasped at certain extreme points. The regular time-intervals in different cul-

[1]Karl Joel, loc. cit., *ibid.*

tures, the periodicity of events of a certain meaning "is yet another hint that the Cosmic flowings in the form of human lives upon the surface of a minor star are not self-contained and independent, but stand in deep harmony with the unending movedness of the universe. In a small but noteworthy book, R. Mewes, *Die Kriegs- und Geistesperioden im Völkerleben und Verkündung des nächsten Weltkrieges* (1896), the relation of those war-periods with weather-periods, sun-spot cycles, and certain conjunctures of the planets is established, and a great war foretold accordingly for the period 1910-20. But these and numerous similar connections that come within the reach of our senses . . . veil a secret that we have to respect."[1] With all his ridicule of civilized mystics, Spengler, by such formulations, comes very close to astrological superstition. Thus ends the glorification of the soul.

The recurrence of the ever identical pattern, however, in which such a doctrine of fate terminates, is nothing but the perpetual reproduction of man's offense against man. The concept of fate that subjects men to blind domination reflects the domination exercised by men themselves. Whenever Spengler speaks of fate he is dealing with the subjugation of one group of men by another. The metaphysics of the soul supplements his positivism in order to hypostatize as eternal and inescapable the principle of a relentless self-perpetuating rule. Actually, however, the inescapability of fate is defined through domination and injustice. Spengler brings in justice as the bad counter-concept to fate, the sublime in history. In one of the most brutal passages of his work he complains that "the world-feeling of race; the political (and therefore national) instinct for fact ('my country, right or wrong!'); the resolve to be the subject and not the object of evolution (for one or the other it has to be)—in a word, the will-to-power—has to retreat and make room for a tendency of which the standard-bearers are most often men without original impulse, but all the more set upon their logic; men at home in a world of truths, ideals, and Utopias; bookmen who believe that they can replace the actual by the logical, the might of facts by an abstract justice, Destiny by Reason. It begins with the everlastingly fearful who withdraw themselves out of actuality into cells and study-chambers and spiritual communities, and proclaim the nullity of the world's doings, and it ends in every Culture with the apostles of world-peace. Every people has such (historically speaking) waste-products. Even their heads constitute physiognomically a group by themselves. In the 'history of intellect' they

[1]II, 392, note 1.

stand high—and many illustrious names are numbered amongst them—but regarded from the point of view of actual history, they are inefficients."[1] After this, opposition to Spengler would mean historically overcoming the "point of view of actual history"; it would mean realizing what is historically possible, what Spengler calls impossible only because it has not yet been realized. In sober terms and yet with the deepest understanding James Shotwell's review gets to the hub of this question: "Winter followed Autumn in the past because life was repetitive and was passed within limited areas of self-contained economy. Intercourse between societies was more predatory than stimulative because mankind had not yet discovered the means to maintain culture without an unjust dependence upon those who had no share in its material blessings. From the savage raid and slavery down to the industrial problems of today, the recurring civilizations have been largely built upon false economic forces, backed up by equally false moral and religious casuistry. The civilizations that have come and gone have been inherently lacking in equilibrium because they have built upon the injustice of exploitation. There is no reason to suppose that modern civilization must inevitably repeat this cataclysmatic rhythm."[2] This insight is capable of shattering Spengler's whole concept of history. If the fall of antiquity were dictated by the autonomous necessity of life and by the expression of its "soul," then indeed it takes on the aspect of fatality and by the analogy this aspect carries over to the present situation. If, however, as implied by Shotwell's statement, the fall of antiquity can be understood by its unproductive system of latifundia and the slave economy related to it, the fatality can be mastered if men succeed in overcoming such and similar structures of domination. In such a case, Spengler's universal structure reveals itself as a false analogy drawn from a bad solitary happening—solitary in spite of its threatening recurrence.

This, however, involves more than a belief in continuous progress and the survival of culture. Spengler has stressed the raw nature of culture, and with an emphasis which ought once and for all to shake naive confidence in its conciliatory effect. More strikingly than almost anyone else, he has demonstrated how this rawness of culture again and again drives it toward decay and how, as form and order, culture is affiliated with that blind domination which, through permanent crises, is always prone to annihilate itself and its victims. The essence of culture bears the mark of Death—denying this would be weak and sentimental, given Spengler's theory

[1] II, 186.
[2] loc. cit. p. 66f.

which has spilled as much of the secrets of culture as Hitler has of those of propaganda. There is no chance of evading the magic circle of Spengler's morphology by defaming barbarism and relying upon the healthiness of culture. Any such straightforward optimism is proscribed by the present situation. Instead, we should become aware of the element of barbarism inherent in culture itself. Only those considerations that challenge the idea of culture no less than they challenge the reality of barbarism have a chance to survive Spengler's verdict. The plant-like culture-soul, the vital "being in form," the unconscious world of symbols, the expressive power of which intoxicates him—all these marks of triumphant life are messengers of doom wherever they actually manifest themselves. For they all bear witness to the coercion and sacrifice which culture lays upon man. To trust them and to deny impending doom means only to be entangled the more deeply within their deadly jungle.

Spengler has the prying glance of the hunter who strides mercilessly through the cities of mankind as if they were the wilderness they actually are. But one thing has escaped his glance: the forces set free by decay. "How does everything that is to be appear so ill" (*"Wie scheint doch alles Werdende so krank"*)—this sentence of the poet Georg Trakl transcends Spengler's landscape. There is a passage in the first volume of the *Decline of the West* that has been omitted in the English translation. It refers to Nietzsche. "He used the word decadence. In this book, the term Decline of the West means the same thing, only more comprehensive, broadened from the case before us today into a general historical type of epoch, and looked at from the bird's-eye view of a philosophy of Becoming."[1] In the world of violence and oppressive life, this decadence is the refuge of a better potentiality by virtue of the fact that it refuses obedience to this life, its culture, its rawness and sublimity. Those, according to Spengler, whom history is going to thrust aside and annihilate personify negatively within the negativity of this culture that which promises, however weakly, to break the spell of culture and to make an end to the horror of pre-history. Their protest is our only hope that destiny and force shall not have the last word. That which stands against the decline of the west is not the surviving culture but the Utopia that is silently embodied in the image of decline.

[1]4th edition, Munich 1919, I, p. 394.

Reviews

Arnold, Thurman W., *The Bottlenecks of Business.* Reynal & Hitchcock. New York 1940. (xi and 335 pp.; $2.50)

Hamilton, Walton H., *The Pattern of Competition.* Columbia University Press. New York 1940. (vii and 106 pp.; $1.25)

Hamilton, Walton and **Irene Till**, *Antitrust in Action.* Monograph No. 16, printed for the use of the Temporary National Economic Committee. U. S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C. 1941. (vii and 146 pp.; $0.20)

Handler, Milton, *A Study of the Construction and Enforcement of the Federal Antitrust Laws.* Monograph No. 38, printed for the use of the Temporary National Economic Committee. U. S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C. 1941. (vii and 106 pp.; $0.15)

Watkins, Myron W., and The Division of Industrial Economics of The Conference Board, *Public Regulation of Competitive Practises in Business Enterprise.* National Industrial Conference Board, Inc. New York 1940. (xxi and 355 pp.; $5.00)

Simpson, Kemper, *Big Business, Efficiency and Fascism.* An Appraisal of the Efficiency of Large Corporations and of their Threat to Democracy. Harper & Brothers. New York and London 1941. (x and 203 pp.; $2.50)

The American economic scene is dominated by monopolies or monopolistic groups to a far greater extent than the public has ever assumed. The antitrust laws have been unable to check the growth of such tendencies and may in a certain way even have contributed to it.[1] This, in short, is the picture unfolded in the hearings of the Congressional TNEC (Temporary National Economic Committee), in its over 20,000 printed pages of testimony and 3,300 exhibits (altogether 31 volumes, and 6 supplements, of records of hearings), besides 43 monographs.[2] Here then is where problems arise whose solution is of the utmost importance for the entire set-up

[1]See the testimony of Thorp and Arnold in *Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee*, U. S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C., part 1 (1939, *Economic Prologue)*, pp. 112-113.

[2]See especially Monographs No. 17, *Problems of Small Business*, by J. H. Cover, N. H. Engle, E. D. Strong, D. R. Nehemkis Jr., W. Saunders, H. Vatter and H. H. Wein; and No. 27, *The Structure of Industry* by W. L. Thorp; and *Final Report and Recommendations of the Temporary National Economic Committee*, U. S. Senate, 77th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 35, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1941, pp. 90-91—See also *Hearings......*, part 30 (1940, *Technology and Concentration of Economic Power)*.

of present-day industrial society. The publications under review do not solve these problems. They do not answer the question of whether monopoly does—or must—hamper or further technological progress,[1] whether such progress is or is not inseparable from concentration, whether it does reduce the consumer's chance to satisfy his needs, or does not, letting him rather, in the long run, enjoy benefits hitherto unobtainable, whether it must or must not result in a stagnation of the productive forces that could be overcome by totalitarian regimentation only. What the authors are concerned with is but the problem of how monopolization increases, how this process can be prevented, and how abuses can be checked. Then, of course, the questions to be answered are merely factual ones. It is not the viewpoint of society as a whole that prevails but that of the victims of specific monopolistic practices.[2]

This reviewer's critical approach should not, however, be understood as belittling the tremendous importance of the publications. The authors perform a real public service by offering proof upon proof and by making accessible to many the new facts which were hitherto known to only a few. If they do not analyze these facts in their interdependence nor the social functions of economic monopoly and the trends inherent in it in their relation to the general economic mechanism of society, they only follow the same trend as that underlying the TNEC's approach: also the TNEC investigation's central theme has only been the efficiency or inefficiency of the existing legal means to check monopoly.[3]

The main aspect of monopoly in modern society is the disruption of the "automatic" relation between supply and demand. A dwindling demand no longer necessarily produces lower prices, but rather a shrinkage of production whilst prices remain rigid. Technical improvements increase unemployment and corporate profits, but often do not result in lower retail prices.

The industrial development of the U. S. has been made possible, or at least enhanced, by the barrier of protective tariffs.[4] In the shadow of this wall, an enormous concentration process has gone on for years. It is a sort of vicious circle. Mass production nowadays requires investments of such a size that small or middle-sized enterprises, as a rule, are unable to afford them. But the big corporation then desires protection against "unreasonable," "cutthroat" competition. And in order to cover at least their huge overhead expenses, such corporations require a reasonably steady sale.

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[1]See Monograph No. 22, *Technology in Our Economy*, by H. D. Anderson.

[2]See Monograph No. 7, *Measurement of the Social Performance of Business*, by T. J. Kreps and K. R. Wright, which, however, is not concerned with the relation between monopolies and society as a whole, but rather with the "social performance" of business in general, measured in terms of "criteria advanced by such responsible business groups as the National Association of Manufacturers and the United States Chamber of Commerce" (p. ix). This "social audit of business" refers to the period 1919 to 1938 and is "limited to only six measurements," to wit: "Employment," "Production," "Consumer effort commanded," "Consumer funds absorbed," "Payrolls" and "Dividends and Interest" (pp. 3-4).

[3]See *Final Report*......, pp. 20-21 and 30.

[4]See Monographs No. 6, *Export Prices and Export Cartels*, by M. Gilbert and P. D. Dickens, and No. 10, *Industrial Concentration and Tariffs*, by C. L. James, E. C. Welsh and G. Arneson.

Hence their tendency to secure "fair" competition[1] or to exclude competition altogether, or to shift it into fields where the investments may not be endangered (advertising campaigns instead of price wars). All their demands ultimately culminate in the demand of the investor that the state should prevent competition outright and abolish freedom of trade. "In instances competition itself has become the mother of restraint . . ." (Hamilton, p. 95).[2]

But what is a big corporation? It has been shown to the TNEC that one corporation produces 100 per cent of the national output of aluminum; 3 produce 86 per cent of the output of automobiles; 3 manufacture 90 per cent of all cans; 3, 80 per cent of all cigarettes; 4, 78 per cent of the copper; 2, 95 per cent of the plate glass, and so on.[3] Bigness can only be determined by comparisons among competitors in a given field. A company with a relatively small capital might be a monopoly. If radium or tungsten could be found in the United States, a corporation with a few million dollars might control the entire output; on the other hand, a corporation with a capital of hundreds of millions might conceivably, in another field, only control a small percentage.

The bigness of corporations has also been measured, e.g. in W. Thorp's testimony before the TNEC,[4] in terms of balance-sheet figures, such as corporative assets or income. It has been reported that, in 1937, 394 American corporations, i.e., less than 0.1 per cent of the total, owned about 45 per cent of all corporate assets, whereas 228,721 corporations, i.e., 55 per cent of the total, reported less than 1.5 per cent of the assets.[5] But for the purpose of measuring the importance of corporations with respect to their position in the market, only their percentage in the total of annual sales or output gives us the right measuring rod. Balance-sheet figures are more important for the much discussed problem of the efficiency of larger corporations as compared with the medium-sized ones.

Kemper Simpson[6] comes to the conclusion that it is the medium-sized corporation rather than the giant one which operates with the optimum of efficiency. But the computing methods on which he bases his assertion might easily be challenged as not being reliable enough to be conclusive. Comparing costs as shown in balance-sheets of different companies without checking every basic item always exposes the comparison to the criticism that the wrong figures may have been compared or that a special situation has not been given enough weight.[7]

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[1]Which in itself may already be restraint of trade. If the scope of the antitrust laws is to "unleash the productive forces for the benefit of consumers" (Arnold, p. 14), only "cutthroat" competition would do. But that would mean, nowadays, the possibilities of sudden unemployment of huge numbers of workers and the loss of huge amounts of investments. "Confidence" is what business needs. Hence the tendency to permit "reasonable" restraint of trade, a concept, by the way, which is not to be found in the Sherman Act itself, but was interpreted into it by the U. S. Supreme Court *(Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, [1911] 221 U. S. 1).*

[2]See also Hamilton-Till, pp. 19-20.

[3]See W. Thorp, in *Hearings......*, part 1, p. 137.

[4]*Hearings......*, part 1, pp. 81-156; see also O'Mahoney, in: *Final Report......*, pp. 678f.

[5]Statistics of Income for 1937, quoted by O'Mahoney, *supra*, p. 679.

[6]See also Monograph No. 13, *Relative Efficiency of Large, Medium-sized and Small Business*, by the Federal Trade Commission, in which study Simpson collaborated.

[7]How contradictory (and, as a whole, inconclusive) this kind of comparative investigation generally is, is demonstrated in Monograph No. 21, *Competition and Monopoly in American Industry*, by C. Wilcox, pp. 309f.

Thurman W. Arnold, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the ATD (Antitrust Division), has done much more than anyone before him to protect the consumers from being "milked" by monopolistic groups. Among his many publications his newest book stands out as the credo of a crusader who sincerely believes that the "power of the few" might be broken by a better antitrust law and a better enforcement procedure. But he, too, is only concerned with the legal angle. He says that the evil is not bigness in itself, but only the abuse of it,—in other words, he takes the monopoly for granted and considers it acceptable where it "does increase the efficiency of production or distribution and passes savings on to the consumer" (p. 125).

The automobile industry would be such a case. In 1938 there were only 11 companies or company groups in the passenger car market, 3 of which together controlled about 89 per cent of the total sales.[1] Except in the minor field of installment financing, where a test case is pending, the auto industry seems to have behaved so that the ATD had no cause to institute any action against it. Nevertheless, and even if we admit that in the formative years of the industry, i.e., until after the creation of General Motors, the application of modern inventions has brought the price of the low-price car down to the present level, the "competition" that is going on nowadays between the different companies might better be called a mock competition: there is practically no competition in terms of prices among the several makes;[2] what appears as such is a competition in gadgets of insignificant value but of a certain sales appeal, and a competition in advertising. For years, ever since "the coming of age" of the industry, sales volume, price and production have not been automatically interdependent as should be the case in a truly competitive market.[3]

We do not know for certain whether this condition of the car market has been brought about through "artificial" means, such as illegal agreements among the manufacturers (no evidence has so far been found) or through, what we may call, "natural" means, such as "price leadership" of one of the big manufacturers, whose prices may voluntarily be accepted by the competitors as leads (a wholly legal situation, as far as the antitrust laws are concerned).[4] We use the terms "artificial" and "natural" to differentiate

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[1]See Monograph No. 36, *Reports of the Federal Trade Commission*, part III (Report on Motor Vehicle Industry Inquiry), pp. 259f.

[2]"Competition of manufacturers with respect to passenger cars in the low-price class is more in volume than in prices . . ." *(ibid.*, p. 262).

[3]It has been said that the rigidity of car prices is, at least partly, due to the circumstance that they are now at such a low level that even a drop of, let us say, $100 in a particular make of car would not yield a rise in the number of prospective buyers sufficient to secure continuance of a satisfactory rate of profit in spite of the huge new investments which would be required to expand plant capacity to the extent needed to make such an increase of production possible. Undoubtedly, installment sales and the convenience of buying used cars have already tapped the reservoir of low income groups otherwise available as buyers of cheaper cars. Nevertheless, there is also no doubt that hundreds of thousands of used car buyers would prefer to buy new cars at a lower price level. However, existing manufacturers have no reason to be dissatisfied with the present set-up of the car market and therefore are induced to shun such a major venture as a price war or, what would practically be the same, the introduction of revolutionary technical improvements, such as an engine consuming less gasoline or a filter making oil changes forever unnecessary. Incidentally, there is still another reason against such innovations: they might endanger the interests which the groups controlling the auto industry have in the gasoline and oil business.

[4]See Handler, pp. 40-45.

between a situation where manufacturers have to resort to "conspiracy" to create monopolistic conditions and a situation where they need not do so, i.e., where existing overcapacity and enormity of necessary investments discourage quite "naturally" potential competitors and thus protect the present manufacturers. Gardiner C. Means, in his brilliant 1935 paper on *Industrial Prices and their Relative Inflexibility*,[1] has given a very convincing explanation of how car prices are controlled by "natural" means, which study has been completely confirmed by the results of the TNEC investigation. The willingness of the motor-car producers to comply with the law and to refrain from "abuse" does not annihilate the monopolistic position they hold. But monopoly that complies with the antitrust legislation appears to the crusaders as rather "harmless," and that's where the crusade necessarily comes to a deadlock.

In many other fields, "natural" preponderance of a few big corporations would not as such explain the situation. "Artificial" means for creating or enhancing domineering positions are undoubtedly used, and it is against such "conspiracies in restraint of trade" that the scope of the antitrust laws is directed. But the legal fight has not been successful. Monopolistic tendencies have many ways of being put into practice, and many of them are too subtle to be caught at once by the slow and inept machinery of the law, as, e.g., the distribution of "statistical information" by trade associations, in itself a measure apparently innocent enough, but undoubtedly quite often used in lieu of open quota allocation agreements.[2] To quote some examples of violation of the antitrust laws: there is the basing point system, whose illegality, by the way, is not yet fully established.[3] Then we find, e.g., the erection of trade barriers among localities or states,[4] collusive bidding

[1]U. S. Senate, 74th Congress, 1st Session, Document No. 13, Jan. 17, 1935.

[2]It is certainly a difficult task to prove that what on the face of it purports to be only dissemination of trade statistics might really be a conspiracy under the law. See Handler, pp. 18-29, esp. p. 19: "The entire plan has been scrutinized [by the Federal Trade Commission and the U. S. Supreme Court] to determine whether it has resulted or is likely to result in the elimination of competition. The ultimate question in every case has been whether it can fairly be said that implicit in the plan is an agreement or understanding with regard to the price or production policy to be pursued by the member of the combination . . . The fact that uniformity of prices has resulted from the operation of the plan has not been deemed conclusive of illegality."

[3]We quote from the TNEC's unanimous resolution: "Extensive hearings on basing-point systems showed that they are used in many industries as an effective device for eliminating price competition. During the last 20 years basing point systems and variations of such systems, known technically as "zone pricing systems" and "freight equalization systems," have spread widely in American industry. Many of the products of important industries are priced by basing point or analogous systems, such as iron and steel, pig iron, cement, lime, lumber and lumber products, brick, asphalt shingles and roofing, window glass, white lead, metal lath, building tile, floor tile, gypsum plaster, bolts, nuts and rivets, cast-iron soil pipe, range boilers, valves and fittings, sewer pipe, power cable, paper, salt, sugar, corn derivatives, industrial alcohol, linseed oil, fertilizer and others. The elimination of such systems under existing law would involve a costly process of prosecuting separately and individually many industries, and place a heavy burden upon antitrust enforcement appropriations. We therefore recommend that the Congress enact legislation declaring such pricing systems to be illegal" (*Final Report*...., p. 33.)—See also Monograph No. 42, *The Basing Point Problem*, by the Federal Trade Commission.

[4]See *Hearings*......, part 29 (1941, *Interstate Trade Barriers)*, and *Final Report*......, pp. 128-131.

in public purchases,[1] the use of patents to maintain resale price levels and other conditions (glass containers, Ethyl gasoline),[2] agreements to restrict output (Beryllium, Bausch & Lomb),[3] the prevention of the use of labor-saving machinery by labor unions (the make-work system, exclusion of efficient methods or prefabricated material),[4] agreements regarding sales conditions ("block-booking" in the motion picture industry)[5] and, to quote a few from a long list of such practices mentioned in testimony before the TNEC by Mr. J. A. Horton, Chief Examiner of the Federal Trade Commission;[6] boycott; threats; interference with sources of supply or distributing outlets; threats of patent infringement suits not made in good faith; intimidation;[7] bogus independents; allocation of territory among ostensible competitors, and so on.[8]

Plenty of evidence about methods of "restraint of trade" has also been presented by Myron W. Watkins and his collaborators. His valuable book, a "completely revised and expanded edition of the well-known Conference Board study that was first published in 1925," is a sort of handbook for the "uninitiated" business executive, showing which trade practices are undoubtedly illegal, in the light of final decisions and established procedure, what can be done without fear of prosecution, and how far the "no-man's-land" of uncertainty extends. It is certainly not the author's fault that so many of the commonly known trade practices seem to lie somewhere between the fronts. It may be said that the chief merit of his book, whatever his intentions might have been, consists in showing that it is far too optimistic to think that counteracting the consequences and results of monopolization is merely a juridical problem.

That very often[9] the consumer is left "holding the bag" as a result of the monopolistic tendencies, is obvious. It is, however, very difficult to ascertain in dollars and cents the economic consequences of such practices. How much consumer's money is prevented from being used for better living or housing by being drained into the tills of the dominating manufacturers

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[1]See Monograph No. 19, *Government Purchasing.* An Economic Commentary, by M. A. Copeland, C. C. Linnenberg Jr. and D. M. Barbour.

[2]See Arnold, pp. 26-28 and 173.

[3]See *Final Report......*, pp. 182f.

[4]See *Final Report......*, pp. 169-170.

[5]See Monograph No. 43, *The Motion Picture Industry,* a pattern of control, by D. Bertrand, W. Duane Evans and E. L. Blanchard; and Arnold, p. 168.

[6]See *Final Report......*, p. 300.

[7]Arnold testified about that practice before the TNEC as follows: "They know what is going to happen to them if they don't follow the prices of the largest competitor, and they don't have to go and ask. That was illustrated by the remark of one smaller company executive to me in the privacy of my office. I said, 'Why do you always follow the prices of this larger company? What would happen to you, if you didn't follow them?' He said: 'That, Mr. Arnold, is a question which I hope never to be able to answer from actual experience.' There, of course, is the effect of the large man's coming in the field; the small man is simply terrorized". *(Final Report......*, p. 303)

[8]See also Monograph No. 21, *supra;* No. 34, *Control of Unfair Competitive Practices through Trade Practice Conference Procedure of the Federal Trade Commission,* by the Federal Trade Commission; and No. 36, *Reports of the Federal Trade Commission,* by the Federal Trade Commission.—See further *Hearings......*, *passim,* on specific fields of industry or trade.

[9]Not always, see p. 335.

as an economically "undeserved" profit is not easily ascertainable. It is clear, however, that huge amounts are thus diverted from better use.[1]

As for the burning problems of defense, we have only to refer, as a matter of public knowledge, to the fact that the serious shortage of aluminum which is now hampering the construction of airplanes and which will shortly cause the disappearance of aluminum from the civilian market, is admittedly due to the refusal of the "ALCOA," the foremost example of a hundred per cent monopoly in American industry, to expand its capacity in time to meet the growing demand, and to its—for a long time successful—prevention of potential competitors from erecting competing plants. This attitude is quite easy to understand: the ALCOA management feared that increased plant capacity would not find a wide enough market after the emergency had passed.

Monopolistic interference with actual consumer's interests or public needs is surely established beyond any reasonable doubt. There is no doubt, either, that Arnold has succeeded in exposing the "bottlenecks" that threaten business at large because of the private monopolies' hold on economic life. He has not succeeded, however, in outlining methods whereby monopolies would be checked without encroaching upon the privileges and property-titles of private enterprise as such. The question as to whether such methods are possible and how they could work still remains open to discussion.

The political consequences of the fast growth of monopolistic corporations have been described in many hearings before the TNEC and especially in Simpson's book. With the old fashioned equality of opportunity dwindling, with the market becoming a domain reserved to a few privileged big companies, which like to keep their profits undistributed and to re-invest their own savings without having to seek new investors,[2] we find everywhere dislocation of the small shopkeepers, increase of unemployment and ever-increasing impossibility of absorbing the unemployed into other occupational fields. The trend of eliminating small enterprises is being accentuated—in the United States as well as in Germany or England—by the stress of the present emergency situation. The government departments prefer to deal with a few score "reliable" and technically best equipped big companies instead of with a crowd of small manufacturers who are not as dependable with respect to punctual delivery, etc. With certain raw materials becoming scarce and a system of priorities being introduced, it is inevitable that the big corporations will fare better than the small ones. Not only do they have more "pull," but their continuous operation is much more indispensable than that of the others.

To this economic process there corresponds a political one: an increase of the political influence of the leaders of the big corporations. There have

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[1]Arnold has pointed out, for example, that the milk consumers of Chicago, after the indictment of a combination of interested groups, saved about ten million dollars a year (p. 194), and that in Washington, D. C., the ATD prevented a price increase of 2 cents a gallon of gasoline which would have cost the consumers two million dollars a year (p. 48). In most of the cases mentioned by Arnold, however, the overcharges levied upon the consumer cannot be ascertained in figures. He estimates, though, that "investigations of newsprint, potash, nitrogen, and steel, which cost a total of about $200,000, have saved the consumers of this country $170,000,000" (p. 77).

[2]See *Hearings......*, part 9 (1939, *Savings and Investment)*; also Monograph No. 12, *Profits, Productive Activities and New Investments*, by M. Taitel; and No. 37, *Saving, Investment and National Income*, by O. L. Altman.

been some legislative attempts to curtail this influence, such as the several Corrupt Practices Acts and the two Hatch Acts. Their failure has been demonstrated.[1] Of common knowledge also, and substantiated by the investigations of the TNEC, is the growth of the powerful "lobbies," the pressure agencies maintained by the big interests.[2] It has been recognized—and this was one of the reasons for the creation of the TNEC—that the democratic political system faces a real danger by an unchecked increase of the power of monopolistic groups. Can antitrust legislation cast out the anti-democratic spirit of monopoly?

"Antitrust is a symbol of democracy," says Hamilton (p. 97). Yet, the antitrust legislation, "a weapon of policy from another age,"[3] has proved to be very inefficient in checking the growth of monopolistic tendencies. After about forty years of inactivity the Federal Government has finally, under Roosevelt, started a serious attempt to enforce the laws.[4] But besides the lack of sufficient personnel, law enforcement is hampered by structural and procedural defects inherent in any system of penal law: the administration has, e.g., no subpoena power and can therefore only proceed to seize evidence and to hear witnesses under oath by getting a grand-jury to investigate a case with the view of approving an indictment. But grand-juries, mainly composed of respectable business men, are as a rule reluctant to proffer criminal charges against other respectable business men,[5] especially when the criminal liability of the defendants appears to depend upon complicated technicalities of law interpretation.[6]

The testimony before the TNEC and the publications referred to, especially the two excellent monographs of Milton Handler and of Walton

[1]See O. Kirchheimer, "The Historical and Comparative Background of the Hatch Law" in: *Public Policy*, vol. II, 1941, pp. 341f., esp. p. 360.

[2]See Monograph No. 26, *Economic Power and Political Pressures*, by C. C. Blaisdell, assisted by J. Greverus.

[3]Hamilton-Till, p. 5.

[4]It succeeded in getting the yearly appropriation of the ATD increased from less than $300,000 to about $1,300,000, so that instead of an utterly inadequate staff of only 15 lawyers, at the time the Roosevelt administration came into office, there are now about 200 attorneys (see Hamilton-Till, p 24; also Hamilton, p. 58, and Arnold, p. 276) busy with investigations, indictments and other matters of enforcement. But even that increased number is still very low for an agency which in addition to the antitrust laws proper has to take care of the enforcement of 30 odd laws throughout the whole of American economy, in comparison with the 2,800 employees of the Civil Aeronautics Authority or the 1,200 of the Securities and Exchange Commission (budget appropriation 1940: $5,470,000), which have only one or a few laws each to administer and operate only in a highly specialized field (Arnold, p. 171).

[5]"As often as not they are reluctant to indict persons who belong to their own class and are respectable pillars of society". (Hamilton-Till, p. 52)

[6]"At the moment the law of antitrust stands out in sparse and indistinct lines . . . it will take quite an assortment of beacons to light the twilight zone which separates the legal from the illegal . . ." (Hamilton-Till, p. 102). That, for example, a merger of two corporations, which results in an elimination of competition, may be indictable if the merger was brought about by corporation A buying up the stock of B, but that the perpetrators of the very same crime may go scot-free if A, instead of buying B's stock, bought out its assets, is one of these technicalities which make it understandable that grand-jurors are not likely always to be found willing to go along with the ATD. (See *Hearings*....., part 1, p. 113, and Handler, pp. 46-86; as to the question of what constitutes "elimination" of competition there are very contradictory decisions: consolidations resulting in a 90-95 per cent of output control have been sustained, others covering only 20 per cent have been declared illegal).

Hamilton with Irene Till, as well as Hamilton's very instructive and comprehensive book,[1] have given a complete picture of what one may call the "heroic" struggle of a man with a "little stick"[2] against a well armed giant, namely, an under-staffed public agency charged with the enforcement of old fashioned laws against modern industrial corporations and their trade associations, aided by the most expensive legal talent available.[3] All the enthusiasm and zeal shown by ATD staff members (some of them even paying investigation expenses out of their own pockets)[4] have only succeeded more or less in breaking up some bottlenecks or enforcing a price drop in cases where either the evidence gathered by the Government was of such nature that the defendant companies preferred, immediately after an indictment, to have the case settled without trial, by consent decree, or where the nuisance value of the investigation[5] was such that the corporations feared the ensuing publicity. But in many cases, especially in the most important ones, where the defendants may be reasonably sure that a criminal intention is not likely to be proven, so that all they have to face is the $5,000 maximum fine of the present law,[6] the existing legislation proves indeed very inadequate to prevent or punish violations to any extent commensurate with their frequency.

Can there be a better and more efficient law? The reforms urged by the ATD[7] consist mainly in increasing the appropriations,[8] in giving the Government agencies subpoena power and in "shifting the punitive sanction to a civil base."[9] Arnold has stated clearly that the ATD does not intend to curtail its activities just because of the possible defendant corporations being engaged in national defense work, that, on the contrary, it will "prevent the necessities of national defense from becoming a cloak for schemes which are motivated only by desire for undue private profit. The antitrust laws are the front line of defense against unreasonable use of industrial power" (p. 67).

"Streamlining" and "retooling" of the antitrust laws appears therefore indeed very necessary. Its basic need will be the replacing of the tedious and cumbersome criminal prosecution by administrative control and by a speedy civil procedure.

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[1]See also the material enumerated in note 8, p. 331.

[2]Hamilton-Till, p. 23.

[3]In the Madison Oil case there were no less than 101 defense lawyers who leased an entire hotel during the trial (Arnold, p. 208).

[4]Arnold, p. ix.

[5]"It takes the shock of indictments to clean up a bad situation in the distribution of a product" (Arnold, p. 204). See also Arnold's testimony before the TNEC, *Final Report*......, pp. 98f., especially p. 107: "Indeed, I have come to the conclusion that all that is necesary to bring unjustified prices down is a grand-jury investigation of persons with a guilty conscience".

[6]"The risk of a $5,000 penalty is not guaranteed to kill off a conspiracy that promises to net five millions" (Hamilton-Till, p. 104).

[7]See *Final Report*......, pp. 261-271.

[8]The ATD is already, so to speak, on a "pay-as-you-go" basis. Although it is not meant to be a revenue producing agency, it collected about $2,400,000 in fines in the first half of the fiscal year 1940, or about twice as much as its expenditures for the whole year (Arnold, p. 212). An increase in expenditures, even without increasing the size of fines, would doubtless be rewarded with a much higher increase in fine collections.

[9]Hamilton-Till, p. 104; see also the "O'Mahoney bill". S. 2719, 76th Congress, 1st Sess. (1939), reprinted in *Final Report*......, p. 259.

The TNEC has recommended a revision of the patent laws, has adopted the ATD's recommendations for the reform of the antitrust legislation and has added some recommendations of its own, such as the Federal charter for corporations.[1] It is unlikely that all its recommendations will ever become law.[2] But assuming this would come to pass, would or could it result in an effective check on the growth of monopoly and monopolistic trade practices?

Provided that Congress would increase ten-fold the appropriation of the ATD, the "streamlining" of the laws and a complete overhauling of the organization of the ATD[3] might possibly prevent most of the flagrant abuses of economic power which today must remain unhampered because of the lack of enforcing personnel and the inadequateness of the "horse and buggy" law itself. But it is not abuses that matter!

Even the best law—a real weapon instead of a nuisance—and the best law-enforcing agency could only prevent the growth of monopolistic practices by "artificial" means. They could give more protection to the consumer than he has now. However, they could not alter the situation as far as voluntary acceptance of price leadership is concerned, nor could they prevent all other market curtailments which result from the fact that modern technology and the ensuing huge investments have caused a condition where a few corporations by their very existence and economic power can, very widely and without any conspiracy, suspend the law of demand and supply for their particular markets.[4] There can be no law to prevent this.[5] "The industry strides ahead, little embarrassed by fetters too out of date to bind. The use of litigation to give effect to economic policy is not the happiest of human inventions" (Hamilton, p. 82).

The position of monopolies in modern society is ambivalent. It is doubtful whether monopolies economically are bad *per se*. Without the enormous technological development resulting from and causing the prevailing monopolistic tendency, mass production would hardly have been possible. Monopolies as the ultimate consequence of concentration are unavoidably linked to modern industrialism. What they are and what they stand for is not a mere abuse to be ruled out by legislation.

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[1] *Final Report*......, pp. 20f.

[2] After all, Congress, by permitting vertical price fixing as an exception to the prohibition of price fixing under the antitrust laws (Miller-Tydings Act of 1936; see the interesting discussion between Edwards and Tydings, *Final Report*......, pp. 142-164) has not shown itself to be keenly in favor of a tightening of the antitrust laws and ". . . there are great pressures to keep down appropriations for actual antitrust enforcement and to solve our conscience by research and reports on prices which emit feeble roars like a toothless lion" (Arnold, p. 295).

[3] Giving it for instance a staff of specially trained investigators instead of having it depend upon the assignment of personnel by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who, trained as they are to detect murderers and spies, may not be the best available sleuths to unravel complicated trade practices.

[4] See Monograph No. 21, *supra*, pp. 314-315.

[5] See the discussion between Arnold and O'Connell (*Final Report*......, pp. 107-108): Arnold: "We restored competitive conditions insofar as is possible with [only] four companies operating in the [potash] field . . ." O'Connell: "I know and you know what the price structure in potash industry is. . . . It doesn't seem to me that there is an industry where there is effective price competition. . . . I was trying to see whether or not there were not areas in which the antitrust laws will not be effective due to competitive conditions." Arnold: "Unquestionably."

The main problem centers, thus, on the question whether industrial monopoly as such can be abolished.[1] As President Roosevelt stated in his message of April 29, 1938, recommending the setting up of the TNEC: "The power of a few to manage the economic life of the nation must be diffused among the many or be transferred to the public and its democratically responsible government. If prices are to be managed and administered, if the nation's business is to be allocated by a plan and not by competition, that power should not be vested in any private group . . ." *(U. S. Senate, 75th Congress, 3d Sess., Document No. 173.)*

Inasmuch as the recommendations of the TNEC are aimed at "diffusing among the many" the power to manage the economic life of the nation, they will prove insufficient, because laws cannot stop an irreversible social trend. This is what the testimony before the TNEC actually proves. This is what the additional data presented and discussed in the TNEC monographs and in the publications under review are supporting. This is what overshadows all theses and arguments aiming at improvement of the antitrust legislation.

FELIX WEIL (New York).

Dimock, Marshall E., and **Howard K. Hyde,** *Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations.* Monograph No. 11, printed for the use of the Temporary National Economic Committee. U. S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C. 1940. (144 pp.; $0.30)

Brecht, Arnold, and **Comstock Glaser,** *The Art and Technique of Administration in German Ministries.* Harvard University Press. Cambridge 1940. (xiv and 191 pp.; $2.00)

Marx, Fritz Morstein, "Bureaucracy and Dictatorship" in: *The Review of Politics,* Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1941, pp. 100-117.

R., Bruno, *La Bureaucratisation du Monde.* Paris 1939. (350 pp.)

Burnham, James, *The Managerial Revolution.* What is happening in the World. John Day. New York 1941. (296 pp.; $2.50)

It is generally conceded that the numerical increase of public and private bureaucracies has of necessity been accompanied by a manifest growth in bureaucratic power and influence. The books under review deal with two aspects of the problem that has resulted from these developments, first, its more technical and administrative aspect, and second, the social process that leads to bureaucratization.

The first aspect of the problem is the one treated in Marshall E. Dimock and Howard K. Hyde's very thorough and intelligent study of the causes and possible correctives of industrial bureaucracy. Having found that bureaucracy—characterized by "distribution of functions, hierarchy, and

[1]See Monograph No. 25, *Recovery Plans.*

professionalization"—is as much in evidence in large-scale corporations as in public administration, and having made clear their conviction that the phenomenon is detrimental to social well-being, the authors thresh about for possible remedies by way of legislation. Industrial bureaucracy, they point out, is an inevitable product of the concentration of economic power, and the manifestation of this concentration—half of American industrial wealth controlled by 200 large corporations—makes up the factual background of the analysis. The result of economic concentration has been the well known separation of ownership from control and the consequent shift of economic power from the owners (stockholders) to the managers who rule "for all practical purposes without effective check from any source" (p. 22).

Legally, managerial control is made possible through the device of proxy. The controlling power of management is rarely vested in any one person; even where a company appears to be a one-man show the chief executive depends on the advice of his subordinates, the financial, production, and similar committees which as a whole constitute the mighty management. The separation of ownership from control is the primary factor in the development of bureaucracy; there are five others: the division of authority, the formalization of rules, the growth of corporate institutionalism, the lax definition of authority and responsibility, and difficulties of communication and integration. The first two of these obviously spring from the concentration of economic power mentioned above, the other four seem more or less generally to result from the great size of institutions, private or public, which brings about confusion of authority and a lack of personal touch.

To overcome these bureaucratical shortcomings of big corporations, the authors have recommended either practices they have found used in some corporations or those they think should be applied. Prominent among structural correctives is the demand that the objectives of the business and the responsibilities and authority of the managers should be clearly defined; that clever standard rules be used as a good substitute for the impractical personal touch; that decentralization take place wherever possible and that emphasis of public relation may offer an equivalent for the competition that is lacking. In the personal realm the maintenance of high morale among the laborers, for example by granting them a measure of security, is as imperative as the selection and development of capable, progressive leadership.

One of the weak points of administration, the use of standard practices as substitutes for the impracticability of personal direction, is the subject matter of a book on administration in German ministries written by A. Brecht, a former high official in the Prussian Ministry of the Interior, and C. Glaser, an official in the United States Department of Agriculture. Theirs is a very valuable description of public administration as practised in the German ministries over the past forty years. The authors were in the fortunate position of being able to base their account of the art and technique of German ministries on the "Code of Administrative Procedure" which has been elaborated during 1924-26 for all German national ministries. The translation and annotation of this document fills the greater part of the volume, and its presentation seems the more justified since no other country has regulated the technical procedure of all national departments by means of a detailed and common code. The major theme of their study could be described as a demonstration of Max Weber's thesis on the structure of

bureaucratic rule, namely "that the technique of administration is not immediately dependent on the political form of the government" (p. vii).

One could extend this very cautious statement somewhat further and make it apply to the personal identity of the administrative bureaucracy before and after Hitler or before and during the Fascist regime. But one must also not overlook some important structural changes that F. M. Marx has shown to have occurred within the public bureaucracy under the "totalitarian" systems. First of all, "totalitarianism" has brought an unprecedented growth to bureaucracy. At the same time, "totalitarianism has been held to the path of conservation in building its administrative system" (p. 117). Both tendencies are to be found in Italy and in Germany: after the "insurgents" took power no mass displacement of public personnel occurred, but a change took place in the "atmosphere" of the offices because the officials were forced to identify themselves with the new one-party system and because the top ranking men in the hierarchy wielded great policy-making influence. The latter were significant because they exercised a kind of "veto power" over the party and secured the prompt clearance of proposals emanating from the central departments. In the second instance, the totalitarian systems broke "the legislative deadlock that accompanied the demise of parliamentary government" (p. 117).

The second group of books goes far beyond the scope of the first: they deal with the social processes underlying and leading to bureaucratization. Whereas the authors we have discussed so far were careful to base their statements on plenty of material and experience, we now encounter very subjective conceptions on matters of vast historic dimension. This is especially true of the anonymous French writer, Bruno R., a socialist who diagnoses social trends and at the same time appeals to the working class to counteract those trends that seem to him not to possess the stringency of historical laws. His very simple thesis, one that is more often repeated than confirmed, reads as follows. The bureaucracy, which is going to dethrone the bourgeoisie and its capitalist economy, will be the new ruling class.[1] This is a world wide trend that has found its clearest expression in Russia. There the proletarian revolution has been betrayed by a bureaucracy which first came to power through the October Revolution and which now, under Stalin's regime, controls the economy and the state. This bureaucracy, consisting of technicians, high-ranking officers, and public administrators, constitutes a new class which, aided by the G.P.U., army, and police, exploits the working class. Exploitation does not take place by way of private property, as was the case with the old and now defunct bourgeois economy, but through the collective ownership of the instruments of production. The ruling class, though numbering only about 15 million people, reserves for itself about 40 per cent of the social product (an estimate of Trotsky's). For ideological purposes it employs journalists and writers to deceive the workers by scientific means. There is only a slight difference between the bureaucracies of the capitalist states (the "*bureaucratie syndicale*") and the Russian; both aim to perpetuate their power, but whereas the capitalist bureaucracy serves the interests of

[1]A similar idea was conceived by the Italian theoretician of government Gaetano Mosca, a contemporary of Pareto. Fifty years ago he anticipated the development of modern states toward "totalitarianism." Underlining the prevalence of bureaucracy, he called the new form the "exclusively bureaucratic" state. His book, *The Ruling Class*, was published in English in 1939.

the bourgeoisie, the Russian serves the interests of its state, that is, of itself. For R., there is not much difference between the economic system of Russia and that of the "totalitarian" states (both are "*collectivisme bureaucratique*"), except that a vestige of the capitalist system still survives in the latter. The United States, too, is on the way to bureaucratic rule. The "New Deal" marks the beginning to this development which will eventually result in a complete bureaucratic autocracy. Since the tendency toward the bureaucratic state is a uniform one in all countries, it will finally result in seven or eight vast autarchies to replace the great number of small nations. Among these autarchies a new economic equilibrium will arise "*sur les ruines du capitalisme,*" provided that no general upheaval ("*conflagration*") or proletarian revolution will forestall this development.

J. Burnham indulges in a similar historical conception in his vivid book. In many respects, he may be considered an unconscious successor of Bruno R., though he differs from him in that he is a former socialist who has lost all faith in the future of socialism and submitted calmly to the "unavoidable" trend toward a new class society, much as he dislikes it. According to his view, we are at present witnessing the transformation of capitalism into a new social system, that of "managerial society." The capitalist system that ruled the world since the fourteenth century ended with the first world war, which is to be regarded as the last capitalist war. From then on began a change toward the new social system, a change that has been speeded up during the second world war, which is also the first war of the new society. Though capitalism has abdicated, its successor is not socialism. One of the fundamental mistakes of Marxism, says Burnham, was that socialism was thought to be the only alternative to capitalism. This is not the case, either in reality, as Russia proves, or in theory. The alternative to individual control over the instruments of production can be control through corporate rights anchored in social institutions. A society in which the control of property rests with institutions is naturally not a socialist one, not the free, classless, international society of the Marxists. It is rather a social system in which the majority of the people are ruled by a small and very powerful class of those controlling "access to the means of production and of preferential treatment in distribution." Ruling classes of this kind are in the making all over the world; their members are the industrial and political "managers," who have been able to free themselves from the control of the purely capitalist groups and from parliamentary institutions. Release of the technical manager from the control of the bourgeoisie has been attained in Russia, is approached in Germany, and is on its way in all nations including the United States; "this development is a decisive phase of the managerial revolution" (p. 88). The managerial class will build up a new economy, a new state and a new ideology. The economy, a type of "corporate exploitation," will not be regulated by money to the extent that it has been. It will not have economic but political crises, and the function of the market will change to a deliberate regulation of production. Political sovereignty will be shifted from parliaments to administrative bureaus, the active heads of which will play the same role in public administration as the industrial managers play in the economy. Moreover, politics and economics will be so interwoven that there will be hardly any separation between political and industrial officials. Under the political system of the managerial society the large number of small sovereign nations characteristic of capitalism will be replaced by three "super-states" dividing the world into three

spheres, America, Europe and Asia, and any war in the future will be a struggle among these three strategic centers for world control. The capitalist ideologies, with their slogans of "individualism," "opportunity," etc., which have lost their appeal to the masses, will be superseded by the slogans of "security," "planning," and such, justifying the rule of the managerial class. Managerial society, though nowhere a reality, takes shape everywhere. It has gone farthest in Russia, still retains some capitalist elements in Germany. In the United States, where capitalism is not yet done with, the managerial revolution expresses itself in the slow process of governmental intervention into private economy.

We find the same mistakes in Burnham's book regarding governmental intervention as we do in Bruno R.'s. But Burnham has at least tried to trace the social roots of the managerial class, and in the explanation of them we see the principal failure of his theory. The power of the "managers" originates in the "separation of ownership and control," in Burnham's wording the "separation of control over access from control over preferential treatment in distribution" (p. 94). That is to say, the owners have been losing control over access, and those who control it, the managers, "are the owners." This playing with the word "control," equating it in fact with "ownership," leads Burnham to conclusions that bear no relation to the reality. With respect to the United States he has to concede that the bureaucrats still have to share control with all the groups of "owners" who steadfastly hold to their capitalist attitude, and with respect to Germany he would have gone much further than he has (p. 239), if he had been more familiar with German conditions than his examples on page 237 show. Again and again Russia remains the only instance for Burnham and Bruno R., in which the theory of managerial rule seems to be applicable. And this is the only country where capitalism, as we know it, has been radically extinguished.

JOSEF SOUDEK (New York).

Technology on the Farm. A Special Report by an Interbureau Committee and the Bureau of Agricultural Economics of the U. S. Department of Agriculture. U. S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C. August 1940. (xiii and 224 pp.; $0.40)

Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, part 30, "Technology and Concentration of Economic Power," printed for the use of the Temporary National Economic Committee. U. S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C. 1940. (xxi, 1392 [pp. 16207-17599] and viii pp.; $1.75)

The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940, "Farmers in a Changing World." U. S. Department of Agriculture. U. S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C. (xii and 1215 pp.; $1.50)

Hoffman, A. C., *Large-Scale Organization in the Food Industries*. Monograph No. 35, printed for the use of the Temporary National Economic Committee. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1940. (xi and 174 pp.; $0.20)

Meyers, Albert L., *Agriculture and the National Economy.* Monograph No. 23, printed for the use of the Temporary National Economic Committee. U. S. Government Printing Office. Washington, D. C. 1940. (vii and 48 pp.; $0.10)

Gold, Norman Leon, A. C. Hoffman, Frederick V. Waugh, *Economic Analysis of the Food Stamp Plan.* A Special Report. U. S. Department of Agriculture. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1940. (vi and 98 pp.; $0.20)

Schmidt, Carl T., *American Farmers in the World Crisis.* Oxford University Press. New York 1941. (xi and 345 pp.; $3.00)

Rochester, Anna, *Why Farmers Are Poor.* The Agricultural Crisis in the United States. International Publishers. New York 1940. (317 pp.; $2.75)

The scope and significance of the changes which American farming has been undergoing in the last two decades appear all the more impressive when seen against the background of the old controversy concerning the economic laws governing the development of agriculture. As late as the beginning of the century, the census material had been often interpreted as proving the victorious advance of the small, independent farm and the breaking-up of the big land concentrations. Today there can hardly be any further discussion of such once heatedly contested questions as the relative superiority of small or large-scale farming, the adaptability of the machine to the requirements of agricultural production or the trend of land ownership. The idyllic conception of a farm world which is hardly affected by changes in its economic and social environment has been shattered as mechanization conquered one agricultural operation after the other, as commercial interests acquired strongholds in the distribution of agricultural products and as the agricultural "ladder," contrary to expectations, led from farm ownership to tenancy, from tenancy to unemployment.

"In 1787, the year the Constitution was framed, the surplus food produced by 19 farmers went to feed 1 city person. In recent years, 19 people on farms have produced enough food for 56 non-farm people, plus 10 living abroad."[1] This growth of agricultural productivity was accompanied by all the economic and social problems that characterized the history of industry. For, agriculture, like industry, pays for the increase of its productive forces with insecurity and poverty and with the separation of millions of producers from their means of livelihood. Indeed, the specific conditions of agricultural production which have so often been praised as safeguards against the social evils of big industry, actually make its transformation into a scientific and commercial enterprise even more painful. For many years the country's biggest single industry has been in a state of chaos far too involved and serious to be cleared up merely by the working of the market.

A number of factors have contributed to the present difficulties of American agriculture which are due to circumstances outside its own sphere, such as the loss of foreign markets and the long industrial depression. But other

[1] *Technological Trends and National Policy,* National Resources Committee. U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1937, p. 99.

factors have been the direct result of agriculture's rise to technical maturity. It is primarily with these "natural" developments and with their effect on the farm population that the following review will deal.

The most striking feature in the present agro-technical picture is the replacement of animal power by mechanical power. The tractor is the representative machine of American farming. It extended the mechanization of the planting, cultivating and harvesting operations to an ever increasing variety of crops. The number of tractors used on farms rose from 10,000 in 1910 to more than 1,600,000 in 1939, with almost half of this number—746,000—added in the years 1930-1939. According to the estimates of the Department of Agriculture an additional 500,000 may be in use within the next ten years.[1]

But these figures alone, momentous as they are, do not reveal the whole picture. Within thirty years, the tractor has been developed from a heavy and clumsy machine into a highly dependable and maneuverable instrument. Of late, the introduction of pneumatic tires has further improved its traction and speed and has cut its operating expenses by 10 to 20 per cent as compared to those of the steel wheel type.

The immediate result of the replacement of the farm's work stock by automobile, truck and tractor was the decrease of the number of horses and mules from 26,500,000 in 1915 to about 15,000,000 in 1939. The Department of Agriculture sees reasons to assume that there will be a further decrease of 1,500,000 heads in the next 10 years.[2] The acreage thus released from the production of feed to the raising of commercial crops is estimated to be between 40 and 50 million acres. The supply of the commercial markets has been increased by at least one-eighth merely through this shift from horse to tractor.[3]

The use of more efficient implements and the combination of several operations which the tractor's greater power makes possible, permits better, faster and cheaper tillage and harvesting. The number and variety of special machines on modern farms is astonishing.[4] So far, the harvesting machines show the greatest advance in mechanization. The most important of these and, barring the tractor, the most revolutionary machine in its economic and social effects is still the combined harvester-thresher. "Combined" wheat rose from 5 per cent of the total crop in 1920 to 50 per cent in 1938.[5] The introduction of new types of combines with wider ranges of use is likely to lead to a further increase in the total number.[6]

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[1]*Technology*......, p. 12.

[2]*Technology*......, p. 44.

[3]See Howard R. Tolley, "An Appraisal of the National Interest in the Agricultural Situation" in: *American Economic Review*, February 1941, p. 113.

[4]In the machine sheds of well equipped farmers can be found a series of plows, harrows and cultivators, each of them designed for a special job; various planters, among them the multi-row and variable depth-planter; plates for accurate seed placement; transplanting machines; band fertilizer placement equipment; field ensilage cutters; hay pick-up balers; mechanical beet lifter and toppers; potato planting and gathering machines; power sprayers and dusters; electric dairy sterilization and milking equipment; etc.

[5]*Technology*......, p. 14.

[6]The number of combines in use on farms rose from about 4,000 to 100,000 in the period 1920-1938 (Schmidt, p. 66), and to 110,000 in 1939 (*Yearbook*......, p. 515).

Second in the harvesting machine group is the mechanical corn-picker which by now handles 15 per cent of the total corn crop.[1] In spite of the greater technical difficulties which the production of corn offers as compared with wheat, its mechanization will undoubtedly increase. In the corn belt, the portion of mechanically picked corn has already reached 30 per cent and some observers see the day approaching when corn will be machined from planting to harvest.[2]

When contrasted with the harvester-thresher and the corn-picker, the mechanical cotton-picker seems to be still in an experimental stage. The perfection and general use of this machine could easily have the same or even a greater impact on the agricultural structure of the South than the combine had on the wheat plains. The fact that more than 800 patents have been taken out on various types of cotton harvesting machines proves the universal recognition of the picker's economic potentialities. Technical deficiencies and the low cost of labor in the cotton belt have been the main obstacles it encountered. But government experts believe that "the mechanical cotton-picker can be said to be on the horizon."[3] This statement must sound ominous to hundreds of thousands of croppers.

The government, experimental stations, agricultural colleges and the farm machinery industry are all studying the effect of mechanization with regard to the cost of production. A decrease of more than 50 per cent in the cost of cotton production per acre (excluding picking) was reported in an official study in the South. This extraordinary reduction was due to the replacement of the one mule-half row equipment, commonly used by sharecroppers, by the tractor-drawn four-row equipment.[4] The net costs of producing a bushel of corn have been shown to vary from 47 cents to $1.12 and those of wheat from 81 cents a bushel to $1.45.[5] In the period 1909-1913 to 1934-36 the amount of labor required to produce wheat fell, on an average, from 12.7 man hours to 6.1 hours per acre; to produce oats from 12.5 to 7.9 hours; to produce corn from 28.7 to 22.5 hours and to produce cotton from 105 to 88 hours.[6]

The equipping of the farm with mechanical power and the new implements which are called for, naturally requires greater capital investment. Comparative studies have found the capital requirements to be thirty per cent to fifty per cent higher on tractor-operated farms than on farms using horses.[7] Other economists estimate the increase in the value of power and implements on tractor-operated farms even higher.

The running expenses of tractors and trucks are cash expenditures and therefore tend to make the farmer extend his commercial crops, as he does

[1]The number of machine pickers in use on farms is estimated to have risen from less than 10,000 in 1920 to at least 70,000 in 1939 (Schmidt, p. 67).

[2]See Paul Schuster Taylor, "Goodby to the Homestead Farm" in: *Harper's Magazine*, May 1941, pp. 589-597.

[3]*Technology*......, p. 15.

[4]Rochester, p. 172, referring to *Mississippi Agricultural Experiment Stations, Bulletin* 298, June 1932, p. 12.

[5]Schmidt, p. 75.—Other factors besides mechanization are responsible for the difference in production cost expressed in these figures. But on an average the statement is justified that efficiently run mechanized farms have the lowest cost of production.

[6]*Hearings*......, pp. 16941-16944.

[7]*Illinois Experiment Station Bulletin* 395, p. 295, and *Iowa Experiment Station Research Bulletin* 258, pp. 344 and 361.

to meet mortgage interests and taxes. But there is an even greater inducement to expand as he realizes that increased use of his machines will decrease their operating cost. One test revealed that the cost of plowing an acre decreased by more than half when the tractor's working time was increased from 269 hours to 836 hours annually.[1] In order to get the full benefit of his efficient and expensive mechanical equipment, the farmer must take an area under cultivation far greater than the traditional homestead.

The conflict between mechanized production and traditional farming as well as its outcome is most clearly visible in such crops as wheat, corn and cotton, fruit and vegetables. Tractor, combine, corn-picker and the other modern implements are breaking the old boundary lines and establishing a new conception of the farm. Formerly, one man with horses and some help at harvest time could manage 320 acres of wheat land; now with a heavy duty tractor he is able to take care of 1,600 acres.[2] The mechanical corn-picker is considered to be profitable only when the area to be picked exceeds 100 acres. A medium-sized combine requires about 1,000 acres each year for maximum efficiency.[3] The 160 acre homestead, once considered a family-sized farm, is giving way to farms three and four times its size. In the western cotton states where mechanization has made greater advances than in the old cotton centers, farm families work more than 100 acres today compared with 15 or 20 acres in the past.[4]

Two ways in which modern machinery creates the conditions favorable to its full utilization are "consolidated farming" and "chain farming." The consolidated farm is the result of the merging of formerly independent farms into a new production unit; the main characteristic of chain farming is the centralized management of a number of farms. Commercial, shipping and industrial interests are closely connected with this development which in some parts of the country has already created a major problem. California offers the best example of urban capital playing an active part in farming. In 1935 land concentration had progressed there to such a point that 3.5 per cent of all farms held 62.3 per cent of all farm land; 10.0 per cent of all farms received 53.2 per cent of the 1929 gross farm income; 9.4 per cent of all farms spent 65.0 per cent of all expenditures for wage labor in 1929; and 7.0 per cent of all farms employed 66.0 per cent of all farm workers in January 1935.[5] In one of the most intensively cultivated regions of California, the Imperial irrigation district, corporations and non-resident individuals comprised 65.0 per cent of the owners of farms exceeding 640 acres and owned 77.0 per cent of the total acreage of this group.[6] "Many of the large owners are shippers, handlers, or packers who acquired ownership in order to insure themselves of sources of supply."[7] The same motives

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[1]Taylor, *loc. cit.*, p. 590.

[2]*The Yearbook of Agriculture* 1932, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1933, p. 419.

[3]Schmidt, p. 66.

[4]Schmidt, p. 72; Bonnen and Magee state in the *Journal of Farm Economics* for August 1938, that within little more than a decade, by introduction of tractors and four-row tillage equipment on cotton farms on high plains, the amount of cropland that can be handled by a farm family has increased from approximately 100 to approximately 450 acres.

[5]*Hearings*......, p. 17455.

[6]Meyers, p. 11.

[7]*Ibid.*

led the cannery and dairy industries into the agricultural field. Insurance companies and banks acquired farm property when the owners were unable to carry the cost of their credits. Striking details of such multiple ownership are given by A. Rochester,[1] whose thorough analytical study approaches the subject from a Marxist point of view. Her treatment of the rent problem in the agricultural crisis is a valuable contribution, though its merit is somewhat obscured by the heavy treatment that characterizes the whole book.

The immediate reasons for the investment of industrial and banking capital in agricultural production are varied but this capital once invested becomes the most active agent for rational methods of production and management. Its efficiency and commercial success makes the managerial farm a natural leader in the community.

Even where industrial capital does not directly own or manage agricultural enterprises, it makes its influence felt by its position of domination in the agricultural market. The production of hops, celery, tomatoes, asparagus, carrots, onions, melons, citrus and other commercial crops is increasingly regulated by marketing agreements between growers and processors or handlers. The need for cheap transportation, large deliveries and uniform standards,—all make for greater concentration of such crops.[2] The monopolistic tendencies of the market for farm products have been brought out in various official investigations. This rich material—especially the interesting *Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee,* part 30, and Hoffman's and Meyer's instructive Monographs for the TNEC—calls attention to the ever widening influence of industrial and commercial capital on the agricultural structure. Monopolization is most manifest in the processing of agricultural products. The *Agricultural Income Inquiry* of the Federal Trade Commission revealed that in 1934 five tobacco companies bought 57 per cent of the total American crop; thirteen wheat mills processed 65 per cent of all marketed wheat; three meat packers handled 41 per cent of all cattle, and six dairy and packing firms 32 per cent of all milk produced; the three biggest bakeries in 1933 supplied 19 per cent of all wheat bread.[3] One single company, the National Dairy Products Corporation, in 1934 handled 9.4 per cent of the total volume of milk produced for commercial use; more than 21 per cent of all the ice cream consumed; and manufactured and sold approximately one-third of the total supply of cheese in the United States.[4] Two meat packers, together with a creamery com-

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[1]Examples: On January 1, 1938, according to an estimate of the U. S. Bureau of Agricultural Economics, life insurance companies owned farm property in excess of $700,-000,000. A Senate report of 1936 revealed that 25 insurance companies owned 70,400 farms. The biggest "farmer" is the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company which possesses enough acreage to "make a mile-wide farm from New York to Los Angeles." Fifty thousand to sixty thousand people are living on the Metropolitan's 7,300 foreclosed farms (pp. 110-11).

[2]The *Annual Report of the Associate Administrator, Agricultural Adjustment Administration,* 1939, contains the following illustrations of crop concentration: The estimated annual farm value of the crops of 385 celery growers in Florida was $3,289,000 or $8,543 per farm; of 54 tobacco growers in Connecticut (Valley Shade) $3,639,000 or $67,333 per farm; and of 79 cantaloupe growers in Imperial and Yuma County $9,413,000 or $119,152 per farm.

[3]See Rochester, p. 33.

[4]Hoffman, p. 28.

pany, are the greatest butter handlers and distribute around 20 per cent of all butter produced.[1]

One of the most impressive illustrations of concentration can be found in the field of food distribution. At present, approximately 40 per cent of all food stuff distributed by retailers is sold by the corporate grocery chains, and another 7 per cent by the super markets.[2] The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, the biggest of the chains, reaches an annual business of a billion dollars and in 1935 had about 14 per cent of all the business in its field. By vertical integration the chains extend their activities into the processing industries and in many cases even into production itself. In 1936 the "A & P" owned 40 bakeries; 13 milk plants, including condenseries, creameries and cheese plants; 8 coffee roasting plants and 9 general factories. It is the third largest firm in the milk canning industry.[3]

The polarization of agricultural production into commercial and subsistence farming, already accelerated by the mechanization, is still further advanced by the demands which these big processors and distributors exact with regard to price, quantity and quality of the products. At the same time, with the market for farm products showing a growing concentration, the supply of agricultural machinery is almost completely monopolized. In 1936, four industrial firms sold more than three-quarters of all important farm implements.[4]

Caught in the pincers of monopoly capital, the competitive struggle of the millions of scattered agricultural producers is carried on with all the more intensity and fatal results. "For fifty years American agriculture has been drifting away from the ideal of the family farm," writes Schmidt (pp. 4-5), whose book may be said to follow, on the whole, the New Deal's approach to the farm problem, in spite of occasional criticisms. Today the owner-operated farm, free of mortgage debts and relying only on its own land, comprises less than a quarter of the total value of land and farm buildings. The passing of the independent family farm, the history of which is so inseparably connected with the history of democracy in America, shows itself in the growth of other types of farms, in the rapidly mounting mortgage indebtedness, in the "glacier-like drift towards tenancy,"[5] in the loss of the income of the middle-sized farm and in the development of agricultural wage labor.

Farms under 20 acres and over 500 acres comprise the only statistical groups which show an increase in number and acreage for the period 1910-1935. The acreage expansion of the smallest group is insignificant. In 25 years, it increased its share from 1.0 to 1.2 per cent of the total farm area. But the farms over 1,000 acres raised their portion of the total farm acreage from 19 to 29.5 per cent. The farms of 100 to 499 acres suffered the severest loss of all. Their share of the total farm land decreased from 53.6 to 44.3

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 36.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 5 and 10.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 7 and 12.

[4] Meyers, p. 30; see also p. 29: "We have here a situation of nearly perfect oligopoly. Two firms dominate the industry, four firms have effective control of the output and eight or ten firms control 90 per cent of the sales of eight implements, 80-90 per cent of four implements and 70-80 per cent of five implements."

[5] Schmidt, p. 20.

per cent.[1] It should be noted that this group includes the farms which come closest to the popular conception of the typical American family farm.

About 40 per cent of all owner-operated farms were mortgaged in 1935. The ratio of the debt to the total farm value rose from 27.3 per cent in 1910 to 50.2 in 1935.[2] The fixed charges of mortgage interests and taxation have been an ever-growing burden on the farmer. According to Schmidt (p. 81), real estate taxes and mortgage interests took six to eight per cent of the farmers' cash income before the first world war, eight to fourteen in the 1920's and nine to twenty-one in the 1930's. In the depression years, hundreds of thousands of farmers found themselves unable to cope with this unrelenting pressure and lost their properties. The number of forced sales of farm real estate in 1925-1930 was 108.0 per thousand and increased to 189.3 in 1930-1935.[3]

Growing concern over the drift from ownership to tenancy led in 1936 to the appointment of the "President's Committee on Farm Tenancy." Its report of 1937 was unusually candid and valuable. Tenant farmers are increasing by the rate of 40,000 annually, and 45 per cent of all America's farm land was rented in 1935 (as compared to 31 per cent in 1900). Furthermore, the percentage of tenant farms (including croppers) rose from 25 per cent to 42 in the period 1880-1935.[4] The advance of mechanization, one of the main causes of the increase in tenancy, has a different effect on the various forms of tenant farming. The prosperous cash tenant can rent more acreage to meet the requirements of mechanized production, whereas the sharecropper and the sharetenant have hardly any alternative but to succumb to the onslaught of the tractor. The small cash tenant finds that the sort of farm he desires is becoming rare. Taylor describes numerous cases of tenants being forced out by consolidated and chain farming and unable to establish themselves anywhere else.[5]

The industrialization of cotton farming means the transformation of the sharecropper and sharetenant into a wage laborer with sporadic employment. Each tractor pushes two to three farm families out of southern tenancy. Government economists estimate that the number of tractors used in the South will nearly double within the next decade and that as a result some 300,000 families now living on farms, may be displaced—and this even without the introduction of the mechanical cotton-picker.[6]

The man on the lowest rung of the agricultural ladder, the wage laborer, has suffered most from the agricultural crisis, the technical advances and the crop reduction policy. His chances of climbing to tenancy and eventual

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[1]Meyers, p. 10.

[2]*Yearbook*......, pp. 743-744.

[3]See Rochester, p. 193.—In some states the percentage of foreclosures was much higher than this average: "Roughly, 40 farms in every hundred went through a forced sale between 1925 and 1935 in the West North Central and Mountain states; and more than 30 farms in every hundred in the South Atlantic and East South states." (*Ibid.*, p. 193)

[4]*Yearbook*......, pp. 888-889.

[5]"Only last August a regional official of the United States Department of Agriculture told the House Committee on Interstate Migration that twenty-five thousand Middle Western farmers are not able to find a farm to rent!" (pp. 589-590) See also Taylor's testimony in *Hearings*......, pp. 17040-17078.

[6]*Technology*......, p. 64.

ownership are gone. He is, of all labor, the least protected by legislation or unions. Neither minimum wages and maximum hours nor the guaranteed right of collective bargaining exist for him. The seasonal character of his work condemns him to long periods of unemployment, but he is excluded from the benefits of unemployment insurance. The introduction of labor-saving devices in a period of curtailed production further eliminates jobs, thus increasing competition among the workers and lowering their resistance to attacks on their already miserable standards of living. Commercial farming is able to draw at any time of the year on a supply of wage laborers more than ample to meet all peak-requirements, and it can dismiss them the moment they are no longer needed, leaving it to the public relief agencies to keep them alive. The seasonal fluctuation of agricultural employment is shown by the fact that in January 1935 the census counted about 1,600,000 wage laborers on farms, whereas 2,700,000 were reported in April 1930. The annual average of hired agricultural workers on the first of each month has been estimated by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics as having fallen from 3,027,000 in 1926 to 2,479,000 in 1939.[1] The general trend is towards concentration of wage labor on an ever decreasing number of farms.[2]

The industrialization of production is changing the farm laborer's working and living conditions. The combined harvester-thresher, for instance, has eliminated the need for 80 per cent of the quarter million migratory workers that used to follow the ripening wheat crops across the plains. Normal requirements in farm production can today be met with about 1,600,000 fewer workers on farms than in 1929. Almost a million men living on farms were reported by the unemployment census of 1937 as either totally unemployed or working on emergency relief projects. And more than half a million were only partly employed.[3]

The wages of farm laborers are below the earnings of any other group of American workers. Considering the months of unemployment, the average farm worker's yearly wage income even in 1929, when wages were relatively high, was not more than $350.[4] Monthly average wage rates fell from $44.52 in 1929 to $21.10 in 1933.[5] In 1937, the total annual net income per wage laborer in various localities in the South ranged from $128 to $156.[6] In April 1939, farm wage rates averaged $1.23 per day with board and $1.53 per day without board.[7] Seven million farm laborers and their dependents live under conditions often considered as undesirable and sometimes intolerable. Malnutrition, poor health, ignorance and social apathy are widespread among them. "Many farm laborers cannot, or do not, even send their children to school. They do not know the stability and security of being a real, integral part of a community, and therefore enjoy almost no social participa-

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[1] *Hearings......*, p. 17443.

[2] According to Rochester (p. 86), the farms employing wage workers decreased from 41.8 per cent in 1929 to 22.1 per cent in 1935.

[3] Schmidt, p. 30—The "combine" helped to break the powerful organization of the Industrial Workers of the World who had grown strong by their hold on these laborers.

[4] Schmidt, p. 26.

[5] Rochester, p. 151.

[6] *Hearings......*, p. 17441.

[7] Rochester, p. 151.

tion of any kind. They are a socially isolated, sometimes shifting, sometimes stagnant group, without anchor, without keel and without direction."[1]

The unemployed wage workers are only a fraction of the surplus population "backed up" on the farms. Long years of industrial inability to absorb the country's labor reserve have made American farming as a whole a most overcrowded profession, wasteful in terms of average output per worker, unused productive capacity and return on the capital investments. In 1937, while the farm population constituted about one-fourth of the total population of the United States, the agricultural income was less than 9 per cent of the total national income. One has only to look at the various farm income groups to realize that agriculture harbors today millions of families and single individuals whose work does not secure them an existence anywhere near a decent standard of living. In 1929, at the height of prosperity, over 1,800,000 farms—more than 25 per cent of all the farms in the country—had gross incomes of less than $600. More than a million farm families were on relief or rehabilitation rolls at the beginning of 1935.[2] A report of the National Resources Committee estimates that in 1935-1936, a year of partial recovery, over 600,000 farm families still received some form of direct relief, and that of the remaining more than 6,000,000 families, almost 4 per cent had less than $250 income; 14 per cent between $250 and $500; and 18 per cent between $500 and $750. 3,825,000 farm families, more than half of all, had less than $1,000 income.[3]

These figures reflect the relative unimportance of fifty per cent of all farms from the point of view of commercial farming. Indeed, the share in the total agricultural output of these fifty per cent is hardly more than one-tenth. The other half of the farms not only account for ninety per cent of the total production, but have an unused capacity which could meet the whole demand of the market, if higher prices offered the necessary stimulus. The potential output of the present agricultural plant is estimated as 25 per cent to 50 per cent higher than its actual production.[4] "If the Corn Belt were being run by a great corporation, say the A.T.&T., within twenty years it probably would be producing the present supply of pork and lard with half as much man-labor as at present, with 35 million instead of the present 50 million acres in corn, and with probably half as many farms and half as many people living on farms. That is the possibility of efficiency and commercialization pressed to the extreme," said the then Secretary of Agriculture, Wallace, in 1936.[5] And he continued: "May the day of impersonal corporate dominance of a completely efficient and commercialized agriculture never come!" These words express very well the dilemma which the government is facing in regard to a farm policy.

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[1]Schmidt, pp. 27-28, quoted from Taylor, C. C., Wheeler, H. W., Kirkpatrick, E. L., *Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture.* U. S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D. C. 1938.

[2]Schmidt, pp. 32 and 33.

[3]*Consumer Incomes in the United States: Their Distribution in 1935-36.* U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1938.

[4]Schmidt, p. 70.—See also p. 71: "The agrobiologist, O. W. Willcox, declares that if the most productive methods now known were generally applied, then it would be possible for 1,600,000 farmers on 40,000,000 acres to produce as much of our eight principle crops as are now produced by six or seven million farmers on about 240,000,000 acres."

[5]Speech of August 11, 1936.

Left to itself, the mechanism of the market would inevitably lead to the complete economic ruin of millions of producers, and in all likelihood to political chaos. The need for planned agricultural adjustment is so generally recognized that the lamentations of a rugged individualist among American economists, deploring the annihilation of the independent farmer by governmental intervention, were cited for their grotesqueness and amusing antiquity.[1] Besides, the American farmer is not inexperienced in the political sphere and never hesitated in time of distress to call for government help and protection. But it is one thing to recognize the necessity of economic planning and another to agree on the goal and the course to follow. The suggestions as to desirable social ends of governmental policy are as varied and contradictory as the interests involved. Some would like to see American agriculture reconstructed on the basis of the quickly disappearing family-farm; others go even further and would have farming declared a closed field and the entrance of new competitors barred by law. But economists are increasingly inclined to see the same causes at the bottom of the farm problem that underlie the disruptions of the whole national economy.

Farm relief programs are usually arrived at by way of political compromise and they have a tendency to follow the line of least political resistance. The extremely diversified farm legislation of the last decade consists of emergency measures necessitated by the desperate farm situation in the early 1930's, and of long-range adjustment programs. Naturally, commercial farming received the main attention. The influential farm organizations with their "lobbies" have been seeing to that. To the New Deal belongs the credit of having made itself the spokesman for the less articulate strata of the farm population and of having focused public attention on the low-income groups, on the plight of the wage worker and sharecropper, on child labor, on the concealed unemployment on the farms, on the bad state of health, hygiene and education in the countryside. A series of measures have been undertaken to alleviate the hard lot of this part of the farm population, to spare them some of the daily drudgery and to give them a minimum of security. But even government experts are at a loss to say what eventually will become of these people.

The Yearbook of Agriculture, 1940, is an excellent compilation of the various problems facing the Roosevelt administration and of measures undertaken by it to improve the situation of the farmers: the creation of a wide-flung agricultural credit system; compensation payments to farmers for soil conservation;[2] parity prices for farm commodities;[3] the "ever normal granary program" and other marketing devices and agreements, de-

[1]"Papers and Proceedings of the Fifty-third Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association" in: *The American Economic Review,* February 1941, p. 175.

[2]These payments are actually meant as an inducement for the farmer to reduce the area of surplus crops. The act was formulated after the Supreme Court had declared the production-control features of the AAA to be unconstitutional.

[3]The concept of parity loans and parity prices for agricultural products shows quite openly that it is of a political, not economic nature. "Parity" is regarded as the price ratio between farm and industrial products that existed in the period 1909-1914, one of the best periods American farming ever experienced. The purchasing power of farm commodities is quite arbitrarily stabilized at a level and in a way which cannot be justified by any economic considerations. The *New York Times* (May 15, 1941) rightly asks: "What would be thought of the proposition that a 1941 automobile should sell for the same relative price that an automobile of similar quality sold for in 1914?"

signed to stabilize prices and to encourage domestic consumption and foreign trade.

The outbreak of the war destroyed the government's efforts to increase agricultural exports by reciprocal trade agreements. Over twelve million bales of unsold cotton, almost the equivalent of a year's crop, are lying in warehouses and this year's bumper wheat crop will further add to the wheat carry-over, bringing it well above a half billion bushels. These stocks will become powerful weapons in the battle for the reconstruction of Europe but "even a return to normal world trade would not solve the problem of cotton and wheat surpluses."[1]

All the more attention is given to the possibilities of extending the domestic market. Nutrition experts point out that a satisfactory diet for every person in the United States would call for a 100 per cent increase in the consumption of green vegetables, for a 70 per cent greater consumption of tomatoes and citrus, for a 35 per cent greater consumption of eggs etc. So far as production is concerned, this goal could easily be reached within a few years and the dietary habits of the country developed accordingly. But the limited purchasing power of millions of consumers is a more formidable obstacle to overcome.[2]

Among the government's various devices for adjusting production and consumption, the Food Stamp Plan deserves special attention. The stamp plan's objective is to raise farm income and at the same time improve the dietary standards of low-income consumers. A Federal subsidy is paid to the eligible persons in the form of blue stamps which any retail food store in the areas where the Plan is in operation accepts for the purchase of specified surplus foods. As a rule, the blue stamps are given only on the condition that a certain number of orange-colored stamps are bought by the participant which he can give in payment for any food product. The plan is intended to insure that any surplus product bought with the free blue stamps actually represents a net addition to the participant's food consumption. Underlying it is the observation that the food demand of the higher-income groups is less elastic than that of the low-income groups. By diverting a larger share of a certain product from high-income to low-income consumers, the plan not only improves the quantity of the latter's food supply but is also expected to raise the market price of this product, since the higher-income consumers are inclined to buy their customary supply regardless of price changes. This price increase constitutes the farmer's interest in the plan.

So far, the plan has met with remarkable success. In June 1940, about one year after its try-out in Rochester, it has been in operation in 83 cities and county areas throughout the country, with 1,500,000 persons participating. This summer, it is expected to reach 5 million people and to distribute foods worth $10,000,000 a month. "If the plan were made available to all persons in the United States who receive public assistance, it would

[1]Claude R. Wickard, Agricultural Policy and Abundance in: *Survey Graphic*, July, 1941; p. 390.

[2]More than 4 million families in the United States with annual incomes under $500 in 1935-36 spent slightly more than $1 per person per week, or about 5 cents per person per meal.

See *U. S. National Resources Committee. Consumer Expenditures In The United States*, Estimates For 1935-36. p. 195. Washington, D. C. 1939.

be necessary to provide blue stamps for approximately 15 million people. With blue stamp expenditures amounting to $25 to $30 per person per year, the cost of the program to the Federal Treasury would be from 375 to 450 million dollars per year."[1] According to the same estimate, it would lead to an increase in farm income of 240-440 million dollars.

The war and the country's defense program have modified some of the basic problems of American agriculture. The industrial boom and the military draft are draining the farms' surplus population. The necessity to supply Britain with food and to safeguard the domestic needs have led to a new agricultural policy designed to encourage the production of all essential food stuffs. The recent legislation has greatly extended the government's power over agricultural production and distribution. The impact of the war situation accelerates only a development towards state control over the market which is universal as well as irresistible. "There is going to be planning in the modern world," writes the Secretary of Agriculture,[2] "—either autocratic planning or democratic planning. As I look forward to the condition of the world after this war, I think we can avoid autocratic planning—dictatorship—only by proving that we can do a better job with democratic planning."

PAUL W. MASSING (Quakertown, Pa.).

Fabricant, Salomon, with the assistance of **Julius Shirkin.** *The Output of Manufacturing Industries 1899-1937.* National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. New York 1940. (xxi and 685 pp., 66 tables, 24 charts; $4.50)

This report deals with the trend of production in American industry, with the exception of mining and public utilities. The period covered runs for 38 years since 1899. Since only from that year on have reasonably adequate data been collected in the U. S. Census of Manufactures. The primary interest of this study is in physical output, the actual quantities of goods produced in American factories. It was only where other information was lacking that the census data on pecuniary value were used, and then merely to supplement the deficiencies in the information on physical output. So, freed of money-mysteries, this study offers extraordinarily important material—though such as should only be used critically—for an examination of changes that occurred in the material state of the population during the period from 1899 to 1937, changes measured not by gold but by quantity of goods actually on disposal. It is to be noted, thus, that the study has not treated cyclical changes but deals exclusively with the most persistent shifts in production.

Evaluation of the rich material offered by the book demands painstaking and detailed analysis. In this review, however, we shall limit ourselves to brief comment on the contents and chief results.

In chapter 3 the author deals with changes in the total manufacturing output. During the years 1899 to 1937 physical output grew 276 per cent,

[1] Economic Analysis of the Food Stamp Plan, . . . p. 86.

[2] Claude R. Wickard, *loc. cit.*

representing an annual increase of 3.5 per cent on the average, while increase in population during the same period ran to only 73 per cent or 1.4 per cent per annum. On the other hand, the Day-Thomas Index for the same years shows a rise of only 203 per cent (p. 47), indicating that the greater rate of increase disclosed by the National Bureau index was based on a greater number of industries, many of them new, rapidly rising ones, such as rayon and rayon goods (p. 49). Were there the possibility of determining the improved quality of the product statistically, the rate of increase in output would be still greater. Calculated per capita of the population, the increase in manufacturing for the period designated comes to 120 per cent. The author stresses that it does not follow from this rate of increase that there was an equivalent "rise in the per capita consumption of finished processed goods" (p. 52) since the total output includes not only consumers goods but capital goods as well. But—and this is a serious defect in the book—the author nowhere carries through a division of the physical output into the two familiar categories of producers goods and consumers goods on the basis of the statistical data, but merely states quite generally that "it is probable that the rise of 120 per cent in the per capita net output of manufacturing industries from 1899 to 1937 overstates the gain in per capita production of finished processed goods" and the probable increase is, quite arbitrarily, put at an estimate of about 100 per cent per capita.

This result of the National Research Bureau's analysis must be sharply questioned. Did the material living standard of the broad mass of the population—expressed in goods—actually rise 100 per cent during the latter 38 years? Since the mass of capital goods increased much more quickly in the course of productive development than the production of consumers goods, the average growth of the total manufacturing output of production must consequently be very strongly overstated. For example, the machinery group as a whole increased its value "almost 50 per cent more than did all manufacturing industries combined" (p. 297). This machinery group, considered by itself, shows a growth of close to 400 per cent in the 38 year period under discussion (p. 298). The increase in total output of transportation equipment was even greater (p. 313).

It follows from this that the per capita increase in quantity of goods actually consumed must be considered significantly less than 100 per cent. This seems to be confirmed by the data the author himself presents on the two most important consumers goods industries, food and textile. In the food industry group, for example, the increase during the period reported comes to 156 per cent (p. 142) as against a population increase of 73 per cent. This would signify a real increase of only 48 per cent in consumers goods. Since, moreover, it is precisely in the food industry that a stronger shift takes place from home made to factory made goods, the real increase in food production becomes even further reduced, and the author himself arrives at the result that the index of increase in per capita consumption of processed goods is overstated (p. 144). Incidentally, the author in a footnote further weakens the value of his calculation: "If caloric content, rather than value added per unit, had been used as the coefficient, *it is possible that no increase in per capita consumption* would have been found" (p. 144). We must ask, therefore, what can be the value of the indices that show an increase of 100 per cent in the output of consumers goods? The danger remains that they might become slogans which can be lightly used for

political propaganda. According to Robert F. Martin[1] the realized national income per capita, adjusted by the General Price Level, increased from $456 in 1899 to $531 in 1938 (after it had passed through an artificial inflation in the post-war decade up to 1929). The per capita increase in real income thus came to barely 17 per cent in these 38 years. The unusually great difference in Martin's and Fabricant's researches shows that the statistical methods of research are still in their beginning stages and require further improvement. Fabricant's work, however, is most welcome as a step along this path.

Griffin, John I., *Strikes*, a Study in Quantitative Economics. Columbia University Press. New York 1939. (319 pp.; $4.00)

Cooke, Morris L., and **Philip Murray,** *Organized Labor and Production*. Harper & Brothers. New York 1939. (277 pp.; $2.50)

Ziskind, David, *One Thousand Strikes of Government Employees*. Columbia University Press. New York 1940. (279 pp.; $3.00)

Galenson, Walter, *Rival Unionism in the United States*. American Council on Public Affairs. New York 1940. (317 pp.; $3.25)

Sharp, Malcolm and **Gregory, Charles D.,** *Social Change and Labor Law*. The University of Chicago Press. Chicago 1939. (175 pp.; $2.00)

Written Trade Agreements in Collective Bargaining. National Labor Relation Board, Bulletin No. 4. 1939. (359 pp.)

Dawson, Marshall, *Problems of Workmen's Compensation Administration* in the United States and Canada. U. S. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bulletin No. 672. 1940. (229 pp.)

Administration of the Fair Labor Standards Act of October 1938. 2 vols. (mimeographed)

National Labor Relations Board. (mimeographed)

The Walsh-Healey Act. Division of Public Contracts, Department of Labor.

The last three volumes are the monographs No. 12, 18, and 1 of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure (1940).

One of the significant facts about publications in the field of labor law and labor relations is the superiority of the governmental reports over the academic treatises, especially in labor law and not so much in labor economics. In the books under review this fact is amply illustrated. The reason seems to lie in the lack of any theory of labor law which would serve as the *raison d'être* for academic publications in the field. It is even impossible to circumscribe the field of labor law and to delimit it from other disciplines,

[1]Robert F. Martin, *National Income in the United States 1799-1938.* National Industrial Conference Board Studies, #241, New York 1939, pp. 6-7.

so that textbooks on labor law might be more than just chapters without any connecting link.

As the title already indicates, Mr. *Griffin's* book is concerned only with the measurable aspect of strikes. "Imponderables" are not handled. In consequence, the development of a theory of strikes is rendered impossible and the author indeed comes to the result "that there is no dominant trend, there is no basis for forecasting."

A certain value can nevertheless not be denied to the book. The concretizing of a theory of strikes is not possible without quantitative analysis. This analysis, which the author has undertaken of the statistics of the past 58 years, yields him the following results: Economically, strikes are closely connected with the course of competition. In the degree that prices rise, strikes increase, and with the fall of prices, the number of strikes decline. Politically, the periods of abundant and far reaching strikes fall together with periods of active interference on the part of the administration with the workers movement. Organizationally, where there exists an old trade union, the number of strikes is high. The results are founded on the official statistics on strikes in the United States and on specific researches of the author in Massachusetts and New York.

All the statistics set forth and therewith also the conclusions drawn by the author exhibit decisive weaknesses which make clear anew that without a definite economic and social theory, quantitative analysis conceals the true state of affairs. European experiences have made evident definite regularities which can be summarized in a few theses, and it would be of eminent interest to examine the validity the European development has for the United States.

Europe has shown the following: 1) Unions beget powerful employers associations. 2) The social reform policy of unions facilitates the process of concentration of capital and monopolization. 3) Mechanization, concentration, and monopolization change the social structure of the working classes. Unskilled, semi-skilled, female foremen and office employees hold ascendancy over skilled workers. 4) Thereby the significance of traditional craft organizations diminishes, 5) the importance of the state apparatus grows and 6) reduces therewith the political influence of the craft guilds. 7) Statistics show that from the moment unions receive formal recognition, the free collective agreement and the strike lose so strongly in importance that direct state encroachment becomes the most important political means for governing workers' relationships.

Whether these regularities have already broken through in the United States cannot be judged.

The theoretical import of the book by *Cooke* and *Murray* is slight, its political significance great. Cooke is an engineer who through his work in scientific management and through his practical activities in this field, has made a great name in public and semi-public companies. Murray is now President of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. The book is an important key to judging the political and economic theories of the C. I. O. Does the C. I. O. have a fundamentally different ideology from the A. F. of L., or are the distinctions between them rather of a tactical nature? On the basis of a reading of the book we must come to the conclusion that the theories of the A. F. of L. and C. I. O. are not basically different. The authors, who belong to different camps, come to the same result. In their opinion, the

period of economic expansion is not yet closed, because the need of present society for consumers and producers goods has never been as great as it is now. The problem of unemployment, in their opinion, can be solved in and through the present order of society, provided that a few revisions be made in it. These revisions are full recognition of trade unions, recognition of collective agreements as a means of stabilizing and normalizing the relations between those who labor and those who employ labor, and a certain degree of industrial democracy which gives the employees associations an opportunity to have a say in the affairs of business and industrial management. The authors regard it as clearly ideal that a great corporation at present discusses the question whether it is suitable to call a union chairman into the directing board of the company.

Trade union recognition, industrial democracy, and public works are in their view the institutions that make possible a full productivity and that will solve the unemployment problem. The program offered is thus nothing but a summing up of all the reformist programs of the European trade unions of the last twenty years.

The larger section of Dr. *Ziskind's* book is devoted to a detailed description of strikes of government employees, using sources that have never been accessible before. To this extent the merit of the book is beyond dispute. Evaluation of the many facts assembled shows, however, a serious deficiency, especially in the discussion of the legal aspects of government strikes. "The right to strike is rooted in the freedom of men." Very true, if the notion of right is clearly defined. There is no right to strike if right is understood as an enforceable claim against the contractual partner. There is, however, a right to strike if right means only the freedom to stop work, whatever the consequences of that stoppage may be. Thus understood, the government employee may strike like any other employee.

The value of the investigation would have been really great if the author would have analyzed the consequences of strikes for the different categories of employees. That would, in my view, have necessitated a classification among the government employees, an undertaking which the author rejects as impossible. The right to strike will considerably differ as between those government employees exercising sovereign functions and those carrying on merely technical functions.

Dr. Galenson's book is a doctoral dissertation at Columbia University and an excellent contribution to the problem of rival unionism besides. He distinguishes rival unions, that is, competing unions, from dual unions, that is, the mere coexistence of two or more unions without competition. The distinction is helpful and clarifies the whole analysis that follows. The author deals with the history of rival unionism, its causes, the tactics applied, the legal principles involved, the attitude of the common law and finally the impact of recent legislation. The study of the Wagner Act is especially enlightening. The author ends with a legislative proposal to mitigate the harshness of jurisdictional disputes for the employer and the consumer. He suggests prohibiting picketing by a minority union for a period of one year after the union is certified by the Board. The author himself raises and discards the objection that this provision would lead to a restriction of the minority's right to strike. Much as I believe that jurisdictional disputes should not be fought at the expense of the employer and the public, they

cannot be eliminated simply by depriving a minority union of the one weapon which makes its strike possible.

A review of the lectures by Messrs. *Sharp* and *Gregory* is a very difficult task. Though the book deals with a decisive problem which has never been adequately discussed, it lacks an hypothesis and conclusion. It is thus nearly impossible to recognize what the authors really want to say. The second part of the lectures deal with government control of labor disputes and discusses many important problems in their historical development,—from the English statute of labor of 1349 to the National Labor Relations Act. The discussion of specific problems is always stimulating, yet one fails to see a connecting idea.

Written Trade Agreements contains an excellent discussion of the role and the spread of the written trade agreements in many industries. The survey is introduced by an incisive discussion of the essentials of collective bargaining and a survey of the historical development of the written agreement. The treatment of these two problems is, in spite of the briefness, a model of clarity and precision.

This laudatory judgment equally applies to the publication of the Bureau of Labor Statistics on *Workmen's Compensation*. It is an invaluable study, discussing the various types of workmen's compensation laws in their operation. An appendix (written by Max D. Kossoris) deals with the experience with silicosis in relation to the Wisconsin laws.

The three following publications are produced by the *Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure* under the directorship of Professor Walter Gellhorn of Columbia University. They are the monographs to which the President referred when he vetoed the Logan-Walter Bill which attempted to subject administrative acts to judicial review.

The monograph dealing with the *Fair Labor Standards Act* of 1938 is the only existing thorough analysis of the act's operation. The monograph on the *National Labor Relations Board* reveals two outstanding problems. The Board has two tasks which are legally and sociologically completely different: the determination of the exclusive bargaining agency and the adjudication of unfair labor practices. The first function is typically administrative. The superiority of the Board's activities over those of courts can only be fully appreciated if we compare it with the German system where the very same problem, though in another legal form, were decided by courts which so hopelessly muddled it that in spite of a large number of decisions of the Federal Supreme Labor Court, it was never quite possible to find out whether and how far a collective agreement of the craft union was applicable to members of the craft union employed in another industry. We cannot here deal with the problem whether the solution which the National Labor Relations Board has elaborated is sound. It is decisive that only an administrative agency is capable of dealing with the problem. The determination of unfair labor practices is not an administrative but rather a judicial function. Yet, to refer such cases to the courts and to apply strict rules of evidence would mean an end of the protection afforded against unfair discrimination on the part of the employer. The Weimar Republic may again serve as a comparison. The Weimar Constitution (Article 159) protected employees against any discrimination because of their membership in a union. Yet, the task of demonstrating before a court that there existed a causal nexus between dismissal and union membership proved almost impossible. It is my con-

viction that the Board will be able effectively to sustain the life of the act if it sticks to the admissibility of evidence "which in the daily life of employers and employees appears to have probative force." Unfortunately, the monograph is very brief on this point.

The pamphlet dealing with the administration of the *Walsh-Healy* Act of 1936 assumes special significance today. With the growth of the national defense program the realm of the act must necessarily widen and its provisions assume a far greater importance than any other kind of minimum wage or maximum hour legislation. Adequately handled, the act may, next to the Wagner Act, become the cornerstone for the establishment of rational labor relations. The admirable monograph points out some weaknesses which may ultimately lead to making the act inoperative. The first lies in the application of the blacklist sanction, that is, the prohibition of a public contract to anyone who has been found to have violated the act, unless the Secretary of Labor specifically recommends otherwise. The blacklisting, which is far more powerful than a criminal fine or even imprisonment, creates a tremendous responsibility for the Secretary of Labor. It is thus no wonder that the sanction is applied only with great reluctance. Yet, too great a reluctance may lead to the disruption of the act. The problem will be to vest the authority of blacklisting in some administrative body with greater authority,—perhaps, as reports suggest, in some inter-departmental agency. It could certainly not be an administrative tribunal or court, since the kind of decision involved is fundamentally a matter of policy-shaping.

The second defect appears to lie in the method of field inspection. It is at this point that the trade union has to be involved and that the lack of legally recognized works councils elected by all employees becomes visible. Nothing in the act prevents the trade unions from filing a complaint, hearing witnesses, and preparing the material for the field inspector. With the increase of the number of manufacturers working for national defense, the Department of Labor will either have to increase the number of field inspectors or will have to resort to close collaboration with the trade union.

FRANZ L. NEUMANN (New York).

Nickerson, Hoffman, *The Armed Horde 1793-1939.* A Study of the Rise, Survival, and Decline of the Mass Army. G. P. Putnam's Sons. New York 1940. (xii and 428 pp.; $4.25)

This is indeed a book with a challenge. Its very title warns the reader not to expect an unbiased analysis of modern war. Democracy and "the armed horde," the dominant form of warfare during the last century and a half, are to the author two aspects of the same sinister principle. "It is the thesis of this book that the two are inseparably connected both with each other and with a third thing, barbarism" (p. 14). Nickerson does not omit any of the invectives that have been directed against universal conscription, mass war, national war, "absolute" or "unlimited" or "total" warfare, from the days of the French revolution to the present crusade of the civilized world against Nazism and Fascism, and he improves on all of them.

At the same time, his definition of "democracy" comprises a great variety of tendencies that are not generally comprehended under this term. It in-

cludes tendencies of proletarian socialism and anarchism as well as certain behavior patterns of modern anti-democratic Nazism. Socialism he refers to as "the monstrous doctrine produced in the alien brain of Mordecai, alias Karl Marx" (pp. 228-29) and he blames the dictators for copying "the worst feature of previous democracies" (pp. 395-96). The "romantic nationalism" of the early 19th century and even the far less romantic nationalism that was later developed by the Prussian state and the new German empire of 1871 are presented as mere offshoots of revolutionary Rousseauian democracy (pp. 128-29, 236).

Thus, the whole theory of this book is based on a strangely outdated philosophy. Rousseau appears as the very arch-initiator of the horrors of modern "totalitarian" or "absolute" warfare (p. 86). There is only one period in all modern history that glitters with all the conceivable virtues. This is the pre-Rousseauian, pre-revolutionary 18th century with its "moderation and decorum," its "Augustan serenity and order," its "moral unity" and the ensuing "successful and strict limitation of war" (p. 63). It is the period of which Talleyrand said: "He who has not lived before 1789, does not know the sweetness of life." It is the period that throughout the 19th century was extolled by all masters of the counter-revolution, from De Maistre to Taine. To reach this truly halcyon epoch, humanity had to pass through the horrors of the religious wars which in some respects surpassed even the 19th century's "climax of vileness and destruction." It is the "high summit" from which afterwards "Christendom fell away" into that orgy of mass-massacre which has not ended yet.

In spite of this unconcealed bias of the author, his book is of outstanding value as a study of one of the most vital problems of our time. Since Fuller's *War and Western Civilization 1832-1932* this is the first book written with the particular purpose of studying "the interaction of social and military forms." Even though we take exception to its conclusions we still have to accept its factual content and to base our own criticism mainly on a closer observation and a different organization of the same facts.

The author's principal thesis, already implied in the title and worked out in detail through all the eight chapters of the book, concerns the historical character of "the armed horde." Mass war does not belong to all historical epochs; the author most appropriately comments on the fact that "oddly enough, our time which in most matters emphasizes changing rather than unchanged things, usually talks of war as if it changed little except for new weapons" (p. 5). Mass war in all its aspects is a historical product of the present time, "reflecting its technics, power of organization, and moral driving forces, fused into a single effort."

On the other hand, what the propagandists of both sides would make us believe, is not true. "Total war," as at present conceived, is not a brand new invention of the last ten or twenty years. It is not a peculiar expression of the Nazi movement. During the last 150 years democracy itself invented and developed all the known aspects of the so-called total war of our time. Since the Jacobin *levée en masse* of 1793, all major democratic wars in Europe and the United States have been total wars within the limits set by the currently existing degree of technical and industrial development. They have been mass wars based on conscription and on a "universal draft" of all the resources of the belligerent nations, putting all labor and all capital absolutely at the disposal of the government which in turn tended to be-

come an appendage to the High Command of the armed forces. They were virtually, and in some cases actually, "unlimited" wars in the sense first developed in practice by the armies of the *Convention* and the Napoleonic empire, and elaborated in theory by Fichte and Hegel and their disciple, the German general von Clausewitz. Furthermore, these democratic wars almost invariably originated from, or tended to culminate in, some kind of social revolution. All these statements, with the possible exception of the last, are today accepted by all historical experts. One basic feature of this kind of warfare, the principle of universal service as against professional and semi-professional long-service forces, has been acclaimed as the most democratic principle of military organization—the people in arms. Even today, the conscript armies of England and the United States resemble more closely the *levée en masse* of the revolutionary Jacobins of 1793 than does the German army, "with only a third of its strength even nominally infantry, and with much if not most of its real work done by the long-service professionals of its Tank Corps and of the German Air Force" (p. 397).

Thus far the general theory of the author, which describes the modern form of mass war as the "natural fruit" of democracy, seems to be essentially justified. Its weakness is disclosed when in the last chapters of the book he applies it to the particular phenomena of the most recent historical development. In spite of some evidence to the contrary, the main tendency of this new development of warfare is not toward a further enhancement but rather toward a gradual decline of the type of mass warfare that predominated formerly. This is manifested, among other things, by the lessening importance of the "armed horde" in the military operations of the present war, by the comparative bloodlessness of its every operation in comparison with those of twenty years ago, and by a conspicuous lack of the general enthusiasm characteristic of 1914 and '15.

There is no reason to challenge this statement of the author as long as we regard it as a mere factual description of observable phenomenological tendencies. What is wrong is his attempt to explain these observable facts, in terms of his general theory, by a final exhaustion of the democratic principles of the French revolution. The whole theory of the author appears to suffer from over-generalization. It needs a much more specific formulation in order to fit the concrete facts of the actual historical development.

First, mass warfare, even in its origin, was not a product of the French revolution in general, but of one definite phase of that revolution. It originated at the critical juncture when the rise of the *Vendée* and outside aggression had forced the replacement of the much more democratic principles of the first phase of the revolution by the authoritarian and violent measures of the revolutionary dictatorship of the Jacobins. Second, the further development of universal conscription and of all other features of the "armed horde" during the 19th century lay not so much in the hands of democratic France as in those of the anti-democratic Prussian state. This was not, as the author believes, merely historical irony, but had its foundation in the greater appropriateness of an exalted use of force and violence for the purposes of the anti-democratic counter-revolution. Third, compulsory military service was reintroduced in Germany after Versailles not by a democratic government, but by the authoritarian and anti-democratic dictatorship of Hitler. Thus total war is less the outcome of the democratic revolution than it is the weapon of the anti-democratic counter-revolution. If, nevertheless,

the present war shows—on the side of the fascist aggressors even more than on the side of the democratic defenders—a certain change of form from an unrestricted all-round offensive effort to a more deliberately controlled and, as it were, "planned" method of conducting war, the decisive reasons for this change are to be found almost exclusively in a corresponding change of the economic structure of present-day society. As already observed by Clausewitz, the total or absolute war of the beginning of the 19th century had a close structural resemblance to the then flourishing cut-throat struggles of early economy. "War," said he, "is much like business competition pushed to its logical conclusions and unrestrained by any law other than expediency." As compared to that earlier form, the war waged today by Hitler, and against him by the democracies, is not a less comprehensive and less violent, but merely a more highly rationalized, planned, and controlled form of modern war.

KARL KORSCH (Boston, Mass.).

Bruck, W. F., *Social and Economic History of Germany* from William II to Hitler. 1888-1938. A Comparative Study. Oxford University Press. London and New York 1938. (291 pp.; 12 s. 6 d., $4.50)

Stolper, Gustav, *German Economy*, 1870-1940. Reynal & Hitchcock. New York 1940. (315 pp.; $3.00)

Reimann Guenter, *The Vampire Economy.* Doing Business under Fascism. The Vanguard Press. New York 1939. (350 pp.; $3.00)

Lewis, Cleona, *Nazi Europe and World Trade.* The Brookings Institution. Washington, D. C. 1941. (200 pp.; $2.00)

An economic history of Germany during the past fifty years is a daring undertaking for anyone to attempt in 291 pages. But when, as in Bruck, the attempt is also made to present the ideological connections that go with the economic history, the work must of necessity and at best come out as a rather sketchy affair. Furthermore, it is questionable in the extreme how far one may stress ideological ties that belong to the mercantilist period, as is done here, and yet obtain parallels to problems that have been raised in the latest period of capitalism. For example, Bruck puts the economic policy of Frederic II of Prussia under the same rubric as the T.V.A. The two policies, however, though they may from a formal point of view both be identified as policies of governmental intervention, are decisively different, as every volume of the *Acta Borussica* clearly shows. Frederic II found intervention necessary to stimulate and further privately owned manufactures, while the T.V.A. attempts to substitute public ownership in the utilities field as a means of assuring cheaper rates to the consumer.

The most interesting section consists of the author's presentation of the more recent problem of concentration and the problems of banking and industry in which he has had wide experience. The wealth of material on economic and social developments of the post-war era has quite evidently overwhelmed him, however, and instead of a concise sketch, we get among

other things historico-psychological aperçus on the character of the German working class, pro and con judgments on Rosenberg's history of the German Republic and skeleton remarks on the most recent events in Germany. Taken all in all we can say that the author has brought an unquestionably wide range of knowledge to bear on his study; but the work places before us a mass of opinions, those of the author and of others, and these do not attain his goal of an economic history of Germany.

Whereas Bruck overemphasizes the recrudescence of mercantilist motives, Stolper puts much too much emphasis from the very beginning on a thesis that has become rather popular today for manifold reasons, namely, that the state gains ascendancy over the economic life of the nation. Viewed in this context, the early history of Prussia appears as a history of "statecraft, administrative efficiency, and military organization."

This *Leitmotiv* never disappears. It helps to formulate the thesis that "imperial Germany has gradually become an economic system of mixed private and public ownership." But the term "mixed ownership" begs more questions than it answers. For example, which class has the means of production at its disposal in the case of mixed ownership? As the thesis is further developed, imperial Germany is described as a system very different from the so-called classic liberal system, a view, by the way, which is rather difficult to combine with the contention we find 30 pages later that "when Germany entered the war, her economic life was intrinsically free, built on liberal capitalist principles." The chapter on the Weimar Republic, too, gives the author welcome opportunity to build up his thesis. He turns his attention especially to the administration of government and banking. But since he does not mention the structural changes that took place in the forms of capitalist organization, especially the undermining of the stockholders' democracy by various well-known devices, and since he is completely silent about the internecine struggle that went on between the different banking groups, his picture becomes a fairly one-sided one, so that it would be difficult to subscribe to his thesis "that the democratic republic left as a heritage an economic system that corresponded rather closely to a complete system of socialism."

One special point has to be mentioned in this context which shows a single-mindedness on the part of the author. Referring to the stream of foreign loans, he complains that there was no legal remedy against the mounting foreign indebtedness and he gives special credit to Schacht for having applied brakes in some cases, at least as far as the foreign indebtedness of municipalities was concerned. But he entirely fails to mention that these measures enabled the privately owned public utilities to continue to compete with the extensive system of municipally owned public utilities. What gives the book some interest despite its shortcomings is the fact that it constitutes an attempt to describe German economic developments in the categories and with the eyes of liberal capitalism.

Reimann has pieced together his picture of the German economic situation out of impressions gleaned in conversations with German business men, letters from Germany, and the data in official publications. The whole is presented from the viewpoint of a manufacturer who is comparing his present social position in Germany with the conventional position enjoyed by a manufacturer within a capitalist economy. This does not imply that the social situation and individual attitude of other social classes is not treated in the

book, but they are intentionally made subordinate to the manufacturer's problem about his fate. The author is most successful when he shows how the attitude of aversion on the part of the manufacturers for the new system, to some extent a reflex of their more comfortable position in the second Reich, did not prevent their absorption into the German economic apparatus. Reimann is right in his assertion that the theoretical retention of private property as the basis for the economic structure went hand in hand with methods which already belonged to another economic system. Although emphasizing that this did not result in a new social order, he is at the same time anxious to show that a phenomenon of great social importance occurred, at least in a negative sense, in the annihilation of the independent middle class.

Reimann uses his presentation of the economic groups in the society to adduce an elaborate explanation of the role of the group leader as the contact man. This leader, however, has another, perhaps not intended, yet still more important function, clearly to be seen from the German decrees and periodicals. The actual control exercised over the groups by their most powerful leaders gives the big combinations an additional means whereby they can exclude smaller competitors. This practice has also been observed recently in the English war economy. Further investigation of it as an important element in the process of concentration would not be without significance.

The problem of the relationship between the bureaucracy and the manufacturers is given clear answer by the author when he speaks of a lowering of the rank of the latter and their complete subordination under a high ranking bureaucracy. As already shown in Louis Frank's newest book on Italy, however, the problem probably is one of a process of mutual interpenetration between power positions and interests, wherein the emphasis lies not so much on property as on the command over the means of production regardless of legal ownership. In most cases, the state simply acknowledged existing economic powers of command. In some others, it shifted such powers from "unreliable" persons (non-aryans or so-called enemies of the state) to "reliable" ones, or enhanced existing powers.

Many details in German developments that have not received much attention hitherto are thoroughly investigated in this book, replete with its especially fluent and illustrative descriptions: the hows and whys of the "*Preiskommissar's*" actions, the industrial *Standortsverschiebungen* and the consequences, the manufacturing cost of *Ersatz* production. Though the theme has been necessarily limited through the selection of the viewpoint, the book is a good presentation of a certain aspect of German development.

Nazi Europe and World Trade is based on an analysis of the trade relationships of the Nazified parts of Europe, with the figures for 1929 and 1937 serving as starting points. The book shows in the main that the trade position of Nazi Germany has not been basically altered by the conquests made up to the spring of 1941. Net imports of food and raw materials into the areas under German domination are still considerably greater than the net exports of manufactures. This thesis is proved by an exhaustive and careful analysis of all available data. The tabulation takes into account even the possibility of a complete conquest of the whole Mediterranean area. But, as the author points out in many places and especially in her conclusions, the validity of the analysis is limited by a series of factors, part of them political, part economic. An appraisal can not yet be attempted of the

impact of the technical as well as the organizational revolution that is constantly going on, although the comparison of the 1929 with the 1937 figures already shows some significant changes.

The book starts with the assumption of a Nazified Europe, the sphere of domination of which ends at the Channel ports and at the confines of the Russian Empire. But it looks as if Hitler's advisers had studied the same figures and made up their minds not to reassume trade relations on this basis.

Otto Kirchheimer (New York).

Studies in Philosophy and Social Science is published three times a year by the Institute of Social Research, 429 West 117th Street, New York City.

The price of a single issue is $1.00, and the annual subscription is $3.00.

Editorial communications should be addressed to the Institute of Social Research, 429 West 117th Street, New York City.

Subscriptions and business communications should be sent to William Salloch, 344 East 17th Street, New York City.

STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

PUBLISHED BY
THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

MORNINGSIDE HEIGHTS
NEW YORK CITY

Vol. IX 1941 No. 3

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Articles

(Continued on inside back cover)

PREFACE

The present issue is made up exclusively of articles written in the Institute alongside the pursuit of larger bodies of research. Dr. Pollock's article and that of Dr. Kirchheimer originated from lectures aiming at a fundamental economic and social critique of National Socialism, delivered at Columbia University as a part of a series by the Institute. Dr. Marcuse's article expands his paper for the same occasion into a more comprehensive discussion of the problem of the individual in present day society. The article on Reason and the one on Veblen represent the fruit of a joint effort of their authors. It became clear to us that thorough study and earnest analysis of Veblen, America's great sociological critic of culture, would help us better to understand the catastrophic change in human nature, outlines of which the article on Reason attempts to sketch.

For the duration of the war, the "Studies" will be published as a yearbook instead of three times per annum.

MAX HORKHEIMER.

Los Angeles, California
March 1942.

The End of Reason

By Max Horkheimer

The fundamental concepts of civilization are in a process of rapid decay. The rising generation no longer feels any confidence in them, and Fascism has strengthened their suspicions. The question of how far these concepts are at all valid clamors more than ever for answer. The decisive concept among them was that of reason, and philosophy knew of no higher principle. It was supposed to order the relationships among men and to justify all the performances demanded of them. The church fathers and the guiding spirits of the Enlightenment agreed in their praise of reason. Voltaire called it "God's incomprehensible gift to mankind" and "the source of every society, institution, and order."[1] Origen said we should not compare men, even bad men, to animals, in order that we might not dishonor reason.[2] To the ancient world reason was the masterful principle of creation,[3] to Kant, its triumph was the hidden yet certain trend of world history notwithstanding all retrogression, interludes of darkness, deviations.[4] It is from this ideal of reason that the ideas of freedom, justice, and truth derived their justification. They were held to be innate to it, intuited or necessarily conceived by it. The era of reason is the title of honor claimed by the enlightened world.

The philosophy this world produced is essentially rationalistic, but time and again in following out its own principles it turns against itself and takes the form of skepticism. The dogmatic or the skeptical nuance, depending on which was given the emphasis, in each case determined the relation of philosophy to social forces, and in the shifting fortunes of the ensuing struggle the changing significance of rationality itself became manifest. The concept of reason from the very beginning included the concept of critique. Rationalism itself had established the criteria of rigidity, clarity and distinctness as the criteria of rational cognition. Skeptical and empiri-

[1] *Dialogue d'Ephémère, Oeuvres complètes,* Paris 1880, Garnier, Vol. 30, p. 488.
[2] Cf. *Origen against Celsus,* Book 4, ch. 25 (The Antinicene Fathers, ed. Robert and Donaldson, New York 1890, Vol. IV, p. 507).
[3] Cf. Aristotle, *Politics,* I 1260a 18.
[4] Kant, *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht,* Ninth Proposition.

cal doctrines opposed rationalism with these selfsame standards. The left wing Socratic opposition branded Plato's academy a breeding place of superstition, until the latter moved toward skepticism. Siger of Brabant and Roger Bacon fought the scholastic rationalism of Thomas Aquinas until his own order, after Duns Scotus, gave way to more empirical tendencies. Progressive and reactionary thinkers alike, the materialistic physicians and Gassendi, the Jesuit, protested against Descartes' doctrine of the spiritual nature of man. Kant was told even in Germany that his philosophy boasted without justification of its victory over Hume's skepticism.[1]

Skepticism purged the idea of reason of so much of its content that today scarcely anything is left of it. Reason, in destroying conceptual fetishes, ultimately destroyed itself. Formerly it was the herald of eternal ideas, which were only dimly shadowed in the material world. Later, it was supposed to recognize itself in the order of natural things and to discover the immutable forms of reality in which eternal reason was expressed. Throughout the millenia philosophers believed that they possessed such knowledge. Now they have learned better. None of the categories of rationalism has survived. Modern science looks upon such of them as Mind, Will, Final Cause, Transcendental Creation, Innate Ideas, *res extensa* and *res cogitans* as spooks, despising them even more than Galileo did the cobwebs of scholasticism. Reason itself appears as a ghost that has emerged from linguistic usage. According to most recent logics, the grammar of every day language is still adapted to an animistic pattern of thought, continuously hypostatizing states and actions as nominatives, so that within this language "life calls," "duty demands," and "the nothing threatens." By this method reason comes to "make discoveries" and to "exist as one and the same in all men." The name of such reason is held to be a meaningless symbol, an allegorical figure without a function, and all ideas that transcend the given reality are forced to share its disgrace. Since this opinion has pervaded every stratum of our society it does not suffice to propagate freedom, the dignity of man, or even truth. Any attempts along this line only raise the suspicion that the true reasons behind them are either held back or are entirely lacking.

Nevertheless, reason has not been cancelled altogether from the vocabulary of those who are up to date, but has only been reduced

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[1]Gottlob Ernst Schulze, *Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementarphilosophie. Nebst einer Verteidigung des Skeptizismus gegen die Anmassung der Vernunftkritik.* 1792. In Neudrucke der Kantgesellschaft, Berlin 1911, p. 135.

to its pragmatic significance much more radically than ever before. Gone are the teachings of rationalistic metaphysics, but the patterns of rationalistic behavior have remained. Locke once wrote, "the word reason in the English language has different significations; sometimes it is taken for true and clear principles; sometimes for clear and fair deductions from those principles; and sometimes for the cause, and particularly the final cause."[1] He appended four degrees of reason: discovering truths, regularly and methodically ordering them, perceiving their connections, and drawing the right conclusion. Apart from the final cause, these functions today still are held to be rational. Reason in this sense is as indispensable in the modern technique of war as it has always been in the conduct of business. Its features can be summarized as the optimum adaptation of means to ends, thinking as an energy-conserving operation. It is a pragmatic instrument oriented to expediency, cold and sober. The belief in cleverness rests on motives much more cogent than metaphysical propositions. When even the dictators of today appeal to reason they mean that they possess the most tanks. They were rational enough to build them; others should be rational enough to yield to them. Within the range of Fascism, to defy such reason is the cardinal crime.

As close as the bond between reason and efficiency is here revealed to be, in reality so has it always been. The causes of this interconnection lie within the basic structure of society itself. The human being can fulfill his natural wants only through social channels. Use is a social category, and reason follows it up in all phases of competitive society; through reason the individual asserts or adapts himself and gets along in society. It induces the individual to subordinate himself to society whenever he is not powerful enough to pattern society upon his own interests. Among primitives the individual's place in society was determined by instinct, in modern society it is supposed to be determined by reason, that is to say, by the individual's consciousness of where his advantage lies. Even Greek idealism was to a large extent pragmatic in this sense and identified the good and the advantageous, the beautiful and the useful,[2] putting the welfare of the whole before the welfare of its members. The individual was nothing apart from that whole. The entire humanistic tradition of philosophy tried to bring the two together. Reason, in humanism, aimed at the proper balance between what is good for the individual and what is good for the totality.

[1] *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, ch. xvii, p. 1.

[2] Cf. E. Zeller, *Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, transl. by Reichel, London 1868, p. 125.

The *Polis* was guided by the ideal of harmony between the individual interest and the common good. The medieval towns and the political theorists of the rising national state renewed this ideal. Harmony was supposed to come about through the sphere of law. Whoever desires to live among men has to obey their laws—this is what the secular morality of Western civilization comes down to. Montaigne says in discussing Socrates that as long as we seek refuge in religion we have one guide only, that each must obey the laws of his country.[1] Rationality in the form of such obedience swallows up everything, even the freedom to think. This is the one point on which De Maistre agrees with the French revolution. "Government is a veritable religion: it has its dogmas, its mysteries, its ministers . . . the primary need of man is that his growing reason . . . be lost in the national reason so that it may change his individual existence into another, common, existence, just as a river that flows into the ocean always exists in the mass of water though without a name and without a distinct reality. What is *patriotism?* It is that national reason of which I speak; it is the *abnegation* of the individual."[2] This brand of reason also prevailed in the cults of the French revolution. Mathiez, the apologist for Robespierre, says that the religion of reason had as much intolerance in it as did the old religion. ". . . It admits of no contradiction, it requires oaths, it is made obligatory by prison, exile or the scaffold, and like religion proper it is concretized in sacred signs, in definite and exclusive symbols which are surrounded by a suspicious piety."[3]

The basic unity of the period obliterates differences of opinion. The enthusiasm of the counter-revolution and of the popular leaders not only joined in a common faith in the executioner but also in the conviction that reason may at any time justify renouncing thought, particularly of the poor. De Maistre, a belated absolutist, preaches forswearing reason for reason's sake. The others set up the *Comité du Salut Publique.*

The individual has to do violence to himself and learn that the life of the whole is the necessary precondition of his own. Reason has to master rebellious feelings and instincts, the inhibition of which is supposed to make human cooperation possible. Inhibitions originally imposed from without have to become part and parcel of the individual's own consciousness,—this principle already prevailed

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[1]Cf. *Les Essais,* edited Villey, Paris 1930, Vol. II, ch. xii, p. 491 ff.
[2]De Maistre, *Etude sur la Souveraineté,* Oeuvres complètes, Lyon 1891, Tome I, pp. 367-77.
[3]A. Mathiez, *Contributions à l'Histoire religieuse de la Revolution Française,* Paris 1907, p. 32.

in the ancient world. What is called progress lay in the social expansion of it. In the Christian era everyone was to bear the cross voluntarily. For those at the base of the social pyramid, however, the harmony between the universal and the particular interest was merely a postulate. They had no share in that common interest which they were asked to make their own. It was never quite rational to them to renounce their instincts, and as a result they never were quite reached by civilization, but were always made sociable by force. This is what dictatorship always has been based upon. The *beati possidentes,* however, rightly regarded the political and spiritual powers as agencies of their own. They fulfilled for themselves the idea of a rational civilization in so far as their sociability was derived from their knowledge of their individual interests. The latter remain the rational criteria for the harmony between the universal and the particular interest.

The difficulties of rationalistic philosophy originate from the fact that the universality of reason cannot be anything else than the accord among the interests of all individuals alike, whereas in reality society has been split up into groups with conflicting interests. Owing to this contradiction the appeal to the universality of reason assumes the features of the spurious and the illusory. Reason's claim to be absolute presupposes that a true community exists among men. By denying the reality of universal concepts and pointing to existing reality instead, the empiricists are right as against the rationalists. On the other hand, the rationalists are right as against the empiricists in that, through what is implied in their concept of reason, they uphold the potential solidarity of men as an ideal against the actual state of affairs in which solidarity is asserted with violence and catastrophe. At the close of the liberal era, however, thinking in terms of mere existence, of sober self-preservation, has spread over the whole of society. All men have become empiricists.

The definition of reason in terms of individual self-preservation apparently contradicts Locke's prototypical definition, according to which reason designates the direction of intellectual activity regardless of its external goal. But Locke's definition still holds true. It does not liberate reason from the atomic self-interest of the individual. It rather defines procedures which more readily suit whatever goal self-interest may require. The increasingly formalistic universality of reason, far from signifying an increasing consciousness of universal solidarity, expresses the skeptical separation of thought from its object. Thought becomes what it was designated to

be during the Aristotelian beginnings of empirical science, namely, an "organon." As a consequence of Locke and Kant, thought no longer conceives the objects as they really are, but contents itself with ordering and classifying supposedly pure data. The triumph of nominalism goes hand in hand with the triumph of formalism. In limiting itself to seeing objects as a strange multiplicity, as a chaos, reason becomes a kind of adding machine that manipulates analytical judgments. The objects could be regarded as an unqualified mass in philosophy because economic reality had levelled them, rendering all things equivalent to money as the common denominator. In the face of such levelling the proper being of the object is no longer taken into account. Cognition thus becomes that which registers the objects and proceeds to interpret the quantified expressions of them. The less human beings think of reality in qualitative terms, the more susceptible reality becomes to manipulation. Its objects are neither understood nor respected.

The sheer multiplicity of objects has its counterpart in the so-called pluralism of ends, according to which a gulf exists between the scientific judgments and the realm of values. As a result the value judgment has nothing to do with reason and science. It is regarded as a matter of subjective preference whether one decides for liberty or obedience, democracy or Fascism, enlightenment or authority, mass culture or truth. Freedom of choice, however, has always been the privilege of the small groups which enjoyed a life of abundance. For them it was possible to select among the so-called cultural goods, always provided that these goods were in harmony with their interests of dominion. This was the only pluralism of values that materialized. Wherever the values in question affected the base of European society, they were predetermined. The will to self-preservation of the upper strata of society, though it was rent asunder by competition, unequivocally defined the course of action against slaves, serfs, and masses. The perpetuation of privileges was the only rational criterion which determined whether one should fight against or collude with other interests and groups, maintain constitutional government or take the step to authoritarianism. The great historic decisions differed from one another in being far-sighted or near-sighted, not in the nature of their ends.

Self-preservation was also at the root of the variety of attributes characterizing individuality. Poise, rank, propriety, gallantry, still are what pragmatism mistakes them to be, habitual forms of the individual's adjustment to the social situation. In the distant past all who behaved at variance with these norms were threatened with loss

of class standing. Today, the norms are remnants of those past forms of society in which the individual was lost without them. They still retain the mark of these times, but with the loss of their purpose they have lost their vigor. As the ornaments on useful objects point to past techniques of production, the imperfection of which they retain as adornments, so the now impotent human standards of behavior inherited from feudal ages still bear the hallmark of the violence which the lords of the past had to exercise against themselves for the sake of their own adjustment. In the present state of society these human traits assume the reconciliatory character of the purposeless, but they still adapt themselves very well to prevailing ends. The aristocrat, who left the domestic market to the business man, attempted instead to conquer the foreign market for him. Aristocrats held their monopoly as war lords for the business man until the new technology of war brought about the inevitable alteration. They held it even at a time when bourgeois norms, attitudes, and reactions, such as thrift and integrity, already began to share the fate of aristocratic standards of behavior. The latter owed their glory chiefly to the efforts of the middle class to strengthen its position by glorifying its predecessors. This solidarity with past rulers is derived from a common attitude to the rest of society. Power is made to appear as eternal. One's own prestige is enhanced if functionaries of the middle class like Napoleon Bonaparte find their place in the pantheon of history side by side with other great lords and executioners regardless of whether they were friends or enemies. At home, the well-to-do imitate what they call style; in their offices they abide by the standards of business morality, since their class cannot exist without a discipline of its own; as against internal and external competitors and as against the masses, however, they practice that which actually links them to the historical tradition, namely, integral self-preservation.

This self-preservation may even call for the death of the individual which is to be preserved. Sacrifice can be rational when it becomes necessary to defend the state's power which is alone capable of guaranteeing the existence of those whose sacrifice it demands. The idea of reason, even in its nominalistic and purified form, has always justified sacrifice. During the heroic era the individual destroyed his life for the interests and symbols of the collectivity that guaranteed it. Property was the institution that conveyed to the individual the idea that something of his existence might remain after death. At the origin of organized society, property endured while generations passed away. The monadic individual survived

by bequeathing it. Through the legacy, the individual perpetuated himself even after his death, but he did not contradict the principle of self-preservation if he sacrificed his life to the state whose laws guaranteed this legacy. Sacrifice thus took its place as a rational institution.

The rationality of sacrifice and self-renunciation, however, was differentiated according to social status: it decreased with decreasing wealth and opportunity, and eventually became compulsory. As against the poor it has always been rational to supplement reason with earthly and heavenly justice. Voltaire admits that reason might triumph for decent people, "but the *canaille* is not made for it."[1] "We have never intended to enlighten shoemakers and servants,—this is up to apostles,"[2] he says.

For the masses the road from one's own interest to that of preserving society was devious and long. In their case one could not rely upon rational and self-imposed renunciation of instincts or drives. If a Greek slave or a woman had spoken and acted like Socrates she would have been a fool, not a sage. Socrates, by his death, elevated loyalty to the laws of the state above all else. Within the era of conscience that he initiated rationality pertained to those who were socially more or less independent.

The masses turned to religion, but their doing so did not affect the basic rationality of self-preservation. Rationalism has no right to complain about Luther. The latter called reason a beast and a whore only because at his time reason could not of itself cause the individual to suppress his appetites. The religious Reformation trained men to subordinate their lives to more remote ends. Instead of surrendering to the moment they were taught to learn objective reasoning, consistency, and pragmatic behavior. Man was thus not only strengthened in his resistance to fate but was also enabled to free himself now and then from the overpowering mechanism of self-preservation and expediency. Such contemplative pauses, however, could not prevent the interest of the prevailing order from spreading its roots in the hearts of men. Protestantism promoted the spread of that cold rationality which is so characteristic of the modern individual. It was iconoclastic and did away with the false worship of things, but by allying itself with the rising economic system it made men dependent upon the world of things even to a higher degree than

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[1]Letter to D'Alembert, Feb. 4, 1757, *op. cit.*, Vol. 39, p. 167.
[2]Letter to D'Alembert, Sept. 2, 1768, *op. cit.*, Vol. 46, p. 112.

before. Where formerly they worked for the sake of salvation, they were now induced to work for work's sake, profit for profit's sake, power for power's sake. The whole world was transformed into a mere "material." If the new spirit served as an anodyne for the people it was at least one that eased the surgery, foreordained by rationalism, which the industrial system worked on their bodies and minds. There was no other path from the medieval workshop to the assembly line than through the inversion of external compulsion into the compulsion of conscience. It produced the machine-like assiduity and pliable allegiance required by the new rationality. Calvin's theocratic irrationalism eventually revealed itself as the cunning of technocratic reason which had to shape its human material. Misery and the poor laws did not suffice to drive men into the workshops of the early capitalistic era. The new spirit helped to supplement the external pressures with a concern for wife and child to which the moral autonomy of the introverted subject in reality was tantamount. Today, at the end of this process which originated in Renaissance and Reformation, the rational form of self-preservation boils down to an obstinate compliance as such which has, however, become indifferent to any political or religious content. In Fascism, the autonomy of the individual has developed into heteronomy.

The totalitarian order marks the leap from the indirect to direct forms of domination, while still maintaining a system of private enterprise. The National Socialists do not stand outside the pattern of economic trends. The gangster theory of National Socialism must be taken even more seriously than it is by those who believe that a normal state of affairs could be restored as soon as the fester has been removed. Government in Germany was not usurped by gangsters who forced an entry from without; rather, social domination led to gangster rule by virtue of its own economic principle. During the era of free industrial economy when none of the many decentralized enterprises was so powerful that it did not need to compact with the others, self-preservation was restricted by standards of *humanitas*. Monopolism has again abolished these restrictions and led social domination back to its true nature which had continued to operate only where the humane form of domination had left some loopholes to inhumanity, in the petty rackets and rings of the big cities. They knew of no other law than the discipline they inevitably had to have in order to plunder their clients. Procurers, condottieri, manorial lords and guilds have always protected and at the same time exploited their clients. Protection is the archetype of domination. After the interlude of liberalism economic tendencies in Europe progressed toward a new and total protectionism. Only the great com-

bines survived competition. They were strong enough to destroy the separation of powers and the network of guarantees and rights. The monopolies and their government constituted an impenetrable jungle for the masses. The magnitude and diversity of the tasks of the prevailing cliques, the all-embracing character of which still distinguishes them from racketeering, turns into comprehensive planning on the one hand and on the other into an attack on mankind as such. This is the inevitable result of the economic development itself. The same sociological mechanisms apply to the monopoly and to the city racket. The latter had previously shared the spoils with other rackets of the same branch, but the growth of communication and the progressing centralization of the police made it impossible to continue with small bribes and the procurement of new henchmen and guns. The racket was forced to mechanize its business and to undertake the costly task of affiliating it to large political organizations. Such investments are profitable only if the spoils do not have to be divided. In the racket, cartelization asserts itself. The rackets in the cities and in the entire country are driven to unification unless the police succeed in eradicating them in time. A study of such border phenomena as racketeering may offer useful parallels for understanding certain developmental tendencies in modern society. As soon as the concentrated power of large property has reached a certain point, the struggle continues on a broader scale and develops, under the pressure of giant investments necessitated by the progress of technology, into the struggle for world conquest interrupted only by periods of precarious compromise. From this point on, the differences of goals and ideals within the power hierarchy recede before the differences in the degree of docility. The *élites* must see to it, even against their own will, that in the social order everything is rigidly coordinated. Under totalitarian conditions of society, reliability decides upon the allocation of all positions of trust, whether a manager of a provincial factory is to be appointed or the head of a puppet government. Side by side with efficiency, human qualities of a kind again win respect, particularly a resolution to go along with the powerful at any cost. For the trustees are mere delegates. He who is worthy of his task is not to show any traces of that which the self-criticism of reason has destroyed. He must embody the self-preservation of a whole that has become identical with the liquidation of humanity. At the beginning of the history of modern rackets stand the Inquisitioners, at its end the Fascist leaders. Their henchmen, living their lives face to face with catastrophe, have to react correctly until they fall victim to the rational principle that none may abide too long.

Present day contempt of reason does not extend to purposive behavior. The term mind, insofar as it designates an intellectual faculty or an objective principle, appears as a meaningless word unless it refers to a coordination of ends and means. The destruction of rationalistic dogmatism through the self-criticism of reason, carried out by the ever renewed nominalistic tendencies in philosophy, has now been ratified by historical reality. The substance of individuality itself, to which the idea of autonomy was bound, did not survive the process of industrialization. Reason has degenerated because it was the ideological projection of a false universality which now shows the autonomy of the subject to have been an illusion. The collapse of reason and the collapse of individuality are one and the same. "The ego is unsavable,"[1] and self-preservation has lost its "self." For whom can an action still be useful if the biological individual is no longer conscious of itself as an identical unit? Throughout its various stages of life the body possesses only a questionable identity. The unity of individual life has been a social rather than natural one. When the social mechanisms which made for this unity are weakened as they are today, the individual's concern for his self-preservation changes its meaning. What previously served to promote man's development, the joy in knowledge, living through memory and foresight, pleasure in oneself and others, narcissism as well as love, are losing their content. Neither conscience nor egoism is left. The moral law has become inadequate for those who are supposed to obey it, and the authority which it previously invoked has disappeared. Morality had to disappear, since it did not conform with its own principle. It pretended to be independent of empirical individuals, unconditionally universal. But its universal form perpetuated antagonisms among individuals and a tyranny over men and nature. It is vain to hope that in better times men will return to morality. Yet even in Fascism it has left its traces within men, and these at least have been freed of spurious positivity. Morality has survived insofar as men are conscious that the reality to which they yield is not the right one. Nietzsche proclaimed the death of morality; modern psychology has devoted itself to exploring it. Psychoanalysis as the adjustment form of modern skepticism triumphed over moral law through its discovery and unmasking of the father in the super-ego. This psychology, however, was the "owl of Minerva" which took its flight when the shades of dark were already gathering over the whole sphere of private life. The father may still possess a super-ego, but the child has long unmasked it, together

[1]Ernst Mach, *Contributions to the Analysis of the Sensations*, transl. by C. M. Williams, Chicago 1897, p. 20.

with the ego and the character. Today the child imitates only performances and achievements; he accepts not ideas, but matters of fact.

With the disappearance of independent economic subjects, the subject as such disappears. It is no longer a synthetic unit; it has become senseless for it to preserve itself for some distant future or to plan for its heirs. In the present period the individual has opportunities only on short term. Once secure property has vanished as the goal of acquisition, the intrinsic connection between the experiences of the individual disappears. Concern for property under orderly competition and the rule of law has always been constitutive of the ego. Slaves and paupers had no individuality. The "premise of all my acting in the sensuous world, can only be as part of that sensuous world, if I live amongst other free beings. This determined part of the world . . . is called . . . my *property*."[1] The concept of the ego "must also will a future state to exist, which shall have resulted from the present state, in consequence of the rule which he followed when he resolved upon his act of causality."[2] Property and the orderly functioning of property relations were the referents of the notion of one's own past and future. Today the individual ego has been absorbed by the pseudo-ego of totalitarian planning. Even those who hatch the totalitarian plan, despite and because of the huge mass and capital over which they dispose, have as little autonomy as those they control. The latter are organized in all sorts of groups, and in these the individual is but an element possessing no importance in himself. If he wants to preserve himself he must work as part of a team, ready and skilled in everything, whether in industry, agriculture or sport. In every camp he must defend his physical existence, his working, eating and sleeping place, must give and take cuffs and blows and submit to the toughest discipline. The responsibility of long term planning for himself and his family has given way to the ability to adjust himself to mechanical tasks of the moment. The individual constricts himself. Without dream or history, he is always watchful and ready, always aiming at some immediate practical goal. His life falls into a sequence of data which fit in advance the questionnaires he has to answer. He takes the spoken word only as a medium of information, orientation, and command. The semantic dissolution of language into a system of signs, as undertaken by modern logistics, transcends the realm of logic. It draws its conclusions from a state of affairs which surrenders language to

[1] I. G. Fichte, *The Science of Ethics*, transl. by A. E. Kroeger, New York 1897, p. 308.
[2] I. G. Fichte, *The Science of Rights*, transl. by A. E. Kroeger, London 1889, p. 167.

the rule of monopoly. To be accepted, men must sound like the vocal chords of the radio, film, and magazine. For in point of fact no one seems to make his living by himself, and everyone is suspect in mass society. Everyone needs a permanent alibi. The individual no longer has any future to care for, he has only to be ready to adapt himself, to follow orders, to pull levers, to perform ever different things which are ever the same. The social unit is no longer the family but the atomic individual, and the struggle for life consists in his resolving not to be annihilated at any moment in the world of apparatusses, engines, and handles.

Bodily strength is not the chief point, but it is important enough. To a large extent, it is not a natural quality. It is a product of the social division of labor, one that is necessary for production and supplied by whole strata of society to whom no other reason for existence was left except to supply it. Those among the dominated strata who excel in brute force reflect the injustice that the ox which treads out the corn has always been muzzled. Culture was the attempt to tame this element of brute force immanent in the principle of bodily strength. Such taming, however, concealed the fact that physical exertion remained the kernel of work. The counterpart of this concealment was the glorification of bodily strength in ideology, expressed in encomia to every brand of greatness,—intellectual giants as well as muscle men at county fairs, in Wagner's *Gesamtkunstwerk*, in the monster stadium. Today the ideological veil has been lifted and the principle of bodily strength has been openly propagated in the form of strongarm methods and purges.

Contemporary individuals, however, need presence of mind even more than muscles; the ready response is what counts, affinity to every kind of machine, technical, athletic, political. Previously, men were mere appendages to the machine, today they are appendages as such. Reflective thought and theory lose their meaning in the struggle for self-preservation. Fifty years ago psychological experience, skillful argumentation, foresight in business were still instruments of progress in society. Prior to the mechanization of the office, even the accountant had to use not only his dexterity but also his intellect. With the total incorporation of the enterprise into the realm of monopoly, rational argumentation loses its force. It now bears the hallmarks of that sales talk in the service of which it was formerly used, and which the victorious monopoly can dispense with. The distrust which peasants and children display for glib persons has always preserved the notion of that injustice which made language the servant of gain. The muteness of men today is largely to

be blamed on language which once was only too eloquent against them.

Today man needs factual knowledge, the automaton ability to react correctly, but he does not need that quiet consideration of diverse possibilities which presupposes the freedom and leisure of choice. The liberty which the market offered to the producers, consumers, and their multifold intermediaries, although it may have been abstract and deceptive, had at least permitted a certain range of deliberation. In the monopolistic apparatus none possesses that time and range. Each has to respond quickly, to innervate promptly. Under totalitarian planning men are dominated by the means of production even more than they were under the market system. Lack of efficiency is a capital offense. The brief period of spare time which still remains to men in their daily lives is now protected against waste. The danger that it will degenerate into otiosity, a state always despised so much by industry, is warded off. Since Descartes, philosophy was one great attempt to place itself as science in the service of the prevailing mode of production, an attempt opposed only by very few thinkers. With the abolition of *otium* and of the ego no aloof thinking is left. The social atoms, though they may still yearn for liberation, have lost the speculative sense, in the good and bad connotation of that term. The outlook is dark for philosophy. Without *otium* philosophical thought is impossible, cannot be conceived or understood. In such a state of affairs the argumentative procedure of traditional philosophy appears as helpless and idle talk. At the last minute phenomenology attempted, paradoxically enough, to elaborate a mode of thinking without disputation, but positivism, in which this philosophy originated, became its heir. It removed thought from philosophy and reduced the latter to the technique of organizing, by reproduction and abridgment, the matters of fact given in the world of sense. In positivism reason sustains itself through self-liquidation.

With the decline of the ego and its reflective reason, human relationships tend to a point wherein the rule of economy over all personal relationships, the universal control of commodities over the totality of life, turns into a new and naked form of command and obedience. No longer buttressed by small scale property, the school and the home are losing their educational function of preparing men for life in society. Living and being prepared have become one and the same thing, just as with the military profession. In school the hierarchy of sport and gymnastics triumphs over the classroom hierarchy which has never been accepted whole-heartedly by children anyhow.

The disputed authority of the teacher decreases in favor of an unconditional and anonymous, but ever-present, authority whose demands now have preference. This is the authority of the omnipotent standards of mass society. The qualities which the child needs in this society are imposed upon him by the collectivity of the school class, and the latter is but a segment of the strictly organized society itself. The teacher has the choice of winning the pupil's favor, even by harshness if need be, or of being ridiculed. Compared with the skills which are required of the individual today, the curriculum possesses only a subordinate value. Children learn quickly to know the automobile and radio inside out. They are born with this knowledge, which is not essentially different from knowledge of the most complicated machine, and they can do without science. School physics is obsolete in a twofold sense: it is equally remote from the mathematical consequences of relativity and quantum theory (which have long since passed beyond the limits of representation) and from the practical dexterity which alone matters to the pupil. The teacher cannot mediate between the realm of theory and practice, since the transition from practical observation to theory is no longer recognizable. The highest theory is still a mode of blind technique, as much as repair work is. Both are accomplished by sheer skill, the one in the study, the other in the shop. The difficulties which the theoretical physicist experiences when asked to cross from his mathematical syntheses of different conceptual realms to the world of objects is about the same as the inability of the most skillful mechanic to cross from manipulation of the motor to the principles of its working. Physical knowledge is split into knowledge of handling and knowledge of fields, and this cleavage resulting from the division of labor affects the student's relation to knowledge as such. The exploration of meanings is replaced by an acquaintance with functions. The animistic carryovers of theory are weeded out and this triumph at the same time implies a *sacrificium intellectus.* Technical practice can get along without physics, just as the film star can get along without an apprenticeship and the Fascist statesman without learning. Education is no longer a process taking place between individuals, as it was when the father prepared his son to take over his property, and the teacher supported him. Present day education is directly carried out by society itself and takes place behind the back of the family.

Childhood becomes a historical phenomenon. Christianity inaugurated the idea of childhood in its glorification of the weak, and the bourgeois family sometimes made that idea a reality. During the Christian era up to the Enlightenment, however, reason operated

on the child as an external compulsion to self-preservation which crushed everything that could not defend itself. The sculpture and painting of the middle ages, which did not differentiate between physically and socially inferior beings, revealed the secret of the *ordo* and hierarchy, namely, who could with impunity beat whom. Children who in the Christian world suffered the tortures of Hell were, in the Enlightenment world, rewarded with the Christian heaven. Happiness shall be theirs because they have been chosen as the symbols of innocence. In his adoration of his children the enlightened business man of the 19th century could mourn his lost religion without becoming superstitious. Children symbolized the Golden Age as well as the promising future. The rationalistic society gave children legends and fairy tales so that they might mirror hope back to their disillusioned elders. The latter created the idyll of childhood in order to escape between the horns of sober knowledge and ideology, from a dilemma which, in the face of ever threatening social upheavals, they could not resolve. The child ideal reflected the truth within the lie that kept the underlying population in line, the utopia of eternal happiness. This utopia was the place of last resort for the religious ideals of those times in which the bourgeois themselves were still among the underlying.

They can do without this utopia today. In monopolistic society childhood and adolescence have become mere biological processes. Puberty is no longer a human crisis, for the child is grown up as soon as he can walk, and the grown-up in principle always remains the same. Development has ceased to exist. During the heyday of the family the father represented the authority of society to the child, and puberty was the inevitable conflict between these two. Today, however, the child stands face to face with society at once, and the conflict is decided even before it arises. The world is so possessed by the power of what is and the efforts of adjustment to it, that the adolescent's rebellion, which once fought the father because his practices contradicted his own ideology, can no longer crop up. The process which hardens men by breaking down their individuality—a process consciously and planfully undertaken in the various camps of Fascism—takes place tacitly and mechanically in them everywhere under mass culture, and at such an early age that when children come to consciousness everything is settled. Since Freud, the relation between father and son has been reversed. Now, the rapidly changing society which passes its judgment upon the old is represented not by the father but by the child. The child, not the father, stands for reality. The awe which the Hitler youth enjoys from his parents is but the pointed political expression of a

universal state of affairs. This new relationship affects even the very first years of life during which father image and super-ego are supposed to arise. Psychologically, the father is represented not by another individual but replaced by the world of things and by the crowd to which the boy is tied.

The elimination of the conflict between individual and society also affects love. With the passing of the authority of the father the danger of catastrophic conflicts with the family fades away. Yet they had kindled abandon. Today sex seems to be emancipated and still oppression goes on. Social regimentation of the relations between the sexes had gone far before racial eugenics consummated this process; it was expressed by the standardized normalcy in all spheres of mass culture. Eugenics has its roots in the Enlightenment. Science objectified sex until it could be manipulated. In its inhuman soberness Kant's definition of marriage as a contract for the mutual possession of the sexual organs indicts inhuman sexual privileges according to the standards of natural law. This definition had, in the 19th century, made its way into the practice of men. In contemporary mass society, the sexes are levelled in that both regard their sex as a thing over which they dispose without illusion. Girls strive to come off as well as they can in the competition with other girls, and, in their eyes, flirtation enhances prestige rather than future pleasure. With Kant, they take sex as a property possessing an exchange value. Wedekind once demanded freedom of prostitution because he thought that women could catch up with male society only through conscious use of their sole monopoly. The modern girl, however, wins her freedom by exploiting the patriarchal taboo which humiliates her by placing her on a pedestal. Sex loses its power over men. It is turned on and off according to the requirements of the situation. Men no longer lose themselves in it, they are neither moved nor blinded by love. Under National Socialism extra-marital intercourse is among activities encouraged by the state as socially useful forms of labor. Love is organized by the state. During good times, children are trained as future heirs; during bad times, as prospective breadwinners for their parents; under Fascism they are produced under the auspices of the state and delivered to it as a kind of tax, if one can still speak of taxes in a society wherein one group of magnates exploits all the rest of the population. Taxes have an obvious significance under Fascism. With property owners they contribute to accelerating the process of centralization and to beating down weaker competitors. With the masses their money form becomes transparent and shows forth as toil in the service of power. Part of this toil is the labor of childbirth. Under

National Socialism the girl's refusal of herself to men in uniform is deemed to be as unbecoming as ready surrender formerly was. In Germany the image of the Virgin Mary had never quite replaced the archaic cult of the woman. Under the surface of Christian civilization memories of matriarchal conditions were never quite extinguished. These vestiges continued to assert themselves in the common antipathy to the old spinster as well as in the German *Lied's* devotion to the deserted mistress, long before National Socialists ostracized prudes and celebrated illegitimate mothers. But the ascetic beatitude of the Christian virgin by far surpassed the pleasure authorized by the National Socialist regime and fed with memories of the buried past. The National Socialist regime rationalizes the mythical past which it pretends to conserve, calling it by name and mobilizing it on behalf of big industry. Where this archaic heritage did not explode the Christian form and assume Teutonic features it gave to German philosophy and music their specific tone. The mythology in National Socialism is not a mere fake, but the spotlight thrown upon this surviving mythology liquidates it altogether. National Socialism has thus accomplished in a few years what other civilizations took centuries to achieve.

The sexual freedom prescribed by the population policy does not cure the anxiety of the world of sexual taboos but expresses mere scorn of love. Love is the irreconcilable foe of the prevailing rationality, for lovers preserve and protect neither themselves nor the collectivity. They throw themselves away; that is why wrath is heaped upon them. Romeo and Juliet died in conflict with society for that which was heralded by this society. In unreasonably surrendering themselves to one another they sustained the freedom of the individual as against the dominion of the world of things. Those who "pollute the race" in National Socialist Germany remain loyal to the life and death of these lovers. In the inhuman world of National Socialism, which reserves the name of hero to clever yet beguiled youths who in conceiving, begetting and dying are but victims of a monstrous population policy, the racial crime resurrects what once was called heroism, namely, loyalty without prospect and reason. The sad tryst of those who cannot change their ways is blinded to the rationality which triumphs outside. The daybreak in which the SS men surprise the careless, lights up the monstrosity that reason has become—ingenuity, cleverness and readiness to strike. These lovers have not kept pace with the course of society and therefore cannot hope for its clemency in the streamlined world. Their agony in the concentration camp, which the shrewd adherents of the Third Reich deem right and just because

those punished were neither reasonable nor clever, reveals the truth behind Fascism's emancipation of sex and behind the concession existence it entails. What is encouraged as wholesome sexuality is an expression of the same fiendish rationality that harries love.

What Fascism does to the victims it selects as examples for its unlimited power seems to defy all reason. Its tortures transcend the power to perceive or imagine; when thought attempts to comprehend the deed it stiffens with horror and is rendered helpless. The new order contradicts reason so fundamentally that reason does not dare to doubt it. Even the consciousness of oppression fades. The more incommensurate become the concentration of power and the helplessness of the individual, the more difficult for him to penetrate the human origin of his misery. The tattered veil of money has been replaced by the veil of technology. The centralization of production which technology has made necessary conceals the voluntary concord among its leaders. More than ever crises take the guise of natural and inevitable phenomena and tend to destroy entire populations as they ravage continents for reserve supplies. The dimensions of this process are so superhuman that even the imagination which has withstood the mutilation of mass culture hesitates to derive this state of affairs from its social origin.

Injustice has never been more blindly accepted as a visitation of superhuman fate than it is under the spell of Fascism today, when everyone talks of revamping society. Hope has been overshadowed by the consciousness of universal doom. Everyone feels that his work perpetuates an infernal machine from which he manages to wheedle enough time to live, time that he proceeds to lose back by attending the machine. Thus he keeps going, expert in handling every situation and in understanding none, scorning death and yet fleeing it. To men in the bourgeois era individual life was of infinite importance because death meant absolute catastrophe. Hamlet's line, "the rest is silence," in which death is followed by oblivion, indicates the origin of the ego. Fascism shatters this fundamental principle. It strikes down that which is tottering, the individual, by teaching him to fear something worse than death. Fear reaches farther than the identity of his consciousness. The individual must abandon the ego and carry on somehow without it. Under Fascism the objects of organization are being disorganized as subjects. They lose their identical character, and are simultaneously Nazi and anti-Nazi, convinced and skeptical, brave and cowardly, clever and stupid. They have renounced all consistency. This inconsistency

into which the ego has been dissolved is the only attitude adequate to a reality which is not defined by so-called plans but by concentration camps. The method of this madness consists in demonstrating to men that they are just as shattered as those in the camps and by this means welding the racial community together. Men have been released from such camps who have taken over the jargon of their jailers and with cold reason and mad consent (the price, as it were, of their survival) tell their story as if it could not have been otherwise than it was, contending that they have not been treated so badly after all. Those who have not yet been jailed behave as if they had already been tortured. They profess everything. The murderers, on the other hand, have adopted the language of the Berlin night club and garment center. The sphere of trade and business remains a reality only in the struggles and transactions among captains of industry and is there removed from the eye of the little man, nay, even of the big man. But the language of market mentality, Jewish slang, the vernacular of salesmen and traders who have long been humiliated, survive on the lips of their suppressors. It is the language of winks, sly hints, complicity in deceit. The Nazis call failure *Pleite,* he who does not watch his step in time is *meschugge,* and an anti-Semitic song says that the Americans have no idea *was sich tut.* The instigators justify their pogrom by saying that once again all was not quite *koscher* with the Jews. Getting through by hook or crook is the secret ideal, and even the SA troopers envy the Jewish brains which they cudgel. They imagine that the Jewish shrewdness they strive to imitate reflects the truth which they have to deny to themselves and to destroy. If this truth has once and for all been discarded and men have decided for integral adjustment, if reason has been purged of all morality regardless of cost, and has triumphed over all else, no one may remain outside and look on. The existence of one solitary "unreasonable" man elucidates the shame of the entire nation. His existence testifies to the relativity of the system of radical self-preservation that has been posited as absolute. If all superstition has been abolished to such a degree that only superstition remains, no stubborn man may wander around and seek happiness anywhere except in unrelenting progress. The hatred of Jews, like the lust to murder the insane, is stimulated by their unintelligible faith in a God who has everywhere deserted them and by the unconditional rigidity of the principle they maintain even unwittingly. Suspicion of madness is the unperishable source of persecution. It originates from distrust of one's own pragmatic reason.

Pain is the means of calling men back from the noumenal world into which all empiristic philosophers and even Kant forbade them to penetrate. It was always the best teacher to bring men to reason. Pain leads the resistant and wayward, the phantast and utopian back to themselves. It reduces them to the body, to part of the body. Pain levels and equalizes everything, man and man, man and animal. It absorbs the entire life of the being whom it racks, reducing him to a husk of pain. Mutilation of the ego, with which the whole of mankind has been afflicted, thus again repeats itself in each case of torture. The practical requirements that enmesh man at every moment, the pragmatic rationality of the industrial era, completely absorb the lives of their victims. Pain is the archetype of labor in a divided society and at the same time its organon. Philosophers and theologians have always exalted it. Their paeans to it reflect the fact that mankind has hitherto known labor only as an effluence of domination. They justify pain because it drives men to reason. Luther translates the 90th psalm as "Teach us to learn we must die in order to become prudent." Kant says that "Pain is the sting of activity,"[1] and Voltaire that "this feeling of pain was indispensable to stimulate us to self-preservation."[2] The Inquisitors once justified their abominable service to their predatory rulers by saying that they were commissioned to save the errant soul or to wash out its sins. Their language already pictures heaven as a kind of Third Reich which the unreliable and scandalous could attain by way of a training camp. If one of these unhappy victims of the Inquisition escaped, requests were issued for his extradition describing him "as one insanely led to reject the salutary medicine offered for his cure, and to spurn the wine and oil which were soothing his wounds."[3] The inquisition manifested the rage of those who sensed that the inculcation of Christianity had not quite successfully been accomplished, a rage which later, in Fascism, led to open repudiation of Christianity. Fascism has reinstated pain on its throne. During the breathing spells of civilization, at least in the civilized mother countries, brute physical pain was inflicted only upon the abjectly poor; to others it loomed on the horizon only as the *ultima ratio* of society. Under Fascism society has invoked this *ultima ratio*. The contradiction between what is requested of man and what can be offered to him has become so striking, the ideology so thin, the discontents in civilization so great that they must be compensated

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[1] *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, § 61.

[2] Voltaire, *A Philosophical Dictionary*. Article on "Good" in The Works of Voltaire, New York 1901, Vol. V, p. 264.

[3] Henry Charles Lea, *A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, New York 1922, Vol. I, p. 459.

through annihilation of those who do not conform, political enemies, Jews, asocial persons, the insane. The new order of Fascism is Reason revealing itself as unreason.

What remains of reason in its contemporary decline, however, is not just the perseverance of self-preservation and the persistence of that horror in which it culminates. The age old definition of reason in terms of self-preservation already implied the curtailment of reason itself. The propositions of idealistic philosophy that reason distinguishes man from the animal (propositions in which the animal is humiliated just as man is in the converse propositions of the materialist doctors) contain the truth that through reason man frees himself of the fetters of nature. This liberation, however, does not entitle man to dominate nature (as the philosophers held) but to comprehend it. Society, governed by the self-preserving rationality of *élites*, has always also preserved the life of the masses, although in a wrong and accidental form. Reason has borne a true relation not only to one's own existence but to living as such; this function of transcending self-preservation is concomitant with self-preservation, with obeying and adapting to objective ends. Reason could recognize and denounce the forms of injustice and thus emancipate itself from them. As the faculty of calling things by their name, reason is more than the alienated life that preserves itself in the destruction of others and of itself. To be sure, reason cannot hope to keep aloof from history and to intuit the true order of things, as ontological ideologies contend. In the inferno to which triumphant reason has reduced the world it loses its illusions, but in doing so it becomes capable of facing this inferno and recognizing it for what it is. Skepticism has done its job. Ideals seem so futile today that they can change as rapidly as agreements and alliances do. Ideology consists more in what men are like than in what they believe—in their mental constrictedness, their complete dependence upon associations. They experience everything only within the conventional framework of concepts. Any object is comprised under the accepted schemata even before it is perceived. This and not the convictions of men constitutes the false consciousness of today. Today the ideological incorporation of men into society takes place through their "biological" pre-formation for the controlled collectivity. Even the unique becomes a function and appendage of the centralized economy. Culture, exalting the unique as the resistive element amid a universal sameness of things is an ingredient rather than an opponent of mass culture; the unique becomes the shingle of monopoly. The essence of Paris and of Austria had become merely a function of that America from which they differed. The self in

dissolution becomes recognizable as ideology. It was not only the basis of modern self-preservation but also the veil concealing the forces that destroyed it. What applies to the unique equally applies to the living self. With the dissolution of the self the disproportionate reaches of power become the only obstacle to insight into their obsolescence. Mutilated as men are, in the duration of a brief moment they can become aware that in the world which has been thoroughly rationalized they can dispense with the interests of self-preservation which still set them one against the other. The terror which pushes reason is at the same time the last means of stopping it, so close has truth come. If the atomized and disintegrating men of today have become capable of living without property, without location, without time, they also have abandoned the ego in which all prudence and all stupidity of historical reason as well as its compliance with domination was sustained. The progress of reason that leads to its self-destruction has come to an end; there is nothing left but barbarism or freedom.

Veblen's Attack on Culture

Remarks Occasioned by the Theory of the Leisure Class

By T. W. Adorno

Veblen's *Theory of the Leisure Class* became famous for its doctrine of conspicuous consumption, according to which the consumption of goods to a large extent takes place not to satisfy any true wants, or what Veblen chooses to call the "fullness of life," but rather to maintain social prestige or "status." This applies to the whole history of mankind from the very early stage which Veblen characterized as the "predatory" up to the present. From his critique of consumption as a mere ostentation, Veblen has derived inferences that are in the aesthetic sense close to those of functionalism (as these were formulated about the same time by Adolf Loos) and in the practical sense to those of technocracy. Historically effective though they were, however, these elements of Veblen's sociology do not sufficiently point up the objective motives underlying his thinking. His attack is directed against the barbarian character of culture. The term "barbarian culture," which occurs in the very first sentence,[1] crops up again and again throughout his main work. In its precise meaning the term applies only to one particular phase of history, an exceedingly broad one, however, extending from the time of the ancient hunter and warrior to that of the feudal lord and the absolute monarch, whose relation to the capitalist age is purposely left obscure. Yet there is an obvious intention, in numerous passages, to denounce the modern era as barbarian at the very points where it most solemnly raises the claim to be culture. The very features through which this era appears to have escaped bare utility and to have reached the humane level are supposed to be relics of historical epochs long past. Emancipation from the realm of utility is regarded as nothing but the index of a uselessness deriving from the fact that cultural "institutions" as well as anthropological qualities do not change simultaneously with or in conformity with economic modes of production, but lag behind them and at times openly contradict them. If one follows the trend of Veblen's ideas rather than the statements which waver between the vitriolic and the cautious,

[1]Cf. Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, The Modern Library, New York 1934, p. 1.

one might say that those cultural characteristics in which greed, the desire of advantage, and confinement to the immediate appear to be overcome are nothing but the residues of objectively obsolete forms of greed and desire of advantage and bad immediacy. They originate from an urge to prove to men that one is exempt from crudely practical considerations; more specifically, that one can spend one's time on the useless in order to enhance one's position in the social hierarchy and widen the measure of one's social honor, and thus finally reaffirm one's power over others. Culture turns against utility for the sake of an indirect utility. It is marred by the "life-lie." In tracking down this life-lie Veblen's analysis penetrates to the most harmless-looking phenomena of culture. Under his gloomy gaze the walking stick and the lawn, the umpire and the domesticated animal become significant allegories of the barbarian essence of culture.

This method, no less than the contents of his teaching, led people to attack Veblen as a crazy and destructive outsider. At the same time, however, his theory has been assimilated. Today it is widely and officially recognized, and his terminology, like that of Freud, has permeated journalism. This may be regarded as an example of the objective tendency to disarm a tiresome opponent through accepting his views and labeling them according to standard formulas. Yet Veblen's thought is not wholly out of harmony with this scheme of acceptance; he is less of an outsider than he seems to be at first sight. The idea of conspicuous consumption has its long history. It goes back to the postulate of Greek ethics that the true life be one according to the pure nature of man rather than to values arbitrarily posited by him. In its Christian form the critique of waste plays a great role in the works of the patristic writers who accept art only in so far as it "produces the necessary and not the superfluous."[2] Nowhere was irrationality in culture more clearly denounced than by some sceptical humanists of the sixteenth century.[3] It permeates the whole occidental philosophy and theology. The attack on culture was sustained by the intellectual movement which in the second half of the nineteenth century challenged the official morals of the prevailing order as hypocritical and impotent and pointed to the com-

[2] Johannes Chrysostomos, *Kommentar zum Evangelium des heiligen Matthäus*, Kempten and Munich 1916, 3, p. 93.

[3] Thus Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486-1535) criticizes conspicuous wastefulness in architecture "which is of no use whatsoever to men and serves only for being looked at and admired, or, as Plinius says, is built up with great expense only for the sake of pomp and ostentation, that is, in order to show that somebody has a lot of money. . . . Here belong also our proud and magnificently constructed churches and bell towers." Agrippa von Nettesheim, *Die Eitelkeit und Unsicherheit der Wissenschaften*, ed. Fritz Mauthner, Munich 1913, 1, p. 111f.

ing crisis of European civilization, a movement that counts among its protagonists the foremost writers of the period. Veblen incorporated some of the underlying motives of this movement into sociology. Scientifically he depended largely on Spencer and Darwin, the German historical school of Gustav Schmoller and above all on American pragmatism.[4] "The life of man in society, just like the life of other species, is a struggle for existence, and therefore it is a process of selective adaptation. The evolution of social structure has been a process of natural selection of institutions. The progress which has been and is being made in human institutions and in human character may be set down, broadly, to a natural selection of the fittest habits of thought and to a process of enforced adaptation of individuals to the environment which has progressively changed with the growth of the community and with the changing institutions under which men have lived."[5] The concept of adaptation or adjustment is central. Man is subject to life as to the experimental conditions set down by some unknown laboratory director. The achievement expected of him if he is to survive is to adapt himself to the natural and historical conditions imposed upon him. The implicit measure of the truth of ideas is whether they further this adaptation and contribute to the survival of the species.[6] Veblen's critique always applies to the failure of this adaptation. He is quite aware of the difficulties the doctrine has to face within the societal realm, realizing that the conditions to which men have to adjust themselves are largely produced by society. He knows of the interaction between the internal and the external and this compels him steadily to refine and modify the adaptive doctrine, but he hardly ever reaches the point where the absolute necessity of adaptation itself is called into question.

[4]Apart from William James (cf. Wesley C. Mitchell, *What Veblen Taught*, New York 1936, p. xxvi) one has to think chiefly of Peirce's writings here. Pragmatism is meant in a somewhat broader sense, derived from Veblen's concept of the interconnection between intellectual functions and evolutionary adaptation. Veblen conceives this adaptation, it should be emphasized, as involving the totality of the societal process, measured by the stage of technological productive powers, in avowed contrast to the isolated, particular interest of groups or individuals. Hence Veblen in his essay, "The Place of Science in Modern Civilization," has attacked pragmatism of the kind represented in Dewey's earlier works. In the American discussion he has been numbered among the anti-pragmatists. Although his critique of the "practical" spirit doubtless expresses an anti-pragmatist impulse, Veblen's subsumption of truth under its usefulness for the societal whole may suffice to justify the underscoring of the pragmatist aspect in the present study.

[5]Veblen, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

[6]Thus, Veblen's critique of erudition in *The Theory of the Leisure Class* centers around the antagonism of honorific and useful learning without asking whether some third might not exist, the objective character of Truth (cf. p. 394). Inasmuch, however, as Veblen urges the spirit of an objective science the "idle curiosity" of which is emphatically distinguished from any immediate practical interest, his theory contains the counter-motive as well. He thinks more dialectically than his official anti-Hegelianism leads one to believe.

Progress is adaptation and nothing else. The world to which he wants men to adjust themselves is the world of industrial technics. Concretely, progress means to Veblen assimilating the forms of thought and of "life"—that is to say, the sphere of economic consumption—to those of industrial technics. The tool of this assimilation is Science. Veblen conceives it as the universal application of the principle of causality free of archaic animistic habits of thought. Causal thinking means thinking in terms of objective, quantitative relations deriving from the process of industrial production, rather than in personalistic terms. The notion of teleology in particular is to be strictly excluded.

In order to come face to face with the force responsible for the conjunction of all the motives in Veblen's thinking, one has to look for his basic intellectual experience. It may be characterized as that of false uniqueness. As the mass production of identical goods and their monopolistic distribution advances and as the framework of highly industrialized life permits less and less the genuine individuation of a *hic et nunc*, the pretension of the *hic et nunc* to escape universal fungibility becomes more illusory. It is as if each thing's claim to be something special were mocking at a situation in which everyone and everything is incessantly subject to a perennial sameness. Veblen cannot stand this mockery. His rebellion actually lies in his obstinate insistence that this world present itself with that abstract sameness of its commodities which is prescribed by its economical and technological condition. In the present phase, in which "deliciously different" and "quaint" have become frozen standard patterns of advertising for a long time, this insight of Veblen's is easily accessible. He attained it, however, at a time when it was not yet so obvious. He saw through the pseudo-individuality of things long before technics had abolished their genuine individuality altogether. He exposed the sham of the unique through the inconsistency in unique objects themselves, through the contradiction between their esthetic form and their practical function. Their human functions are repudiated by the inhumanity of their forms.

He discovered an aspect of idle show which has largely escaped aesthetic criticism but which may well contribute to explaining the shock and catastrophe which so many buildings and interiors of the nineteenth century express today. The mark of the oppressive is on them. Under Veblen's glance their ornaments become menacing because they manifest their relation to old models of violence and domination. Nowhere does he indicate this more strikingly than in a passage on charity buildings: "Certain funds, for instance, may have

been set apart as a foundation for a foundling asylum or a retreat for invalids. The diversion of expenditure to honorific waste in such cases is not uncommon enough to cause surprises or even to raise a smile. An appreciable share of the funds is spent in the construction of an edifice faced with some aesthetically objectionable but expensive stone, covered with grotesque and incongruous details, and designed, in its battlemented walls and turrets and its massive portals and strategic approaches, to suggest certain barbaric methods of warfare."[7] The emphasis laid upon the threatening aspects of pomp and ornamentation is significant in relation to the deeper, hidden and perhaps unconscious notion of the trend of history that underlies his theory. The images of aggressive barbarism which he dug up in the false glitter of the nineteenth century, and particularly the decorative ambitions of the years after 1870, struck his sense of progress as relics of past epochs or as "reversions" on the part of those who did no productive work themselves, the "industrially exempt" who were, so to say, behind their time. Yet these selfsame features which he called archaic express in his vision the dawning horror of the future. His sad glance disavows his progressive philosophy.[8] The sinister aspect of the fortresslike foundling asylum, which struck him as a sign of oppression, has since revealed itself as the herald of the sinister reality practiced today in the torture palaces of the National Socialists. Veblen sees all the culture of mankind assuming the aspect of terror that has come into the open during its last phase. The fascination of the impending doom explains and justifies the injustice Veblen does to culture. This culture, which has today taken the form of advertising merely to keep men in line from day to day, was never anything else to Veblen but advertising, the display of booty, power and appropriated surplus value. In grandiose misanthropy he neglected everything which goes beyond this display. His obsession prompted him to see the bloody traces of injustice even within the image of happiness. The metropoles of the nineteenth century phantasmagorically assembled the pillars of the Attic temple, the Gothic cathedrals and the spiteful palaces of the Italian city states in order to demonstrate their unlimited command over the history of mankind and its goods. Veblen pays them back. To him the original

[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 349.

[8] In Veblen's last writings his straightforward, optimistic belief in progress breaks down. "All of his other works suggest the imbecility of modern business enterprise and an expectation that the underlying population will take matters in hand, but the tone of *Absentee Ownership* suggests more the imbecility of the underlying population for continuing to put up with the current state of affairs, and an expectation that business enterprise will tend to become more feudalistic in character until modern civilization collapses." (Josef Dorfman, *Thorstein Veblen and his America*, New York 1934, p. 467.)

temples, cathedrals and palaces are already as false as their imitations. He explains culture through the trash, not vice versa. One could not express this universal hypostasis of the monopolistic phase in which culture is swallowed up by advertising more simply than Stuart Chase in his preface to the *Theory of the Leisure Class*: "People above the line of bare subsistence, in this age and all earlier ages, do not use the surplus, which society has given them, primarily for useful purposes."[9] With regard to "all earlier ages" Veblen neglects all traits of cultural objects which are different from today's commodity culture. In so far as the products of human industry were not conceived as serving any useful ends, their *raison d'être*, according to this theory, was that of conspicuous consumption. But they express also the belief in the real power of magic rites; the sex motive and its symbolism, which, by the way, is not mentioned throughout the *Theory of the Leisure Class*; the compulsion of artistic expression; all longing to escape the sphere of utility. The arch-enemy of all teleological speculation, he proceeds, against his own will, according to the scheme of a satanic teleology. His subtle wit does not shrink from the crudest rationalism in order ironically to expose the universal command of fetishism over the supposed realm of freedom. In his intransigent concept of world history culture plays the role of advertising from the very beginning: it advertises domination.

The malicious glance is fertile. It gets at phenomena which, though they belong to the *façade* of society, have too serious a societal impact to be coped with through harmlessly progressive slogans. Sport belongs here. Veblen has bluntly characterized every kind of sport as a manifestation of violence, oppression and exploitation, from the children's war games and college athletics to the big shows of football and baseball: "These manifestations of the predatory temperament are all to be classed under the head of exploit. They are partly simple and unreflected expressions of an attitude of emulative ferocity, partly activities deliberately entered upon with a view to gaining repute for prowess. Sports of all kinds are of the same general character."[10] The passion for sport, according to Veblen, is of a retrogressive kind: "The ground of an addiction to sports is an archaic spiritual constitution."[11] Nothing, however, is more modern than this archaism. The sport displays are models of the fascist rallies. They are "tolerated excesses" combining cruelty and aggression with the authoritarian penchant for discipline. Veblen has an un-

[9] *Op. cit.*, p. xiv.
[10] *Op. cit.*, p. 255.
[11] *Ibid.*

failing sense of the affinity between the sport excess and the manipulating élite. "If a person so endowed with a proclivity for exploits is in a position to guide the development of habits in the adolescent members of the community, the influence which he exerts in the direction of conservation and reversion to prowess may be very considerable. This is the significance, for instance, of the fostering care latterly bestowed by many clergymen and other pillars of society upon 'boys' brigades' and similarly pseudo-military organizations."[12] His insight goes even further. He recognizes sport as pseudo-activity, as canalization of energies which otherwise might become dangerous, as the investiture of meaningless action with the spurious insignia of seriousness and significance. He deduces sport from the nature of the leisure class. The less one has to earn one's own living the more one feels called upon to give the illusion of serious, socially reputable, yet unprofitable work. At the same time, however, sport is adequate to the practical, efficient, "predatory" spirit. It brings the antagonistic desiderata of purposeful behavior and waste of time to their common denominator. Thus, however, it becomes an element of swindle, of "make believe." In the light of this analysis sport loses its harmlessness. To be sure, the analysis ought to be supplemented in order for it to obtain its full societal weight. For sport is not merely characterized by the desire to do violence to others, nor even by the desire to obey and to suffer, but by the productive forces inherent in sport though mutilated by sport itself. Only Veblen's rationalist psychology forbids him to acknowledge the element of bad pliancy in its full significance. It is this element which characterizes sport apart from its being a vestige of some past social form as a means of adaptation to the rising industrial spirit, an adaptation the lack of which troubles Veblen. Modern sport, one might say, attempts to restore to the body a part of the functions it has been deprived of through the machine. This attempt, however, is made in order to train men the more inexorably to serve the machine. Sport virtually transforms the body itself into a kind of machine.

Another complex in Veblen's critique of culture appears less timely, the so-called woman question. The socialist programs regard the final emancipation of women as such a truism that for a long time analysis of the concrete position of women has been dispensed with. In middle class literature the woman question has been regarded as comical ever since Shaw. Strindberg perverted it into the man question just as Hitler perverted the emancipation of the Jews into an emancipation from them. The impossibility of liberating

[12] *Op. cit.*, p. 254f.

women in an unfree society is ascribed by that society not to itself but to the advocates of freedom. The frailty of the ideals of emancipation which brings them close to neurosis is taken as their refutation. The erotically unprejudiced girl who approves of the world as long as she can go to the movies with her date has supplanted Ibsen's Nora and Hedda. If she knew of them she would, in racy lingo, reproach them with lacking a sense of reality. Veblen, who has much in common with Ibsen[13] also in other respects, is one of the last significant philosophers of reform who dares to take the woman question seriously. He is a belated apologist of the feminist movement, who, however, had to do justice to misogynous experiences such as those expressed in the work of Strindberg and Weininger. Thus woman becomes to him the enigmatic image of an antagonistic society. He knows of her patriarchical humiliation. Her position, which he numbers among the throwbacks to the age of the hunter and the warrior, reminds him of that of the servant. She enjoys free time and luxury only in order to enhance the status of her master. This implies two contradictory consequences. In some independence from Veblen's wording, they may be stated as follows: on the one hand the woman is exempted in a certain sense from "practical life" by her very position of slavery and as an object of ostentation—no matter how humiliating it may be. She is, or at least was in Veblen's time, not exposed to economic competition to the same degree as the man. In certain social strata and at certain epochs she was well enough protected not to develop the qualities which Veblen calls those of the predatory spirit. Through her aloofness from the social process of production she maintains the traits of a person not yet completely "possessed," not yet completely shackled by society. Thus the female member of the leisure class is the one who appears particularly fit to desert her class and to contribute to a more humane and more reasonable society. In all this, however, there lies a counter-tendency the most striking symptom of which is, according to Veblen, the pervasive conservatism of woman. She has no important part in the historical development of productive forces. This, and the state of dependency in which she is kept, produces a mutilating effect which overbalances the opportunity offered her by her aloofness fom economic competition. "The woman finds herself at home and content in a range of ideas which to the man are in great measure alien and imbecile."[14] If one would follow this trend of thought further, one might say that women have escaped the sphere of capitalistic production only to fall the more completely into the clutches of the sphere

[13]As to Veblen's knowledge of Ibsen, cf. Dorfman, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
[14]*Op. cit.*, p. 324.

of consumption. They are fascinated and restricted by the immediacy of the surface world of commodities no less than men are fascinated and restricted by the immediacy of profit. Women mirror back to male society the injustice it does to them and assimilate themselves to the commodities among which they are imprisoned. Veblen's critical insight is not a whit behind the Freudian one of the ultimate identity of the male and female structures of drives. It indicates, however, a far-reaching change within the Utopia of emancipation itself. Hope can no longer content itself as easily as it could during the age of woman's emancipation. The idea of emancipation today seems merely to assimilate the mutilated social character of women to the mutilated social character of men. In a free society the face of the efficient, shrewd, practical man ought to disappear together with that of the suffering woman.

Veblen, however, did not draw these consequences. To be sure, his critique of the existent is based upon the insight that it tends to cripple men by denying fulfillment to them and manipulating them as mere tools of the felicitous few—"the trouble is that business enterprises are run for profit, not to meet human needs."[15] Veblen certainly would have endorsed the ideal of human happiness as against the principle of exploitation which refuses such a happiness not only to what he calls the "underlying population" but also, according to his analysis, to the "leisure class" itself. Closer scrutiny, however, shows that the goal of happiness is not so concretely omnipresent in his writings as one might expect it to be. His critique of "institutions" is uncompromising, but he seems to be so fascinated by societal organization that it remains hypostatized even in his own image of rationality and endangers the humanity which a rational societal organization is supposed to serve. This may best be demonstrated through a passage in one of his later writings, where he appears most emphatically to formulate human fulfillment and—implicitly—happiness as his ideal: "The mechanical technology is impersonal and dispassionate, and its end is very simply to serve human needs, without fear or favor or respect of persons, prerogatives, or politics. It makes up an industrial system of an unexampled character—a mechanically balanced and interlocking system of work to be done, the prime requisitive of whose working is a painstaking and intelligent co-ordination of the processes at work, and an equally painstaking allocation of mechanical powers and materials. The foundation and driving force of it all is a massive body by technological knowledge, of a highly impersonal and altogether unbusinesslike nature, running

[15]Wesley C. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. xliii.

in close contact with the material sciences, on which it draws freely at every turn—exactingly specialized, endlessly detailed, reaching out into all domains of empirical fact."[16] It is more than doubtful whether one is entitled to attribute to mechanical technology *in abstracto* any "end" of its own without relating it to the concrete nature of the society within which it functions. As far as technology has such an end, it is production *per se*, only indirectly related to those very needs which it ought to fulfill. Technological planning as advocated by Veblen has at least an intrinsic tendency to treat human needs as a function of the process of production, whereas this dependence of men on the mechanisms of industrial production is symptomatic of the present state of affairs and ought to be reversed. Veblen, however, is ready to regard the engineers and technicians as a kind of élite to whom the rational organization of society might be entrusted. But he does not realize that the distinction between such an élite and the rest of mankind is irrational itself and tends to perpetuate the very same hierarchy of "status" which he expects will disappear through the materialization of his technological order. "This will call for diligent teamwork on the part of a suitable group of economists and engineers, who will have to be drawn together by self-selection on the basis of a common interest in productive efficiency, economical use of resources, and an equitable distribution of the consumable output."[17] The Saint-Simonist conception of the suitable group of economists and engineers is a highly dubious one. Economists and engineers, by virtue of their objective functions, occupy a relatively high place in the very same hierarchy Veblen attacks. He does not differentiate between their technological function and their intrinsic social character. To be sure, their functions are upset by today's irrational economy but this in no way qualifies them to select themselves as dictators. Like all subservience, their subservience to technology contains potential domination, and prepares them to take things into their own hands. It is characteristic that "equitable distribution" appears only as incidental, as it were, within Veblen's technological scheme, instead of determining its every step. Veblen is always tempted to make a fetish of production. This is grounded in his anthropology the supreme category of which is the "instinct of workmanship." His idea of happiness always remains related to this category. He never reaches an unequivocal decision as between the glorification of labor as such and the plea for the final aims of this labor. Beneath the outer armor of this rebellious arch-enemy of the theological tradition of New England hides the asceticism of the

[16]Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System*, New York 1934, p. 132.
[17]*Op. cit.*, p. 152.

Lutheran peasant, not only as a psychological force but as a pervasive element of theory. Though he incessantly attacks taboos, his analysis stops short at the idea that labor is sacred. He feels that this culture does not attribute enough honor[18] to its own work but finds its nefarious prestige in exemption from work, in leisure.

The truth herein is that leisure as practiced reflects the pressure on human labor which makes leisure possible. Veblen stands for the bad conscience of leisure. He confronts middle class society with its own principle of utility and demonstrates to it that according to its own criteria its culture is waste and sham, that it is so irrational as to refute the rationality of the whole system. He has something of the quality of the burgher who takes the postulate of thrift quite seriously. Thus, he reads the whole culture as the senseless expenditure of the show-off if not of the bankrupt. The one-track persistence with which he plays on this motif helps him to reveal the antagonistic character of a society which can maintain its own interest of profit only by trespassing at every step upon its own calculus, building up a whole system of Potemkin villages. Veblen was not a bad musician in the sense of the dictum, according to which one has to play their own melody to petrified conditions in order to make them dance. But he was a musician capable of reading his own part only and not the full score of the devilish concert. Hence his overemphasis on the limited sphere of production. There is implicit in his doctrine a distinction similar to the one between *raffend* and *schaffend*. He distinguishes two categories of modern economic institutions, "pecuniary" and "industrial"[19] and divides according to these categories the occupation of men and the behaviors supposedly corresponding to them. "So far as men's habits of thought are shaped by the competitive process of acquisition and tenure; so far as their economic functions are comprised within the range of ownership of wealth as conceived in terms of exchange value, and its management and financiering through a permutation of value; so far their experi-

[18]Whereas Veblen violently attacks the "honorific" institutions of exploitive society, he maintains the traditional protestant conception of the dignity of labor and expresses the hope that this dignity will finally be recognized under socialism. "Under such a social order [the socialist] where common labor would no longer be a mark of peculiar economic necessity and consequent low economic rank on the part of the laborer, it is even conceivable that labor might practically come to assume that character of nobility in the eyes of society at large, which it now sometimes assumes in the speculations of the well-to-do, in their complacent moods." (Veblen, *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization*, New York 1932, p. 401.) It is highly significant that his critical analysis at this point stops at the concept of nobility which he elsewhere would not hesitate to unmask as the product of predatory "status."

[19]*The Theory of the Leisure Class*, p. 229. Cf. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. xxxviii. The distinction has a long prehistory in America as well as in Europe. We mention here only two of the authors known to Veblen who make this distinction: Lester Frank Ward and Boehm-Bawerk.

ence in economic life favours the survival and accentuation of the predatory temperament and habits of thought."[20] The passage alludes to Marxian terminology. Because, however, he did not visualize the social process as the totality which it is, Veblen was led to divide human activity within the given social system into a productive and an unproductive part with the tacit implication that one could dispense with the latter and maintain the former. He furthermore directs his criticism of the capitalistic mode of production, not so much against appropriation as against the mechanism of distribution.[21] That this is actually at the bottom of his critique he demonstrates by talking about "that class of persons and that range of duties in the economic process which have to do with the ownership of enterprises engaged in competitive industry; especially those fundamental lines of economic management which are classed as financiering operations. To these may be added the greater part of mercantile occupations."[22] Only in the light of this distinction can one succeed in grasping what Veblen actually has against the leisure class, or as he prefers to call it in his later writings, "the kept classes." He does not object so much to the pressure which it exercises but to the fact that there is not sufficient pressure upon the leisure class itself in line with his own puritan ethos of workmanship. He implicitly chides the leisure class for its chance to escape, no matter how twisted this chance may be. He regards it as an archaism that the economically independent are not yet completely beset by the exigencies of life: "An archaic habit of mind persists because no effectual economic pressure constrains this class to an adaptation of its habits of thought to the changing situation."[23] Veblen advocates this adaptation all the time. To be sure, the countermotive, leisure interpreted as the prerequisite of *humanitas,* is not alien to him. But a typical mechanism of the positivist approach becomes effective here: he thinks pluralistically. He is willing to concede its right to leisure and even to waste, but merely "aesthetically." As an economist he does not want to have anything to do with it. One must not ignore the pathetic position to which the aesthetic category is relegated by this half-ironical division of interests, but the more urgent problem comes to the fore, namely, what the term economic actually means to Veblen. The question is not how far Veblen's institutionalism falls within the academic discipline of

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[20] *Op. cit.,* p. 229f.

[21] Here, too, the countermotive as well occurs in Veblen, in his critique of the captain of industry. By favorably contrasting the engineer to the latter, Veblen still appears to maintain the first motive as the stronger one.

[22] *Op. cit.,* p. 230.

[23] *Op. cit.,* p. 319.

economics proper but the meaning of his own concept of the economic. This concept, however, in the last analysis comes very close to that of the business man he despises elsewhere, who protests against unnecessary expense as uneconomic. What Veblen dislikes about capitalism is its waste rather than its exploitation. He dislikes every superfluous action. The concepts of the useful and the useless here presupposed are not analyzed. This makes for the pluralism of Veblen's method. He succeeds in proving that society proceeds uneconomically according to its own criteria. The proof is both much and little. Much, because it makes the irrationality of reason glaringly visible; little, because it falls short of grasping the close relation between the useful and the useless. Veblen leaves the problem of the useless to categories predefined by the special sciences and alien to his own basic concepts, while he himself takes on the role of an efficiency expert whose vote may be overruled by his aesthetical colleagues. He does not recognize the contradictions among scientific departments as an expression of those fundamental societal antagonisms the symptoms of which he otherwise excoriates. While as an economist he takes culture too lightly, striking it as "waste" from the budget, he secretly surrenders to its mere existence in society outside the range of budget making. He fails to see that through the departmental limitations of the observer no decision as to the ultimate right or wrong of cultural phenomena can be reached.

These limitations deny Veblen any insight into the truth hidden even within the illusionary sphere. He remains blind to the motives for the attitude against which his basic experience rebels. In a fragment written by the German poet, Frank Wedekind, and published after his death, there occurs the remark that *Kitsch* is the Gothic or the Baroque of our time. The historical necessity of such *Kitsch* has been misjudged by Veblen. To him, the false castle is nothing but a reversion. He knows nothing of its intrinsic modernity and visualizes the illusionary images of uniqueness in the era of mass production as mere vestiges instead of "responses" to capitalistic mechanization which betray something of the latter's essence. The realm of objects which function in Veblen's conspicuous consumption is actually a realm of artificial imagery. It is created by a desperate compulsion to escape from the abstract sameness of things by a kind of self-made and futile *promesse de bonheur*. Men prefer to embody the hope of childhood in products of their craft and then believe in their own fiction, rather than cast away that hope. The artificial imagery into which commodities are transshaped is not only the projection of opaque human relationships upon the world of things; it serves also to create the chimerical deities of

that which cannot be expressed in terms of production and adaptation to production, but which still obeys the principle of the market. Veblen's thinking bogged down before this antinomy. Still, the antinomy is what makes show a "style." Show is more than a mere false investment of labor. It represents the universal endeavor to summon into reality the idea of that which cannot be exchanged. This futile endeavor is universal and a "style" because the pressure and drudgery which it counteracts is universal. The reversion to the distant past upon which Veblen puts the main emphasis is but another aspect of the futility of this endeavor. The relationship of progress ("modernity") to retrogression ("archaism") may be put in the form of a thesis. In a society in which productive powers develop and are fettered at the same time and as a result of the same principle, each progress in technics always means an archaic reversion somewhere else. It is this "balancing up," this equivalence which invests class society with what is essentially "historyless" and ever the same, and which justifies calling it, in a gigantic abbreviation, "pre-history." Veblen's talk about the barbarian normal[24] exhibits an inkling of this. Barbarism is normal because it does not consist in mere rudiments but is perpetually reproduced in proportion to man's dominion over nature. Veblen has taken this constant balance too lightly, however, no matter how close he comes to acknowledging it. He has noticed the temporal disparity between the castle and the railway station but not the law behind this disparity. The railway station assumes the aspect of the castle but this aspect is its truth. Only when the technological world is a direct servant of domination is it capable of shedding the disguise. Only in fascism does it equal itself.

Veblen overlooks the compulsion within modern archaism. He believes that the artificial imagery may be eliminated by simple institutional changes within the existing society. This is, in the last analysis, why he stops short at the societal *quaestio iuris* of luxury and waste which, with the zeal of a world reformer, he longs to abolish. One may well speak of the double character of luxury. One side of it is that on which Veblen concentrates his attack: the section of the social product that is not expended to fulfill human wants and human happiness but is wasted in order to maintain obsolete and shackling production relations. The other aspect of luxury is the expenditure of parts of the social product that aid the reproduction of human working capacity neither directly nor indirectly but serve man as a man in so far as he has not completely fallen victim

[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 218.

to the principle of usefulness even in class society. While Veblen does not explicitly distinguish these two sides of luxury, he undoubtedly intends to abolish the first as conspicuous consumption and to retain the second in the name of the fullness of life. But the blunt character of this intention makes manifest the weakness of the theory. For in capitalistic society one can as little isolate *faux frais* and happiness in luxury as one can isolate exchange value and use value in labor. Whereas happiness occurs only when men intermittently escape the stranglehold of society, the concrete form of their happiness always contains the totality of social conditions of the situation in which they live.[25] Thus the lover's happiness does not relate merely to the beloved as a human being in herself, not even to the body in itself, but to the beloved in all her social concreteness and in her social appearance. Walter Benjamin once wrote that it is erotically as important to the man that the woman he loves appear in his company as that she give herself to him. Veblen would have joined in the bourgeois jeering at this statement and would have talked about conspicuous consumption. But the happiness that man actually finds cannot be severed altogether from conspicuous consumption. Men themselves are products of the given society. Theirs is no happiness which is not related to their cravings conditioned by this society, just as they know of no happiness which would not transcend these limitations. Abstract utopian thought which fails to take this paradox into account readily turns against happiness and supports the very same order of things against which it contends. For as the abstract utopia starts to wash out of happiness the hallmarks of the existent, it is forced to renounce every concrete claim to happiness. Even as they destroy their own happiness and replace it with the prestige of things—Veblen here speaks of social confirmation[26]—they somehow give testimony of the secret underlying all pomp and ostentation, that there is no individual happiness which does not virtually imply the happiness of society as a whole. Even the invidious, the display of status, and the urge to "impress,"

[25]The fact that Veblen does not sufficiently articulate the dialectics of luxury comes to the fore in his attitude towards the beautiful. He attempts to purge the beautiful of pomp and ostentation. Thus, however, he derobes it of every concrete societal quality and falls back to the pre-Hegelian standpoint of a purely formal concept of beauty based on categories of mere nature, such as mathematical proportion. His discussion of beauty is so abstract because there is no concrete beauty without an intrinsic element of injustice. Consequently he ought, like Tolstoi in his late period, to advocate the abolition of art. Yet, he avoids this conclusion. Here his pluralism comes into play. He supplements his economic principle of thriftiness by an aesthetic principle of the nonillusionary, the functional. But in being torn apart from each other both these postulates approach absurdity. The complete expediency of the beautiful contradicts its aimlessness, its being non-practical. Veblen's idea of the economic *qua* the thrifty contradicts the idea of a non-oppressive society which otherwise guides him.

[26]*Op. cit.*, p. 136.

by which the manifestations of happiness are invariably disfigured in a competitive society, implicitly contains the recognition that true happiness would exist only if the joy of the individual were free of its privational character. The features of luxury that Veblen calls invidious, the bad will, not only reproduce injustice but also express a disfigured appeal to justice.

It is most ironic that in Veblen faith in Utopia necessarily takes the form which he so vigorously condemns in middle class society, the form of retrogression, or "reversion." Hope, for him, lies solely with the primitive history of mankind. Every happiness barred to him because of the pressures of dreamless adjustment and adaptation to reality, to the conditions of the industrial world, shows him its image in some early golden age of mankind. "The conditions under which men lived in the most primitive stages of associated life that can properly be called human, seem to have been of a peaceful kind; and the character—the temperament and spiritual attitude—of men under these early conditions or environment and institutions seems to have been of a peaceful and unaggressive, not to say an indolent, cast. For the immediate purpose this peacable cultural stage may be taken to mark the initial phase of social development. So far as concerns the present argument, the dominant spiritual feature of this presumptive initial phase of culture seems to have been an unreflecting, unformulated sense of group solidarity, largely expressing itself in a complacent, but by no means strenuous, sympathy with all facility of human life, and an uneasy revulsion against apprehended inhibition or futility of life."[27] He views the aspects of demythification and *humanitas* exhibited by mankind during the bourgeois age not as symptoms of its coming to self-consciousness but rather as a retrogression to its elysian first stage: "Under the circumstances of the sheltered situation in which the leisure class is placed there seems, therefore, to be something of a reversion to the range of non-invidious impulses that characterize the ante-predatory savage culture. The reversion comprises both the sense of workmanship and the proclivity to indolence and good-fellowship."[28] Veblen, the technocrat, longs for the restoration of the most ancient. He calls the "New-Woman" movement a conglomerate of "blind and incoherent efforts to rehabilitate the woman's pre-glacial standing."[29] Such provocative formulations today appear to strike blows at the posivitist sense of facts. At this point, however, a most curious relationship in Veblen's

[27] *Op. cit.*, p. 219.
[28] *Op. cit.*, p. 351.
[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 356.

sociology comes into the open, that between his positivism and his Rousseauist ideal[30] of the primitive. As a positivist who does not acknowledge any other norm but adaptation, he sardonically raises, in one of the most advanced passages of his work, the question of why one should not also adjust oneself to the givenness of the principles of waste, futility and ferocity which according to his doctrine form the canon of pecuniary decency: "But why are apologies needed? If there prevails a body of popular sentiment in favour of sports, why is not that fact a sufficient legitimation? The protracted discipline of prowess to which the race has been subjected under the predatory and quasi-peacable culture has transmitted to the men of today a temperament that finds gratification in these expressions of ferocity and cunning. So, why not accept these sports as legitimate expressions of a normal and wholesome human nature? What other norm is there that is to be lived up to than that given the aggregate range of propensities that express themselves in the sentiments of this generation, including the hereditary strain of prowess?"[31] Here Veblen's reasoning brings him close to the danger of capitulating before the mere existent, before "normal barbarism." His solution is surprising: "The ulterior norm to which appeal is taken is the instinct of workmanship, which is an instinct more fundamental, of more ancient prescription, than the propensity to predatory emulation."[32] This is the key to his theory of the primitive age. The positivist permits himself to think the potentiality of man only by conjuring it into a given; in other words, conjuring it into the past. He allows no other justification of non-predatory life than that it is supposed to be even more given, more positive, more existent than the hell of existence. The golden age is the positivist's *asylum ignorantiae.* He introduces the instinct of workmanship incidentally, as it were, in order finally to bring paradise and the industrial age to their common anthropological denominator.

It was in theories of this kind, with their impotent auxiliary constructions in which the idea of Novelty tried to make its peace with adjustment to the ever equal, that Veblen exposed himself most dangerously to criticism. It is easy to call a positivist a fool when he tries to break out of the circle of the matter of fact. Veblen's whole work is actually affected by spleen. It is one big parody on the sense of proportion required by the positivist rules of the game. He is insatiable in his broad analogies between the habits and institu-

[30] Veblen's intimate knowledge of Rousseau is corroborated. Cf. Dorfman, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[31] *Op. cit.*, p. 270.

[32] *Ibid.*

tions of sport and of religion or between the aggressive canon of honor of the gentleman and the criminal. He cannot even refrain from economic complaints about the waste of ceremonial paraphernalia in the religious cults. He is pretty close to the reformers of life. Often enough his utopia of the primitive deteriorates into a cheaper belief in the "natural" and he preaches against the follies of fashion, long skirts and corsets—for the most part attributes of the nineteenth century swept away by the progress of the twentieth without bringing the barbarism of culture to an end. In Veblen conspicuous consumption plays the role of a fixed idea. To understand the contradiction between it and Veblen's keen social analyses one must take account of the cognitive function of spleen. Like the image of a peacable primitive age, the spleen in Veblen—and in other writers as well—is a symptom of too early a slackening of the effort of knowledge. The observer who permits his spleen to guide him attempts to make the overwhelming machinery of society commensurable with human experience. The opaque quality and strangeness of life under monopoly are, as it were, to be grasped with sensory organs, and yet this selfsame strangeness is what escapes immediate experience.[33] The fixed idea replaces the general concept by petrifying and spitefully maintaining a specific and limited experience. The spleen expresses a desire to overcome the inadequacy of any kind of theory in face of universal suffering. Suffering, however, is intrinsic to society as a system and can therefore be adequately identified by theory only and not by the flashlight thrown upon symptoms. As paradoxical as this situation is the endeavor to break through it by means of the spleen. The spleen drafts schemes, so to speak, of a colloquy with the ununderstandable by accusing society in terms of its surface phenomena. Spleen pays for the commensurability of its knowledge with life experience by the manifest insufficiency of knowledge itself. In this the splenetic attitude comes close to that of the backwoods sectarian who ascribes world ruin to a conspiracy of mysterious powers. The splenetic attitude differs, however, from this way of thinking because it confesses to the absurdity of its own whims. When Veblen places the responsibility which actually lies with the economic structure of society on a surface phenomenon, barbarian expenditure, the disproportionality between this thesis and reality becomes an instrument of truth. It aims at a shock. Spleen accompanies itself with impish laughter because its actual object slips through its fingers. Veblen's spleen

[33]One may well seek here the origin of one of Veblen's main polemical concepts, that of absentee ownership. His struggle against the credit function is essentially a protest against the self-alienation of men.

originates in his disgust with official optimism, with the sort of "progressiveness" with which he himself sides as soon as he speaks with common sense.

Melancholy lurks behind his kind of critique, the attitude of disillusionment and "debunking." It follows a traditional pattern popular in the Enlightenment that religion is a "hoax of the clergy." "It is felt that the divinity must be of a peculiarly serene and leisurely habit of life. And whenever his local habitation is pictured in poetic imagery, for edification or in appeal to the devout fancy, the devout word-painter, as a matter of course, brings out before his auditors' imagination a throne with a profusion of the insignia of opulence and power, and surrounded by a great number of servitors. In the common run of such presentations of the celestial abodes, the office of this corps of servants is a vicarious leisure, their time and efforts being in great measure taken up with an industrially unproductive rehearsal of the meritorious characteristics and exploits of the divinity."[34] The way the angels are blamed here for the unproductivity of their labor has a touch of rationalized swearing in it and is just as innocuous. A practical man beats his fist on the table. He does not fall for the dreams and neuroses of society. His triumph is like that of the husband who forces his hysterical wife to do housework in order to cure her of her caprices. The splenetic attitude clings obstinately to the alienated world of things and makes the malicious object responsible for evil. The debunker follows through. He is the "man with the knack" who does not allow himself to be cheated by the malicious objects but tears the ideological coverings from them in order to manipulate them the more easily. He curses the damned swindle. It is not accidental that the debunker's hatred is always directed against intermediary functions. The swindle and the middle-man belong together. So, however, do mediation and thinking. At the bottom of debunking lies a hatred for thinking.[35] Criticism of barbarian culture cannot be content with a barbaric denunciation of culture. It has to recognize the open, culture-less barbarism and reject it as the intrinsic goal of that culture rather than sullenly proclaim the supremacy of this barbarism

[34] *Op. cit.*, p. 124f.

[35] Veblen's consciousness was quite free from this hatred. To be sure, anti-intellectualism was objectively implied in his struggle against social intermediary functions as well as in his denunciation of "higher learning." The narrow-mindedness of Veblen's theory possibly can be accounted for by his neglecting the problem of mediation. In his physiognomy the zealotry of Scandinavian Protestantism which does not tolerate any intermediary between God and inwardness trains itself to serve the purposes of a society which liquidates the intermediary functions between the omnipotent production and the forced consumer. In a famous excursus in *Absentee Ownership*, Veblen compares the clergyman with a salesman. Both attitudes, the radical Protestant one and that of State Capitalism, are strongly anti-intellectual.

over culture merely because it has ceased to deceive. In a false society the victory of sincerity is the victory of horror. This horror can be sensed in the quips of the debunker, as it can in Veblen's gibe that the dwellers of "celestial abodes" are practising industrial unproductivity. Such jokes appeal to the friends of the existent. Laughter at this picture of beatitude is closer to violence than the picture itself, no matter how much the latter may be bloated by power and glory.

Yet Veblen's insistence upon the world of facts, his all-pervasive iconoclasm, stems from an impulse which can not be overestimated. One might say that all the forces of rebellion against barbaric life have migrated with him into the pressure of adjustment to the exigencies of that life. The pragmatist of his type is really free of illusions. For him there is no "whole": no identity between thinking and being, not even the concept of such an identity. Again and again he comes back to the position that the "habits of thought" and the demands of the concrete situation are irreconcilable. "Institutions are products of the past process, are adapted to past circumstances, and are therefore never in full accord with the requirements of the present. In the nature of the case, this process of selective adaptation can never catch up with the progressively changing situation in which the community finds itself at any given time; for the environment, the situation, the exigencies of life which enforce the adaptation and exercise the selection, change from day to day; and each successive situation of the community in its turn tends to obsolescence as soon as it has been established. When a step in the development has been taken, this step itself constitutes a change of situation which requires a new adaptation; it becomes the point of departure for a new step in the adjustment, and so on interminably."[36] This irreconcilability excludes the abstract ideal or makes it appear a childish phrase. Truth is reduced to the next step, the closest, not the farthest one. The pragmatist can point to the totality as that which is never definitely and finally given. Only the closest can be experienced while that which is farthest, the ideal, is blurred by incompleteness and uncertainty. These objections ought not to be overlooked. To contrast dialectical philosophy with pragmatism it is not sufficient to insist upon the total interest of a "good" society against the practical advantage in a bad one. The bad and the good do not have two truths. The truth of any good society of the future depends, as it were, on every step within "prehistory," on each of its moments.

[36] *Op. cit.*, p. 191.

Thus the difference between pragmatism and dialectics, like every genuine philosophical difference, consists of a nuance, that is to say, the interpretation of the next step. The type of pragmatism here in question interprets this step as an adaptation. This is at the hub of Veblen's critique of Marx. Mitchell sums up the position as follows: "Just before his time the German historical school had perceived the relativity of orthodox economics; but they had not produced a scientific substitute for the doctrine they belittled or discarded. Karl Marx had been more constructive. In Veblen's view, Marx had made a brave beginning in cultural analysis, though handicapped by a superficial psychology derived from Bentham and by a romantic metaphysics derived from Hegel. Bentham's influence led Marx to develop a commonplace theory of class interests that overlooked the way in which certain habits of thought are drilled into business men by their pecuniary occupations and quite different habits of thought are drilled into wage earners by the machine process in which they are caught. Hegel's influence made the Marxian theory of social evolution essentially an intellectual sequence that tends to a goal, 'the classless economic structure of the socialistic final term,' whereas the Darwinian scheme of thought envisages a 'blindly cumulative causation, in which there is no trend, no final term, no consummation.' Hence Marx strayed from the narrow trail of scientific analysis appropriate to a mechanistic age and attained an optimistic vision of the future which fulfilled his wish for a socialist revolution. The Darwinian viewpoint, which supplies the needed working programme, will spread among social scientists, not because it is less metaphysical than its predecessors or nearer the truth (whatever that may mean), but because it harmonizes better with the thoughts begotten by daily work in the twentieth century."[37] The thesis that the "Darwinian viewpoint" is not "nearer the truth" than Marx but merely more adequate to working conditions in present day society implies the decisive shortcoming of Veblen's theory. The "harmony" of thinking and reality for which his doctrine of adaptation stands may finally be a harmony with that selfsame oppression which he elsewhere condemns. It is a harmony that is certainly not superior to the discordant views of Marx. The latter did not have a "superficial psychology." He had no psychology at all, and for good theoretical reasons. The world Marx scrutinized is ruled by the law of value, not by men's souls. Today men are still the objects or the functionaries of the societal process. To explain the world by means of the psychology of its

[37] *Op. cit.*, p. xlvii f.

victims already presupposes an abstraction from the basic and objective mechanisms to which men are subject. The psychology of capitalism for which Veblen stands proceeds as if society were men; as if men were not alienated from themselves and from the whole. By hypostatizing the essentially unfree subjects as the basis of a social theory of the existent, it necessarily contains an element of deception. The doctrine of class interests and class consciousness, however, which Veblen attacks as a rationalistic or hedonistic psychology does not simply refer to the psychology of the proletariat as it is. This psychology might have been visualized by Veblen more adequately than by Marx, with the slight qualification that the very features of the proletariat which Veblen regards as hopeful signs of enlightenment have since[38] obtained a function which Veblen never would have dreamt of. *Per contra,* Marx insists upon the objective interests of the proletariat precipitated out of the objective relationships of the system. That interest is objective notwithstanding the fact that the system is not transparent to the proletariat, that the proletariat's "interest" is by no means automatically given as a psychological motive. For, the lack of awareness on the part of the workers and their unconscious adjustment to prevailing conditions is due to the system itself. Veblen blames Marx for superficiality because Marx, like the classical economists, takes happiness as his starting point. According to Veblen men today are not ruled by the idea of happiness, which is none too close to Veblen himself, but rather by the proper weight of societal and economic institutions. But this is based on a misinterpretation of dialectical philosophy. The latter certainly ought to acknowledge the deformations of consciousness brought to light by Veblen's institutionalism. But it ought to acknowledge them as facts, not accept them as measures of what ought to be. If "certain habits of thought are drilled into the wage earners by the machine process in which they are caught," one does not have to give in to these habits, no matter how practical they might be, but to destroy them because of their objective falsity—because they implicitly contain wrong judgments about the process of society as a whole which cannot be grasped in terms of naive and subservient tool-mindedness. Veblen's critical motive and his reverence for the historically given are irreconcilable.

[38]Mitchell sums up Veblen's psychology of the industrial worker as follows: "They [the masses of factory hands] tend to become sceptical, matter-of-fact, materialistic, unmoral, unpatriotic, undevout, blind to the metaphysical niceties of natural rights." (*Op. cit.*, p. xlvi.) One could not give a more adequate description of the cynical frame of mind of very large sections of the population in present day Germany. It ought to be noted in particular that even the term patriotism has fallen into disfavor with the National Socialist regime.

There is an obvious break in his sociology between his attack on the existent and his avowedly Darwinian detachment.

The concept of adaptation is the *deux ex machina* through which Veblen tries to bridge the gap between what is and what ought to be. But adaptation implies the rule of the ever equal.[39] If dialectics, on its side, were to understand the next step as adaptation, it would be surrendering its very case, the idea of potentiality. But what can the next step be if it is not to be abstract and arbitrary, if it is not to be the brand of those Utopias which the initiators of dialectical philosophy have rejected? Conversely, how can the next step obtain its direction and its aim without one's knowing more than merely what is pre-given?

Varying the Kantian question, one might ask: how is anything novel possible at all? The pointing up of this question defines the seriousness of pragmatism. The pragmatist is conscious of the perennial limits put upon men's attempts to go beyond the existent—limits set to both thought and action. He knows, moreover, that the slightest neglect of these limits, the slightest underestimation of the natural and societal powers-that-be, may lead to impotent phrase and futile behavior, liable to be punished by an all too easy victory on the part of the existent which may be delayed or mitigated by one's patiently taking into consideration the full and inexorable weight of what is given. The seriousness of the pragmatist is a reminder of the sceptical attitude of the physician who refuses to bother about the potentiality of a final abolition of death but prefers to help those who live while he takes the final inevitability of death for granted. Just as the physician speaks often enough as if he were the advocate of death, to the ultimate sovereignty of which he bows, the pragmatist stands for man's kinship with blind nature, as the invariant condition upon which every attempt actually to help those who suffer must be based. What may be doubtful, however, is whether the attitude of the philosopher has really to be that of a diagnostician, whether philosophy is bound to be in harmony with the intrinsic principles of practice as it is. For the practical attitude presupposes a kind of detachment which itself falls within the range of philosophical criticism. To the physician men are cases, and his resignation, no matter how deeply founded in facts it may be, at

[39]Mitchell leaves no doubt that this is actually Veblen's opinion and that the difference between his "Darwinism" and dialectical materialism has to be sought here. "His [Veblen's] evolutionary theory forbids him to anticipate a cataclysm, or to forecast a millenium. What will happen in the inscrutable future is what has been happening since the origin of man." (*Op. cit.*, p. xlvi.) The interconnection between the concept of the next step and the belief in the ever equal could not be expressed more strikingly.

least partly reflects, by his very reference to facts, his implicit conviction that this relation of subject and object cannot possibly be altered. His well-beloved admonition to "keep cool" may be necessary if he is to tender effective aid, but the philosophical equivalent of this attitude tends toward the acceptance of mere fate by theoretically reifying once more those who are already treated as objects by reality. The stubborn facts which are accepted by the observer may finally be recognized as man-made bricks in the wall behind which the stubborn society keeps each of its members. Where the pragmatist sees mere "opaque items"[40] which from the point of view of science are simply data to be organized in a logical context, there the task of philosophy only starts. It is the task of calling things by their names,[41] instead of shelving them in logical files, and of conceiving even their very opaqueness as the outcome of the selfsame social process from which they appear utterly detached. The novel may well consist in what is thus being "named." Nothing, however, is more opaque than adaptation itself wherein mere existence is installed as the measure of truth. The pragmatist wants every statement referred to a specific locus in time and space to get the historical index of every truth. But the pragmatist's own idea of adaptation needs such an index. It is what Freud called the life need. The next step is an adapting one only so far as want and poverty rule the world. Adaptation is the behavior adequate to a situation of "not enough" and the shortcoming of pragmatism lies in the fact that it hypostatizes this situation as an eternal one. This is implied in its concepts of nature and life. Thus, Veblen wishes men "identification with the life process,"[42] thereby perpetuating the attitude practised by men in nature when nature does not allow them sufficient means for their existence. Veblen's attacks against the sheltered whose position of privilege exempts them from having to make any adaptation to a changed situation[43] virtually terminates in a glorification of the Darwinian struggle for existence. This selfsame assumption of a life need is today clearly obsolescent, at least as regards the social conditions of life. It is outdated by the very development of technological productive forces to which Veblen's doctrine counsels men to adjust themselves. The pragmatist thus falls victim to dialectics. Whoever wishes to "live up" to the standard of the present technological situation, with its promises of richness and abundance to men which are kept from fulfillment only by the organization of

[40]Veblen, *op. cit.*, p. 304.
[41]Cf. T. W. Adorno, *Kierkegaard, Konstruktion des Ästhetischen*, Tübingen 1933, p. 88.
[42]*Op. cit.*, p. 335.
[43]Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 193.

society, has to cease obeying the rules of scarcity culture. In one of the most beautiful passages of his work Veblen has realized the interconnection between poverty and the continuance of existing forms. "The abjectly poor, and all those persons whose energies are entirely absorbed by the struggle for daily sustenance, are conservative because they cannot afford the effort of taking thought for the day after to-morrow; just as the highly prosperous are conservative because they have small occasion to be discontented with the situation as it stands to-day."[44] The pragmatist, however, clings retrogressively to the standpoint of those who cannot think for the day after to-morrow—that is to say, beyond the next step—because they do not know what they will live on to-morrow. He represents poverty. This is his historical truth because the organization of society still maintains men in poverty, and his historical untruth because the absurdity of this poverty finally has become manifest. To adapt oneself to what is possible today no longer means adapting oneself at all. It means realizing the objective potentiality.

[44] *Op. cit.*, p. 204.

Some Social Implications of Modern Technology

By Herbert Marcuse

In this article, technology is taken as a social process in which technics proper (that is, the technical apparatus of industry, transportation, communication) is but a partial factor. We do not ask for the influence or effect of technology on the human individuals. For they are themselves an integral part and factor of technology, not only as the men who invent or attend to machinery but also as the social groups which direct its application and utilization. Technology, as a mode of production, as the totality of instruments, devices and contrivances which characterize the machine age is thus at the same time a mode of organizing and perpetuating (or changing) social relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behavior patterns, an instrument for control and domination.[1]

Technics by itself can promote authoritarianism as well as liberty, scarcity as well as abundance, the extension as well as the abolition of toil. National Socialism is a striking example of the ways in which a highly rationalized and mechanized economy with the utmost efficiency in production can operate in the interest of totalitarian oppression and continued scarcity. The Third Reich is indeed a form of "technocracy": the technical considerations of imperialistic efficiency and rationality supersede the traditional standards of profitability and general welfare. In National Socialist Germany, the reign of terror is sustained not only by brute force which is foreign to technology but also by the ingenious manipulation of the power inherent in technology: the intensification of labor, propaganda, the training of youths and workers, the organization of the governmental, industrial and party bureaucracy—all of which constitute the daily implements of terror—follow the lines of greatest technological efficiency. This terroristic technocracy cannot be attributed to the exceptional requirements of "war economy"; war economy is rather the normal state of the National Socialist ordering of the social and economic process, and technology is one of the chief stimuli of this ordering.[2]

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[1]Cf. Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization*, New York 1936, p. 364: The motive in back of "mechanical discipline and many of the primary inventions . . . was not technical efficiency but holiness, or power over other men. In the course of their development machines have extended these aims and provided a vehicle for their fulfillment."

[2]Cf. A.R.L. Gurland, "Technological Trends and Economic Structure under National Socialism," in this journal, IX (1941), No. 2, pp. 226ff.

In the course of the technological process a new rationality and new standards of individuality have spread over society, different from and even opposed to those which initiated the march of technology. These changes are not the (direct or derivative) effect of machinery on its users or of mass production on its consumers; they are rather themselves determining factors in the development of machinery and mass production. In order to understand their full import, it is necessary to survey briefly the traditional rationality and standards of individuality which are being dissolved by the present stage of the machine age.

The human individual whom the exponents of the middle class revolution had made the ultimate unit as well as the end of society stood for values which strikingly contradict those holding sway over society today. If we try to assemble in one guiding concept the various religious, political and economic tendencies which shaped the idea of the individual in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, we may define the individual as the subject of certain fundamental standards and values which no external authority was supposed to encroach upon. These standards and values pertained to the forms of life, social as well as personal, which were most adequate to the full development of man's faculties and abilities. By the same token, they were the "truth" of his individual and social existence. The individual, as a rational being, was deemed capable of finding these forms by his own thinking and, once he had acquired freedom of thought, of pursuing the course of action which would actualize them. Society's task was to grant him such freedom and to remove all restrictions upon his rational course of action.

The principle of individualism, the pursuit of self-interest, was conditioned upon the proposition that self-interest was rational, that is to say, that it resulted from and was constantly guided and controlled by autonomous thinking. The rational self-interest did not coincide with the individual's immediate self-interest, for the latter depended upon the standards and requirements of the prevailing social order, placed there not by his autonomous thought and conscience but by external authorities. In the context of radical Puritanism, the principle of individualism thus set the individual against his society. Men had to break through the whole system of ideas and values imposed upon them, and to find and seize the ideas and values that conformed to their rational interest. They had to live in a state of constant vigilance, apprehension, and criticism, to reject everything that was not true, not justified by free reason. This, in a society which was not yet rational, constituted a principle of per-

manent unrest and opposition. For false standards still governed the life of men, and the free individual was therefore he who criticised these standards, searched for the true ones and advanced their realization. The theme has nowhere been more fittingly expressed than in Milton's image of a "wicked race of deceivers, who . . . took the virgin Truth, hewd her lovely form into a thousand peeces, and scatter'd them to the four winds. From that time ever since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear, imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangl'd body of Osiris, went up and down gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them. We have not yet found them all, . . . nor ever shall do, till her Master's second coming . . . —To be still searching what we know not, by what we know, still closing up truth to truth as we find it (for all her body is homogeneal and proportionall)," this was the principle of individualistic rationality.[3]

To fulfill this rationality presupposed an adequate social and economic setting, one that would appeal to individuals whose social performance was, at least to a large extent, their own work. Liberalist society was held to be the adequate setting for individualistic rationality. In the sphere of free competition, the tangible achievements of the individual which made his products and performances a part of society's need, were the marks of his individuality. In the course of time, however, the process of commodity production undermined the economic basis on which individualistic rationality was built. Mechanization and rationalization forced the weaker competitor under the dominion of the giant enterprises of machine industry which, in establishing society's dominion over nature, abolished the free economic subject.

The principle of competitive efficiency favors the enterprises with the most highly mechanized and rationalized industrial equipment. Technological power tends to the concentration of economic power, to "large units of production, of vast corporate enterprises producing large quantities and often a striking variety of goods, of industrial empires owning and controlling materials, equipment, and processes from the extraction of raw materials to the distribution of finished products, of dominance over an entire industry by a small number of giant concerns. . . ." And technology "steadily increases the power at the command of giant concerns by creating new tools, processes and products."[4] Efficiency here called for integral unification and simplification, for the removal of all "waste," the avoidance of all

[3]Areopagitica, in Works, New York 1931, 4, pp. 338-339.
[4]*Temporary National Committee*, Monograph No. 22, "Technology in Our Economy," Washington, 1941, p. 195.

detours, it called for radical coordination. A contradiction exists, however, between the profit incentive that keeps the apparatus moving and the rise of the standard of living which this same apparatus has made possible. "Since control of production is in the hands of enterprisers working for profit, they will have at their disposal whatever emerges as surplus after rent, interest, labor, and other costs are met. These costs will be kept at the lowest possible minimum as a matter of course."[5] Under these circumstances, profitable employment of the apparatus dictates to a great extent the quantity, form and kind of commodities to be produced, and through this mode of production and distribution, the technological power of the apparatus affects the entire rationality of those whom it serves.

Under the impact of this apparatus,[6] individualistic rationality has been transformed into technological rationality. It is by no means confined to the subjects and objects of large scale enterprises but characterizes the pervasive mode of thought and even the manifold forms of protest and rebellion. This rationality establishes standards of judgment and fosters attitudes which make men ready to accept and even to introcept the dictates of the apparatus.

Lewis Mumford has characterized man in the machine age as an "objective personality," one who has learned to transfer all subjective spontaneity to the machinery which he serves, to subordinate his life to the "matter-of-factness" of a world in which the machine is the factor and he the factum.[7] Individual distinctions in the aptitude, insight and knowledge are transformed into different quanta of skill and training, to be coordinated at any time within the common framework of standardized performances.

Individuality, however, has not disappeared. The free economic subject rather has developed into the object of large-scale organization and coordination, and individual achievement has been transformed into standardized efficiency. The latter is characterized by the fact that the individual's performance is motivated, guided and measured by standards external to him, standards pertaining to predetermined tasks and functions. The efficient individual is the one whose performance is an action only insofar as it is the proper reaction to the objective requirements of the apparatus, and his liberty is confined to the selection of the most adequate means for reaching a goal which he did not set. Whereas individual achievement is independent of recognition and consummated in the work itself, effi-

[5] *Temporary National Economic Committee, Final Report of the Executive Secretary,* Washington 1941, p. 140.

[6] The term "apparatus" denotes the institutions, devices and organizations of industry in their prevailing social setting.

[7] L. Mumford, *op. cit.,* pp. 361ff.

ciency is a rewarded performance and consummated only in its value for the apparatus.

With the majority of the population, the former freedom of the economic subject was gradually submerged in the efficiency with which he performed services assigned to him. The world had been rationalized to such an extent, and this rationality had become such a social power that the individual could do no better than adjust himself without reservation. Veblen was among the first to derive the new matter-of-factness from the machine process, from which it spread over the whole society: "The share of the operative workman in the machine industry is (typically) that of an attendant, an assistant, whose duty it is to keep pace with the machine process and to help out with workmanlike manipulation at points where the machine process engaged is incomplete. His work supplements the machine process rather than makes use of it. On the contrary the machine process makes use of the workman. The ideal mechanical contrivance in this technological system is the automatic machine."[8] The machine process requires a knowledge oriented to "a ready apprehension of opaque facts, in passably exact quantitative terms. This class of knowledge presumes a certain intellectual or spiritual attitude on the part of the workman, such an attitude as will readily apprehend and appreciate matter of fact and will guard against the suffusion of this knowledge with putative animistic or anthropomorphic subtleties, quasi-personal interpretations of the observed phenomena and of their relations to one another."[9]

As an attitude, matter-of-factness is not bound to the machine process. Under all forms of social production men have taken and justified their motives and goals from the facts that made up their reality, and in doing so they have arrived at the most diverging philosophies. Matter-of-factness animated ancient materialism and hedonism, it was responsible in the struggle of modern physical science against spiritual oppression, and in the revolutionary rationalism of the enlightenment. The new attitude differs from all these in the highly rational compliance which typifies it. The facts directing man's thought and action are not those of nature which must be accepted in order to be mastered, or those of society which must be changed because they no longer correspond to human needs and potentialities. Rather are they those of the machine process, which itself appears as the embodiment of rationality and expediency.

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[8] *The Instinct of Workmanship*, New York 1922, p. 306f.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 310. This training in "matter of factness" applies not only to the factory worker but also to those who direct rather than attend the machine.

Let us take a simple example. A man who travels by automobile to a distant place chooses his route from the highway maps. Towns, lakes and mountains appear as obstacles to be bypassed. The countryside is shaped and organized by the highway: what one finds en route is a byproduct or annex of the highway. Numerous signs and posters tell the traveler what to do and think; they even request his attention to the beauties of nature or the hallmarks of history. Others have done the thinking for him, and perhaps for the better. Convenient parking spaces have been constructed where the broadest and most surprising view is open. Giant advertisements tell him when to stop and find the pause that refreshes. And all this is indeed for his benefit, safety and comfort; he receives what he wants. Business, technics, human needs and nature are welded together into one rational and expedient mechanism. He will fare best who follows its directions, subordinating his spontaneity to the anonymous wisdom which ordered everything for him.

The decisive point is that this attitude—which dissolves all actions into a sequence of semi-spontaneous reactions to prescribed mechanical norms—is not only perfectly rational but also perfectly reasonable. All protest is senseless, and the individual who would insist on his freedom of action would become a crank. There is no personal escape from the apparatus which has mechanized and standardized the world. It is a rational apparatus, combining utmost expediency with utmost convenience, saving time and energy, removing waste, adapting all means to the end, anticipating consequences, sustaining calculability and security.

In manipulating the machine, man learns that obedience to the directions is the only way to obtain desired results. Getting along is identical with adjustment to the apparatus. There is no room for autonomy. Individualistic rationality has developed into efficient compliance with the pregiven continuum of means and ends. The latter absorbs the liberating efforts of thought, and the various functions of reason converge upon the unconditional maintenance of the apparatus. It has been frequently stressed that scientific discoveries and inventions are shelved as soon as they seem to interfere with the requirements of profitable marketing.[10] The necessity

[10]Florian Znaniecki, *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*, New York 1940, p. 54f. —Bernard J. Stern, *Society and Medical Progress*, Princeton 1941, Chapter IX, and the same author's contribution to *Technological Trends and National Policy*, U. S. National Resources Committee, Washington 1937.

which is the mother of inventions is to a great extent the necessity of maintaining and expanding the apparatus. Inventions have "their chief use . . . in the service of business, not of industry, and their great further use is in the furtherance, or rather the acceleration, of obligatory social amenities." They are mostly of a competitive nature, and "any technological advantage gained by one competitor forthwith becomes a necessity to all the rest, on pain of defeat," so that one might as well say that, in the monopolistic system, "invention is the mother of necessity."[11]

Everything cooperates to turn human instincts, desires and thoughts into channels that feed the apparatus. Dominant economic and social organizations "do not maintain their power by force . . . They do it by identifying themselves with the faiths and loyalties of the people,"[12] and the people have been trained to identify their faiths and loyalties with them. The relationships among men are increasingly mediated by the machine process. But the mechanical contrivances which facilitate intercourse among individuals also intercept and absorb their libido, thereby diverting it from the all too dangerous realm in which the individual is free of society. The average man hardly cares for any living being with the intensity and persistence he shows for his automobile. The machine that is adored is no longer dead matter but becomes something like a human being. And it gives back to man what it possesses: the life of the social apparatus to which it belongs. Human behavior is outfitted with the rationality of the machine process, and this rationality has a definite social content. The machine process operates according to the laws of physical science, but it likewise operates according to the laws of mass production. Expediency in terms of technological reason is, at the same time, expediency in terms of profitable efficiency, and rationalization is, at the same time, monopolistic standardization and concentration. The more rationally the individual behaves and the more lovingly he attends to his rationalized work, the more he succumbs to the frustrating aspects of this rationality. He is losing his ability to abstract from the special form in which rationalization is carried through and is losing his faith in its unfulfilled potentialities. His matter-of-factness, his distrust of all values which transcend the facts of observation, his resentment against all "quasi-personal" and metaphysical interpretations, his suspicion of all standards which re-

[11]Thorstein Veblen, *op. cit.*, p. 315f.
[12]Thurman Arnold, *The Folklore of Capitalism*, New York 1941, p. 193f.

late the observable order of things, the rationality of the apparatus, to the rationality of freedom,—this whole attitude serves all too well those who are interested in perpetuating the prevailing form of matters of fact. The machine process requires a "consistent training in the mechanical apprehension of things," and this training, in turn, promotes "conformity to the schedule of living," a "degree of trained insight and a facile strategy in all manner of quantitative adjustments and adaptations . . ."[13] The "mechanics of conformity" spread from the technological to the social order; they govern performance not only in the factories and shops, but also in the offices, schools, assemblies and, finally, in the realm of relaxation and entertainment.

Individuals are stripped of their individuality, not by external compulsion, but by the very rationality under which they live. Industrial psychology correctly assumes that "the dispositions of men are fixed emotional habits and as such they are quite dependable reaction patterns."[14] True, the force which transforms human performance into a series of dependable reactions is an external force: the machine process imposes upon men the patterns of mechanical behavior, and the standards of competitive efficiency are the more enforced from outside the less independent the individual competitor becomes. But man does not experience this loss of his freedom as the work of some hostile and foreign force; he relinquishes his liberty to the dictum of reason itself. The point is that today the apparatus to which the individual is to adjust and adapt himself is so rational that individual protest and liberation appear not only as hopeless but as utterly irrational. The system of life created by modern industry is one of the highest expediency, convenience and efficiency. Reason, once defined in these terms, becomes equivalent to an activity which perpetuates this world. Rational behavior becomes identical with a matter-of-factness which teaches reasonable submissiveness and thus guarantees getting along in the prevailing order.

At first glance, the technological attitude rather seems to imply the opposite of resignation. Teleological and theological dogmas no longer interfere with man's struggle with matter; he develops his experimental energies without inhibition. There is no constellation of matter which he does not try to break up, to manipulate and to change according to his will and interest. This experimentalism, however, frequently serves the effort to develop a higher efficiency of hierarchical control over men. Technological rationality may

[13]Thorstein Veblen, *op. cit.*, p. 314.
[14]Albert Walton, *Fundamentals of Industrial Psychology*, New York 1941, p. 24.

easily be placed into the service of such control: in the form of "scientific management," it has become one of the most profitable means for streamlined autocracy. F. W. Taylor's exposition of Scientific Management shows within it the union of exact science, matter-of-factness and big industry: "Scientific management attempts to substitute, in the relation between employers and workers, the government of fact and law for the rule of force and opinion. It substitutes exact knowledge for guesswork, and seeks to establish a code of natural laws equally binding upon employers and workmen. Scientific management thus seeks to substitute in the shop discipline, natural law in place of a code of discipline based upon the caprice and arbitrary power of men. No such democracy has ever existed in industry before. Every protest of every workman must be handled by those on the management side and the right and wrong of the complaint must be settled, not by the opinion either of the management or the workman but by the great code of laws which has been developed and which must satisfy both sides."[15] The scientific effort aims at eliminating waste, intensifying production and standardizing the product. And this whole scheme to increase profitable efficiency poses as the final fulfillment of individualism, ending up with a demand to "develop the individuality of the workers."[16]

The idea of compliant efficiency perfectly illustrates the structure of technological rationality. Rationality is being transformed from a critical force into one of adjustment and compliance. Autonomy of reason loses its meaning in the same measure as the thoughts, feelings and actions of men are shaped by the technical requirements of the apparatus which they have themselves created. Reason has found its resting place in the system of standardized control, production and consumption. There it reigns through the laws and mechanisms which insure the efficiency, expediency and coherence of this system.

As the laws and mechanisms of technological rationality spread over the whole society, they develop a set of truth values of their own which hold good for the functioning of the apparatus—and for that alone. Propositions concerning competitive or collusive behavior, business methods, principles of effective organization and control, fair play, the use of science and technics are true or false in terms of this value system, that is to say, in terms of instrumentalities that dictate their own ends. These truth values are tested and perpetuated by experience and must guide the thoughts and actions

[15] Robert F. Hoxie, *Scientific Management and Labor*, New York 1916, p. 140f.
[16] *Ibid.*, p. 149.

of all who wish to survive. Rationality here calls for unconditional compliance and coordination, and consequently, the truth values related to this rationality imply the subordination of thought to pregiven external standards. We may call this set of truth values the technological truth, technological in the twofold sense that it is an instrument of expediency rather than an end in itself, and that it follows the pattern of technological behavior.

By virtue of its subordination to external standards, the technological truth comes into striking contradiction with the form in which individualistic society had established its supreme values. The pursuit of self-interest now appears to be conditioned upon heteronomy, and autonomy as an obstacle rather than stimulus for rational action. The originally identical and "homogenous" truth seems to be split into two different sets of truth values and two different patterns of behavior: the one assimilated to the apparatus, the other antagonistic to it; the one making up the prevailing technological rationality and governing the behavior required by it, the other pertaining to a critical rationality whose values can be fulfilled only if it has itself shaped all personal and social relationships. The critical rationality derives from the principles of autonomy which individualistic society itself had declared to be its self-evident truths. Measuring these principles against the form in which individualistic society has actualized them, critical rationality accuses social injustice in the name of individualistic society's own ideology.[17] The relationship between technological and critical truth is a difficult problem which cannot be dealt with here, but two points must be mentioned. (1) The two sets of truth values are neither wholly contradictory nor complementary to each other; many truths of technological rationality are preserved or transformed in critical rationality. (2) The distinction between the two sets is not rigid; the content of each set changes in the social process so that what were once critical truth values become technological values. For example, the proposition that every individual is equipped with certain inalienable rights is a critical proposition but it was frequently interpreted in favor of efficiency and concentration of power."[18]

The standardization of thought under the sway of technological rationality also affects the critical truth values. The latter are torn from the context to which they originally belonged and, in their new form, are given wide, even official publicity. For example, proposi-

[17] Cf. Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, "Traditionelle und kritische Theorie," in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, VI (1937), pp. 245ff.

[18] Cf. the discussion on the law Le Chapelier in the National Assembly of the French Revolution.

tions which, in Europe, were the exclusive domain of the labor movement are today adopted by the very forces which these propositions denounced. In the Fascist countries, they serve as ideological instruments for the attack on "Jewish capitalism" and "Western plutocracy," thereby concealing the actual front in the struggle. The materialistic analysis of present day economy is employed to justify Fascism to the German industrialists in whose interest it operates, as the regime of last resort for imperialistic expansion.[19] In other countries, the critique of political economy functions in the struggle among conflicting business groups and as governmental weapon for unmasking monopolistic practices; it is propagated by the columnists of the big press syndicates and finds its way even into the popular magazines and the addresses to manufacturers associations. As these propositions become part and parcel of the established culture, however, they seem to lose their edge and to merge with the old and the familiar. This familiarity with the truth illuminates the extent to which society has become indifferent and insusceptible to the impact of critical thought. For the categories of critical thought preserve their truth value only if they direct the full realization of the social potentialities which they envision, and they lose their vigor if they determine an attitude of fatalistic compliance or competitive assimilation.

Several influences have conspired to bring about the social impotence of critical thought. The foremost among them is the growth of the industrial apparatus and of its all-embracing control over all spheres of life. The technological rationality inculcated in those who attend to this apparatus has transformed numerous modes of external compulsion and authority into modes of self-discipline and self-control. Safety and order are, to a large extent, guaranteed by the fact that man has learned to adjust his behavior to the other fellow's down to the most minute detail. All men act equally rationally, that is to say, according to the standards which insure the functioning of the apparatus and thereby the maintenance of their own life. But this "introversion" of compulsion and authority has strengthened rather than attenuated the mechanisms of social control. Men, in following their own reason, follow those who put their reason to profitable use. In Europe, these mechanisms helped to prevent the individual from acting in accordance with the conspicuous truth, and they were efficiently supplemented by the physical control mechanisms of the apparatus. At this point, the otherwise

[19] Hitler's speecn before the Industry Club in Düsseldorf, January 27, 1932, in *My New Order*, New York 1941, pp. 93ff.

diverging interests and their agencies are synchronized and adjusted in such a manner that they efficiently counteract any serious threat to their dominion.

The ever growing strength of the apparatus, however, is not the only influence responsible. The social impotence of critical thought has been further facilitated by the fact that important strata of the opposition have for long been incorporated into the apparatus itself—without losing the title of the opposition. The history of this process is well known and is illustrated in the development of the labor movement. Shortly after the first World War, Veblen declared that "the A.F. of L. is itself one of the Vested Interests, as ready as any other to do battle for its own margin of privilege and profit. . . . The A.F. of L. is a business organization with a vested interest of its own; for keeping up prices and keeping down the supply, quite after the usual fashion of management by the other Vested Interests."[20] The same holds true for the labor bureaucracy in leading European countries. The question here pertains not to the political expediency and the consequences of such a development, but to the changing function of the truth values which labor had represented and carried forward.

These truth values belonged, to a large extent, to the critical rationality which interpreted the social process in terms of its restrained potentialities. Such a rationality can fully develop only in social groups whose organization is not patterned on the apparatus in its prevailing forms or on its agencies and institutions. For the latter are pervaded by the technological rationality which shapes the attitude and interests of those dependent on them, so that all transcending aims and values are cut off. A harmony prevails between the "spirit" and its material embodiment such that the spirit cannot be supplanted without disrupting the functioning of the whole. The critical truth values borne by an oppositional social movement change their significance when this movement incorporates itself into the apparatus. Ideas such as liberty, productive industry, planned economy, satisfaction of needs are then fused with the interests of control and competition. Tangible organizational success thus outweighs the exigencies of critical rationality.

Its tendency to assimilate itself to the organizational and psychological pattern of the apparatus caused a change in the very

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[20]*The Engineers and The Price System,* New York 1940, pp. 88ff.

structure of the social opposition in Europe. The critical rationality of its aims was subordinated to the technological rationality of its organization and thereby "purged" of the elements which transcended the established pattern of thought and action. This process was the apparently inevitable result of the growth of large scale industry and of its army of dependents. The latter could hope effectively to assert their interests only if these were effectively coordinated in large scale organizations. The oppositional groups were being transformed into mass parties, and their leadership into mass bureaucracies. This transformation, however, far from dissolving the structure of individualistic society into a new system, sustained and strengthened its basic tendencies.

It seems to be self-evident that mass and individual are contradictory concepts and incompatible facts. The crowd "is, to be sure, composed of individuals—but of individuals who cease to be isolated, who cease thinking. The isolated individual within the crowd cannot help thinking, criticizing the emotions. The others, on the other hand, cease to think: they are moved, they are carried away, they are elated; they feel united with their fellow members in the crowd, released from all inhibitions; they are changed and feel no connection with their former state of mind."[21] This analysis, although it correctly describes certain features of the masses, contains one wrong assumption, that in the crowd the individuals "cease to be isolated," are changed and "feel no connection with their former state of mind." Under authoritarianism, the function of the masses rather consists in consummating the isolation of the individual and in realizing his "former state of mind." The crowd is an association of individuals who have been stripped of all "natural" and personal distinctions and reduced to the standardized expression of their abstract individuality, namely, the pursuit of self-interest. As member of a crowd, man has become the standardized subject of brute self-preservation. In the crowd, the restraint placed by society upon the competitive pursuit of self-interest tends to become ineffective and the aggressive impulses are easily released. These impulses have been developed under the exigencies of scarcity and frustration, and their release rather accentuates the "former state of mind." True, the crowd "unites," but it unites the atomic subjects of self-preservation who are detached from everything that transcends their selfish interests and impulses. The crowd is thus the antithesis of the "community," and the perverted realization of individuality.

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[21] E. Lederer, *State of the Masses*, New York 1940, p. 32f.

The weight and import of the masses grow with the growth of rationalization, but at the same time they are transformed into a conservative force which itself perpetuates the existence of the apparatus. As there is a decrease in the number of those who have the freedom of individual performance, there is an increase in the number of those whose individuality is reduced to self-preservation by standardization. They can pursue their self-interest only by developing "dependable reaction patterns" and by performing pre-arranged functions. Even the highly differentiated professional requirements of modern industry promote standardization. Vocational training is chiefly training in various kinds of skill, psychological and physiological adaptation to a "job" which has to be done. The job, a pre-given "type of work . . . requires a particular combination of abilities,"[22] and those who create the job also shape the human material to fill it. The abilities developed by such training make the "personality" a means for attaining ends which perpetuate man's existence as an instrumentality, replaceable at short notice by other instrumentalities of the same brand. The psychological and "personal" aspects of vocational training are the more emphasized the more they are subjected to regimentation and the less they are left to free and complete development. The "human side" of the employee and the concern for his personal aptitudes and habits play an important part in the total mobilization of the private sphere for mass production and mass culture. Psychology and individualization serve to consolidate stereotyped dependability, for they give the human object the feeling that he unfolds himself by discharging functions which dissolve his self into a series of required actions and responses. Within this range, individuality is not only preserved but also fostered and rewarded, but such individuality is only the special form in which a man intercepts and discharges, within a general pattern, certain duties allocated to him. Specialization fixates the prevailing scheme of standardization. Almost everyone has become a potential member of the crowd, and the masses belong to the daily implements of the social process. As such, they can easily be handled, for the thoughts, feelings and interests of their members have been assimilated to the pattern of the apparatus. To be sure, their outbursts are terrifying and violent but these are readily directed against the weaker competitors and the conspicuous "outsiders" (Jews, foreigners, national minorities). The coordinated masses do not crave a new order but a larger share in the prevailing one. Through their action, they strive to rectify, in an

[22]Albert Walton, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

anarchic way, the injustice of competition. Their uniformity is in the competitive self-interest they all manifest, in the equalized expressions of self-preservation. The members of the masses are individuals.

The individual in the crowd is certainly not the one whom the individualist principle exhorted to develop his self, nor is his self-interest the same as the rational interest urged by this principle. Where the daily social performance of the individual has become antagonistic to his "true interest," the individualist principle has changed its meaning. The protagonists of individualism were aware of the fact that "individuals can be developed only by being trusted with somewhat more than they can, at the moment, do well";[23] today, the individual is trusted with precisely what he can, at the moment, do well. The philosophy of individualism has seen the "essential freedom" of the self to be "that it stands for a fateful moment outside of all belongings, and determines for itself alone whether its primary attachments shall be with actual earthly interests or with those of an ideal and potential 'Kingdom of God.' "[24] This ideal and potential kingdom has been defined in different ways, but it has always been characterized by contents which were opposed and transcendent to the prevailing kingdom. Today, the prevailing type of individual is no longer capable of seizing the fateful moment which constitutes his freedom. He has changed his function; from a unit of resistance and autonomy, he has passed to one of ductility and adjustment. It is this function which associates individuals in masses.

The emergence of the modern masses, far from endangering the efficiency and coherence of the apparatus, has facilitated the progressing coordination of society and the growth of authoritarian bureaucracy, thus refuting the social theory of individualism at a decisive point. The technological process seemed to tend to the conquest of scarcity and thus to the slow transformation of competition into cooperation. The philosophy of individualism viewed this process as the gradual differentiation and liberation of human potentialities, as the abolition of the "crowd." Even in the Marxian conception, the masses are not the spearhead of freedom. The Marxian proletariat is not a crowd but a class, defined by its determinate position in the productive process, the maturity of its "consciousness," and the rationality of its common interest. Critical rationality,

[23] W. E. Hocking, *The Lasting Elements of Individualism*, New Haven 1937, p. 5.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

in the most accentuated form, is the prerequisite for its liberating function. In one aspect at least, this conception is in line with the philosophy of individualism: it envisions the rational form of human association as brought about and sustained by the autonomous decision and action of free men.

This is the one point at which the technological and the critical rationality seem to converge, for the technological process implies a democratization of functions. The system of production and distribution has been rationalized to such an extent that the hierarchical distinction between executive and subordinate performances is to an ever smaller degree based upon essential distinctions in aptitude and insight, and to an ever greater degree upon inherited power and a vocational training to which everyone could be subjected. Even experts and "engineers" are no exception. To be sure, the gap between the underlying population and those who design the blueprints for rationalization, who lay out production, who make the inventions and discoveries which accelerate technological progress, becomes daily more conspicuous, particularly in a period of war economy. At the same time, however, this gap is maintained more by the division of power than by the division of work. The hierarchical distinction of the experts and engineers results from the fact that their ability and knowledge is utilized in the interest of autocratic power. The "technological leader" is also a "social leader"; his "social leadership overshadows and conditions his function as a scientist, for it gives him institutional power within the group . . .," and the "captain of industry" acts in "perfect accordance with the traditional dependence of the expert's function."[25] Were it not for this fact, the task of the expert and engineer would not be an obstacle to the general democratization of functions. Technological rationalization has created a common framework of experience for the various professions and occupations. This experience excludes or restrains those elements that transcend the technical control over matters of fact and thus extends the scope of rationalization from the objective to the subjective world. Underneath the complicated web of stratified control is an array of more or less standardized techniques, tending to one general pattern, which insure the material reproduction of society. The "persons engaged in a practical occupation" seem to be convinced that "any situation which appears in the performance of their role can be fitted into some general pattern with which the best, if not all,

[25]Florian Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, pp. 40, 55.

of them are familiar."[26] Moreover, the instrumentalistic conception of technological rationality is spreading over almost the whole realm of thought and gives the various intellectual activities a common denominator. They too become a kind of technique,[27] a matter of training rather than individuality, requiring the expert rather than the complete human personality.

The standardization of production and consumption, the mechanization of labor, the improved facilities of transportation and communication, the extension of training, the general dissemination of knowledge—all these factors seem to facilitate the exchangeability of functions. It is as if the basis were shrinking on which the pervasive distinction between "specialized (technical)" and "common" knowledge[28] has been built, and as if the authoritarian control of functions would prove increasingly foreign to the technological process. The special form, however, in which the technological process is organized, counteracts this trend. The same development that created the modern masses as the standardized attendants and dependents of large scale industry also created the hierarchical organization of private bureaucracies. Max Weber has already stressed the connection between mass-democracy and bureaucracy: "In contrast to the democratic self-administration of small homogeneous units," the bureaucracy is "the universal concomitant of modern mass democracy."[29]

The bureaucracy becomes the concomitant of the modern masses by virtue of the fact that standardization proceeds along the lines of specialization. The latter by itself, provided that it is not arrested at the point where it interferes with the domain of vested control, is quite compatible with the democratization of functions. Fixated specialization, however, tends to atomize the masses and to insulate the subordinate from the executive functions. We have mentioned that specialized vocational training implies fitting a man to a particular job or a particular line of jobs, thus directing his "personality," spontaneity and experience to the special situations he may meet in filling the job. In this manner, the various professions and occupations, notwithstanding their convergence upon one general pattern, tend to become atomic units which require coordination and management from above. The technical democratization of func-

[26] *Op. cit.*, p. 31—Znaniecki's description refers to a historical state of affairs in which "no demand for a scientist can arise," but it appears to refer to a basic tendency of the prevailing state of affairs.

[27] Cf. Max Horkheimer, "The End of Reason," p. 380 above.

[28] Florian Znaniecki, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

[29] *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, Tübingen 1922, p. 666.

tions is counteracted by their atomization, and the bureaucracy appears as the agency which guarantees their rational course and order.

The bureaucracy thus emerges on an apparently objective and impersonal ground, provided by the rational specialization of functions, and this rationality in turn serves to increase the rationality of submission. For, the more the individual functions are divided, fixated and synchronized according to objective and impersonal patterns, the less reasonable is it for the individual to withdraw or withstand. "The material fate of the masses becomes increasingly dependent upon the continuous and correct functioning of the increasingly bureaucratic order of private capitalistic organizations."[30] The objective and impersonal character of technological rationality bestows upon the bureaucratic groups the universal dignity of reason. The rationality embodied in the giant enterprises makes it appear as if men, in obeying them, obey the dictum of an objective rationality. The private bureaucracy fosters a delusive harmony between the special and the common interest. Private power relationships appear not only as relationships between objective things but also as the rule of rationality itself.

In the Fascist countries, this mechanism facilitated the merger between private, semi-private (party) and public (governmental) bureaucracies. The efficient realization of the interests of large scale enterprise was one of the strongest motives for the transformation of economic into totalitarian political control, and efficiency is one of the main reasons for the Fascist regime's hold over its regimented population. At the same time, however, it is also the force which may break this hold. Fascism can maintain its rule only by aggravating the restraint which it is compelled to impose upon society. It will ever more conspicuously manifest its inability to develop the productive forces, and it will fall before that power which proves to be more efficient than Fascism.

In the democratic countries, the growth of the private bureaucracy can be balanced by the strengthening of the public bureaucracy. The rationality inherent in the specialization of functions tends to enlarge the scope and weight of bureaucratization. In the private bureaucracy, however, such an expansion will intensify rather than alleviate the irrational elements of the social process, for it will widen the discrepancy between the technical character of the division of functions and the autocratic character of control over

[30]Max Weber, *op. cit.*, p. 669.

them. In contrast, the public bureaucracy, if democratically constituted and controlled, will overcome this discrepancy to the extent that it undertakes the "conservation of those human and material resources which technology and corporations have tended to misuse and waste."[31] In the age of mass society, the power of the public bureaucracy can be the weapon which protects the people from the encroachment of special interests upon the general welfare. As long as the will of the people can effectively assert itself, the public bureaucracy can be a lever of democratization. Large scale industry tends to organize on a national scale, and Fascism has transformed economic expansion into the military conquest of whole continents. In this situation, the restoration of society to its own right, and the maintenance of individual freedom have become directly political questions, their solution depending upon the outcome of the international struggle.

The social character of bureaucratization is largely determined by the extent to which it allows for a democratization of functions that tends to close the gap between the governing bureaucracy and the governed population. If everyone has become a potential member of the public bureaucracy (as he has become a potential member of the masses), society will have passed from the stage of hierarchical bureaucratization to the stage of technical self-administration. Insofar as technocracy implies a deepening of the gap between specialized and common knowledge, between the controlling and coordinating experts and the controlled and coordinated people, the technocratic abolition of the "price system" would stabilize rather than shatter the forces which stand in the way of progress. The same holds true for the so-called managerial revolution. According to the theory of the managerial revolution,[32] the growth of the apparatus entails the rise of a new social class, the "managers," to take over social domination and to establish a new economic and political order. Nobody will deny the increasing importance of management and the simultaneous shift in the function of control. But these facts do not make the managers a new social class or the spearhead of a revolution. Their "source of income" is the same as that of the already existing classes: they either draw salaries, or, insofar as they possess a share in the capital, are themselves capitalists. Moreover, their specific function in the prevailing division of labor does not warrant the expectation that they are predestined to inaugurate a new and more rational division of labor. This function is either determined by

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[31] Henry A. Wallace, *Technology, Corporations, and the General Welfare*, Chapel Hill 1937, p. 56.

[32] J. Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, New York 1941, pp. 78ff.

the requirement of profitable utilization of capital, and, in this case, the managers are simply capitalists or deputy-capitalists (comprising the "executives" and the corporation-managers[33]); or it is determined by the material process of production (engineers, technicians, production managers, plant superintendents). In the latter case, the managers would belong to the vast army of the "immediate producers" and share its "class interest," were it not for the fact that, even in this function, they work as deputy-capitalists and thus form a segregated and privileged group between capital and labor. Their power, and the awe which it inspires, are derived not from their actual "technological" performance but from their social position, and this they owe to the prevailing organization of production. "The leading managerial and directorial figures within the inner business sancta . . . are drawn from, or have been absorbed into, the upper layers of wealth and income whose stakes it is their function to defend."[34] To sum up, as a separate social group, the managers are thoroughly tied up with the vested interests, and as performers of necessary productive functions they do not constitute a separate "class" at all.

The spreading hierarchy of large scale enterprise and the precipitation of individuals into masses determine the trends of technological rationality today. What results is the mature form of that individualistic rationality which characterized the free economic subject of the industrial revolution. Individualistic rationality was born as a critical and oppositional attitude that derived freedom of action from the unrestricted liberty of thought and conscience and measured all social standards and relations by the individual's rational self-interest. It grew into the rationality of competition in which the rational interest was superseded by the interest of the market, and individual achievement absorbed by efficiency. It ended with standardized submission to the all-embracing apparatus which it had itself created. This apparatus is the embodiment and resting place of individualistic rationality, but the latter now requires that individuality must go. He is rational who most efficiently accepts and executes what is allocated to him, who entrusts his fate to the large scale enterprises and organizations which administer the apparatus.

Such was the logical outcome of a social process which measured individual performance in terms of competitive efficiency. The

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 83f.

[34] Robert A. Brady, "Policies of National Manufacturing Spitzenverbände," in *Political Science Quarterly*, LVI, p. 537.

philosophers of individualism have always had an inkling of this outcome and they expressed their anxiety in many different forms, in the skeptical conformism of Hume, in the idealistic introversion of individual freedom, in the frequent attacks of the Transcendentalists against the rule of money and power. But the social forces were stronger than the philosophic protests, and the philosophic justification of individualism took on more and more of the overtones of resignation. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the idea of the individual became increasingly ambiguous: it combined insistence upon free social performance and competitive efficiency with glorification of smallness, privacy and self-limitation. The rights and liberties of the individual in society were interpreted as the rights and liberties of privacy and withdrawal from society. William James, faithful to the individualistic principle, asserted that, in the "rivalry between real organizable goods," the "world's trial is better than the closest solution," provided that the victorious keep "the vanquished somehow represented."[35] His doubt, however, as to whether this trial is really a fair one seems to motivate his hatred of "bigness and greatness in all their forms,"[36] his declaration that "the smaller and more intimate is the truer,—the man more than the home, the home more than the state or the church."[37] The counterposition of individual and society, originally meant to provide the ground for a militant reformation of society in the interest of the individual, comes to prepare and justify the individual's withdrawal from society. The free and self-reliant "soul," which originally nourished the individual's critique of external authority, now becomes a refuge from external authority. Tocqueville had already defined individualism in terms of acquiescence and peaceful resignation: "a mature and calm feeling, which disposes each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellow-creatures; and to draw apart with his family and his friends; so that, after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves society at large to itself."[38] Autonomy of the individual came to be regarded as a private rather than a public affair, an element of retreat rather than aggression. All these factors of resignation are comprehended in Benjamin Constant's statement that "our liberty should be composed of the peaceful enjoyment of private independence."[39]

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[35] *The Thought and Character of William James*, ed. R. B. Perry, Boston 1935, II, p. 265.
[36] *Ibid.*, p. 315.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 383.
[38] *Democracy in America*, transl. H. Reeve, New York 1904, II, p. 584.
[39] Quoted in E. Mims, *The Majority of the People*, New York 1941, p. 152.

The elements of restraint and resignation which became increasingly strong in the individualist philosophy of the nineteenth century elucidate the connection between individualism and scarcity. Individualism is the form liberty assumes in a society wherein the acquisition and utilization of wealth is dependent on competitive toil. Individuality is a distinct possession of "pioneers"; it presupposes the open and empty spaces, the freedom of "hewing out a home" as well as the need to do so. The individual's world is a "world of labor and the march," as Walt Whitman says, one in which the available intellectual and material resources must be conquered and appropriated through incessant struggle with man and nature, and in which human forces are released to distribute and administer scarcity.

In the period of large scale industry, however, the existential conditions making for individuality give way to conditions which render individuality unnecessary. In clearing the ground for the conquest of scarcity, the technological process not only levels individuality but also tends to transcend it where it is concurrent with scarcity. Mechanized mass production is filling the empty spaces in which individuality could assert itself. The cultural standardization points, paradoxically enough, to potential abundance as well as actual poverty. This standardization may indicate the extent to which individual creativeness and originality have been rendered unnecessary. With the decline of the liberalistic era, these qualities were vanishing from the domain of material production and becoming the ever more exclusive property of the highest intellectual activities. Now, they seem to disappear from this sphere too: mass culture is dissolving the traditional forms of art, literature and philosophy together with the "personality" which unfolded itself in producing and consuming them. The striking impoverishment which characterizes the dissolution of these forms may involve a new source of enrichment. They derived their truth from the fact that they represented the potentialities of man and nature which were excluded or distorted in the reality. So far were those potentialities from their actualization in the social consciousness that much cried out for unique expression. But today, *humanitas*, wisdom, beauty, freedom and happiness can no longer be represented as the realm of the "harmonious personality" nor as the remote heaven of art nor as metaphysical systems. The "ideal" has become so concrete and so universal that it grips the life of every human being, and the whole of mankind is drawn into the struggle for its realization. Under the terror that now threatens the world the ideal constricts itself to one single and at the same

time common issue. Faced with Fascist barbarism, everyone knows what freedom means, and everyone is aware of the irrationality in the prevailing rationality.

Modern mass society quantifies the qualitative features of individual labor and standardizes the individualistic elements in the activities of intellectual culture. This process may bring to the fore the tendencies which make individuality a historical form of human existence, to be surpassed by further social development. This does not mean that society is bound to enter a stage of "collectivism." The collectivistic traits which characterize the development today may still belong to the phase of individualism. Masses and mass culture are manifestations of scarcity and frustration, and the authoritarian assertion of the common interest is but another form of the rule of particular interests over the whole. The fallacy of collectivism consists in that it equips the whole (society) with the traditional properties of the individual. Collectivism abolishes the free pursuit of competing individual interests but retains the idea of the common interest as a separate entity. Historically, however, the latter is but the counterpart of the former. Men experience their society as the objective embodiment of the collectivity as long as the individual interests are antagonistic to and competing with each other for a share in the social wealth. To such individuals, society appears as an objective entity, consisting of numerous things, institutions and agencies: plants and shops, business, police and law, government, schools and churches, prisons and hospitals, theaters and organizations, etc. Society is almost everything the individual is not, everything that determines his habits, thoughts and behavior patterns, that affects him from "outside." Accordingly, society is noticed chiefly as a power of restraint and control, providing the framework which integrates the goals, faculties and aspirations of men. It is this power which collectivism retains in its picture of society, thus perpetuating the rule of things and men over men.

The technological process itself furnishes no justification for such a collectivism. Technics hampers individual development only insofar as they are tied to a social apparatus which perpetuates scarcity, and this same apparatus has released forces which may shatter the special historical form in which technics is utilized. For this reason, all programs of an anti-technological character, all propaganda for an anti-industrial revolution[40] serve only those who regard human

[40]See for example Oswald Spengler, *Man and Technics*, New York 1932, p. 96f., and Roy Helton, "The Anti-Industrial Revolution," in *Harpers*, December 1941, pp. 65ff.

needs as a by-product of the utilization of technics. The enemies of technics readily join forces with a terroristic technocracy.[41] The philosophy of the simple life, the struggle against big cities and their culture frequently serves to teach men distrust of the potential instruments that could liberate them. We have pointed to the possible democratization of functions which technics may promote and which may facilitate complete human development in all branches of work and administration. Moreover, mechanization and standardization may one day help to shift the center of gravity from the necessities of material production to the arena of free human realization. The less individuality is required to assert itself in standardized social performances, the more it could retreat to a free "natural" ground. These tendencies, far from engendering collectivism, may lead to new forms of individualization. The machine individualizes men by following the physiological lines of individuality: it allocates the work to finger, hand, arm, foot, classifying and occupying men according to the dexterity of these organs.[42] The external mechanisms which govern standardization here meet a "natural" individuality; they lay bare the ground on which a hitherto suppressed individualization might develop. On this ground, man is an individual by virtue of the uniqueness of his body and its unique position in the space-time continuum. He is an individual insofar as this natural uniqueness molds his thoughts, instincts, emotions, passions and desires. This is the "natural" *principium individuationis.* Under the system of scarcity, men developed their senses and organs chiefly as implements of labor and competitive orientation: skill, taste, proficiency, tact, refinement and endurance were qualities molded and perpetuated by the hard struggle for life, business and power. Consequently, man's thoughts, appetites and the ways of their fulfillment were not "his," they showed the oppressive and inhibitive features which this struggle imposed upon him. His senses, organs and appetites became acquisitive, exclusive and antagonistic. The technological process has reduced the variety of individual qualities down to this natural basis of individualization, but this same basis may become the foundation for a new form of human development.

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[41]In National Socialist Germany, the ideology of blood and soil and the glorification of the peasant is an integral part of the imperialistic mobilization of industry and labor.

[42]For examples of the degree to which this physiological individualization has been utilized see *Changes in Machinery and Job Requirements in Minnesota Manufacturing 1931-36,* Works Projects Administration, National Research Project, Report No. 1-6. Philadelphia, p. 19.

The philosophy of individualism established an intrinsic connection between individuality and property.[43] According to this philosophy, man could not develop a self without conquering and cultivating a domain of his own, to be shaped exclusively by his free will and reason. The domain thus conquered and cultivated had become part and parcel of his own "nature." Man removed the objects in this domain from the state in which he found them, and made them the tangible manifestation of his individual labor and interest. They were his property because they were fused with the very essence of his personality. This construction did not correspond to the facts and lost its meaning in the era of mechanized commodity production, but it contained the truth that individual development, far from being an inner value only, required an external sphere of manifestation and an autonomous concern for men and things. The process of production has long dissolved the link between individual labor and property and now tends to dissolve the link between the traditional form of property and social control, but the tightening of this control counteracts a tendency which may give the individualistic theory a new content. Technological progress would make it possible to decrease the time and energy spent in the production of the necessities of life, and a gradual reduction of scarcity and abolition of competitive pursuits could permit the self to develop from its natural roots. The less time and energy man has to expend in maintaining his life and that of society, the greater the possibility that he can "individualize" the sphere of his human realization. Beyond the realm of necessity, the essential differences between men could unfold themselves: everyone could think and act by himself, speak his own language, have his own emotions and follow his own passions. No longer chained to competitive efficiency, the self could grow in the realm of satisfaction. Man could come into his own in his passions. The objects of his desires would be the less exchangeable the more they were seized and shaped by his free self. They would "belong" to him more than ever before, and such ownership would not be injurious, for it would not have to defend its own against a hostile society.

Such a Utopia would not be a state of perennial happiness. The "natural" individuality of man is also the source of his natural sorrow. If the human relations are nothing but human, if they are freed from all foreign standards, they will be permeated with the sadness of their singular content. They are transitory and irre-

[43]See Max Horkheimer, "The End of Reason," p. 377 above.

placeable, and their transitory character will be accentuated when concern for the human being is no longer mingled with fear for his material existence and overshadowed by the threat of poverty, hunger, and social ostracism.

The conflicts, however, which may arise from the natural individuality of men may not bear the violent and aggressive features which were so frequently attributed to the "state of nature." These features may be the marks of coercion and privation. "Appetite is never excessive, never furious, save when it has been starved. The frantic hunger we see it so often exhibiting under every variety of criminal form, marks only the hideous starvation to which society subjects it. It is not a normal but a morbid state of the appetite, growing exclusively out of the unnatural compression which is imposed upon it by the exigencies of our immature society. Every appetite and passion of man's nature is good and beautiful, and destined to be fully enjoyed. . . . Remove, then, the existing bondage of humanity, remove those factitious restraints which keep appetite and passion on the perpetual lookout for escape, like steam from an overcharged boiler, and their force would instantly become conservative instead of destructive."[44]

[44] Henry James, "Democracy and Its Issues," in *Lectures and Miscellanies*, New York 1852, p. 47f.

Is National Socialism a New Order?[1]

By Frederick Pollock

When I speak of a new order I do not refer to the new system of frontiers, coalitions, puppet states and such that the Axis is establishing all over Europe or that might be worked out at the forthcoming peace conference. My aim is to clarify the new order as a new social and economic system in contrast to monopoly capitalism. To cite the most obvious example, nineteenth century capitalism must certainly be called a new social and economic system when compared with the feudal order that preceded it. But must we, for instance, also declare monopoly capitalism to be a new order as contrasted with competitive capitalism?

Obviously, we can proceed only after we have chosen a yardstick permitting us to distinguish a new order from an old one. The basic concepts and institutions of our economic and social system must serve as such a yardstick. Only if we agree upon the essential characteristic of our own social system, will the answer to our problem make sense. For those who refuse agreement, the answer will be meaningless.

I should like to put the essential characteristics of modern society under the following headings:

(1) the ruling class,
(2) the integration of society,
(3) the operation of economic life,
(4) the relation between government and governed,
(5) the role of the individual.

[1] The following is the last in a series of five public lectures delivered at Columbia University by the Institute of Social Research during November and December 1941. The other four lectures were:
Herbert Marcuse, State and Individual under National Socialism;
A. R. L. Gurland, Private Property under National Socialism;
Franz Neumann, The New Rulers in Germany;
Otto Kirchheimer, The Legal Order under National Socialism (published in this issue.)
The author's task was a two-fold one: to summarize the four preceding lectures and to answer the question whether National Socialism is a new social order. The combination of these two tasks led to the stressing of those points which were discussed before and in which the author partly disagrees with his colleagues.
Since it was impossible to publish the whole series, the text of the concluding lecture is given here in its original form, incorporating the main points of the previous lectures as well as the controversial issues. This lecture represents the application of a general theory of State Capitalism (as outlined on pp. 200ff. of IX, No. 2 of this periodical) to Nazi Germany.

Before we enter into the discussion of these headings we have to make two methodological remarks. (1) No social system is static. A continuous change daily alters the structure of society. Such changes may not be at once apparent. They may be hidden particularly because the institutions remain unchanged while their functions change. The legal institution of property, for instance, has remained unchanged for centuries—and yet the social function of property today radically differs from previous periods. (2) When do changes that gradually creep into an existing order become so vital that we must speak of a structural change entailing a new order? When does quantitative change turn into qualitative change? A convincing answer can only be given after this change has been in progress for a considerable time.[2]

(1) *The Ruling Class.*

Under National Socialism four groups are in control which are distinctly marked off from each other, have conflicting interests, but are nevertheless bound together by common aims and the fear of common dangers. These four groups are big business, the army, the party, and the bureaucracy. They share among them the coercive power which was previously the monopoly of the state that stood above them all. Whereas until recently in the capitalistic era social power mainly derived from one's property, under National Socialism one's status is determined by his social function. Wealth, acquired or inherited, may and does facilitate access to positions of power, but instead of market laws and property rights, the status of the individual within the group decides the use he can make of his property. This development will be better understood when seen in connection with the universal trend toward a divorce between ownership and control.[3] Side by side with the owner-manager who owns the majority of capital, stands the pure manager, who, having only

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[2]For the latest comprehensive material about the National Socialist economy and society see: Franz Neumann, *Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, New York 1942; Lewis L. Lorwin, *Economic Consequences of the Second World War*, New York 1941 (parts one and three); Maxine Y. Sweezy, *The Structure of the Nazi Economy*, Cambridge, Mass., 1941. The important problem of the connection between the recent technical revolution and the new order has been discussed in A. R. L. Gurland's article on Technological Trends and Economic Structure under National Socialism (IX, No. 2, pp. 226ff. of this periodical).

[3]The American standard work on this trend is still A. A. Berle and G. C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, New York 1933. James Burnham, in his *Managerial Revolution* (New York 1941), has tried to discover where this trend is leading to. In a recent article, "Coming Rulers of the U. S." (*Fortune*, November 1941) he has presented his thesis in terms of developments in the United States. It should, however, be noted that Burnham speaks of a *fait accompli* where, so far, a trend only is visible. For the scope of ownership control still existing in the United States, see *The Distribution of Ownership in the 200 Largest Nonfinancial Corporations*, Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph No. 29, Washington, D. C., 1940.

a minority interest, yet as fully controls the enterprise as the owner-manager. As against these two, who exercise economic power, stands the man who owns capital without exercising power. If his capital is small, he will become a victim of the process of concentration which has been speeded up by the supra-enterpreneurial organization. It may eliminate him by refusing him the right to produce, to buy raw materials, or to hire labor. If, on the other hand, his capital is large and the enterprise sound, the inefficient capitalist will be reduced to a mere rentier.

The situation of private property in Nazi Germany has been summarized as follows:[4] "The legal institution of private property has been preserved under National Socialism. The claim of invested capital for a just return has never been questioned. But the owner's right to control the use of his property is subject to manifold restrictions, the handling of which lies with the supra-enterpreneurial organizations. They are being run by representatives of the most powerful industrial and financial combines. The checks imposed upon the rights of the individual property owners result in an increased power of a few groups every one of which rules over real industrial empires."

I quite agree that the legal institution of private property has been retained and that many of the characteristics shown to be inherent in National Socialism are already apparent, perhaps only in an embryonic stage, in non-totalitarian countries. But does it mean that the function of private property is unchanged? Is the "increased power of a few groups" really the main result of the change that has taken place? I think that it goes far deeper and should be described as the destruction of all but one of the essential characteristics of private property. Even the mightiest combines have been deprived of the right to establish a new business where the highest profits can be expected; or to discontinue production where it becomes unprofitable. These rights have been transferred to the ruling groups as a whole. It is the compromise between the controlling groups which decides on the scope and direction of the productive process; against such decision the property title is powerless even if it is derived from ownership of an overwhelming majority of a stock, not to speak of a minority stock owner.

This view of mine might be challenged by reference to the growth of "internal financing." But "internal financing" is deliberately furthered by the ruling groups to facilitate expansion. Like any

[4]By A. R. L. Gurland, in his lecture mentioned above.

other investment it depends upon the consent of the authorities and not upon the mere fact that internal funds are available. If the expansion of an enterprise does not fit into the general program of the government, the utilization of the accumulated reserves for plant expansion will be prohibited and the accumulated funds must then be used otherwise, perhaps compulsorily invested in government bonds.

It is hardly necessary to mention that all those who do not belong to the controlling group—the urban and rural middle classes, workers and salaried employees—have no institutionalized means to enforce their wishes upon the rulers. Their organizations have been destroyed or transformed into agencies to dominate them. Only the fear that they could rebel when the pressure from above becomes too strong, makes the pressure from below somewhat effective and enforces concessions.

In this short summary I can neither discuss the transfer of power from finance capital to industry nor the different trends in the power-position of producers and consumers goods industries. In a complete survey of the changes which have occurred within the ruling class these and other processes would have to be thoroughly analyzed.[5] It is their totality, combined with the change in the functions of property, that, in my opinion, justifies speaking of a qualitative change in the ruling class under National Socialism. Although the power of the industrial monopolists may still be enormous, it is today contingent upon the goodwill and cooperation of the "practitioners of violence" (as Harold Lasswell has aptly termed them).[6]

(2) *The Integration of Society.*

Under National Socialism the individuals as well as the social groups meet in a way which, in its social meaning and legal status, is totally different from that of the traditional society. In the latter the individuals and strata communicate with each other through the medium of exchange as legally equal partners. Free workers and free entrepreneurs meet each other on the market. Income figures determine the social value and power of the individual.

National Socialism has abolished the last vestiges of such free economic subjects; property and income are no longer the foremost determinants of the individual's social position. Capitalists and

[5]Cf. Franz Neumann, *op. cit.*, and Otto Kirchheimer, "Changes in the Structure of Political Compromise" in IX, No. 2, pp. 264ff. of this periodical.

[6]Harold D. Lasswell, "The Garrison State" in *The American Journal of Sociology*, No. 4 (1941) pp. 455ff.

labor alike are organized in one all-embracing organization, the Labor Front, and fused ideologically in the people's community. Their relationship is defined as that of leaders and followers, and it is based upon command and obedience. Though wages are paid, they have lost one of their main functions, namely, to distribute the labor power within the economic process. Social power, prestige, and honor now depend decisively upon one's place in the government and party hierarchies. The relation between property, income and social power has thus been radically altered. Money alone gives only limited power or (as in the case of the Jews) no power at all. Political power, in turn, which is equivalent to the control of the means of production, may become the source of practically unlimited income.

It has been suggested that the National Socialist relation of "leader and followers" is equivalent to the feudal relation between lord and vassal. I do not believe this to be true. We must not be deceived by terminological similarities and especially not by skilful National Socialist propaganda which would like us to believe in a paternalistic relation between employer and worker. Feudal society is characterized by the directness of human relations which are based on a contract of trust and faith, incompatible with authoritarian discipline. The leader of a German enterprise is merely a cog in the wheel of a huge bureaucratic machine which has destroyed the last remnants of personal relations still existing in capitalist society.

(3) *The Operation of Economic Life.*

National Socialism has not created a planned economy so that the whole economic life might be directed and performed according to a well conceived and detailed plan. Its so-called Four Years Plan has never been published, because it does not exist and must be considered a mere ruse to enforce concentration of control and speed-up of armament production. As late as 1941 the *Frankfurter Zeitung*[7] declared that "the problem of a totally planned economy has never been seriously discussed." Planning in Nazi Germany is a mere patchwork of stop gap measures designed to cope with the tasks created by armament and warfare. It has been stressed that the "legislative measures carried through during the first years of National Socialist administration were based on the assumption that the inherited economic system would last forever."[8] In view of the fact that there is no general plan, and no intention of establishing a

[7]In its issue of June 1, 1941.
[8]A. R. L. Gurland, in his lecture mentioned above.

planned economy, in view of the emergency character of preparedness and war economy, many observers believe that no new economic order has arisen. In this view, a highly monopolized war economy has resulted in some strengthening of the monopolistic positions but has left the economic structure untouched. I believe this view to take surface phenomena at face value. Even if the German leadership should be committed to the maintenance of private capitalistic economy, the objective force of its manifold interferences in the economy is more powerful than its pious wishes. Even against its desires and preferences the objective facts are on the way to destroying the old order. One interference of necessity produces another. The leaders are driven to take increasingly drastic steps by the unpleasant alternative of proceeding and having a chance of survival or of stopping and meeting complete collapse. To summarize: all basic concepts and institutions of capitalism have changed their function; interference of the state with the structure of the old economic order has by its sheer totality and intensity "turned quantity into quality," transformed monopoly capitalism into state capitalism.

Let me examine a few details: the market, prices, and profits. It seems certain that no master plan exists for the Nazi economy and it is unlikely that detailed figures have been worked out for the various branches of industry. But there is definitely a detailed plan for agriculture which has led to wholesale regimentation of agricultural production and marketing. For industrial production, however, a clearly defined general program exists embodying the basic aim of National Socialist economy: full employment, utmost nondependence on imports, withdrawal from consumption of whatever can be spared of the national income, and producing the physical maximum of producers goods in general and armament in particular.

To carry out this program, a variety of methods are at the disposal of the regime; they have been described.[10] The supra-entrepreneurial organizations, federated in the National Economic Chamber, cooperating with the numerous Four Years Plan bureaucracy, obviously bears the brunt of this task. Such central steering of the whole economy leads to the actual disappearance of the market as the steering wheel of production. It is not only that many prices have been frozen. Even where fluctuations of prices are still permitted, prices can no longer serve as signals for increasing or curtailing production. Allocation of raw material, of machinery,

[10]See this periodical, IX (1941) No. 2, pp. 204ff.

of fuel and of labor were gradually replacing the system of bidding for the factors of production. I don't believe central steering to be merely the result of scarcity that develops in every war economy and disappears with the emergency. On the contrary; the avowed goal of Nazi economic policy is permanent full employment without recurring phases of boom and depression; or, to put it in the words of a Nazi writer, "an epoch without trade cycles which is the fulfillment of National Socialist aims and which spares the employer hard times of losses and the risk of collapse."[11] This goal can only be achieved if the market mechanism is definitely scrapped as the controlling machinery and if centralized control, more centralized than before, is put in its place.[12]

What will be the fate of the so-called economic incentives? Are there no longer profits and is the profit system abolished? I should like to give a paradoxical answer: there are and will be profits in Nazi Germany, even enormous profits for big business, but the profit system, as we have known it, is nevertheless dead. Profits have lost their main economic function, namely, to direct the flow of capital. To put it paradoxically again, under National Socialism production is for use and not for profit. It should be understood that production for use is not intended to mean "for the needs of free men in a harmonious society" but simply the contrary of production for the market. In the capitalist economy production and investment have always swiftly moved into the sphere of the highest profits. Under National Socialism, even the most powerful profit interests become subordinated to the general program. If they act in accordance with this program (and under prevailing circumstances they often do), profits may be made. But the most outrageous profit expectations will lead nowhere if they run contrary to this program. In every case where the interest of single groups or individuals conflicts with the general plan or whatever serves as its substitute, the individual interest must give way. It is the interest of the ruling group as a whole that is decisive, and not the individual interests of those who belong to it. Even very strong particular interests cannot prevent the execution of urgent tasks necessary for the common weal.[13]

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[11]*Frankfurter Zeitung, loc. cit.*

[12]The main arguments for the feasibility of substituting for the market mechanism a control machinery making use of a pseudo-market are given on pp. 204ff. of IX, No. 2, of this periodical.

[13]For the situation in the United States prior to its entry into the war, see the findings of the Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program (Truman Committee). The following blunt statement illustrates our point: "The committee, in the investigations which it has already conducted, has found numerous instances of gross

(footnote continued on next page)

Two functions are left to profits in National Socialism: as income for the property owners and as a premium for enterpreneurial efficiency. In the first aspect they are strictly controlled and limited, in the second they are the reward for efforts and accomplishments which are above average. Since business cycles are eliminated it is quite "natural" that "the ever recurring profit for the average enterpreneurial performance, a profit which is not mortgaged by losses and risks, will be smaller than in former times of booms and depressions."[14]

I believe these remarks to be sufficient to clarify my thesis that National Socialism is building a new economic order where the market is replaced by the command.

(4) *The Relation between Government and Governed.*[15]

The ruling groups exercise their domination over the masses through bureaucracies which in their upper layers are themselves partners to the "compromise"[16] and which in the lower ranks of police, judiciary and party bureaucracy are the executive organs entrusted with the domestication of the masses.

In this new partnership the spheres of influence are not fixed once and for all. They fluctuate constantly according to the failure or success, relative strength or weakness of a given policy with which one given group may be more intimately associated than another. But these fluctuations do not change two essential facts. First, the position of the individual has largely become dependent upon his status within his group. This status, in turn, is sanctioned and confirmed by administrative orders which have come to supersede the rules of civil law. A new state of affairs has arisen which has aptly been called "a synthesis between government and private enterprise." Second, the consequence of this new synthesis is the disappearance of the rule of law as equally binding on ruler and ruled. The two-sided rationality subjecting rulers and ruled to the same formulas has been replaced by a one-sided technical rationality. The uppermost concern of the government is the precision and speed with which its rapidly changing orders are executed.

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inefficiency and still more instances where the private interests of those concerned have hindered and delayed the defense program. A considerable quantity of supplies and material which we should have today have not been produced and the war effort has been seriously handicapped as a result." (77th Congress, 2nd Session, Senate, Report No. 480, Part 5, Washington, D. C., 1942, p. 2.)

[14] *Frankfurter Zeitung, loc. cit.*

[15] For the following see Otto Kirchheimer's articles on pp. 456ff. of this issue, and pp. 264ff. of IX, No. 2, of this periodical.

[16] See Otto Kirchheimer, *loc. cit.*, p. 264.

Under such a system the executive organs tend to be more and more machinelike, and this machine quality gives the state apparatus its high degree of precision and technical calculability.

Law in Nazi Germany presents a striking example of functional changes. Many of the old legal institutions are still working and still applying time-honored formulas. The staff of the Ministry of Justice is unchanged. The whole difference between democratic and totalitarian laws seems to boil down to a wholesale use of terror by National Socialism. Yet, factually, nothing has been left of the old order of things besides the façade.

(5) *The Role of the Individual.*[17]

The National Socialist regime has, more than any other form of government, unleashed the most brutal instincts of the individual. It regards man only as the ultimate source of that energy on which the gigantic apparatus of domination and expansion feeds. The human individual is cared for and even cherished only insofar as he is the source of labor power, furnishing the instruments of war and expansion. All the official efforts to beautify work and leisure, all the Strength Through Joy activities, serve, in the last analysis, to increase the output of the individual, to strengthen his performance, to enhance his efficiency. The mobilization of the individual is without limits: National Socialism tears down the protective walls which the liberalistic era had erected between private and social life. This mobilization cannot be carried through, however, without compensating the individual for the total loss of his independence. Since every compensation that amounts to a real increase of individual liberty and happiness must, of necessity, endanger the system of domination, a form of satisfaction had to be found which was to intensify rather than weaken the system. Such a form of satisfaction was made possible by the abolition of certain social taboos which, while restricting the drives and desires of the individual, at the same time had guarded his privacy against the interference of state and society. National Socialism has done away with discrimination against illegitimate mothers and children, it has encouraged extramarital relations between the sexes, and it has transformed this entire sphere of protected privacy into a realm of public service. It must be noted, however, that the increase in liberty and pleasure involved in this abolition of taboos is effectively counteracted by several factors:

[17]For the problems connected with the role of the individual in modern society, cf. Max Horkheimer's article in this issue.

(1) The very fact that the individual's private satisfaction has become a public affair and an officially rewarded and controlled performance removes the danger implied in such liberation.

(2) The sexual relations have been made instruments for executing the imperialist population policy of the Third Reich. They are thus means to a definite end, which is posited and supervised by the National Socialist regime.

(3) And perhaps most important, the liberation of this sphere is skilfully coordinated with the release of instincts and impulses operating against the enemies and scapegoats of the regime, such as cruelty against the weak and helpless (Jews, feeble-minded and "unfit" persons), hatred of racial aliens, or instincts and impulses operating directly in the interest of the present rulers: masochistic submission to all kinds of commands, to suffering, sacrifice or death. The released individual is thus caught in a physiological and psychological structure which serves to guarantee and perpetuate his oppression.

It would be worthwhile to discuss the fundamental changes in the role of the individual from the point of view of the changed status of the family. The family in Nazi Germany is in full disintegration, deprived of all its former functions. It can no longer protect the individual economically. Words carelessly used in front of one's own children may lead to disaster. Education has passed completely into the hands of the party, and even the family's monopoly on legitimate procreation has been broken.[18] The destruction of the cornerstone of modern society, the family, may prove more convincingly than any other single argument that a New Social Order is being built in Nazi Germany.

I have come to the end of my cursory analysis of the changes in the functions of basic institutions and concepts. I should have added many others, e.g., the nature of the new imperialism. Its decisive difference lies in the fact that oldfashioned imperialism could be saturated, while the new imperialism must incessantly expand until it has attained world domination.

The deeper one goes into the comparison of the old and the new in Nazi Germany, the more one comes to the conclusion that a New Order is in the making, a New Political, Legal, Economic and Social Order. What is this new order and can it last?

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[18]All these and related problems are reported in: Gregor Ziemer, *Education for Death*, New York 1941.

The New Order—what is it?

Is it useful to label the new order "State Capitalism"?[19] Serious objections may be raised against this term. There are already grave doubts as to whether it makes sense to call the National Socialist system a state. The word state capitalism, besides, is possibly misleading because it may be understood to denote a society wherein the state is the sole owner of all capital. This is definitely not the case for National Socialism. Nevertheless, the term "State Capitalism" describes better than any other term four properties of the new system: (1) That the new order is the successor of private capitalism, (2) that the state assumes important functions of the private capitalist, (3) that capitalistic institutions like the sale of labor, or profits, still play a significant role, and (4) that it is not Socialism.

Many other labels have been offered in recent discussions, such as controlled economy, state organized monopoly capitalism, totalitarian state economy, neo-mercantilism, bureaucratic collectivism. I believe the term "Command Economy" best expresses the meaning of the new system. This word was first used by a Nazi writer[20] in an article in which he asserts that "competition, monopoly and command, these basic elements of every economic theory, equal each other today in scope as well as in power. But gradually the weight turns in favor of command."[21] What strikes me in the concept "Command Economy" is that it essentially counterposes itself to the concept "Exchange Economy." It suggests an economy which is based upon command in a similar sense as the liberal economy is based upon exchange. It leads logically to describing the new society as a "Command Society" in contrast with the "Exchange Society" of bygone days.

In using these labels, I do not wish to imply that National Socialist Germany is a fully developed state capitalism or a total command economy. I want to stress that the new German system comes closer to these economic concepts than to those of *laissez faire* or of monopoly capitalism.

The differences between the new order and private capitalism need no further discussion. But wherein lies the difference between

[19] See the discussion of this concept on pp. 200ff. in: IX, No. 2, of this periodical.
[20] Willi Neuling, "Wettbewerb, Monopol und Befehl in der heutigen Wirtschaft." Eine Vorstudie zur Neubegründung der deutschen Wirtschaftstheorie, in *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft,* 1939, pp. 279ff.
[21] *Loc. cit.,* p. 317.

National Socialism and an economy in which "the concentration of economic power in, and financial control over, production and distribution of goods and services"[22] has become typical of most spheres of the economic life? Certainly, under monopoly capitalism many of the conditions of production and distribution are controlled in a way similar to that of National Socialism. In pre-Nazi Germany the quantity and quality of many commodities were fixed by supra-enterpreneurial organizations or straightforward monopolies independent of the laws of the market. Wage and salary scales did not necessarily change with the variations of supply and demand. But the manipulation of the market lay in the hands of antagonistic groups; it was not determined by any other goal than that of bettering their bargaining positions. The interference with the market system made the market more and more unworkable but no provisions were foreseen to eliminate the ever more serious disturbances.

Under National Socialism, we again observe a typical change from quantity into quality. The monopolistic organizations no longer operate as disturbing intruders but take over the market functions as government agents. What formerly were more or less voluntary supra-enterpreneurial organizations have become compulsory and comprehensive. Instead of each specific industrial group fighting for maximum profits at the expense of more and more frequent interruptions of production, they collectively assume the responsibility of coordinating the whole economic process and thereby of maintaining the existing social structure.

This development has been accentuated in the hothouse of the war economy but is far from completed. Bitter struggles between competing groups have made their appearance in the past and will probably come into the foreground again, provided that the whole system will survive the war. Meanwhile the smaller fry is being annihilated at top speed under the impact of priorities, allocations, labor and exchange control.[23]

In following this line of reasoning, the monopolistic phase of German economic development appears as a transitory one. During

[22]This is the Temporary National Economic Committee's official description of its object of investigation.

[23]A similar process is going on in the United States. The *New York Times* (February 6, 1942) quotes a report of the Senate's Special Small Business Committee (Murray Committee): "Small business enterprise . . . is facing bankruptcy and chaos along a wide front. Unless effective measures are taken . . . the postwar period will see it wholly out of the picture. Then, big business, with its branch and chain establishments, backed by great financial and political power, will move in to occupy the entire field. . . . The position of small business has long been precarious. The effect of the defense program has been to grease the skids for it."

a few decades the organs of the new order had been developed, so to speak, in the womb of the *laissez faire* economy. When it became evident that the old system was no longer workable, the new one sprang into being with that incredible ease which can be understood only when we recognize the preceding decades as preparatory to it.

The New Order—can it last?

During the last years, we have been driven to ponder again and again the question: can this totalitarian system last, and what are its possibilities and limitations? I do not claim to possess an answer to the manifold problems involved here. What I shall try to discuss, and only briefly, are the economic aspects of the question.

So far, the National Socialist economy has shown an enormous strength under all sorts of pressure and has probably overcome all the handicaps which ought to have led to its doom—in the opinion of many economic experts. These prophets of downfall have overlooked that National Socialism applies a new set of rules to its economic policy, rules which made its economic policy more efficient than anything known heretofore. They have also misjudged the limits of those economic laws which the recognized science of economics has in vain tried to bring under control for the last 150 years.

By a new set of rules I understand those principles which are applied with the purpose of replacing the principles of *laissez faire*. Most of the new rules have been mentioned before, especially the iron necessity of full employment. The totalitarian state is in a position to guarantee one single right to all its "racial comrades," a right which no democratic state so far has been able to grant to its citizens: economic security. This security, it is true, is bought at the expense of a total brutalization of society. Still, the integrative function of full employment in this era of ever more threatening general economic insecurity can hardly be overestimated.[24] It prob-

[24]It is a rapidly spreading opinion that the creation of uninterrupted full employment has become a main economic task in all industrialized countries. The following quotations are representative of numerous others: "The problem of full employment is crucial; it must be solved even at the cost of radically modifying our system. If it is not solved, it will itself modify the system—radically." (Elliot V. Bell in the *New York Times Book Review*, July 27, 1941.)—"The dangerous temptation to barter political freedom for economic security will exist until it is proved by experience that a free government can not only provide a higher but a safer standard of living for the masses than despotism. Yet safety of livelihood can only exist if a sufficient number of jobs is available, and it would be a fatal error to believe that this can be achieved at the end of the war by 'letting nature take its course.'" (Carl Landauer in a letter to the *New York Times*, February 15, 1942.)—" . . . The Free Enterprise System will have to provide full protection, full employment, full distribution of goods and services, or

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ably counts for more in the minds of most people than their standard of living (provided that this standard is not desperately low and has a tendency to improve), it probably counts for more to the small business man than the loss of independence, or to the worker than the loss of his own organization. In following up the purely economic aspects, we find those devices that were designed to replace the functions of the market. There is, firstly, the goal set for all economic activities, a goal which is not based upon the anonymous and unreliable poll of the market, verified *post festum,* but based upon a conscious decision on the ends and means of production before it starts. There is, secondly, the administration of prices which are no longer allowed to behave as masters of the economic process but have been reduced to a closely controlled tool. There is, thirdly, the one which I have already discussed, namely, the subordination of the profit interest to the general economic program. There is, fourthly, the replacement of guess work by the principles of scientific management in all spheres of public activity (and under National Socialism that means in all spheres of social life). Guess work and improvisation must give way to an all-comprehensive technical rationality. This principle of "rationalization" is being applied to spheres which were previously the sanctuary of guess work, of routine and of muddling through, e.g., military preparedness, the conduct of war, manipulation of public opinion, the granting of rewards, the use of the legal machinery, and the "strategy of terror." In the economic realm the same principle has produced many of the successes in rearmament, and counteracted some of the destructive effects of red tape necessarily connected with a scarcity economy.

The recognition of an economic sphere into which the state shall not and cannot intrude, so essential for the era of private capitalism, is being radically repudiated. In consequence, execution of the program is enforced by state power and nothing essential is left to the functioning of laws of the market or other economic "laws." The primacy of politics over economics, so much disputed under democracy, is clearly established.

But have we not been taught that politics cannot successfully interfere with the economic laws and that all attempts to cope with them by political pressure have ended in dismal failure? My answer to this is that as long as economic laws are attacked from the outside

step aside for government agencies . . . There is no 'return to normalcy' ahead for the old world, whoever wins . . . Our people demand economic freedom and security. If we don't give them their birthright, some other system will attempt the job . . . " (Charles E. Wilson, President of the General Electric Company, in *Readers Digest,* January 1942.)

only (for instance in tampering with money and prices to overcome the fluctuations of the business cycles), all these efforts are in vain. But it is a different story when the economic laws are put out of operation by depriving the market of its main functions. Exactly this is happening in National Socialist Germany. I do not pretend that the ruling groups in Germany have unlimited power in the economic realm—there is no such thing as unlimited power on earth—but I stress that in a command economy the "theoretical laws of classical economic theory as well as of the theory of monopolistic competition are eliminated to a wide degree. Notwithstanding certain unavoidable deviations (which result from the co-existence of residues from the old order) the fundamental fact remains that every command in the economic sphere has acquired a range of discretion. [*Beliebigkeitsspielraum*] which surpasses everything possible under individualistic or monopolistic conditions."[25]

All this may make most unpleasant hearing for those of us who had hoped that a totalitarian order was bound to collapse as a result of the clash between political aims and economic necessities. As far as the purely economic aspect is concerned, I cannot see serious dangers for the continuance of the new order, if Germany should succeed in acquiring control over an adequate supply of raw material and foodstuffs. We all expect that Germany will suffer military defeat and that the National Socialist system will disappear from the earth. But that is not the point in our present discussion; we are concerned here with the—let us hope purely academic—question whether there are economic limitations of the new order. I do not speak here of the limitations that apply to every social system, e.g., those which result from the necessity to reproduce the given resources, to achieve optimum efficiency, to have a sufficient supply of labor, raw materials and machinery. I am searching for those factors which under conditions of private capitalism tend to create unemployment, overproduction and overinvestment, tend to make accounting impossible and tend to produce a standstill or even retrogression in technical development. In analyzing the structure of state capitalism I am unable to discover such inherent economic forces as would prevent the functioning of the new order. The command economy possesses the means for eliminating the economic causes of depression, cumulative destructive processes and unemployment of capital and labor. Economic problems in the old sense no longer exist when the coordination of all economic activities is effected consciously instead of by the "natural laws" of the market.

[25] Willi Neuling, *op. cit.*, p. 286.

There are indeed limitations to the possibilities of the new order but they derive from the very structure of the society which state capitalism seeks to perpetuate and from the opposition of the non-totalitarian outside world. If the democracies can show that economic security must not be tied up with the loss of liberty but can be achieved under democratic conditions, then I dare forecast that the new order of National Socialism will be followed in Germany and elsewhere by an infinitely superior democratic new order.[27]

[27]An attempt to outline an economic program for such a democratic "new order" was recently made by Alvin H. Hansen in a pamphlet issued by the National Resources Planning Board, *After the War—Full Employment,* Washington, D. C., 1942. Hansen formulates the problem as follows: "If the victorious democracies muddle through another decade of economic frustration and mass unemployment, we may expect social disintegration and, sooner or later, another international conflagration. A positive program of post-war economic expansion and full employment, boldly conceived and vigorously pursued, is imperative. Democracies, if they are going to lead the world out of chaos and insecurity, must first and foremost offer their people opportunity, employment, and a rising standard of living."

The Legal Order of National Socialism[1]

By Otto Kirchheimer

It is one of the strongest contentions of the National Socialist legal system that it has finally closed the gap which, under the liberal era, had separated the provinces of law and morality.[2] Henceforth, the legal and the moral order are one and the same. What is the reality against which we have to measure this contention? The National Socialist legal order substitutes racial homogeneity for equality, and therefore abandons the conception of human beings equipped with similar capacities and equally capable of bearing legal rights and duties. It was easy for the Nazis to make fun of this conception. Under the conditions of our advanced industrial society, it usually did not offer a profitable tool for the adjustment of differences which frequently represented claims of social groups and not of mere individuals. But our legal heaven does not consist exclusively of group claims and counter claims. There exist also parallel relations among individuals and between the individual and the state. Indeed the subjection of individual and government alike to the same rules of the game is one of the happiest and not unintentional consequences of the liberal emphasis on general notions, with its quest for equality between the contending parties. Under the veil of the community ideology, the system of general legal conceptions equally applicable to all cases falls.[3] With it falls the beneficial fiction of a government bound by law to the same rules as the individual contesting its commands. Now the individual is checked by two forces, the official social grouping and the government, whose commands are not subject to discussion and who are organized so that their jurisdictional disputes cannot be exploited by the individual. The individual is subjected to the law of his professional group as well as to the impetuous command of the state. For the run of his daily task the government relinquishes him to the paternal care of the group, but does not hesitate to make use of its own coercive machinery when the latter's persuasive and dis-

[1] Public lecture given in Columbia University in December 1941.

[2] H. Frank, *Rechtsgrundlegung des Nationalsozialistichen Führerstaates*, Munich 1938, p. 11.

[3] Cf. G. A. Walz, *Artgleichheit gegen Gleichartigkeit*, Hamburg 1938, p. 19.

ciplinary means of professional, racial, and intellectual co-ordination and discrimination have been of no avail. The group's police power is in itself no creation of the National Socialist regime. But before, the power of the professional and trade associations was limited by the individual's chance to stand aloof from them and was further subjected to the rule of the civil law interpreted by the civil courts. With the access to power of National Socialism the common legal bond of a generally applicable civil law disappeared more and more, and at the same time the professional organizations lost their voluntary character. The labor organization, economic groups, the handicraft and peasant organizations became compulsory organizations. By the same token the National Socialist system dispensed with an outside body to whose authority a group member could appeal when faced with an inequitable group decision.[4]

The authority of the group bureaucracy in industry, trade and the professions, representing the most powerful interests or combinations of interests, is steadily increasing with the number of executive tasks relinquished to them by the state bureaucracy.[5] For this reason the conventional notions of property and expropriations are in need of redefinition. What profit an individual is able to draw from his real property, trade or ownership of means of production, depends mainly on his status within his professional group and on the general economic policy of the government. It is the group that determines the quota of available raw material and with its authoritative advice guides the labor authorities in deciding the vital question as to the labor force to which an individual entrepreneur should be entitled.[6] Should his property lose its economic value in consequence of such decisions of the group bureaucracy, it is once more the organs of the group and not the courts that will decide whether and

[4]Even in cases involving the coercive power of an organization as much affected with public interest as that of the social insurance doctors, the civil courts have shown the utmost reluctance to examine the orders of the group leadership which deprive a member of his livelihood. Cf. German Supreme Court, April 26, 1940, *Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen*, 164, pp. 15, 32; German Supreme Court, December 21, 1937, *Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht*, 1938, p. 131, with comment by E. R. Huber; L. Kattenstroh, "Rechtscharakter und Nachprüfbarkeit von Anordnungen der Wirtschaftsgruppen," in *Deutsches Recht*, 1939, p. 676.

[5]The most recent shifts in the distribution of functions between state bureaucracy and group bureaucracy have been discussed by A. Dresbach, "Ämter und Kammern, Bemerkungen über die staatliche Wirtschaftsverwaltung," in *Die Wirtschaftskurve*, 1941, No. 3, p. 193.

[6]Cf. "Auskämmungskommission," in *Frankfurter Zeitung*, May 18, 1941, Nos. 250-251, p. 7. Interestingly enough in this commission where members of the military and the state bureaucracy, of the bureaucracy of the groups and the chambers of commerce are always present, representatives of the Labor Front are called upon only irregularly.

to what amount and in what form indemnity may be granted.[7] They also will decide whether his exclusion from the rank of the producers shall be permanent or transitory, whether he should be allowed some trade privileges or should become a rentier fed on a more or less liberal allowance, to be paid by his more fortunate competitors, or whether, as in the handicraft organization, he should simply be thrown into the ranks of the working class.[8] The logic of economic concentration has never worked more smoothly than when the ideology of the community deprived the weaker group member of the right to appeal to an outside body which would be prepared to maintain the intra-group balance. In the same vein the separation of the legal title to property from the enterpreneurial function has been legally stabilized by the new joint-stock company legislation. The minority stockholder has lost the last vestiges of legally enforcible influence on the administration of industrial enterprise, regardless of whoever may actually be in control, the old majority interests or new managerial elements. If the newspapers and court decisions report at length instances of legal skirmishes between minority stockholders and the controlling group of an enterprise, this may serve the welcome aim of humanizing the world of corporate giants, but the decisions on the scant amount of information to be thrown open to stockholders do not affect the security of tenure assured to the controlling group and the complete economic domination it may exercise.

In the realm of agriculture, the government has gone as far as to sanction the redefinition of property relations brought about by the activity of the official groupings, which are more tightly knit in this field than in any other.[9] In the hereditary farm legislation it has created a powerful tool for the preservation of an agricultural aristocracy and middle-class throughout the whole country. The creation and the security of tenure of a class of well-to-do peasants and landowners was of such great concern to the government that it took pains to create a strict legal order of succession in favor of the oldest or, as the local custom may be, the youngest son of the family, pushing the other children into the ranks of the proletariat. The decisions

[7] Cf. F. Wieacker, "Die Enteignung," in *Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht*, Munich 1937, p. 749. The practice of the estate courts in indemnity cases is discussed by L. Gebhard and H. Merkel, *Das Recht der landwirtschaftlichen Marktordnung*, Munich 1937, and by P. Giesecke, "Entschädigungspflicht bei marktordnenden Massnahmen," in *Festschrift für Justus Hedemann*, Jena 1938, p. 368.

[8] We do not have figures on the depletion of these groups as a result of the war combing-out measures. As regards the pre-war figures cf. *Der Vierjahresplan*, 1939, p. 1029.

[9] Cf. the remarks of A. Dresbach, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

of the special hereditary farm courts make it abundantly clear that undivided preservation of substantial agricultural units in the same family takes precedence over considerations of proven ability.[10] The legislation on the so-called dissolution of entailed property, which enables the Junkers to take cover under the status of hereditary farmers, follows exactly the same pattern. When the present occupant of the entailed estate is in good standing with the authorities and the undivided preservation of his property fits into the Food Estate's agricultural program, he will become a "peasant."[11]

This legislation was introduced without delay in the territories regained from Poland.[12] While the great landowners thus get preferential treatment, the inverse process may be observed with regard to the internal settlement and colonization policy.[13] Under the Third Reich the internal settlement policy, which theoretically at least would have corresponded so well to the blood and soil ideology, receded more and more into the background. Agriculture now takes on the color of a large scale industry; small units vanish, mechanization advances, cheap labor is furnished by the government, products are standardized and their sale monopolized by the Food Estate bureaucracy that fixes the prices in a bargaining process with the other powers of the realm.

In the case of the hereditary farmer, the government has taken care to lay down binding legal rules of succession in the interest of conserving a reliable rural upper class and in order to produce a maximum amount of staple food. In all other cases the new statute on wills of July 31, 1938 left fairly intact the right of the individual to dispose of his worldly goods.[14] It only strengthened the position of the family of the testator and gave government and family the legal weapons to harass the churches in case they might be beneficiaries and to nullify all dispositions in which an absent minded testator might have shown some affection for a Jew or other enemy of the community.[15] This freedom to testate would be a problematical one and would not hinder the breaking-up of big industrial and rural estates if the legal succession were subject to a heavy tax

[10]Supreme Hereditary Farm Court, May 30, 1939, *Entscheidungen des Reichserbhofgerichts*, 6, p. 295; December 20, 1939, 7, p. 237, and January 30, 1940, 7, p. 256.

[11]Statute of July 6, 1938, art. 31, 1, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1938, 1, p. 825, Decree of March 20, 1939, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, 1, p. 509.

[12]Decree of March 18, 1941, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1941, 1, p. 154.

[13]*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, p. 285.

[14]*Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1941, 1, p. 973.

[15]Cf. A. Roth, "Zum Art. 48, 2 des Testamentgesetzes," in *Deutsches Recht*, 1941, p. 166, and G. Boehmer, "Die guten Sitten im Zeichen nationalsozialistischer Familienpflicht," in *Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht*, 1941, p. 73; German Supreme Court, September 17, 1940, and September 19, 1940, *ibid.*, pp. 84-85.

burden as is now the case in England and the United States. But the German inheritance tax as established in 1925 was already comparatively mild, and it was further modified in 1934 in the same direction by granting more generous exemptions to smaller fortunes and large families and total exemption for the succession into a hereditary farm. Inheritance tax rates for children do not exceed 15% in the highest bracket. That the inheritance tax is meaningless in terms of the German tax system may be seen from the fact that out of 23 billion marks total revenue collected in 1939, only 104 millions—that is to say, not even one half of one per cent—was derived from inheritance taxes.[16] Thus, of the two pillars which characterize the legal order of the liberal era, private property in the means of production and the freedom of contract, property, even if heavily mortgaged to the political machine, has managed to survive. But what about contracts? Is it still justifiable to say, as is officially done in Germany,[17] that the liberty of contract together with private property, competition and the continuance of free private trade associations form the irreplaceable fundamentals of the racial community? This characteristic utterance itself gives a clue to the answer. The right to combine freely into trade associations is, under prevailing German conditions, synonymous with the existence of powerful cartels and combines, which exercise public power either directly or under the thin disguise of official chambers and groups. Liberty of contract and government-sponsored monopoly are incompatible. The effect of this state of affairs was to reduce to a minimum the sphere in which free contracts are still concluded. We witness an acceleration of the long drawn-out process by which general norms and conditions are substituted for individual contracts. The conditions of business relations between producers in different stages of the process of production, or between producers and agents of distribution, are either covered in advance by a general agreement between partners of approximately equal economic strength or are forced by the more powerful party on its economically weaker partner. Only where this unilateral dictate threatened to become too disastrous in its possible consequences, did the government take the supervision of these dictated norms into its own hands. Under the Third Reich the pseudo-contractual relations shaped by such unilateral dictates are steadily increasing. As cartels acquire official titles as authorities for distribution, their clients can do

[16] *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, p. 235. It should be borne in mind that there is only a Reich Inheritance Tax in Germany.

[17] C. H. Nipperdey, "Das System des bürgerlichen Rechts," in *Zur Erneurung des Bürgerlichen Rechts*, Munich 1938, p. 99, and Hans Frank, *Rechtsgrundlagen des Nationalsozialistischen Führerstaates*, Munich 1938, p. 21.

nothing but acquiesce in the general conditions laid down by them. Criticism and suggestions of academic writers notwithstanding, the general norms and conditions incessantly replace liberty of contract and make it meaningless.[18] But whereas the government took only an intermittent interest in the conditions under which so-called free contracts were concluded, it did not hesitate to interfere more and more with the stages of execution of individual contracts. At first it limited its interference by refusing the creditor its help in executing a judgment against a small debtor. Later it went further and extended to every reliable racial comrade the help of the judge in getting wholly or partially rid of the debts he had contracted during the "pseudo-prosperity" period or the previous depression.[19] The war decrees generously widened the frame of this legislation. Liquidation of most of the small creditor-debtor relations, whether they concern rents, mortgages, doctor's or furniture bills, was entrusted to the administrative skill of a judge, who was expected to alleviate the little man's burden wherever feasible.[20] Contract, therefore, is steadily disappearing from the legal horizon of Mr. Everyman. The workers, the small businessmen and the small farmers as well as the consumers in general have no bargaining power, as they are prohibited from combining for such purposes. The local representatives of the Party, of the Labor Front or of the National Socialist welfare organizations, may find it convenient to recommend a change in a particular working, wage, distribution or price arrangement. They may or may not be able to carry their point against the industry and industry's bureaucratic spokesmen. But these battles are fought and compromises are reached over the head of Mr. Everyman. For him contract has been replaced by the peculiar compound of private command and administrative order. This compound, which joins in the same individual undertaking the interest of private property and of the administration, the private advantage,

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[18]The German literature in this field is increasing. We note only the scholarly discussion by L. Raiser, *Recht der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen,* Hamburg 1935; the characteristically vague reform proposals by H. Brandt, "Die allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen und das sogenannte dispositive Recht," in *Deutsche Rechtswissenschaft,* 5 (1940), p. 76; and the cocksure attitude of the respresentative of industry, C. van Erkelens, "Lieferbedingungen der Industrie im Kampf der Meinungen," in *Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht,* 1940, p. 367. More interesting than the theoretical discussion is the attitude of the bureaucracy which favors more and more the policy to make standardized contracts universally binding and applicable. Cf. C. Ritter, "Legalisierung der allgemeinen deutschen Spediteurbedingungen," in *Deutsches Recht,* 1940, p. 779, and especially K. Nehring, "Das neue deutsche Speditionsrecht," in *Hanseatische Rechts-und Gerichtszeitung,* 1940, 23 (1940), Abt. A, pp. 75, 80.

[19]Statute of August 17, 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt,* 1938, 1, p. 1033. Cf. H. Vogel, "Die Rechtsprechung zur Schuldenbereinigung," in *Deutsches Recht,* 1940, p. 1343.

[20]Decree of September 3, 1940, *Reichsgesetzblatt,* 1940, 1, p. 1209. Cf. Breithaupt, "Die Neufassung des Gesetzes über eine Bereinigung alter Schulden," in *Deutsches Recht,* 1940, p. 1602.

and the public purpose, is one of the first characteristics of the new legal order. Taken in this sense, the National Socialist legal doctrine rightly claims to have overcome the traditional gulf between private and public law.[21] Free agreement and contract are restricted to the province of the mighty. Their contract, in turn, has lost its private character, since their working agreements are the basis of the new constitutional order.

We may venture to define the present conditions of property in Germany as follows: the ranks of the proprietary class, controlling the means of production, are steadily shrinking through such well-known devices as concentration, Aryanization, combing-out legislation, quota restrictions and closing-down "on account of war emergency."[21a] Those proprietary elements that belong to the rentier group suffer from the administration's control over investment conditions and rents. They suffer also from the general ability to gain a foothold in the process of production, which, with the administration's active furtherance, has been monopolized by a few powerful individuals and combines. New property titles are accumulating in the hands of the newcomers from the ranks of party, army and bureaucracy. Yet, members of these groups do not always find it advisable to acquire formal titles to property but find it sufficient for their purpose to reap the fruit of administrative control. The freedom to transfer property titles and the lack of onerous inheritance taxes are intended to perpetuate the property structure as it is developing from this process of concentration.

The German lawyer has acquired the habit of separating rather sharply the rules which dominate family life from the realm of contractual property relations. In fact, it is one of the most frequent reproaches against the old civil code that its general rules placed business relations on the same footing as the order of the family; the National Socialist legislation takes pride in having radically separated the issues of blood and money.[22] It contends that in its new racial and family law it has prepared a basis for the development of the racial community. This new legislation excels in two characteristics: the thoroughgoing extirpation of the Jews and, above all, its outspoken populationist traits. We do not have to dwell here upon the anti-Semitic legislation, as it constitutes the most widely known element of the German legislative and administrative endeavors. The

[21] E. R. Huber, "Neue Grundlagen des Hoheitlichen Rechts," in *Grundfragen der neuen Rechtswissenschaft*, 1935, pp. 143, 151.

[21a] Even the German legal literature has to recognize this process. Cf. J. W. Hedemann, *Deutsches Wirtschaftsrecht*, Berlin 1939, p. 209: "The distribution of property becomes more critical or assumes at least other forms."

[22] F. Schlegelberger, *Abschied vom B. G. B.*, Munich 1937, p. 9.

populationist traits of the new family legislation are visible everywhere. They are evident in the social and welfare policy, with marriage loans, substantial tax reductions and exemptions and special family allowances. They are evident in the manifold attempts to improve the position of illegitimate mothers and children. That such adjustment measures are due not to moral or humanitarian but to purely populationist motives, a recent edict shows very distinctly. This edict orders the school authorities to see to it that illegitimate children do not feel at a disadvantage psychologically, provided that racially and biologically they are not objectionable.[23] The exemption of parents from punishment under anti-procurement statutes in case they allow their children to have pre-marital sexual intercourse under their own roof has been forced on a recalcitrant higher judiciary, mainly by the propaganda of the influential weekly of the SS. Blackshirts, *Das Schwarze Korps.*[24] In spite of earlier judicial utterances to the contrary, an employer is no longer allowed to dismiss female workers on grounds of pregnancy, regardless of whether the expectant mother is or is not married.[25] This relaxation of conventional moral conceptions, noticeable everywhere in Germany, was accompanied by open attacks on some of the most basic doctrines of the established churches, calculated to keep down to a minimum any ecclesiastical influence on the social life of the family. Since millions of Germans today live a barracks life rather than a family life, the State found it easy to encourage *ad hoc* sexual relations. Together with this encouragement went the official endeavors to minimize legal as well as social consequences of illegitimacy. Such moves could not fail to influence deeply the sex mores of the German population and especially of German youth, who would, of course, be more immediately affected. This change in turn was bound to leave a heavy imprint on the institution of marriage, even if not a single word of the family law, as contained in the old civil code, had been changed. But, in fact, the government subjected the family law to complete revision in 1938.[26]

While this policy generally transforms every woman into an official agent of procreation, marriage in particular is regarded as a state institution to which the main responsibility for raising the

[23]Edict of the Ministry of Education of May 29, 1940, reprinted in *Deutsche Justiz,* 102 (1940), p. 1143.

[24]German Supreme Court, June 29, 1937, and the new line of thought in the decision of the Cottbus *Schöffengericht* of February 7, 1937, in *Juristische Wochenschrift,* 1937, pp. 2386-2389.

[25]German Supreme Labor Court, August 21, 1937, *Juristische Wochenschrift,* 1937, p. 3057.

[26]Statute of July 6, 1938, *Reichsgesetzblatt,* 1938, 1, p. 807.

birthrate has been transferred. Marriage becomes a business relationship, the success or failure of which is measured in terms of the production of soldiers and future mothers who live up to the physical and intellectual standards of the Third Reich. The Hereditary Health Courts are instituted to uphold such standards at the admission into marriage and during its continuance; divorce and annulment procedures perform the same tasks at its dissolution. Under the limited divorce facilities granted by the earlier German legislation, the parties who wanted to separate usually had to reach collusive agreement which then was registered by the court under one of the existing legal categories. The new statute of 1938 has opened a wide field for controversial divorce proceedings by abandoning the principle of guilt. It has introduced a number of situations in which circumstances outside the control of the partners are grounds for a divorce. Foremost is the sterility of either partner, but contagious diseases, mental defects or a three-year separation are also sufficient grounds for issuance of a divorce decree.[27] Whatever progressive characteristics this statute may have had, they have been completely submerged in the course of its interpretation by the courts. Not in all cases may the decisions rendered be as crude and morally shocking as the following one handed down by the German Supreme Court. A woman had lost her fertility through an operation necessitated by an abdominal cavity pregnancy. The husband's request for a divorce was granted and a plea of duress was denied to the defendant mainly on the grounds that the state had an active interest in the plaintiff's getting children from a new marriage.[28] But such decisions set precedents, and it is no wonder that the chief reasoning in divorce cases gravitates more and more around the rights and duties deriving from the fulfillment, partial fulfillment, or impossibility of fulfillment of maternal functions.[29] On the one hand, egotistical or immoral motivations of a partner are encouraged when they happen to coincide with the government's desire to raise the birthrate.[30] But on the other hand, the same official considerations may lead to the maintenance of an entirely meaningless marriage as a reward for services a mother has rendered to the state by the production of a numerous progeny.[31] It is too early to surmise all the consequences of this policy. The rise in the rate of divorce and annulment proceedings, which began immediately after 1933, may have been par-

[27] *Loc. cit.*, Art. 50-55.
[28] German Supreme Court, September 5, 1940, *Deutsches Recht*, 1940, p. 2001.
[29] German Supreme Court, June 29, 1940, *ibid.*, p. 1567; July 8, 1940, *ibid.*, p. 1627.
[30] German Supreme Court, May 7, 1940, *ibid.*, p. 1362.
[31] German Supreme Court, March 6, 1940, *ibid.*, p. 1050; March 20, 1940, *ibid.*, p. 1049; May 22, 1940, *ibid.*, p. 1363.

tially caused during the first years by the desire of many to avail themselves of generous facilities for getting rid of Jewish partners.[32] Under the new law of 1938, the divorce rate, as was to be expected, jumped up. In 1939, out of every 10,000 marriages 38 were terminated by divorce as against 29 in 1932 and 32 in 1936.[33] That the institution of marriage does not stand to win much by its instrumentalization, which makes it the most convenient breeding agency, seems a fairly safe conclusion.

Before we enter into a discussion of the ways and methods peculiar to the coercive machinery of the Third Reich, let us have a moment's look at the personnel which runs this machine and at the principles according to which it is run. The personnel of the judicial bureaucracy, especially in the higher ranks, still consists overwhelmingly of the very persons who held office under, and to the detriment of, the Weimar Republic. As late as the beginning of 1941, a lifelong member of the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Justice, Dr. Schlegelberger, was appointed Acting Minister of Justice.

Yet, under the traditional conceptions, the judiciary is only a concomitant to an established body of laws which it adapts to the special needs of the community. The procedural formulas which it develops provide a certain amount of predictability.[34] The contending individuals and groups, though they never are sure which of the many possible interpretations of their behavior will prevail in a given case, usually could confine their actions within such limits that these could not be said to contradict openly the wording of the law and the procedural requirements of the established courts and agencies. The business of individualization carried on by the courts contained a certain amount of rationality, insofar as their decisions tried to satisfy as many as possible of the so-called legitimate interests of society.

The rationality which we can observe in the courts and agencies of the Third Reich is of quite a different nature. Rationality here does not mean that there are universally applicable rules the con-

[32]As late as 1939 an appeal court helped a writer to an annulment of his marriage, reasoning that only after the events of 1938 (vom Rath assassination and November pogroms) did the appellant get a clear perception of the Jewish question. Munich, Appeal Court, December 11, 1939, *ibid.*, p. 327.

[33]*Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, p. 37, including some interesting comments showing how the rise of the birth rate has become the uppermost official consideration.

[34]*Vide* K. Loewenstein, "Law in the Third Reich," in *Yale Law Journal*, 45 (1936), pp. 779, 782, 814.

sequences of which could be calculated by those whom they affect.[35] Rationality here means only that the whole apparatus of law and law-enforcing is made exclusively serviceable to those who rule. Since no general notions prevail which could be referred to by the ruling and the ruled alike and which thus might restrict the arbitrariness of the administrative practice, the rules are being used to serve the specific purposes of those ruling. The legal system that results is rational for them only. This, then, is a strictly Technical Rationality which has as its main and uppermost concern the question: How can a given command be executed so as to have the maximum effect in the shortest possible time? In a recent speech Reich Minister Hans Frank, President of the Academy of German Law and Governor General of Poland, quite correctly compared this kind of rationality to the working of a good machine. "A smoothly functioning and technically superior administration is to a chaotic despotism what precision machinery is to an unreliable makeshift instrument producing only chance results."[36] Frank wants the industrial methods of taylorism introduced into the realm of statecraft in order to get the most precise answer to the question as to how the will of the political leadership can be put into practical effect as speedily as possible. Such an attitude is not the wishful dream of a particular if highly placed individual. Technical rationality simply follows a pattern drawn by the organization of industry. There, it was not conceived as a method for production departments only. The now officially sponsored Dinta (Institute for Scientific Management and Rationalization of Work), when still owned by representatives of industry, was the first to introduce the same principle into the business of human relations.[37] Technical rationality, as dominant over all governmental organization, precludes the existence of a general body of law in which the rules do evolve but slowly. Under the new system, a legal rule can have only a purely provisional character; it must be possible to change a rule without notice, and, if necessary, retroactively. The Third Reich, with an unlimited legislative and decree power given the Führer and liberally delegated by him to his paladins, amply provides for such facilities. With this legislative omnipotence and latitude for delegations goes also an unlimited

[35]Cf. the opposite conclusions drawn by E. Fraenkel, *The Dual State*, New York 1941, who holds that the existence of a rational law is necessary for the existence of a monopoly-capitalist society, overestimating, however, the importance of some isolated judicial decisions of the earlier epoch. *Vide* my review of this excellent book in *Political Science Quarterly*, 56 (1941), p. 434.

[36]H. Frank, "Technik des Staates," in *Zeitschrift der Akademie für deutsches Recht*, 1941, p. 2f.

[37]As to the Dinta cf. F. L. Neumann, *Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*, New York 1942, p. 429.

willingness to abandon any pretense of logical coherence. Out of every individual situation the maximum of advantage must be drawn, even if the second step contradicts the premises under which the first was taken.[38] Moreover, technical rationality makes it necessary to search always for the shortest ways of transmission from the top to the bottom. That too has been taken care of. Once an agreement is reached by the mighty of the realm and promulgated under the Führer's authority, there is no intermediary organ which could venture to arrest or delay its execution. No court has the right to contest the constitutionality or legality of any legislative enactment. Whereas the judge is given a certain amount of leeway to examine the extent to which anterior legislation conforms to the National Socialist principles,[39] he is emphatically discouraged from making similar inquiries into any piece of Nazi legislation.[40] In short, the idea of technical rationality which underlies the new governmental organization actually finds its nearest approximation in a perfectly running, though complicated, piece of machinery. Nobody save the owners are entitled to question the meaningfulness of the services which the machine performs: the engineers who actually operate it have to content themselves with producing immediate reactions to the owners' changing commands. They may be ordered to proceed more rapidly or more slowly, they may be ordered to change some technical processes and to attain some variations in output. The purport of the results achieved lies beyond this kind of rationality, which is aimed only at the certainty that every order will produce an exactly calculable reaction.

In its judiciary the Third Reich has created an almost perfect tool for the realization of its orders. For reasons we have already explained before, the judiciary has lost much of its earlier importance as an agency for deciding differences between various groups and between individuals. The judicial statistics amply prove this thesis. With the above mentioned exception of matrimonial cases, the number of legal procedures shows a startling decline. Thus, for instance, the roles of those courts which had jurisdiction over civil disputes involving 500 RM or more show a decline from 319,000 cases in the prosperity year of 1929 to 112,000 in 1937.[41] That

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[38]Cf., for instance, the Decree of March 27, 1941, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1941, 1, p. 177, which legalizes until December 31, 1942, the practice of Aryan successors to Jewish business concerns carrying on their premises the name of their Jewish predecessors side by side with their own.

[39]On National Socialist "equity" cf. K. Loewenstein, *op. cit.*, p. 804.

[40]German Supreme Court, June 17, 1940, *Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht*, 1940, p. 304.

[41]*Deutsche Justiz*, 100 (1938), p. 1140.

does not necessarily mean that the courts are going out of business. But they have thoroughly changed their character. From independent agencies of society, able to throw their weight with any of the contending social groups, they have turned into executive agencies of the government. They are employed with preference where a certain amount of individualization is desired. As such they clear up the debtor-creditor or producer-consumer relation, and as such they decide many of the issues which come up in the course of the racial legislation.

As the law, decree, or edict on whose authority the judge bases his decision can be changed without delay, an inopportune decision of his has only the effect that the legal rule will be immediately changed. In the realm of criminal law, the stake of the authority of the state is too important to allow an undesirable decision to go unchallenged. The war legislation has, therefore, introduced the possibility of changing every individual criminal judgment in the desired direction. A Special Section of the *Reichsgericht* is directed to take up the case again and revise the decision[42] in the direction desired by the Führer as indicated by the *Oberreichsanwalt.* The first case to be carried before the Special Section was as follows: A man known for a long time to be a homosexual had profited from the blackout to force a younger man to become the object of his desires. A Special Court had sentenced the offender to hard labor. There are no appeals by either the defendant or prosecutor from sentences imposed by the Special Courts. Nevertheless, under the new law, the case was reopened before the Special Section of the *Reichsgericht* at the request of the *Oberreichsanwalt* and terminated, as desired, in a death sentence.[43]

A decision which is disadvantageous to government interests, though rarely apt to be forthcoming, is frequently of neither legal nor social consequence for the establishment of a precedent for future cases arising in similar circumstances. In addition the judge, like any other administrative official, is accountable for the contents of his decision. Where the relentless pressure of the party through channels like the *Schwarze Korps* should prove of no avail, the new organizational statutes provide ample facilities for dis-

[42] Decree of September 16, 1939, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, 1, p. 1841. Cf. W. Tegtmeyer, "Der ausserordentliche Einspruch," in *Juristische Wochenschrift*, 1939, p. 2060, and my article "Criminal Law in National Socialist Germany" in this periodical, VIII, pp. 444ff.

[43] German Supreme Court (Special Section), December 6, 1939, *Zeitschrift der Akademie für deutsches Recht*, 1940, p. 48, with comment by Klee.

charging or transferring a recalcitrant judge.[44] The judiciary is entitled to have and to express opinions of its own only in those cases where it does not act as a kind of common executive organ to the combined ruling classes. There are some boundary spheres where the distribution of power between the mighty of the realm has not been finally settled. The judiciary, for instance, may trespass into the sphere of the party and try with varying success to apply the general rules of civil and criminal responsibility to acts of party officials.[45] The party, of course, does not stand by passively in such jurisdictional conflicts, and presses forward vigorous attacks of its own against the bureaucracy. Right now it uses the party-dominated police as a cover to wrest from the judicial bureaucracy the complete control of the criminal police and, therewith, the final direction of criminal prosecution.[46] Generally speaking, however, the industrialists and landowners, party and army, as well as the corresponding bureaucracies, jealously see to it that nobody trespasses into the provinces carved out for each by common agreement; the tendency is, therefore, towards departmentalization, towards disappearance of a unified system of law behind innumerable steadily increasing special competences. If technical rationality is nevertheless to be preserved, two conditions have to be fulfilled. First, every official agency must grant recognition to an official act of other public agencies. Second, each of these groups must be equipped with a penal power of its own in order to execute swift reprisals against malefactors in its own sphere. The party has established its own jurisdiction over its members and over its special subdivisions like the SS;[47] the army achieved the reestablishment of

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[44] Judges are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Statute. *Vide* A. Brand, *Das Deutsche Beamtengesetz*, Berlin 1937, p. 462. Regarding the possibilities of transferring judges to other jobs, cf. the Decree of September 1, 1939, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, 1, p. 1658, and especially Art. 4,3 of the "Decree on the Organization of a Supreme Administrative Court" of April 3, 1941, *ibid.*, 1941, 1, p. 201. For an interesting definition of the meaning of judicial independence under National Socialism, cf. Hans Frank, "Reichsverwaltungsgericht," in *Deutsches Recht*, 1941, p. 1169.

[45] A. Lingg, *Die Verwaltung der NSDAP*, Berlin, 1940, p. 257. The right of the courts to pass on this question is upheld by S. Grundmann, "Die richterliche Nachprüfung von politischen Führungsakten," in *Zeitschrift für die gesamten Staatswissenschaften*, 100 (1940), pp. 511ff., and by the German Supreme Court, February 17, 1939, *Deutsches Recht*, 1939, p. 1785.

[46] W. Best, *Die Deutsche Polizei*, Darmstadt 1940, p. 28, against which E. R. Huber is polemizing in his review, in *Zeitschrift für die gesamten Staatswissenschaften*, 101 (1941), p. 723, where he gives the legal and administrative arguments of the higher bureaucracy in its fight to restrict Party influence.

[47] One of the first statutes of the Third Reich, dated April 28, 1933, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1933, 1, p. 230, enables the Führer to institute special disciplinary and penal courts for the SA and SS. Cf. also the Decree of October 17, 1939, *ibid.*, 1939, 1, p. 2107. That the Party, even under actual war conditions, does not relinquish its grip upon its special formations becomes evident from the Decree of April 17, 1940, *ibid.*, 1940, 1, p. 659, which takes the jurisdiction over members of SS formations in the armed forces away from the court martials and transfers it to the SS Court in Munich.

its own court martials as one of the first rewards of the new order;[48] the industrial groups and chambers as well as the official organizations of the Food Estate can levy fines of their own; the Ministries of Finance and of Economics and the Price Commissioner also have been equipped with extensive powers to fine.[49] The latest newcomer in this list is the compulsory Labor Service. By decree of Nov. 17, 1940,[50] extensive penal powers, which for some time it had been exercising "illegally,"[51] were confirmed to it. This list of exemptions and penal privileges is not given merely for curiosity's sake. With the one exception of the penal privileges granted to the bureaucracy of the Ministries of Finance and Economics which allows powerful individuals to buy off their penalties without adverse publicity and thus make the business man prefer this kind of administrative jurisdiction to the general one of the criminal courts, this development appears as a death-warrant to individual rights.

The separation of functions between the employer and the coercive machinery of the state was one of the main guarantees of individual liberty in a society where an ever diminishing number of people controlled the means of production. This separation is swept aside when the organizations—Party, Army, Food Estate, Labor Service—on whose attitude depends the social existence of the individual, are able to bolster up their commands with a, so to speak, "company-owned" disciplinary and penal power. It is at this point that the inroads of the National Socialist machine into the daily life of the average citizen appear the most striking and that absence of an outside agency willing and able to sift the individual's grievances will bring the greatest moral and material hardship.

The repressive activities of this joint enterprise, officially called the Racial Community, are exercised by the already mentioned special agencies, by the so-called People's Court, the Special Courts, the regular criminal courts, and last but by no means least, by the party-dominated police. The police has a special and comprehensive jurisdiction: it may kill or imprison for an indeterminate time persons whom it thinks to be inimical to the people's welfare, without taking the trouble of handing them over to other agencies[52] for examination of the merits of the case. It may

[48] Statute of May 12, 1933, *ibid.*, 1933, 1, p. 264.

[49] Cf. K. Siegert, *Wirtschaftsstrafrecht*, Berlin 1939, and the Decree of April 6, 1940, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1940, 1, p. 610, regulating the procedure in regard to contraventions in the sphere of distribution.

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 1513.

[51] Cf. my article, *loc cit.*, p. 453, note 3.

[52] W. Best, "Die politische Polizei des Dritten Reiches," in *Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht*, Munich 1937, p. 417.

likewise apply the same technique after the other agencies have relinquished an accused person, either after he has served his time or has been acquitted. The latter does not happen too frequently—the rate of acquittals in the regular criminal courts has gone down from 13% in 1932 to 7% in the second quarter of 1940.[53] The procedures followed by the agencies of repression correspond in the highest degree to the already formulated principles of technical rationality. To attain the results desired by the government with the maximum speed and with the greatest possible degree of accuracy, criminal procedure, that part of the law that was the most formalized hitherto, now had to become its most formless one.[54] Careful preparation was sacrificed to speed, all possibilities for effective defense were abolished,[55] the functions of the judge, traditionally the central figure in a German criminal trial, completely receded behind those of the prosecutor, and, finally, the opportunities for an appeal were severely curtailed and often completely abolished in capital cases. The same technical calculation dominates the methods applied to the different categories of offenders. The substantive penal law has been equipped with a network of conceptions which with every succeeding legislative enactment become broader and less definite.[56] Within a framework sufficiently broad to include easily every supposed wrongdoer, the government has unlimited latitude to be lenient or brutal. It has shown the utmost leniency against the small fry in general and against every criminal in its own ranks. A most generous succession of general amnesties and general *nolle prosequi,* repeated fairly regularly every second year, was turned out to the benefit of the host of wrongdoers of little consequence, granting absolution of nearly every crime committed by overzealous party members.[57] Directed likewise by the desire to enrol as large as possible a number of racial comrades into the regular labor process, the government passed on November 17, 1939, and complemented in 1941, some enlightened rules which allow criminals, after a certain period, to

[53]*Wirtschaft und Statistik,* 1941, p. 247.

[54]Cf. the somewhat melancholic reflections of G. Dahm, "Richtermacht und Gerichtsverfassung," in *Zeitschrift für die gesamten Staatswissenschaften,* 101 (1941), p. 287.

[55]As regards the limitations set to the lawyer's representation of his client's interest, cf. the much publicized Groepke case, *Deutsches Recht,* 1941, p. 918.

[56]Cf. R. Freisler, "Rechtswahrer-Gedanken zum Kriegsjahr 1940," in *Deutsche Justiz,* 103 (1941), pp. 6, 17. Cf. also the Decree of September 7, 1939, *Reichsgesetzblatt,* 1939, 1, p. 1683, forbidding listening to foreign broadcasts, which penalizes the spreading of news which might weaken the power of resistance of the German people, with the comments in *Deutsches Recht,* 102 (1940), p. 1415.

[57]As regards the earlier amnesties cf. my article, *loc. cit.,* p. 457. A new amnesty has been granted at the beginning of the war by a decree of September 4, 1939, *Reichsgesetzblatt,* 1939, 1, p. 1753. No figures have been published, however, as to the effects of this amnesty.

pass as not previously convicted.[58] The same viewpoint has dominated for a long time the National Socialist attitude towards juvenile crime, where reformation long remained the official slogan. Still, in 1940, thanks to the combined efforts of the youth and the labor authorities, who were eager not to lose a single part of their most precious capital, labor power, fines and short term imprisonment for juvenile criminals were replaced by a special light and short form of detention.[59]

However, long before the beginning of the war this policy was overshadowed by the increasing brutality which became the rule against all those regarded as criminal enemies of the people at large. The number of enemies who did not find mercy continued to increase. In the beginning these comprised mainly habitual and professional criminals who were taken into preventive custody, as well as traitors who were believed to have menaced or to threaten to menace the internal and external security of the Reich. Soon this category of enemies of the people was extended to cover the new crime of "race defilement" and was applied to the ever increasing body of sex offenders, which seems to have arisen from the general brutalization of sexual morality. Now, after two years of war, the list of enemies of the people's community who have to be extirpated to protect the home front, comprises those perpetrating almost every type of criminal act if committed by means of violence[60] or as an exploitation of the state of war. It comprises, too, violations of the War Economy Decree of September 4, 1939.[61] In this connection the Führer claimed that in this war, for the first time in history, the principle by which the merchant made his gain, whereas the soldier died,[62] had lost its validity. As if to confirm this, the German newspapers are at present announcing the first death sentences for usury. But since Sec. 25,4 of the above-mentioned War Economy Decree

[58] *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, 1, p. 139, and the announcement in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 12, 1941. Cf. also M. Wachinger, "Die Wirkungen der Tilgung eines Strafvermerks," in *Deutsche Justiz*, 102 (1940), p. 863.

[59] Decree of October 4, 1940, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1940, 1, p. 1366. Cf. also Rietzsch, "Neuordnung des Jugendstrafrechts," in *Deutsches Recht*, 1940, p. 698. Contrast the Decree of October 4, 1939, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, 1, p. 2000, which tends to deprive juveniles in the more serious cases of the privileges granted in the special juvenile jurisdictions.

[60] For an extensive interpretation of the term "weapon to cut and thrust" as including the use of the bare fist, cf. Stuttgart Special Court, February 1, 1940, *Deutsches Recht*, 1940, p. 441.

[61] *Reichsgesetzblatt*, 1939, 1, p. 1609.

[62] Cf. "Bekanntmachungen über die Bekämpfung der Preistreiberei," Executive Decree of January 11, 1941, *Deutsche Justiz*, 103 (1941), pp. 110, 112, which contains detailed instructions as to the procedure to be followed in the case of offenders of the War Economy Decrees.

exempts cartel prices, it is obvious that the main war profiteers are in no actual danger of punishment. But as a means of popular oppression and general deterrence rather than of monopoly control the death penalty has become fairly widespread during the last two years. There are no accurate figures available. The published statistics, even if accepted as accurate, cover only the number of offenders convicted through the channels of the special and regular law courts, which probably means that they embrace only a small percentage of criminals liable to death penalty. For the sake of comparison, however, those figures are important in that they indicate a sharp increase in the use of the death penalty. In the following figures the number of convictions for murder is compared with that of death sentences in general. In 1937 the quarterly average of all convictions for murder, attempts at or participation in murder, was 45, as against a total of death sentences for all crimes, including murder, of 14; the quarterly average for 1939 begins to show an inverse ratio between murder convictions and death sentences, 34 murders as against 39 death sentences, and the known figures for the second quarter of 1940 show only 14 sentenced murderers, but 80 death sentences.[63] The death penalty thus covers a steadily widening range of so-called criminal behavior.

Relatively late German writers and officials have realized that the complete subjection of criminal law and procedure to the idea of technical rationality is bound to shatter completely the specific protective functions inherent in traditional law; and the hope is being expressed that it might be possible, after the war, to reconcile what we called Technical Rationality with somewhat enlarged protective devices and guarantees.[64] Yet, it stands to reason that a system of law which seeks to operate by technical rationality and which at the same time attempts partial retention of liberal guarantees—two mutually exclusive and incompatible objectives since they derive from different social systems—must soon exhaust itself. The social processes that have taken place under National Socialism provide the explanation of the changes which the legal system has undergone. The concentration of economic power which characterizes the social and political development of the Nazi regime crystallizes in the tendency towards preserving the institution of private property both in industrial and agricultural production, whilst abolishing the correlative to private property, the freedom of contract. In the con-

[63] *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1939, p. 553; 1940, p. 557, and 1941, p. 257.
[64] G. Dahm, *op. cit.*, and Hans Frank, "Die Aufgaben der Strafrechtserneuerung," in *Zeitschrift der Akademie für Deutsches Recht*, 1941, p. 25.

tract's place the administrative sanction now has become the *alter ego* of property itself. Equality of law and freedom of contract tended to secure protection to everyone who had acquired legal title to property. The new system of administrative property relations, while abolishing the general rules and uniform procedures, shifts the decision on what property titles may be validated to the monopoly-dominated group.

Within every power grouping, the position of those in control is enhanced through subordinating the individual member of the group to the omnipotence of the group hierarchy that acquires a relatively autonomous jurisdiction of its own. Thus, in the very structure of society the rights and privileges granted the individual in his own right are abolished. Intra-group conflicts in which the individual may fight for the preservation of his claims and legal titles become an arena of mere force collisions and the economically atomized individual becomes a mere object of domination by monopolistic group and estate machines. Simultaneously, legality, no longer serving as an armor to protect the individual, becomes null and void and dissolves into technical rationality which now is the foundation of the structure of legal institutions, of the legal apparatus and of the machine that applies them, the judiciary.

But then, no rights of the individual have to be preserved and maintained in spheres outside economic and political life either. Legal regulation of human relations, whether it be in the sphere of contractual relations, family life or criminal infractions becomes subject to demands of everyday necessities of the totalitarian regime without mediation or indirect transmission. Necessities of securing sufficient labor supply preside as directly over legislation on matrimony as they rule over criminal procedure and substantive criminal law. Where there is a labor shortage which must be overcome as soon as possible, no ethical considerations will influence the decision as to the status of marriage or divorce, and no stipulations of the criminal code will prevent the government from refraining to prosecute or from pardoning numerous offenders. At the same time, special categories of offenders will be outlawed and victimized to serve as mementos of the defenselessness of the atomized individual and of the omnipotence of the groups and machines that run the state with the assistance of a technicalized apparatus of law and law-enforcing.

The system of technical rationality as the foundation of law and legal practice has superseded any system for preservation of indi-

vidual rights and thus has definitely made law and legal practice an instrument of ruthless domination and oppression in the interest of those who control the main economic and political levers of social power. Never has the process of alienation between law and morality gone so far as in the society which allegedly has perfected the integration of those very conceptions.

REVIEWS

Philosophy

Marcuse, Herbert, *Reason and Revolution.* Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory. Oxford University Press. New York 1941. (431 pp.; $3.75)

This book is an extremely valuable interpretation of Hegel's philosophy in its social and political significance and consequences and constitutes a monumental introduction to the method of socio-historical criticism, to the method of "critical theory" as developed by Max Horkheimer and the Institute of Social Research. It consists of two clearly distinguished parts, the first dealing with the foundation of Hegel's philosophy, the second with the rise of social theory in the post-Hegelian and anti-Hegelian philosophy from Schelling and Kierkegaard to Fascism and National Socialism; the main chapters of the second part deal with Marx and French and German positivism. The unity of the two sections lies in the unity of the movement which leads from Hegel's first writings in theology, philosophy and politics to the most recent forms of social theory, a movement which is basically influenced by Hegel either in its dependence on him or in its reaction against him.

Marcuse belongs to that group of important younger philosophers whose starting point is the post-Hegelian period of German intellectual history. While German classical philosophy was rediscovered by the generation to which this reviewer belongs, the younger group, whose philosophical education occurred in the period of world war and revolution, is in a process of rediscovering the post-classical development. For, in this period the ideological foundation of the great catastrophes of our contemporary history was laid. There is hardly a more important step in this rediscovery than Marcuse's book.

The main thesis with respect to Hegel is clearly expressed in the following statement: "Hegel's philosophy is indeed what the subsequent reaction termed it, a negative philosophy. It is originally motivated by the conviction that the given facts that appear to common sense as the positive index of truth are in reality the negation of truth, so that truth can only be established by their destruction. The driving force of the dialectical method lies in this critical conviction" (26). This interpretation of the dialectical method generally, and of Hegel's use of it in particular, links Hegel to the line of revolutionary rationalism, the first segment of which is represented by bourgeois Enlightenment, the second by proletarian socialism. Hegel becomes understandable as the bridge from Kant and the bourgeois revolution to Marx and the proletarian revolution, with critical dialectics serving as the main cable of that bridge. Even the fact that Hegel's philosophical development "concludes with the declaration that history has achieved the

reality of reason" (27) does not remove the critical and negative power of reason. But it is now directed against philosophy as such: "Philosophy reaches its end when it has formulated its view of a world in which reason is realized. . . . The truth now would require actual historical practice to fulfill it. . . . Critical thinking does not cease but assumes a new form. The efforts of reason devolve upon social theory and social practice" (28). This surprising proposition is carried through a precise examination of Hegel's writings from the earliest fragments to the pamphlet on the English reform bill. Equal emphasis is laid on the logical structure of Hegel's thought and on his social and political philosophy, while his interpretation of religion and art is somewhat neglected. It is very fortunate that Marcuse takes his main insights into the character of Hegel's thought from the early writings. For the life of Hegel's work pulsates in those earlier writings and not in the later completed system. Whoever is acquainted with Hegel's fragments and the earliest formulation of his system, including the several political pamphlets written before the *Phenomenology of Mind*, never can be impressed by the distorted picture of Hegel as the dogmatic philosopher of the Restoration, the adorer of the absolute state and the logical sophist, as he has been depicted by those who only know him superficially and not as he really was.

The negative, critical function of reason in Hegel's thought is demonstrated again and again. For, Hegel's "reason signifies the absolute annihilation of the common-sense world" (48). Everything is something other than it immediately is, and uniting itself with "its other" tends to fulfill the law of life and progress which is at the same time the law of thinking and being—the law first expressed in Aristotle's interpretation of being as a movement from potentiality to actuality (42). Applying this law to the social and political situation of his period, Hegel shows the contradictions within the German state, which was not a state, and within the process of labor in bourgeois society which is abstract and quantitative and deprives the individual of the products of his labor, making him dependent on an alien force against which he is powerless. Anticipating Marx's criticism of bourgeois society, Hegel says: "The value of labor decreases in the same proportion as the productivity of labor increases. . . . The faculties of the individual are infinitely restricted and the consciousness of the factory worker is degraded to the lowest degree of dullness" (79). The social system arising from abstract labor and quantitative exchange is "a vast system of communality and mutual interdependence, a moving life of the dead. This system moves hither and yon in a blind elementary way, and like a wild animal calls for strong permanent control and curbing" (79). From this the philosophy of the state is derived. A strong state is necessary in order to prevent the chaos implicit in the method of capitalistic production. The state has as its function the preservation of the freedom of the individual from the destructive forces of economic society. It is not the state as such that is adored, nor is totalitarian power given to it as in Fascism, but the state which incorporates reason, and only so far as it does so. Here lies the absolute contrast between Hegel and National Socialism.

"On the day of Hitler's ascent to power Hegel, so to speak, died" (419). This quotation from a National Socialist writer concludes the book, rightly denouncing the misjudgment of some Americans who make Hegel's theory of the state responsible for modern totalitarianism. "Hegel's philosophy was an integral part of the culture which authoritarianism had to overcome"

(411). This is not disproved by the fact that Hegel's own monarchic solution was not a solution at all, but a relapse into the irrational which the rational state was supposed to have overcome. It only shows that the contradictions of bourgeois reality lead to state absolutism if they are not overcome in themselves by revolution, the road from Hegel to Marx.

The second part deals (too briefly) with those people who represent the transition from philosophy to sociology. The extremely important thesis of this section is that the positive philosophy of the 19th century was an apologetic for the given socio-political reality, that the restoration in Europe obtained comfort from positivistic philosophers, and that positivistic arguments are used by the present day philosophers of reaction and Fascism. There are striking quotations from Comte, Stahl, and the Fascist pseudo-Hegelians in Italy which show that the lack of critical attitudes to any given reality, natural as well as historical, necessarily leads to the acceptance of the given social and political state of affairs and to the devaluation of the rational individual.

As one who agrees in all important points with Marcuse's book, I should like to make the following criticisms and suggestions. Firstly, the section on Hegel should be substantially enlarged by a full treatment of Hegel's philosophy of religion and an adequate treatment of his aesthetics. Even a critical social theory cannot avoid an "ultimate" in which its criticism is rooted because reason itself is rooted therein. Otherwise criticism itself becomes positivistic and contingent. And no successful revolution can be made without a group of people who—however critical they may be of any special religious symbol—believe that the "freedom of personality" is the meaning of existence and are ready to live and to die for this belief. The pervasive disappointment over the last revolutions demonstrates this irrefutably. Feuerbach is right in showing that there is wishful thinking in religion and Marx is right in showing that the bourgeois religion belongs to the whole of bourgeois ideology. But it is a wrong generalization, derived from a metaphysical materialism, to dismiss religion itself as ideology. The transformation of philosophy into critical theory does not imply such a consequence at all.

Secondly, I should suggest that the second part become a second volume. In its present form it is too short to substantiate fully the thesis that positivism is the philosophy of reaction. Above all, the difference between 18th and 19th century positivism is only indicated, not developed. This is a serious point because it would affect the main thesis. Is positivism as such or only a special type of positivism reactionary? Other points, such as the altogether too fragmentary discussion of Kierkegaard and of the struggle within the Hegelian school, may be mentioned in connection with the demand for the enlargement of this part. In the same connection I want to make the suggestion that the result of the interpretation of Hegel in the first part be related more strictly and extensively to the discussion of the second part.

These suggestions will show that the reviewer anticipates a second edition of Marcuse's book, or more exactly, a continuation of the important and far-reaching interpretations with which it has started.

Paul Tillich (New York).

Rickert, Heinrich, *Unmittelbarkeit und Sinndeutung.* Aufsätze zur Ausgestaltung des Systems der Philosophie. J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Tübingen 1939. (xviii and 185 pp.; RM 8.00)

The essays collected in the present volume have, with one exception, appeared in the *Logos.* They are closely interconnected, constituting the prolegomena to the second volume of Rickert's system, which was never completed. They aim at a doctrine of the constitutive forms of the "intelligible" world, which means, for Rickert, the Kosmos of all the empirical subject matters of the cultural sciences. At the same time, they set forth his views on "prophysics," the *prima philosophia.* The treatise on the "knowledge of the intelligible world and the problem of metaphysics" is preceded by discussions on the First in philosophy, the immediately given, and the relationship of the latter to the "understandable," the last concept occupying the central position in the whole book. During his late period Rickert was apparently very strongly impressed by Dilthey, although he does not once mention his name. He expressly polemicizes, however, against the "understanding" psychology and the doctrine of the "structural whole" (*Strukturzusammenhang*), trying to translate Dilthey's psychologism into a neo-Kantian theory of the objective spirit. The theme of the book is the problem of how a non-speculative knowledge of the objective spirit is possible.

The treatise on the "First in Philosophy" (*Vom Anfang der Philosophie*) is, in a certain sense, a counterpart to Husserl's *Méditations Cartésiennes:* "From a . . . psychological beginning which might vary greatly in character the critical thinker first tries to get at that which is absolutely certain in order to put it at the beginning of the system as the 'logically immediate.' So doing, he still has to leave undetermined that which is the beginning of the world or the ultimate ontological principle." (14) This comes very close to Husserl's method of reductions, the "phenomenological" reduction—which Rickert correctly characterizes as still a psychological one—and the "eidetic" reduction which is supposed to lead to that ultimate ontological principle. In Rickert's writing, Husserl's phenomenological residue bears the name "universal minimum." Both conceive the absolutely First as something that is "left over," as it were, as the profit of absolutely secure being which the philosopher can book after having written off the overhead of the categorical "work" of the mind. This minimum which, according to Rickert, is indifferent with regard to subject and object contains the postulate of the system and therewith the harmony of the world: ". . . from the very beginning philosophy takes it for granted that a structural totality of the world (*gegliedertes Weltganzes*) exists, and to this extent one is justified in saying of philosophy that it is more full of presuppositions than any other science." (16) Philosophy is defined *a fortiori* as a system. The identity of subject and object is stipulated, and it is only if that identity is valid that being as a whole fits without any leftover within the residue, as implied in a "principle which links up all parts into a structural totality" (*loc. cit.*).

Rickert's sharp-wittedness comes to the fore in the discussion of the "universal minimum." The criticism of one idealist philosopher very often

hits the weak spots of another. Thus Rickert is superior to Husserl in essential elements of the analysis of the ego, however much he is his inferior as far as conceptual differentiations and concrete richness within the abstraction is concerned. He has a more drastic idea of subjectivity than Husserl. He knows that the correlate of the "act," of the "givenness," of everything that Husserl would label as a mere datum, is a man who "means," to whom something is given, who finds something. Paradoxically enough, it is this very insight which makes Rickert more clearsighted against psychologism than the author of the *Logische Untersuchungen*. By "heterothetically" referring the immediately given to one's "own ego" he cannot any longer regard that ego as a mere form of organization of the data. The ego has to be added, to some extent independently, to everything objective and is therewith from the very beginning much more substantial than the ego is in Husserl's philosophy. This very substantiality, however, makes this ego fall victim to Rickert's critique. Starting from the ego as from "myself," Husserl sees the individual as unproblematical because the individual actually means nothing to him. Rickert, however, realizes that the "exceptional position therewith attributed to one's ego" (22) is accidental. His analysis of solipsism as the starting position of prima philosophia still shows traces of the great idealist tradition lost in phenomenology: "Why at the beginning of philosophy should I not think myself . . . alone with my ideas? . . . but everything depends on what is meant by 'alone' . . . alone means . . . as much as lonely, and this concept loses its meaning if one does not think of a community from which one has separated. It is precisely the ego that knows itself as alone, that is to say, as lonely, that must necessarily presuppose a community of other individuals coordinated to it by their being. There is not and cannot be a lonely ego qua 'world.'" (23) Rickert's insight goes even farther. He despises the easy way out, that of substituting the individual ego through a collective consciousness—in Husserl, "intersubjectivity." His *prima philosophia* leaves room for the experience of alienation: "We have an abundance of immediately given data of our consciousness which do not refer to persons and their interrelationships. Hence, even the content of a self-consciousness broadened into collective consciousness deteriorates into a mere particuliarity within the orbit of the immediately given." (25) He reaches the resolute formula that "we can never hope to penetrate from a mere piece of immediately certain data to the universal minimum." (25). Here, however, the movement of the concept slackens. Rickert is incapable of dissolving the belief in immediateness itself. The "abstract ego element" (*abstraktes Ichmoment*) of something which is utterly beyond objectification, which Rickert claims as the actual residuum, is indeed so abstract that it not only cannot be perceived as Rickert holds against phenomenology, but it cannot even be thought. With Rickert, too, the pure ego of idealism remains an impasse.

The transition from Rickert's *prima philosophia* to his theory of the "understandable" is made in the article "The Method of Philosophy and the Immediate," which is a critique of what Rickert calls "hyletic sensualism." This term covers every philosophic position which accepts only sensual elements as immediately given. Oddly enough, Rickert holds that Kant and Husserl also were guilty of such sensualism. Some misunderstandings are

involved at this point. Thus Husserl believes in a hyletic kernel of every knowledge but reckons the acts (*noeses*) as such, as well as the sensations, to be among the immediate data of consciousness. To be sure, he does not reckon among them the objects of the acts, that which is "meant" by them (*noemata*). These, however, are the things that matter to Rickert. Their totality coincides with his *mundus intelligibilis*. He takes over the object of the act with all its Husserlian characteristics, particularly the timelessness, but ignores Husserl's theory of act correlation and hypostatizes that which is "meant" by the act as an immediateness of its own. His uncritical attachment to the notion of immediateness leads to a confusion which is dispensed with only in the last sections of the book, in implicit contradiction with the middle section (Cf. also p. 89). Yet even this middle section contains some remarkable observations, notably that the historical is basically inaccessible to eidetic phenomenology (58). Almost Hegelian is the formulation against the "stream of experience" (*Erlebnisstrom*): "Without thinking a content to be the same content or within the form of identity . . . we cannot say anything about it at all. Even the idea of the 'stream' must presuppose identity in order to 'sublate' (*aufheben*) it afterwards." (67) The description of preobjective immediateness as a "state" (*Zustand*), however, betrays the limitation of this critical insight within the form Rickert gives it. In the identity of the state, the stream, the becoming, (das Werdende) freezes and Rickert's descriptive concept of "state" is seen to lack that potentiality of sublating itself (*sich selber aufzuheben*), the program of which he maintains.

The final essay puts the not quite humble question, "How can we achieve knowledge of the *mundus intelligibilis* in its proper being when we attempt as far as possible to distinguish it conceptually from the sensual world, and what place is taken in the whole of the world by the *kosmos noetos* thus grasped?" (114) The emptiness of any possible reply is prescribed by the nature of the question itself. Then comes a critique of the platonic doctrine of ideas. It is first arbitrarily transvaluated into a metaphysics of "understandable" being and afterwards rejected because of the transcendence of such a being. Rickert contrasts to it his own problematic "immediateness" of the intelligible. There follows a polemic against Dilthey, underscoring the objective spirit and playing off the timelessness of the *noemata* against the "psychological products" (*psychische Gebilde*): "We ought finally to learn fully to separate the psychological being of single individuals who perceive and understand from the content which is grasped through these, that which is perceived and understood, and which might go far beyond the psychological life of the individuals." (132) The chapter contains—one hardly believes one's eyes—a footnote about Proust, a rumor of whom has reached Rickert through E. R. Curtius. The novelist would have enjoyed the touching final passage of this reference: "Should poetry here precede science and show it new paths?" (134) In spite of such naiveties, however, Rickert still seems capable of some daring exploits. Thus he ascribes to the silent bodily world, as the bearer of understandable meanings, "language and face" (*Antlitz*). He maintains an objectivity of expression far beyond the range of human signs and reaches the conclusion "that the sensual material we need in order to find in it the matter of our knowledge of the intelligible world necessarily always must be allegorical." (147) The physiognomics of the objective spirit were not sung at the cradle of German neo-Kantianism. Such physiognomics

include genuine insights pertaining to the philosophy of language and music, for example, "that the poetic content of any structure of words that we call a poem is as little exhausted within the perceptible (that is to say within the sensuous representation of the meaning of the word) as the theoretical content of a scientific proposition." (149) This, incidentally, is the main idea of the significant but totally forgotten book by Theodore A. Meyer on the law of poetry (*Stilgesetz der Poesie*, 1901). Another example: "Particularly with regard to the sense of a melody the meaning of the individual tones show an analogous relation to the whole of the musical structure as the meaning of individual words do to the meaningful totality of a whole poem." (150) Put this together with Rickert's statement that music consists of tones "which do not enter as words" (*ibid.*) and you have implicit no less a conception than that of music as a non-intentional language *sui generis*. For the sake of such findings one is ready to forgive the fact that Rickert's theory of the intelligible finally evokes his theory of values, through the somewhat sad assertion that everything logically or aesthetically intelligible is either valuable or valueless.

What characterizes the strange book above all is the configuration of sagacity and weakness of thinking which is disclosed in it. Rickert has the merit of striving for precision and for unambiguity of concept within a realm which otherwise, under the title of "life," is the unprotected prey of chat. But again and again the formulations fall short of their aim either through emptiness or through obvious mistakes, as in the case of the "immediateness of the intelligible." There are objective reasons for this. Most of the arguments are belated auxiliary constructs for insights which cannot be "reduced" to basic facts but can only be won within theoretically explicit societal experiences. Hence Rickert's impotence. He either works with pseudo-deductions where nothing can be inferred from mere concepts, or he charges scientific induction with a task which it cannot possibly fulfill: "Hence in the realm of the intelligible, too, nothing is left to us but to attempt to come from the particular to the general. It ought not to be demonstrated expressly (!) that here, as in the sensuous world, we have to proceed towards a general that is more than relatively or conditionally general." (178) This demand falls back behind Kant. The impossibility of Rickert's system cannot be explained through the so-called irrationality of a life that itself is quite able to be permeated by reason. That impossibility has rational reasons of its own. The contradictions of "life" have taken possession of the concepts to such an extent that they are as little to be reconciled as life itself. The belief in their systematic reconcilability has become a mere superstition. To think the world as a unity, this thinking too much today, involves a thinking too little. Already, sharp-wittedness and weak-wittedness belong together.

T. W. ADORNO (Los Angeles).

Mises, Richard v., *Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus*, Einführung in die empiristische Wissenschaftsauffassung. W. P. van Stockum and Zoon. The Hague 1939 (xii and 467 pp.)

Russell, Bertrand, *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth.* W. W. Norton & Co. New York 1940. (445 pp.; $4.50)

Mises' book is a kind of official textbook of modern positivist doctrine covering all branches of science and philosophy. The first four sections deal with the foundations of the "exact theories" and merely restate the well-known position of the protagonists of "unified science." There are, however, some differences in shading: for example, there is less hostility to the *Schulphilosophie* and metaphysic than there is in the *Wiener Kreis*, and a remarkable restraint has been placed on the demand that all scientific propositions be derived from *Protokollsätze*. Moreover, Mises suggests that the division of propositions into *sinnvolle* and *sinnleere* be replaced by a division into *verbindbare* and *unverbindbare* ones.

The primary criterion of a scientific statement is that it conform to the generally recognized rules which govern the use of every-day language. Mises himself stresses the far-reaching implications of this criterion, stating that the rules specified "include all conventions which determine the relations between spoken (written) words and the experiences *(Erlebnisse)* coordinated with these words—no matter whether or not such conventions have ever been expressly formulated" (pp. 332f.). *Verbindbarkeit* thus means much more than compliance with certain grammatical or stylistical rules,—it means that the propositions in which the world is interpreted must *a priori* conform to the whole body of acknowledged experiences which these rules express and perpetuate. No wonder that hardly a single proposition of Hegel's dialectical logic meets with this standard of "truth."

There is, however, another standard and another form of theory accepted by positivism, that of "tautological" propositions. According to Mises, logic and mathematics, for example, consist of tautological propositions which are "valid independent of all experience" because they do not state anything about reality but are merely new forms *(Umformungen)* comprising arbitrarily fixed rules of language (definitions) (p. 117). A tautological system cannot be examined as to its truth or falsehood, but only as to its consistency and utility *(Zweckmässigkeit)* in the presentation of observable phenomena.

The debasement of cognition that is so clearly reflected in these formulations distinguishes all the general methodological utterances of modern positivism. Unable to fulfill its quest for certainty and security, positivist thought seeks refuge in tautological definitions and the fixed conventions of every-day language. It orients knowledge to the ideal of providing an adequate description of that which is. This might still pass for a correct description of the aim of knowledge, were it not for the simple fact that the standard of *Verbindbarkeit* forbids any formulation that is critical in a genuine philosophical sense. For example, the totality of "that which is" is such that its adequate description must renounce the standard of every day language—which is itself an integral part of this totality. If the ends and interests of men are distorted to such an extent that the distortion pervades all human relations (of thought as well as practice) in a given reality,

then its adequate description must be *unverbindbar* in exactly the sense repudiated by the positivists; it must be contradictory to the prevailing conventions rather than compliant with them. This does not imply that the statements of such a critical theory are meaningless, arbitrary, and beyond conceptual control. Their meaning is defined in the theoretical context in which they appear. The theoretical context reformulates the historical content which the fundamental ideas have taken in, applies it to the prevailing situation, and relates it to the concrete potentialities derived from the analysis of this situation. The context itself is essentially other than that of exact positivist theory, for (1) it centers around such human interests and relations as freedom, right, happiness, reason, subordinating all other spheres of intellectual activity to defining and realizing them, and (2) it takes every single phenomenon as part of a definite historical totality of human existence and analyses it with a view to the potentialities of this totality.

It is surprising to find that Mises himself points to the essential limitations of his demand for *Verbindbarkeit.* He draws attention to situations in which the quest for enlightenment encounters a prevailing language that "was not created for such a task and was utterly inappropriate to it" (p. 303). He cites the controversy between Heraclitus and the Eleatics and the consequent elaboration of the concept Being and Becoming. In such a situation, he says, the new insights are at first *unverbindbar*, and this quality might very well be the mark of their truth. We may add that this is exactly the situation in which every genuine philosophy finds itself. Philosophical questions originate from and express a conflict between new insights and the "general usage of language." The "new" insights, also, may well be old ones that have been forgotten and have degenerated in the existential relations which the "general usage" perpetuates. So far the methodological part of the book.

The last three sections are particularly significant because they present a summary of the positivist conception of the cultural sciences. Notwithstanding all efforts to do justice to such "inexact" objects as art, literature, religion and right, these sections are extremely barren and abstract. There is a constantly renewed attempt to show that no essential difference exists between the procedures of the exact theories on the one hand and of the theory of society, art, morals, and right on the other. The common-sense approach here yields insights like this: "the poet communicates experiences on vital relations between observable phenomena by using certain conventions which must be counted among the rules of language" (p. 335). And the author reproaches Hegel's metaphysic for offending against the limits of "good taste!" A religious system is defined as "certain complexes of interconnected statements which aim at ruling *(regeln)* the behavior of large human groups in a definite sense" (p. 405). These statements are so remote from the actual subject matter they claim to be treating that they surpass all *unverbindbare* propositions of metaphysics.

More important, however, is the author's complete helplessness in the field of the social sciences. Here again, Mises is primarily interested in showing that the social sciences have the same conceptual structure as the natural sciences, that the various social theories contradict each other, and that all decision must be left open for future experience and observation. He reproaches Neurath for not stating clearly enough that "propositions

which are contrary to those of Marx and Engels are just as admissible from the standpoint of scientific logic" (p. 286). Discussing law and morals, Mises raises the question whether actions can be approved that run counter to prevailing legal and moral norms and aim to change them by force. He holds the question to be *unverbindbar* insofar as it involves a moral evaluation.

The bare vestiges of philosophical problems that can still be traced in Mises' book have completely disappeared from *Russell's* study of meaning and truth, which deals neither with meaning nor with truth, the approach and concepts being such as to render the notion of meaning and truth inapplicable to the subject matter treated. The problem of truth arose in philosophy in connection with the most concrete questions and interests of human existence, and it has philosophical meaning only insofar as it is definitely related to them. It is meaningful to ask for the truth in the context of the quest for freedom, reason, justice, of a rational society, but it is entirely meaningless to investigate the truth of such statements as "this is a dog," "the snow is white," "I am hot," meaningless not because the analysis of language is not important for philosophy, but because it is much too important to be oriented to silly propositions emptied of all problems. Russell's analysis is concerned with dogs and cats, cheese, butter and bacon, p, p^n and p^{n+1}. Frequently, however, human relationships, history and society enter the horizon of this "philosophy." For example, there is a lengthy discussion of the difference in meaning between the sentences "Brutus killed Caesar," and "Caesar killed Brutus," and the "ultimate source" of the distinction is found to be the difference between "x precedes y" and "y precedes x," where "x and y are events." There are such "decisive" problems as "if there were in New York an Eiffel Tower exactly like the one in Paris, would there be two Eiffel Towers, or one Eiffel Tower in two places?" There is the illuminating assertion that "we know that Caesar was murdered, but until this event occurred it was not known." And there is the warranted prediction that "if some one brings you, in the dark, into the neighborhood of a ripe Gorgonzola, and says, can't you smell roses? you will say no."

We do not think that we are unfair to Russell's book in selecting out these ridiculous illustrations. They indicate precisely the dimension in which his analysis proceeds. In its quest for certainty and security, positivism is compelled to formalize all propositions to such an extent that they either state nothing about reality (see R.v.Mises' thesis above) or state only things in which nobody is interested and which everybody knows anyway. The propositions cannot be disputed because all controversial content has been removed. The problem of meaning and truth, on the other hand, should begin only where there is a controversial matter, one on which no agreement can possibly be arrived at by going back to the "basic propositions" of the "object language." The problems of freedom, reason, justice cannot be discussed within a conceptual framework that centers around "basic propositions" because disagreement and the transcendence of sense-perception belong to their very essence. If meaning and truth are to be derived from statements such as "I am hot" or "this is red," then all philosophic statements are a priori meaningless and false.

The positivist reduction to "basic propositions" puts philosophic truth before the bar of common sense. Indeed, common sense plays an important

role in philosophy. Hegel, for example, has shown that if questioned in the appropriate manner, common sense itself yields the concepts that justify philosophy's going beyond sense-knowledge. The positivist appeal to such knowledge, on the other hand, stops short at the linguistic form of the statements of common sense and renounces the analysis of their content. Russell himself has shown the absurdity which results, in his brief but brilliant criticism of Neurath's doctrine (pp. 184f.).

Like von Mises' book, Russell's work contains insights which lead beyond the positivist position. His theory of a "hierarchy of languages," for example, starts from the fact (first formulated by Tarski) that "the words 'true' and 'false,' as applied to the sentences of a given language, always require another language, of higher order, for their adequate definition" (p. 75). Truth and falsehood really transcend all "given language" only insofar as they likewise transcend the given order of reality which this language expresses. No actual transcendence takes place when the truth of statements like "I am hot" or "this is a dog" are in question. The synthetical and linguistic difficulties implied in the question might easily be avoided by introducing a "higher" language, which in reality, however, is not other than the given language but a mere derivative of it. The case is quite different with respect to the truth of such propositions as "Freedom is the sole truth of Spirit" or "the realm of freedom begins beyond the realm of daily work." Such sentences are part of a language which is truly "beyond" the given, and they measure the given by standards that are essentially foreign to it. These standards cannot be reached, however, by constructing "higher" languages, and by removing the difficulties and contradictions that arise through a process of artificial formalization, terminating in an entirely consistent "scientific" language. The language to which judgments of truth and falsehood belong contains all the matters of fact indicated by the "given" language and all its inconsistencies and contradictions, but it comprehends them under the aspect of their transformation into another, more rational order. It is not the rationality reflected in the system of unified science but that which, in our days, motivates the struggle of men against authoritarian unification. The language of truth and falsehood is, in the last analysis, the language that bears witness to this struggle.

Herbert Marcuse (Los Angeles).

Ushenko, Andrew Paul, *The Problems of Logic.* Princeton University Press. Princeton 1941. (225 pp.; $2.75)

Frye, Albert Myrton, and **Albert William Levi,** *Rational Belief,* An Introduction to Logic. Harcourt, Brace & Co. New York 1941. (xiii and 482 pp.; $2.75)

Wood, Ledger, *The Analysis of Knowledge.* Allen & Unwin. London 1940. (263 pp.; 12 s. 6 d.)

Ushenko's book is a cautious protest against the abusive claims of the purely "postulationalist" logic which identifies logical problems with those of linguistics, semantics, and mathematics. He emphasizes that "logical form is not co-extensive with the syntax of language" and that propositions have a definite "objective reference" to something that is not a word but a "thing," to a fact "outside discourse." Logic, in other words, is concerned with truth, and truth implies something "beyond convention," some agreement with an objective, "external reality." These are insights which constitute a remarkable achievement in the present-day discussion of logical problems. To be sure, Ushenko's position is at once faced with the old "paradox" that "there exists within discourse an objective for reference, the nature of which is to be something outside discourse," that logic comprises elements which "belong at once to conception and to external reality." His solution, in his own words, is a "revival, with essential differences, of the transcendental logic." The essential difference consists in his distinction between categories which have an "objective reference" and categories which are simply means or functions of "organizing thought." To him, the logical validity of the means of organizing thought in a proposition (the categories) is not in any way identical (as it was to Kant) with objective validity. This distinction makes it possible for Ushenko to reconcile transcendental logic with the decisive theses of modern formal logic, especially with the assumption that not concepts (terms) or judgments but propositions are the real units of logic, that concepts attain their logical validity only through their function in propositions, and that logical deduction depends on "formal properties" and not on "connotation." Then, of course, any transcendental deduction of categories and judgments is impossible, and Ushenko seeks the basis for the validity of logical forms in the pronouncement of "intuition," which provides a "direct apprehension of an exhibition of form." Apart from this attempt to formulate the objective foundations of logic, the book contains a thorough and critical analysis of the paradoxes and the most modern efforts to solve them.

While Ushenko's book is fully aware of the philosophical problematic of logic and of the philosophical implications involved in the scientific and mathematical formalization of it, Frye's and Levi's *Rational Belief* exemplifies the leveling down of all logical problems to the uses of an innocuous textbook. Theirs is a treatise in traditional logic with almost complete disregard of recent reformulations of the field. The task that remains unfulfilled is to restate this logic in its full historical and philosophical significance, and no attempt to perform it is made in the book under review. Instead, logic is harnessed to the authority of common sense,—a common sense, of course, which has taken in the refining achievements of modern science and technics. The authors treat logic as the study of rational

belief, and formulate the "law of rational belief" as follows: "Accept without qualification only true propositions; qualify the acceptance of any proposition that is only probably true by the measure, or sufficiency, of the reason for it." True propositions are either formal or material; the former are either self-evident or inferred, the latter must ultimately be justified by experience. Experience must be submitted to scientific method, the primary element of which is observation. This is the framework in which the classifications, distinctions, and laws of traditional logic are repeated, exemplified by nice, often amusing, stories, newspaper clippings, and anecdotes. The level of the discussion might be illustrated by two instances: in the paragraph headed "The Limitations of Sense Experience" one looks in vain for a treatment of the various philosophical criticisms of sense-knowledge, but one finds the statement that "the observer should have his physical condition, particularly his sense organs, tested,—an astronomer with bad eyesight or a particularly slow perceptual response should be aware of such defects." And the Socratic Method is held to be "simply a technique for the clarification of meaning, in which one clear-minded individual sets out to infer accurately the meanings hidden behind the actual assertion of one less clear-minded than himself."

Ushenko uses the referential or intentional thesis for a reformulation of logical problems; Ledger Wood applies the same thesis to a far-reaching epistemological analysis. His book may be characterized as a phenomenological investigation into the structure of knowledge. He begins with sensory knowledge and perception, then takes up memory, introspection and the knowledge of other selves, and ends with conceptual, formal and valuational knowledge. His analysis is guided by the principle that intentionality, meaning referential transcendence "beyond the immediate data of experience," is the essential feature of all knowledge. This implies a critique of positivistic and fictionalistic epistemology that is particularly fruitful in Wood's discussion of sensory knowledge. He recognizes that the sense data, "far from being the first in the order of knowledge, are the end-products of refined and subtle psychological analyses and philosophical abstractions." Spontaneous intellectual processes operate in apparently the most immediate modes of knowledge and terminate in the perception of "things": the "thing" is the result of a whole chain of syntheses which integrate inner- and intrasensory qualities. The syntheses themselves are largely governed by imaginatory and pragmatic factors. "Thinghood is no doubt a pragmatic category, but it is grounded in the structure of the phenomenally real."

One might expect that this view would open the way to an analysis of knowledge which follows out the "mediating processes" operative in perception and dissolves the positivistic abstractions into the unrestricted historical continuum of experience. This, however, is not the case. At best, Wood arrives at some *Gestalt* psychological corrections of positivistic epistemology. The trans-sensory factors which he recognizes as constitutive of experience do not go beyond certain elementary pragmatic or psychological processes (association of ideas, recognition) acknowledged even by the sensualists. He gives a quick critique of Kant's transcendental analytics, treats Hegel's dialectical logic with superior contempt, and eventually succumbs to the positivistic impoverishment of knowledge.

This becomes especially clear in Wood's discussion of conceptual and valuational knowledge. According to him, the universals to which concepts

refer are but "classes" of particulars, dependent upon the resemblance or similarity between the members of the class. True, "the object of the concept is not the bare particulars, but the particulars in their resemblance to one another." The concept is a "unique and unrepeatable mental event" which cannot be identically the same in two individuals. On the other hand, Wood admits that the concept is "not a bare psychological fact" but does possess constancy and identity of meaning in a multiplicity of individual intellectual acts. He explains this identity by the phenomenon of "multiple intent," by virtue of which numerically distinct concepts refer to one and the same intentional object. The phenomenon of multiple intent itself, however, although the "very heart and core of knowledge," is designated as a mere "fact," to be accepted as "an ultimate and inexplainable trait of consciousness." Concerning the formation of concepts, Wood gives a mere psychological interpretation: the conceptual synthesis is determined by the "law of recognition," and the behavior of the child who recognizes and names the toy which was taken away from him is held to exemplify the origin of conceptual thinking.

Wood's theory of conceptual knowledge denies the reality of universals in any form, a position which is greatly facilitated by the exclusion of all problems concerning the existence and structure of the external object of knowledge. Such "phenomenological reduction" seems today to play the same game as the fictionalism and nominalism which it was originally meant to overcome. Wood's theory of universal concepts lacks an adequate empirical foundation. He does not attempt to unfold the full structure of experience, an attempt which might have led him to see the missing experiential basis for universality as a historical phenomenon bound up with the situation of knowledge in a particular form of society. Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*, which links the development of conceptual universality to the historical development of human consciousness and practice, is much more empirical than Wood's epistemological analysis. The latter considers only the abstract epistemological subject in its contacts with other likewise abstract subjects; outside this sphere, the subject appears mainly as determined by custom, habit and the "moral sentiments of decent men." Wood's philosophy thus shows definite conformistic tendencies which bear their fruits in his discussion of valuational knowledge and culminates in the statement that moral ideals and principles "have no authority different from the rules of a game," say contract bridge, or, still better, from the postulates of a mathematical science. They are not true "in the strict sense"; "they are only posited in order that their logical implications may be elicited." These analogies are not meant to illuminate an actual state of affairs (in which case they may be very adequate descriptions) but the verv structure of valuational knowledge.

In his concluding chapter, Wood presents a discussion of the meaning of truth which again combines the features characteristic of his whole study: on the one hand a criticism of current epistemological ideas that aims to go far, and on the other a surrender to these same ideas. Maintaining the definition that truth is a correspondence between the meaning of a proposition and a factual situation, Wood recognizes that "bare facts cannot be subsumed under or assimilated to pure meanings, and hence the fact which constitutes the verification or falsification of a propositional meaning is not a bare fact, but a fact suffused with conceptual meanings." Wood is thus at

the threshold of a theory which places the problem of verification into a critical context transcendent to the homogeneous continuum of logic. For, the conceptual meanings with which the facts are suffused point to the material as well as intellectual totality which constitutes experience. Wood does not follow up this lead, however. He replaces the "bare fact" by a "non-propositional meaning" which turns out to be "usually a perceptual meaning," referring to the "sensuous core of the percept itself." His anti-positivistic interpretation of verification thus comes to terms with the enemy.

Wood's book is rich in thorough phenomenological analyses in the field of epistemology and logic (see, for example, his critique of the doctrine of self-refuting propositions and of the various aprioristic theories) which are far above the level of current discussions. It is strange, however, that this work, which is so much indebted to the doctrines of the phenomenological school, refrains from any discussion or even mention of Husserl and of the even closer related epistemological studies of Wilhelm Schapp and Edith Landmann.

HERBERT MARCUSE (Los Angeles).

Psychology

Fromm, Erich, *Escape from Freedom.* Farrar and Rinehart. New York 1941. (xi and 305 pp.; $2.50)

Much is being written on the subject of freedom in these days of struggle against the totalitarian powers who would like to suppress all freedom. The word is on many lips. Not always does it have meaning for those who use it and sometimes it is used to cover activities and thoughts designed to abolish freedom and democracy. It should give pause to think, then, that one as passionately and seriously interested in the cause of freedom as the author of this book finds himself compelled to call his most penetrating analysis of the role of freedom in modern man "Escape from Freedom."

Fromm's book presents a social and individual psychology from the point of view of freedom. His main thesis concerns the twofold aspect of freedom: on the one hand freedom means the liberation from those "primary bonds" which tied man to nature or which, in the clan or in feudal society, tied him to the authorities of society and to his fellow men from whom he is not yet set apart as an "individual." Such "freedom *from*" is not as yet a positive freedom ("freedom *to*"). Positive freedom, according to Fromm, "is identical with the full realization of the individual's potentialities, together with his ability to live actively and spontaneously." From the lag between the development of "freedom from" and "freedom to" crucial problems result which can be seen ontogenetically especially during infancy and childhood, and which are discussed historically for the period of the Reformation and for the crisis of the present era.

It is characteristic of both these historical periods that entire strata of a society shaken to its foundations by far-reaching social and economic changes attempt to escape their freedom from old ties that have been destroyed by these far-reaching changes.

In a remarkable analysis Fromm shows how Lutheranism and Calvinism appealed strongly to profound psychic needs and anxieties prevalent especially among the middle classes in the period of transition from the medieval to the modern economic form, and how these needs and anxieties were internalized as new attitudes that became powerful productive instrumentalities during the rise of capitalism. To give one instance of this type of analysis, the author points to Luther's and Calvin's emphasis on the worthlessness and impotence of the individual. They were touching upon a feeling deeply rooted among groups that were most sorely threatened by the insecurities attending the dissolution of the medieval guild system and the transformation of the feudal into the capitalist society. The feeling that one had no merits of his own but was merely a powerless tool in the hands of God was especially fostered by the Calvinistic dogma of predestination, according to which God's salvation of one man and his condemnation of another was nothing but God's way of showing His power. Such teachings deprived man of his

sense of dignity and prepared him "to accept a role in which his life became a means to purposes outside himself, those of economic productivity and accumulation of capital," whereas in medieval thought man's spiritual salvation and his spiritual aims had been the purpose of life.

There are a number of other very significant insights into the socio-psychological background of the Reformation. Space does not permit us to do more than mention a few which seemed most illuminating: the Calvinistic dogma of predestination is compared with production for the market (as opposed to the guild system); the quality of work in modern society is shown to be comparable to the compulsive activity with which some neurotics attempt to allay their fears, insecurity, and doubt; there is keen appraisal of the role of doubt and of the attempts to silence it.

The Reformation laid the foundation for the social character of modern man, the analysis of which is the central theme of the book. Fromm lays down a schema of various psychic "mechanisms of escape" employed by modern man to escape from the negative freedom which leaves him isolated and insecure, freed from the primary bonds which fettered his development, but which also gave him security. These mechanisms of escape are conceived as various attempts of the individual to cope with his aloneness and powerlessness in the face of an alienated and overwhelmingly powerful world. They are termed (1) authoritarianism (or the "symbiotic" solution which the sado-masochistic character seeks), (2) destructiveness, (3) withdrawal, (4) self-inflation, and (5) automaton-conformity. Of these Fromm believes withdrawal and self-inflation to be important only in severely pathological cases, hence culturally of small weight. One might question this especially for the mechanism of withdrawal, since the isolation of the individual, although a consequence of the modern social and economic process, is very much reinforced by the tendency of the individual to withdraw from others, to regard them with indifference, if not with suspicion and active hostility, and to live within the four walls of his self, his home, or his family, and to fear the "stranger," tendencies which are especially strong in the French and German lower middle class.[1]

The emphasis in Fromm's discussion of the mechanisms of escape rests on "authoritarianism" and "automaton conformity." Both are essential for an understanding of modern man in western civilization. While authoritarianism may be the more obvious phenomenon in the Fascist countries and automaton conformity of greater social importance in the democracies, especially in the United States, there can be no doubt that, regardless of the differences in political institutions and forms of government, both these mechanisms are powerful psychological forces in the social character of

[1]Fromm himself, in a recent lecture at a meeting of the American Institute for Psychoanalysis, has given a re-interpretation of the character-syndrome observed and described first by Freud and Karl Abraham as the "anal character." Of the three most important traits of the anal character, obstinacy, orderliness, and cleanliness, he has interpreted cleanliness as the attempt of the individual to avoid as dangerous all contact with the world around him, either by not touching it or, if he has to touch it, by eliminating all traces of such contact in the ritual of "cleansing" himself. If this, to my mind very convincing, interpretation is valid it would be a strong argument for the social significance of the mechanism of withdrawal, since the anal character, as Fromm has pointed out, it rather typical of the middle class (see his essay on "Die psychoanalytische Charakterologie und ihre Bedeutung für die Sozialpsychologie," in *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung*, Vol. I, 1932, pp. 253-277).

modern man, no matter whether they are accepted ideologically, as they are, partly, in the totalitarian states, or whether they form a contrast to the prevailing ideology.

In the discussion of authoritarianism Fromm has broadened his earlier studies on the authoritarian character[1] and has added new insights. Of these the emphasis on the symbiotic strivings of the sado-masochistic (or authoritarian) character is especially important. He shows that in both masochistic submission and sadistic domination the drive to escape aloneness by clinging to somebody else plays a major role. The essence of sadism is *not* destruction of its object (although sadism is frequently if not always linked with destructiveness) but the striving to wield absolute power over another being, a striving which needs the continued existence of the dominated being and which assumes its paramount strength when spontaneous relationships to others are crippled and the individual is confronted with the threat of aloneness.

The description and analysis of automaton conformity is perhaps the most important contribution of the book. Because of its tremendous social and psychological importance a brief historical digression may be permitted into a field which is little known and hardly ever mentioned today, but which seems to foreshadow the present-day development with which Fromm is concerned. The automaton, the mechanical machine toy patterned on animals and humans, was very much in vogue during the second part of the 17th and 18th centuries, especially in France and Germany.[2] Public fascination for it at that time was probably due to the fast growing importance of machinery in industry and to the progress of rational medicine (especially since Harvey's discovery of the pump action of the heart and of blood circulation). The automaton was a distorted expression of a rationalistic century's belief in the ultimate triumph of reason: man could do everything with machinery and could understand himself as clearly as a machine.[3] While the automaton was yet in vogue writers like E. T. A. Hoffmann,[4] Jean Paul,[5] and others were already aware of the social processes tending to transform men's personalities into machines functioning like the famous automatons which the public enjoyed so much. Fromm describes in detail, with telling examples drawn from the psychoanalytic exploration of individuals, the psychic processes which lead, usually early in childhood, to

[1] *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, ed. Max Horkheimer, Sozialpsychologischer Teil, Felix Alcan, Paris 1936.

[2] While "robots" still belong to the standard exhibits of fairs and miracle shows they are only the cruder and more powerful descendents of the automaton, built to inspire a mixture of fearful admiration and feelings of superiority over the clumsy giant rather than enjoyment of an ingenious and intricate toy, and they cannot compare in mechanical perfection with the 18th century automaton. A scholarly descriptive catalogue and history of the automaton is given by Alfred Chapuis and Edouard Gélis, *Le Monde des Automates*, 2 vols., Paris 1927. The cultural history of these toys has still to be written and, no doubt, would yield most interesting results.

[3] In Lamettrie, *L'Homme machine*, 1750, this belief finds its classical expression.

[4] E. T. A. Hoffmann, *Der Sandmann* (Nachtstücke in Callot's Manier, 1. Teil), in which the automaton Olympia—of Tales of Hoffmann fame—satirically represents the classical "Débutante."

[5] Der *Maschinen-Mann nebst seinen Eigenschaften* (Auswahl aus des Teufels Papieren, Dritte Zusammenkunft, Chapter X) where the reader is told that he is the machine man (automaton) and the 18th century is derided as the era in which men were nothing but automatons, with the implication that the 19th century is no better.

the "loss of self" and the substitution of automaton conformity for the real self. This, he says, is "the solution that the majority of normal individuals find in modern society." They are what others expect them to be, especially what such anonymous forces as public opinion, the Joneses, the majority expect them to be. The hypnotic situation demonstrates in striking fashion the process which, socially, works in more subtle ways to a similar end. The individual ceases to think and feel his own thoughts and feelings, to make his own decisions, and instead thinks, feels, and acts as he is expected[1] or as a "well adapted person" should. Through the analysis of the automaton character and "loss of self," a criticism is implied of the highly problematical concept of adaptation or adjustment, a normative concept that usually goes unchallenged in spite of its ubiquitous use in present-day education, psychology, and psychiatry. Adaptation through loss of self produces the intense insecurity which drives men to submit to such authorities as seem to promise security and relief from doubt.

The psychological insights won through analysis of the meaning of freedom for modern man and of the mechanisms he employs to escape from negative freedom provide the instrument for a penetrating investigation of the psychology of Nazism. Hitler's character structure is used here as a typical example of those phychological traits, especially prominent in the German lower middle class, to which the Nazi ideology had such a strong appeal and which played a major role in molding the social character of the groups that furnished the mass support for Nazism.

The concluding chapter examines the role of freedom in democracy and points up the dangers which threaten democracy where people do not progress from "freedom from" to "freedom to." From the psychological viewpoint, these dangers lie especially in the abandonment of individuality in favor of automaton conformity, a state which prepares the individual not for fulfilling his self, his potentialities, and his happiness, but for accepting a leader and an ideology that promise to allay his insecurity, anxiety, and doubt. Positive freedom can be achieved only in a society which, on the basis of a planned economy, permits the individual to participate actively in the social process, to find a spontaneous relation, in love and work, to the world and to realize his individual self. The concept of spontaneity is thus established as focal for the psychological meaning of positive freedom.

An appendix on "Character and the Social Process" offers a short outline of the method of social psychology. Outlining the chief differences between Freud's and his own views on the psychology of man, Fromm develops the concept of the "social character" which is the key concept of the book. The social character is defined as the "essential nucleus of the character structure of most members of a group which has developed as the result of the basic experiences and mode of life common to that group." Its function for the individual is to "lead him to act according to what is necessary for him from a practical standpoint and also to give him satisfaction

[1]According to one of the best known present-day psychologists, N. Ach (as quoted in *German Psychological Warfare, Survey and Bibliography*, ed. Ladislas Farago, published by the Committee for National Morale, New York 1941, p. 14) "will is a habit of voluntary response to the command of the superior leader." This astonishing definition is taken from Ach's paper "Toward a more modern (!) study of will." read before the 1936 meeting of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Psychologie.

from his activity psychologically." Its social function is to internalize "external necessities and thus harness human energy for the task of a given economic and social system."

The social character is a result of the social process and is a productive force which in its turn influences this process. Incorporated in it, at every stage of historical development, are all the forces which have developed and shaped the character of man throughout history. Man's striving for freedom is part of his historical evolution and has become an inherent part of human nature which cannot be crushed and eliminated at will, but has become a historical force with a dynamism of its own. In unfolding the particular role that this force plays in modern man, in analyzing the psychological dialectics of freedom, Fromm has made a most outstanding and challenging contribution to the social and individual psychology of modern man.

ERNEST G. SCHACHTEL (New York).

Goldstein, Kurt, *Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology.* Harvard University Press. Cambridge 1940. (x and 258 pp.; $2.50)

Harrington, Milton, *A Biological Approach to the Problem of Abnormal Behavior.* Distributed by the Science Press Printing Co. Lancaster, Pa. 1938. (459 pp.; $4.00)

Pressey, Sidney L., J. Elliot Janney, Raymond G. Kuhlen, *Life: A Psychological Survey.* Harper & Brothers. New York 1939. (xxxiii and 624 pp.; $3.25)

Werner, Heinz, *Comparative Psychology of Mental Development.* Harper & Brothers. New York 1940. (xii and 510 pp.; $4.00)

Zachry, Caroline B., in collaboration with **Margaret Lighty,** *Emotion and Conduct in Adolescence.* D. Appleton Century Company. New York 1940. (xv and 563 pp.; $3.00)

Buhler, Charlotte, *The Child and His Family.* Translated by Henry Beaumont. Harper & Brothers. New York 1939. (viii and 187 pp.; $2.50)

The central problem in the wide expanse of present-day psychology appears to be a methodological one. Should psychology deal with an unlimited number of isolated functions and phenomena, or should mind be studied as an organic unity amidst a complex biological and social environment? Obviously, the methodological question covers two more fundamental issues: should the center of gravity in psychology again be shifted to the actual person? And if an organismic and personalistic (one would like to say realistic) view were adopted, how would it affect the present standards and procedures of psychology which are still built largely on an ideology derived from the natural sciences? It seems as if the present development would increasingly tend toward the qualitative, dynamic, organismic view. Scarcely a book is published which does not in some way react

to this trend and express it at the same time. The following books have been selected not only with regard to the sheer weight of their contribution to psychology, but also from the point of view that they may represent typical positions in the present transitory process. In the William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1937-38, Goldstein discussed what psychology can learn from the study of persons afflicted with diseases or lesions of the brain, at the same time outlining a system of psychology on a biological basis. Biology is now turning from the previous atomistic, predominantly quantitative approach to a new one, emphasizing the indivisible coherence and wholeness of the organism. This "holistic" approach which Goldstein has helped to develop, rests on the observation that organic functions observed in isolation appear different from what they actually are in the complexity of natural functioning. Every observation, therefore, has to be made in view of the total organism, following the scheme of "figure" and "background" set up by *Gestalt* psychology. Single functions can only be understood by taking into account the organism as a living unit, its developmental history, and its environment.

For the study of the human mind Goldstein believes that experiences derived from diseases and lesions of the brain are more helpful than those derived from the as yet controversial fields of neuroses and psychoses. Supported by rich case material, he demonstrates that persons with lesions of the brain exhibit behavior characteristic through "lack of grasp of the abstract, lack of an approach to imagined things, inability on the part of the patient to give himself an account of his own acting and thinking, inability to make a separation between the ego and the world, and lack of freedom." Two basic types of behavior can be distinguished on such grounds, the concrete and the abstract, of which the latter represents the highest and the essentially human capacity. Goldstein, however, does not believe that there are several basic instincts or drives. What may appear as a dualist or pluralist phenomenon can, in his opinion, be brought back to the one basic tendency of self-actualization, the essential moving force of the organism.

We can only point in passing to the great wealth of individual problems considered in his book. Of particular interest will be his analysis of the inadequacy of persons with lesions of the brain, his description of anxiety and of catastrophic behavior and his interpretation of the meaning of form and order in connection with the drive to expand.

Goldstein has demonstrated impressively the central significance of the ability to perform abstractions. In spite of his convincing argument, however, the question may be raised whether this concept has not been overstrained if it is to be used as one single principle to explain the essence of cognition and even more. At the same time, the very exposition of the topic of the book is, it would seem to be, of great importance. It may be an open question whether generalizations derived from this field can be extended to the entire breadth of individual and social psychology, as Goldstein seems to suggest. The concept of the organism itself one would wish more accurately defined, and similarly the principle of the "desire for self-actualization." But arguments which may be brought forward against certain factual positions should not obscure the merits of this book. The systematic criticism of atomism in biology, of the stimulus-response scheme

and of conditioned reflexes, as well as the implementation of comprehensive hypotheses, the characterization of the nature of the data in biology, the outline of a methodology of the biological sciences, are contributions of great significance.

While one may clearly say that Goldstein's psychology, despite the disagreement which some of its issues may evoke, is truly biological in spirit, the same can not be said about Milton Harrington's book. The title promises a viewpoint which can only be considered justified if "biological" is taken to characterize a frame of reference utterly mechanistic and atomistic, the functional aspects of which are named according to physiological terminology. It is a noteworthy feature in the cyclic transition from mechanistic to organismic concepts that after a conceptual framework modeled strictly according to physical images has proved no longer tenable, usually so-called physiological concepts for some time are to provide for an intermediate frame of reference. "We are still able," says Harrington, "to speak of thoughts, wishes, emotions as the causes of action, meaning, however, by these terms, not personified states of consciousness, but the physiological processes underlying the states of consciousness to which these terms may also be applied." In this sense he elaborates a psycho-physiology and psychopathology on the basis of a strict stimulus-response scheme of strongly mechanist character employing a strange mixture of neuro-physiological and psychological terms. None of the features that require man to be considered as a unique psychological being has a place in this system. With what remains one may be able to explain the functioning of a robot but not the autonomy of human existence.

The book by Pressey and his collaborators has two different purposes. It wants to help the reader better to understand other people and himself, and aims "to bring together such data about the determinative environment of human living, and such description of the entire sweep of the processes of maturing and decline in human life, as would give better understanding of life's problems." The socio-economic and cultural environment of modern life is outlined in the first part; the second gives the development of human life in its entire course, emphasizing adulthood and psychological changes which occur during this period. The third part treats "in very commonsense fashion" major problems of living such as efficiency and adjustment. "The attempt is to see the larger long-term problems of living, in their larger setting."

While presenting a vast material with great skill, Pressey and his collaborators do not attempt any new comprehensive view of the setting of life itself. The book is written predominantly from the standpoint of the group. Out of fourteen chapters only one is devoted to the individual, and the "new case study procedure" which is introduced here, does not compare favorably with the achievements of intensive clinical and personality studies in recent years. The aim of a total comprehension of life, such as is implied in the title and in the introduction, has not been maintained, as is clearly demonstrated by the authors' inattention to the dynamic constituents of personality. "In fact, emotion will be defined as disorganized response, occurring when the individual is frustrated or baffled. Emotion is like fever; it is evidence that the organism is not functioning in healthy fashion." This seems a rather amazing statement at a time when the basically dynamic character of mind

and personality finds increasing psychological recognition. Nor should the names and the impact of the work of Freud, of John Dollard, Karl Menninger and Henry A. Murray (to name only a few) be absent from a survey of life.

Heinz Werner's book is a translation extensively reworked and brought up to date by a thorough consideration of recent literature. The task of a genetic psychology is "to compare the results gained from work done in specialized fields, and from this comparison to derive developmental laws, generally applicable to mental life as a whole." Developmental psychology aims to grasp the structure or the pattern of each genetic level, and to establish the relationship of development between them. Each of these levels is an organic self-contained whole. Psychological events of whatever nature unfold and develop as they occur; thus they may run the whole gamut from primitive to more complex mental patterns, although the subject of these events allegedly dwells on the last and highest level only.

Building on an amazingly extensive information and on elaborate experimentation, Werner discusses in detail the sensori-motor, perceptual and affective organization of the primitive mind, primitive imagery, primitive notions of space and time, primitive action, primitive thought processes and finally the world and the personality of the primitive. His book impresses as one of the most genuinely interesting and important contributions to recent psychology. It systematically elaborates an aspect which should prove to be significant and promising; careful attention is given to phenomena which in the customary proceedings of psychology were mostly omitted until now, perhaps because they were thought to be slightly dubious, or all too puzzling, or just because they were overlooked. Yet they may be more revealing of essential features of personality and culture and the human mind at large than many of the problems which are pursued on the broad avenues of interest.

Zachry's book is the result of an extensive research project directed by the Commission on Secondary School Curriculum of the Progressive Education Association, set up in order to reconsider the entire area of secondary school education and to bring forth constructive suggestions as to its general scope and its individual fields and problems. The book gives a comprehensive account of emotional development from childhood to adulthood. Maturation imposes—in our time more than ever—the necessity to adjust individual development to the complex social and cultural reality. Thus, the primary function of the school is not seen as the training of the mind only, but as the well-planned guidance of this process of adjustment. Zachry's book has the outstanding merit that it gives a thorough account of human development from this point of view, appropriate to the purposes and needs of the teacher. In the inclusive and detailed discussion of the typical relations, modes of conduct and problems of adolescence, primary importance is given to the dynamic aspects which should emerge as the fundamental ones in any consideration of the personality as a whole.

Buhler's book describes an attempt to apply exact methods to the study of child-parent and sibling relations, and of the development of character among children. Seventeen upper middle class families with a total of thirty children were selected, their doings in every-day life observed and the observations recorded. The present study deals in detail only with eight of

these seventeen families. The total time devoted to each family was from seven to twenty-seven hours, mostly extended over a period of from two to three months. Activity centering around an object and consisting of various individual events was considered as an essential psychological unit. The events observed were ordered under a system of categories, such as situations in which parents approached their children, and *vice versa;* social situations, intercourse, play, biological situations, domestic situations, school and school work, outside world, etc. The inventory of intended purposes embraces the following:

Social: affection, social intercourse (conversation), unfriendliness.

Pedagogical:

(a) On the part of the adult: instruction, guidance, consideration of the child;

(b) On the part of the child: objective questions and statements, seeking permission or recognition, criticizing and influencing the adult, etc.

The means of establishing contacts are subdivided into

(a) Greetings and affectionate approaches: simple greeting, kissing, embracing;

(b) Non-verbal activities: bodily contact; adjusting, straightening, fixing; helping, cooperating; giving, offering, etc.

In this way contact situations and purposes, the role of individual household members, the reactions of parents and children were recorded and computed into numerous graphs and tables. The second part of the book is devoted to sibling relations which are quantitatively evaluated.

It is hard to say what purpose this book is to serve. If it was intended to introduce a new method, the small number of individuals observed over such an insignificantly short period of time would not be apt to prove much, quite apart from the argument which could be raised against the inadequacy of statistical methods. But if this book was designed as an intensive study of a few selected cases, it has to be said that there is simply not enough psychological substance in these specified accounts for demonstrating the complex dynamic structure of family situations. Incidents of family life can, no doubt, be described in terms of the compartmental system here set up for this purpose. Cut out of the flow of reality, they are naturally more palpable and can be tabulated and scored. The question is, on what grounds was just this divisional framework designed, instead of any other which would be equally possible. The study, introduced as a total comprehension of family situations, is very likely but an atomistic accumulation of somewhat artificial data which has almost entirely lost the dynamism of immediate and actual reality. Underlying this approach there seems to be an idea of the nature of family relationships which is scarcely tenable any longer. If the real forces of motivation should be grasped, a study such as this one could hardly satisfy itself with contacts studied as to their overt significance only, as it is claimed here.

FREDERICK WYATT (Cambridge, Mass.).

Britt, Stuart Henderson, *Social Psychology of Modern Life.* Farrar and Rinehart. New York 1941. (xviii and 562 pp.; $3.75)

Walton, Albert, *The Fundamentals of Industrial Psychology.* McGraw-Hill Book Co. New York 1941. (xiii and 231 pp.; $2.00)

Brennan, Robert Edward, *Thomistic Psychology.* Macmillan. New York 1941. (xxvi and 401 pp.; $3.00)

Britt puts his methodological principle as follows: "In social psychology, . . . the primary consideration is not whether something is true which people believe to be true. The important thing is that whatever people believe to be true is true for them. It may make little difference psychologically whether myths or stereotyped beliefs have any real foundation. If the 'pictures in our heads' are believed by us to represent the world around us, then they are of the utmost psychological significance in determining the things we will do." Guided by this principle, Britt's social psychology casts aside all ideological glorifications and taboos and, with cynical frankness, describes not how men ought to be, but how they actually feel, think and live in the age of mass culture. Present-day existence emerges as a series of stereotyped performances, values and ideas, a life in which even the most personal and most sacred spheres of "individuality" are governed by the standards of efficiency, prestige and conformism. Britt thus uses his freedom from value judgments as a device for picturing the world as it is today. The final standard of behavior ruling that world is compliance with "normality," and normality is nothing but a "statistical concept," designating the "culturally sanctioned way of behavior." The traditional ideal of "personality" breaks down in this world, while the much vaunted rationality of modern man gives way to "infantile ways of thinking" and to the "automatic behavior" characteristic of the monopolistic era. "Non-conformity is punished"—this is the threat which drives the individual to identify himself wholesale with his "leaders" and to become an acquiescent member of the crowd. Education, personal as well as social, dwindles to instruction in compliance and to the learning of recognized rules of competition, the latter increasingly taking shape as collusion among the few most powerful groups. Standards of prestige permeate and shape the modes of sexual satisfaction and the religious attitudes. Contempt and hatred of the weaker, racial discrimination, cruelty and resentment are shown to be the social consequences of stereotyped frustration. The book draws extensively on past and present researches in all fields of theoretical and experimental psychology and is one of the most provocative and stimulating documents of contemporary social science. It is supplemented by a careful bibliography for each section.

Walton's book, a volume of the Industrial Series, is written for supervisors entrusted with the task of "getting the most out of the worker." It is written for the "enlightened supervisor," of course, the man who knows that the worker is more than an engine and who therefore takes account of humane and psychological factors. This reviewer is not interested here in the question whether the psychologically refined and streamlined form of "scientific management" discussed in the book yields a greater efficiency than the older forms; the book concerns him only insofar as it supplements

and illustrates, in the sphere of industrial labor, the findings of Britt's Social Psychology.

To Walton, as to Britt, the "personality" is nothing other than as it appears today: the "impression made on other people." Man is a compound of habits, and the development of the personality consists in learning and utilizing those abilities and qualities which make him a success at his job. Quite naturally, the personality thus becomes an object—the sum-total of responses expected by society from its willing members. "We have names for people who propose anything not customary, and the name lists them as public enemies." Nobody wants to be a public enemy. The elaboration of "dependable reaction patterns" becomes the prerequisite for success, while everything that transcends the realm of recognized efficiency becomes a taboo. The emphasis of the book lies on the means and methods the supervisor can use to promote and perpetuate dependable reaction patterns. The trend is definitely towards managerial "leadership." Among the means suggested to "increase the positive attractiveness" of work we find that of prying into the worker's personal affairs: "The leader should make it his business to learn a fact or two about every man working for him, a fact outside of the work he is doing in the shop or office. Every item of personal information so gained is a handle by which to lay hold of a man, whether he be above or below us in the organization." Reports on a number of tests show the great possibilities for increasing efficiency and output by "scientific" handling of rest periods, motions, and by separating groups of workers from the factory at large and segregating them in isolated rooms.—Walton makes his point perfectly clear: the treatment of man as a mere machine must give way to his treatment as a machine with human gadgets, to be skillfully handled by "enlightened" leaders.

Compared with the frightful actuality of the first two books, Brennan's study in Thomistic Psychology reads like a sorrow contemplation of something that since long has ceased to exist. This is certainly not the fault of Thomas Aquinas, nor of his commentator. Brennan's account of Thomas' doctrine of man is thorough and accurate, well organized and documented. He starts with an analysis of Aristotle's psychology and ends up by contrasting the methods and findings of Thomistic psychology with modern psychological and anthropological schools. He has made no attempt, however, to contrast the "eternal truths" of Thomistic psychology with the actual fate of man's nature in society. Society has not only neglected or forgotten but changed the nature of man and thereby changed the forms in which the eternal truths must be presented and realized. The mere repetition of the old forms will hardly help to reestablish their actuality.

HERBERT MARCUSE (Los Angeles).

History

Farrington, Benjamin, *Science and Politics in the Ancient World.* Oxford University Press. New York 1940. (243 pp.; $2.50)

Nilsson, Martin P., *Greek Popular Religion.* Columbia University Press. New York 1940. (xviii and 116 pp.; $2.50)

Parke, H. W., *A History of the Delphic Oracle.* Basil Blackwell. Oxford 1939. (viii and 457 pp.; s 21/-)

Why did Greek science, with its tremendous beginnings among the Ionians of the sixth century B.C., ultimately surrender to the superstition and deadly authoritarianism of the Roman Empire and beyond? This question is the starting point of Farrington's beautifully and passionately written book. The answer lies neither in science nor in religion but in society. "The struggle between science and obscurantism," today as well as two thousand years ago, "is ultimately a political one" (p. 71). One major reason for the decay of Greek science was "its divorce from the productive activities of life which resulted from the prevalence of a slave economy."[1] The other—the theme of Farrington's book—is that the religion of the state necessarily "tended more and more to be transformed by the ruling-class into an instrument of mental oppression utterly incompatible with the spread of enlightenment" (pp. 164-5).

In the sixth century B.C., the Greek world was awakened by a "popular movement of enlightenment," the Ionian renaissance. Built upon bold physical speculation, it was revolutionary in its implications. Its greatest scientific achievements were the atomic theory and cosmology and Hippocratic medicine. "This period gave us for the first time in recorded history the picture of man behaving in a fully rational way in the face of nature . . . freed from the superstition of animism, serene in his willing subjection to the law" (p. 60).

The enlightenment was abortive, however. The stock explanation for its short life is to place the blame, in the words of Salomon Reinach, on "the admixture of minds emancipated, but few in number, with the ignorant and superstitious multitude." Nothing could be more completely wrong. One need only read the poems of Theognis and Pindar to see that not "the ignorant and superstitious multitude" but their economic and political masters were the champions of obscurantism. Pindar's great choral odes, commissioned by tyrants and land barons, celebrated the divine origin of the aristocracy, their hereditary virtues, their literally miraculous victories in the great games. "Natural philosophers," he said, "reap an ineffectual harvest from their wisdom." His divine patrons could not permit it to be otherwise.

[1] *Cf.* p. 121: "Its mainspring is curiosity, not service. To know was Aristotle's ambition, not to do."

While the Ionian philosophers were undermining the official myths, elsewhere in Greece men were challenging the political power of the aristocracy. With the achievement of political democracy in Athens in the fifth century B.C., the oligarchs found it all the more imperative to resist the onslaughts on the state cult, on the oracles and soothsayers, and on their underlying cosmology and epistemology. For Farrington, the *Prometheus Bound* of Aeschylus is the symbol of the clash between the two conceptual worlds. Prometheus was punished for his *philanthropia,* his love of man expressed in the creation of applied science, above all, medicine. The agents of the retribution of Zeus, significantly, were Might and Violence. We do not know how Aeschylus resolved the conflict, for the second and third plays are lost, but Farrington argues that he sought a compromise. Others, like the philosopher Critias about whom we shall have more to say later, knew better than Aeschylus. Political power was potentially in the hands of the mass of citizens and there could therefore be no compromise with the Ionians if the oligarchs were to retain their *de facto* power.

Plato was the man who successfully turned the philosophic tide in favor of the aristocracy. "Haunted by the question of internal revolution," "so remote from any feeling of sympathy with the people or understanding of them, that he never thought except in terms of legislation, and the imposition of regulation from above" (p. 153), Plato placed at the heart of his system a rigid, all-embracing educational program built around a state-imposed dogma. More correctly we should speak of two curricula, one for the masses and one for the elite, with the study of nature deliberately excluded from both. With the aid of an iron censorship, Plato would impose a religion concocted out of the traditional Greek cults and the astral theology of the Chaldeans. The crucial point is that Plato did not himself believe in this theology and the arguments he adduced were intellectually and morally unworthy of him. Yet he did not shrink from this gigantic lie to preserve the state he thought ideal.

It was in conscious opposition to Plato that Cynicism, Stoicism, and Epicureanism appeared upon the scene. Stoicism, Farrington argues, began as a doctrine with socially revolutionary potentialities.[1] Against Plato, Zeno set forth the principles of an ideal Republic embracing all mankind, with laws prescribed by nature and not by convention, without class divisions, without images or temples, sacrifices or gymnasia. Like Cynicism, however, Stoicism had not "sufficiently analyzed the aristocratic philosophies to be able to offer effective resistance." Its supposed scientific foundation was a false one. Its astral theology, though "more imposing intellectually" than Plato's, opened the door to superstition. Man was turned away from the struggle with nature to a spirit of negativism and resignation. When Stoicism traveled to Rome in the second century B.C., it moved even further away from its early implications. Panaetius, Cicero, and Varro re-shaped it till it invested the "whole threatened system of oligarchic government with the authority of the new universal religion based on the doctrine of the divinity of the stars" (p. 199). That the last of the Stoics was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius is the crowning touch.

How different was the fate of Epicureanism. It was lied about, scorned, concealed and banned by the Roman state and its ideological spokesmen.

[1]He here follows J. Bidez, *La Cité du Monde et la Cité du Soleil* (1932) against the views of W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind* (1933).

Cicero, that paragon of all virtue, wrote to his brother Quintus in frank admiration of Lucretius and then said in the *Tusculan Disputations* some ten years later that he had never bothered to read any of the Latin Epicurean writings. Such barefaced lying stems from the same motives that permitted him to tear apart the sham of divination in one book and to say in another that "the institution and authority of augurs is of vital importance to the state."

What was it that Epicurus did, or rather tried to do through an organized popular movement of enlightenment? Farrington quotes the great nineteenth century French student of ethics, Constant Martha: "In expelling from nature the inept intervention of the gods of paganism, Epicurus also put an end to all those pious frauds by which men duped one another and duped themselves." A true knowledge of nature was his remedy for the evils of society, and choosing atomism as his starting point Epicurus picked up where the Ionians had stopped. "The knowledge of natural law," he wrote in an epigram which Farrington inscribes on the fly leaf of his book, "does not produce men given to idle boasting or prone to display the culture for which the many strive, but men of a haughty independence of mind who pride themselves on the goods proper to man, not his circumstances."

Such notions brought the wrath of the gods down upon Epicurus. Plutarch, always ready with a defense for official obscurantism, wrote: "Religion it is that constraineth and holdeth together all humane society, this is the foundation, prop, and stay of all laws, which the Epicureans subvert and overthrow directly." Epicurus was no atheist.[1] He was indeed subversive, however, of whatever could not withstand the scrutiny of scientific knowledge and scientific methods; of oracles and miracles, of astral theology, of the doctrine of divine intervention and distributive justice in the after-life.

Epicurus died in 270 B.C. His teachings spread widely and rapidly; even Cicero is witness to their popularity in Italy. Within a hundred years of his death the Roman Senate, guardian of the morals of the citizens, expelled two of his disciples from the city. In preserving freedom of superstition and obscurantism, says Farrington, the Senate and later the emperors sounded the death knell of ancient science.[2]

What Farrington has done, in short, is to present a searching analysis and brilliant interpretation of the unsuccessful struggle for "enlightenment" within the realm of formal philosophy. The full significance of this struggle and its outcome can be properly appreciated when we remember that in antiquity the philosopher was not buried in academic halls: remember the Pythagoreans in Southern Italy, Anaxagoras and Pericles, Plato and Dion of Syracuse, Aristotle and Alexander, Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Farrington's book is not without flaws, but before turning to them it will be instructive to see briefly how the material in Nilsson and Parke provides strong supporting evidence for Farrington's thesis and helps fill out the picture of Graeco-Roman culture. That Parke and Nilsson serve this purpose

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[1]The evidence is presented somewhat more fully by Farrington in his article, "The Gods of Epicurus and the Roman State," *Modern Quarterly* (London), III (1938), 214-32.

[2]As further evidence of the fallacy of the masses vs. classes interpretation of the failure of the enlightenment, contrast the intellectual ostracism of Lucretius with the official position held by Virgil, poet of irrationalism, and by Livy, author of a history of Rome in which truth was subordinated to political expediency.

despite fundamentally opposed conceptions of the character of ancient religion and society is further tribute to Farrington.

What did the prevailing religious practices and beliefs of the non-intellectual, non-aristocratic Greek or Roman mean to him in his daily conduct, in his relations with the external world, natural and social? First of all, religion was omnipresent. "One could hardly have taken a step out of doors," Nilsson notes (p. 18), "without meeting a little shrine, a sacred enclosure, an image, a sacred stone, or a sacred tree. . . . This was the most persistent . . . form of Greek religion. It outlived the fall of the great gods." No action was taken, by the lowliest peasant or the mighty Senate, without prior consultation and appeasement of one or more of the countless gods, demons, and heroes. Their form varied from locality to locality and from time to time. Their individual fortunes showed various cyclical movements. None but a handful of professional experts could keep the catalogue in even a semblance of order. That was all unimportant, however, so long as everyone went through the proper motions and believed (or, in the case of a Cicero, pretended to believe).

The story of the Delphic oracle is characteristic. From its untraceable beginnings in the second millenium B.C., Delphi rose to such a position of prominence that its name is still synonymous with prophecy wherever men read. For over a thousand years it was consulted by Greeks from every community and even by the elect of the non-Greeks, by kings and tyrants, cities and private citizens (if they could afford the cost of the trip and of sacrifices and gifts to the god). The founding of colonies, the declaration of war, plagues and droughts, business ventures and illness brought men in droves to the little community north of the Corinthian Gulf, where there flourished one of the greatest devices ever created for the mystification and defrauding of the people.

The secret of the oracle was really very simple: "crooked and ambiguous" utterances, Aeschylus called them. In the political field, as Parke shows by a detailed study of every response known to us, whether real or fictional, "the Delphians were always opportunists . . . their political attitude rather adapted itself to circumstances than attempted to force a way through them" (p. 430). Delphi supported the tyrants when they were in power, condemned them after they were overthrown. It counseled non-resistance to Persia when all of northern Greece was medizing, and then, after Persia had been defeated, invented tales of how it had resisted the invader. Questions about local cult practice were usually answered in accordance with the custom of the city in question. Only when there was strong popular pressure for some religious innovation, as in the case of the god Dionysus, did Delphi depart from its traditional "conservatism" in religion.

By attributing "this equivocal and time-serving attitude" to the military weakness of Delphi, Parke misses the essential point. The strength and prestige of the oracle was the work not of the Delphians but of the rulers of all Greece. Many Greek cities, especially the important ones like Sparta and Athens, maintained "sacred ambassadors" or liaison officials with Delphi. Their kings, tyrants, and aristocrats made a point of frequent consultation. Their ideologists spread its fame in drama and story, inventing oracles where none existed, explaining away where the priests had guessed badly or had maintained a damaging silence. It would be naive to assume

—if we did not have ample evidence to the contrary—that they went to Delphi for advice. They went because it was important, in the long run interests of their form of social organization, that the hand of the gods be ever visible on the right side; and because, once having elevated Delphi as they had, they could not safely neglect so powerful an instrument.

The very lack of a consistent social and political program was the strength and not the weakness of Delphi. In the same way, as Nilsson correctly states (p. 63), the persistence of the Eleusinian mysteries can be attributed to the absence of dogma apart from "some simple fundamental ideas about life and death" which "every age might interpret according to its own propensities." The non-existence of a priestly caste and of elaborate theological dogma is customarily cited as the great advance made by the Greeks over the peoples of the ancient Orient toward a rational and free society. That is much too simple a formulation. Though elements of enlightenment were inherent in the step from Oriental to Graeco-Roman religion and the potentialities can be clearly seen, in the Greek tragedians for example, these elements soon became perverted into their opposite. The emptiness of content became a force of obscurantism. Not only was classical religion not an agency of popular enlightenment, it was able to adapt itself to every shift in state and society and all the more successfully prevent the spread of enlightenment. Not *what* one believed but *that* one believed was the concern of the oligarchs of every age and land.

Several factors tend to mislead the modern student. The literature of antiquity, and especially its prose, requires careful correction in all matters of belief and ideology. Not only was this literature a monopoly in production of the members and proteges of the aristocracy but, with the notable exception of the drama, its audience was restricted to the same narrow circle. Though no statistics are available, there is ample evidence that the great bulk of the population was illiterate. The step from mere literacy, furthermore, to the reading of Plato is a long one, and what passed for a book trade was pitifully primitive.[1] It thus becomes easy to understand the frank and almost naive cynicism with which ancient writers—confident in the solidarity and discretion of the aristocratic intellectuals—revealed the motives and mechanisms of the manipulation of symbols and superstition.

"When the laws hindered indeed wrongful works done by open violence," wrote the philosopher Critias in the fifth century B.C., "but man continued to do them by stealth, some shrewd and wise-thoughted man found an object of awe for mortals. . . . Whence he brought in the divinity. . . . By this discourse he introduced the most welcome of teachings, hiding the truth behind a false story."[2] Critias was a leading member of the Socratic circle, an active political figure in Athens, and the leader of the brutal oligarchic coup at the end of the Peloponnesian War known as the Thirty Tyrants. His cynical theory of the genesis of religion found frequent echo in ancient writings. They were praised by Polybius, one of the keenest political commentators of antiquity, as the foundation of Roman power (VI 56):

[1]See the account in chapter 4 of Wilhelm Schubart, *Das Buch bei den Griechen und Römern* (2nd. ed., Berlin and Leipzig, 1921), all the more significant because Schubart tries desperately to magnify the extent of book publishing and circulation.

[2]But for Nilsson, the historian of Greek religion, "The fate of religion is determined by the masses" (p. 4).

"I will venture the assertion that what the rest of mankind derides is the foundation of Roman greatness, namely superstition. This element has been introduced into every aspect of their private and public life, with every artifice to awe the imagination, in a degree which could not be improved upon. . . . It was not for nothing, but with deliberate design, that the men of old introduced to the masses notions about the gods and views on the after-life. The folly and heedlessness are ours, who seek to dispel such illusions."

The validity of such a theory of the genesis of religion need not concern us now. What is important is the insight into the deliberate manipulation of rites and superstitions in the interest of oligarchic rule, and the clarity with which it is stated. What Critias and Polybius approved without qualification, furthermore, was not a program to be realized at some future date but a well established practice of long standing. Yet in the face of such evidence, Nilsson perverts the whole relationship between ancient religion and society when he writes (p. 111): "Superstition is very seldom mentioned in the literature of the period simply because great writers found such base things not worth mentioning."[1] Not the quantitative frequency of mention but the framework of analysis is crucial.[2] Furthermore, what of the mass of materials about the oracles to be found even in the "great writers"? Or would Nilsson distinguish between "base" superstition and some other kind?

A second major source of error lies in the fact that Athens virtually monopolized Greek cultural production during the two peak centuries, the fifth and fourth B. C. Just at that time, Athens, with its relatively high degree of urbanization, its exceptional political democracy, and its empire, was atypical. The normal forms of social conflict in the pre-Alexandrian Greek world—demands for land distribution, frequent exile and massacre of opposing social and political groupings, petty wars—were absent from the city of Herodotus and Thucydides, the playwrights, Xenophon and the orators, Socrates and Plato. Instead we find a much more subtle and opaque form of conflict, a series of ideological struggles that all too easily concealed the underlying cleavages.

Take the "cult of the peasant" as a significant illustration. Aristophanes, Xenophon, Plato, to name the three most obvious examples, never tired of glorifying the virtues of rustic life. Yet Xenophon, as Max Weber pointed out, "knew little more about the technique of agriculture than a Prussian officer who takes over a *Rittergut.*" Aristophanes' peasant heroes were boorish, stupid, dirty, and altogether unpleasant fellows. And Plato was a man of great inherited wealth who never milked a goat.

Then why the cult of the peasant, in some respects comparable to the hypocritical nineteenth century English lamentations over the disappearance

[1]Nilsson disposes of the Polybius passage very simply: "this is philosophy and must be passed over in an exposition of popular religion" (p. 135).

[2]The evidence from the plastic arts deserves separate study. We are accustomed to thinking of written works in the millions of copies on the one hand, and of millions of dollars worth of works of art buried by Mr. Hearst in a Bronx warehouse until his personal financial situation brings them out into the light of Gimbels' department store. In antiquity, on the other hand, the fine arts were for public consumption as the art of writing was private and limited. The monopoly enjoyed by religious themes in sculpture, both in its autonomous and architectural forms, is well known.

of the yeomanry, whose great virtues were discovered only after they had been forcibly uprooted by the enclosure movement? In the 150 years after Solon, the Athenians broke the political stranglehold of the landed aristocrats and transferred the power to the growing urban population under the leadership of men of wealth. Not the least important factor in this process was the "democratization" of religion through the admission of the lower classes to the phratries, the introduction and elaboration of the great national religious festivals, and the granting of decision in sacral matters to the popular assembly. For a brief period, when the spoils of empire financed the democracy and supported the poor, things were relatively quiet. Then came the outbreak of the decisive war with Sparta and the rapid disintegration of the Athenian empire. The urban masses became restive and their possession of legal and political rights made this restlessness a real menace to the men of privilege and power.

It was at this point that the glorification of the peasant entered in earnest. The Athenian peasant had never participated in any vital sense in the political life of the community. He was not being "led astray" by the radical religious and ethical ideas of an Anaxagoras or a Euripides. The poverty and hardship of his daily struggle for existence exemplified man's subservience to omnipotent nature; he was the living symbol of the folly of the natural philosophers who thought that man could explain, and therefore triumph over, nature. He was, in short, as the first three chapters of Nilsson's book show conclusively, still the pliant victim of the authoritarian obscurantism of the earlier age, the true bulwark of society in the eyes of the aristocratic ideologues, and an object of contempt at the same time.[1]

In knowledge of the details of Greek religion and mythology, Nilsson probably has no superior and his book is a useful collection of materials. That it is no more (and sometimes even less), while Farrington has made one of the important contributions of our generation to the understanding of ancient society, must be attributed solely to basic theoretical considerations. Nilsson conceives society as an aggregate of semi-autonomous spheres: masses and elites, males and females, religion and politics, each following its own inexorable laws of motion. That is why he so frequently resorts to meaningless verbiage in lieu of explanation: "it was only natural" that women "should apply to divinities of their own sex" (p. 15); the "Greeks were too sensible to push legalism to the bitter end" (p. 107).

Neither Nilsson nor Farrington does more than suggest the precise historical background of any particular religious phenomenon or movement. For the former it is unnecessary to do more. What little he does offer is no better than the mechanical conditions-were-better, society-was-degenerating approach. Farrington, on the other hand, has a firm grasp of the total societal complex. It is the idealist Nilsson, and not the materialist Farrington, significantly enough, who offers the most vulgar materialist analyses on occasion (p. 87, for example).

[1]The cult of the peasant is thus different from, though in some ways analogous to, the glorification of the noble savage. For full illustrations of the latter in antiquity, see A. O. Lovejoy and George Boas, *Primitivism and Related Ideas in Antiquity* (Baltimore, 1935), Chap. XI. The prevalence of parallel formulations in Rome is obvious to anyone who has read Virgil.

It is unfortunate, particularly for the non-expert reader, that Farrington did not draw the historical and social picture more fully. In three major places, he would thereby have deepened his analysis considerably and, I think, made certain corrections. One is the case of Plato. Farrington admittedly presents but one side of Plato's philosophy, that aspect dealing with religion, science, and the state. But error is unavoidable when such a man is discussed piecemeal. Plato, somewhat like Hegel, developed a reactionary social philosophy through a series of concepts which were devastatingly critical of the society of his time and which transcended the limits of that society at several crucial points.[1] Did any other ancient thinker, Epicurus included, expose the roots of social conflict and decay in the Greek city-state more mercilessly? I think not. Aristotle's critique of the *Republic* should be sufficient evidence.

That Plato could not carry his criticism to another end was not his weakness but the consequence of his having been born an aristocrat in fifth century Athens. This is no matter of simple class bias, for nowhere in antiquity did either the slaves or the free poor develop a genuinely forward-looking social theory. Given the existing social relationships, there was no new system of society to which they could strive. Hence the social revolts were either attempts to run away (on the part of the slaves), to decrease the crushing burden of taxes and debts, to reestablish the grinding poverty of the small peasant as the universal way of life, or to elevate the lower class citizens to the aristocratic level of non-productive affluence (at the expense of the wealthy and to the exclusion of the slaves). Theory was equally sterile. The social philosophy of the "left wing" Socratics, Cynicism, was the emptiest kind of negativism, symbolized by the pitiful figure of Diogenes and his barrel.[2]

In what sense then can Epicurus be considered a "revolutionary" thinker? Neither the available evidence from his works nor the whole concept of the Garden reveals a revolutionary social philosophy. Epicurus seems far less concerned with immediate social issues than Plato. His whole emphasis is on the achievement of a proper knowledge of the natural world, with its corollary, the elimination of the network of obscurantism and irrationalism with which the people were tied to traditional cults and beliefs. "The principal disturbance in the minds of men," he wrote in the *Letter to Herodotus*, "arises because they think that these external bodies are blessed and immortal . . . and because they are always expecting or imagining some everlasting misery, such as is depicted in legends, or even fear the loss of feeling in death as though it would concern them themselves." Precisely because there could be no genuinely revolutionary social theory in antiquity, the most bitter accusations of Plato or the Cynics were harmless to the oligarchs, even helpful in many respects, whereas the materialist natural philosophy of

[1]The critical effects of Hegel's philosophy were summed up by the emperor Frederick William IV of Prussia when he commissioned Schlegel to "destroy the dragon seed" of Hegelianism. See Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (New York, 1941), a book which offers many valuable insights for our problem even though it deals only with nineteenth and twentieth century thought.

[2]See the brilliant analysis by Robert Eisler in his short article in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, IV, 680-5. As other illustrations, note the primitivism and the ambivalent attitude towards wealth in the poetry of Hesiod, or the other-wordly maxims of the New Testament.

Epicurus was a recognized threat. His audience was wide and ever increasing. From him and his disciples they acquired disrespect for the gods and for their earthly representatives. A major prop in the defense of the existing property and power relationships was thus being undermined. What else could the Roman Senate do but expel and distort? It is of course highly doubtful, to say the least, that Epicurus thought of himself as a revolutionary in society. Although Farrington warns against any possible misinterpretation on this score, his book fails to bring out with sufficient clarity the reasons why this philosophy alone was a genuine threat to the established order, reasons I have tried to indicate briefly and rather schematically.

Farrington's third omission of importance is in his treatment of the Hellenistic world. Neither Stoicism nor Epicureanism can be properly understood without a fuller view of the profound changes that occurred in the Greek-speaking world when the city-state was displaced as the center of economic, political, and cultural life by the great monarchies of the Ptolemies and Seleucids. It is not enough to say that Stoicism and Epicureanism led the counter-attack against Plato by discarding the narrow horizon of the city-state. It was in the Hellenistic world, after all, that ancient science came closest to a genuine link with the productive system—only to fail to achieve it outside of the military and maritime spheres.[1]

Ionian science failed not only to bring popular enlightenment; it even failed to survive. In our world, the conflict between science and obscurantism, equally a political issue, has reached levels and brought forth implications inconceivable in the world of Plato and Epicurus. In the nineteenth century Darwinism was reviled and banned like Epicureanism two thousand years before. The parallel stops there, however, for Darwinism has survived. The difference in the fate of the two schools of scientific thought is the difference in the two systems of social organization. "In our modern world," Farrington writes in explanation (pp. 26-7), "the question of the dissemination of scientific knowledge among the people at large assumes a different aspect from that which it presented in antiquity . . . without a wide dissemination of technical knowledge modern society is unworkable. . . . But in the world of Classical Antiquity, though there was an analogous situation, it had recognizable differences. The machine age had not come. . . . There was therefore no problem to be solved of combining technical training with political incompetence. The problem was the simpler one of disseminating such ideas as would make the unjust distribution of the rewards and toils of life seem a necessary part of the eternal constitution of things, and of suppressing such ideas as might lead to criticism of this view of the universe."[2]

M. I. FINKELSTEIN (New York).

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[1]See Farrington's own discussion in his article, "Prometheus Bound: Government and Science in Classical Antiquity," *Science and Society*, II (1938), 435-47. This article and the one cited above are valuable complements to the book and they help fill out certain points.

[2]Today one aspect of this problem, the technical needs of mechanized total warfare, has particular interest. For one illustration of the complicated social consequences see the somewhat romanticized account of the first British tank corps of World War I in Tom Wintringham, *Armies of Freemen* (London, 1940), chap. VII.

Michell, H., *The Economics of Ancient Greece.* The Macmillan Company. New York 1940. (XI and 415 pp.; $4.00)

Of all the names in Greek literature, none is more thoroughly undeserving of his reputation than Isocrates. An orator who never delivered a speech, a political "thinker" who played no great role in politics, Isocrates acquired wealth and fame because he was phrasemaker for the ruling forces of a society in decay. He, perhaps better than any of his contemporaries, knew how to wring all the real meaning out of the great ideal concepts of Athenian democracy and rattle the bare bones that remained in the unholy cause of oligarchy and plunder.

It is significant that Michell begins his final page with a long passage from one of Isocrates' tirades against the "demagogues." "I marvel," says the orator, "that you cannot see at once that no class is so inimical to the people as our depraved orators and demagogues." Michell then suggests that though "it would, perhaps, be going a little too far" to find the "whole explanation" for the breakdown of Classical Greece here, "it is perfectly clear that the chance for currying favor with the irresponsible masses by offering them the means of plundering the rich was in Greece, as it is today, the best policy for the demagogues." As his concluding sentence, he chooses a quotation from Andreades, until his death a leading economic theorist of the Metaxas regime, to the effect that the system of public finance was the "real cause" of the destruction of the city-state. Four hundred pages earlier Michell had already laid bare the essence of this theory (p. 37): "Greek democracy was unequal to the task of ruling and destroyed itself in its own weakness."

There is nothing particularly new in this use of the "demagogue"—but another name for the democracy—as the scapegoat of Greek history. Nor is there anything else particularly new in the book. Essentially it is not an analysis of Greek economics at all, but a rather meandering exposition of the technical details of agronomy and navigation, price and population figures, metallurgy and handicraft, very much in the tradition of mid-nineteenth century German handbooks of antiquities. As such it is welcome. It is reasonably accurate and well-documented, simply organized and not too difficult to read. Like its predecessors, it shows no regard for the dynamics of economic life and no particular concern for the whys and wherefores.

The mere march of time, however, has lent new meaning to Michell's restatement of the traditional indictments of Greek society. The moment he steps away from the technical details of sheep raising, pottery, and silver mining, Michell sermonizes. On the very first page he suggests that the "actions and policies" of the Greeks "are such as to baffle our theories and defeat our sympathies," and he finds it necessary to issue repeated warnings against being "unfair" to them. He must make a conscious effort to overcome his revulsion at institutions like slavery, which "shocks our susceptibilities and outrages our finer feelings" (p. 150). That is a creditable effort but it leads to nothing more than a zero; objectivity cancels out the finer feelings. Michell offers neither an adequate study of the ethical consequences of slavery nor even an inadequate analysis of its economic consequences.

Only at the very end of his 20-page discussion does he suggest that "Greek civilization itself was based upon and made possible by slavery"—in a footnote that catches the reader entirely unprepared and leaves him untouched.

And always there are the false analogies with the contemporary world. In the case of the demagogues Michell of course misses the key points. In antiquity their promises were sometimes fulfilled; today never. Secondly, they operated under totally different circumstances and faced totally different problems and forces from their alleged modern counterparts. There is more truth in Sismondi's epigrammatic remark that the ancient proletariat lived at the expense of the state while the modern state lives at the expense of the proletariat, than in all the theories of the apostles of unchanging human nature.

Michell is professor of Political Economy in McMaster University (Hamilton, Ont.). There was a time when economists and sociologists still retained a feeling for historical change even if classical philologists did not. When Eduard Meyer published his fantastic essay on *Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Altertums,* perhaps the first major instance of the collapse of German historical science, Karl Buecher and Max Weber (and others) tore it to shreds. Weber's work in the ancient field had many weaknesses to be sure, yet his *Agrarverhaeltnisse im Altertum* is still far and away the ablest study of the economy of antiquity available to the western world. Significantly enough, Michell makes no mention of it that I could find. Even Buecher and still later Sombart saw that there were fundamental qualitative distinctions between the major historical periods, unable as they were to define them correctly. With Michell, however, we find an economist (like Andreades and others before him) revealing the critical failing charged against the classicists and historians of an earlier era.

F. N. Howard (New York).

Gilson, E., *Dante et la philosophie.* Librairie philosophique J. Vrin. Paris 1939. (X, 341 pp.; fr. frs. 50.00)

Gilson's book not only covers the entire problem of the philosophical implications of Dante's work but also examines Dante's relation to the decisive theological and political doctrines of his time. A great part is taken up with a discussion of the supposedly Averroistic traits in Dante's philosophy. Gilson holds that Dante's entire conception is directly opposed to that of Latin Averroism. This is not to deny, however, that some of the Averroistic ideas did jibe with Dante's own, as was the case with the Averroistic separation of philosophy from theology. Although Dante, in contrast to Averroism, did not understand this separation to be a contradiction, he felt the affinity between his own view and the Averroists strongly enough to elevate Siger of Brabant to Paradise in his *Divine Comedy,* where he stands for "pure philosophy" separate from and on the same footing as pure theology.

Gilson shows how the liberation of philosophy from theology governs Dante's whole work and how it culminates in his doctrine of the independent secular Reich, as elaborated in the *De Monarchia.* This conception involves a far-reaching change of the traditional Christian scheme, for it is based

upon the assumption that man has two different ends which cannot be subordinated one to the other: that man's beatitude here on this earth stands, as a genuine Christian goal, side by side with his eternal beatitude in the world hereafter.

HERBERT MARCUSE (Los Angeles).

Clapham, John H., and Eileen Power, ed., *The Cambridge Economic History of Europe*. I. The Agrarian Life of the Middle Ages. The Macmillan Company. New York 1941. (667 pp.; $7.50)

"The Agrarian Life of the Middle Ages" is the product of a truly international division of labor. From its very beginning the work was beset with severe difficulties. Eileen Power, its learned co-editor, died suddenly. Many of the contributors originally scheduled lived in countries invaded by Hitler and could not finish their assignments. The present fate of many of them remains unknown so that last minute replacements were necessary.

Despite these unusual difficulties, the work as finally published will serve for a long time as a reliable and informative account of agrarian conditions in the middle ages. It may seem astonishing that the labors of fifteen scholars with the most varied outlook and background have produced results that are more often than not in harmony with one another. This becomes understandable, however, when we realize that the majority of the contributions lean toward description of ways of life rather than to interpretation of institutional factors.

One significant point that comes out very clearly in the volume is the almost universal failure of the most varied measures designed to check the squeezing out of the small independent landowning classes. Professor Ostrogorsky's chapter on the Byzantine Empire is especially instructive on this point. Also noteworthy is Marc Bloch's study of the transition from late Roman to medieval society.

Some of the chapters describing the state of affairs in the different countries at the height of medieval society suffer from the rigid separation between agricultural and urban society inherent in the plan of the series. The reader must wait until he reaches Nabholz' final chapter on medieval society in transition to find clues for some of the preceding narrative. But that was perhaps an unavoidable feature of such a carefully planned work. We earnestly hope that the succeeding volumes have been only temporarily deferred, not abandoned.

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER (New York).

Trinkaus, Charles Edward, *Adversity's Noblemen*. The Italian Humanists on Happiness. Columbia University Press. New York 1940. (172 pp.; $2.00)

Trinkaus has hit upon one of the most fundamental problems in the history of the ideological origins of modern society, namely, the part played by the Renaissance in the so-called emancipation of the individual. The humanistic doctrines of happiness are appropriate instruments for under-

standing this process of emancipation, for they reflect the attitude the individual was expected to take towards the new social order.—Moreover, in the tradition of Western philosophy, the quest for happiness has always been a decisive outlet for the protest against the prevailing system of oppression and injustice, constituting a segment of militant, critical materialism.[1] The humanist position on happiness may thus yield a clue as to whether the Renaissance philosophy actually championed the right and freedom of the individual.

Trinkaus did not have to give an express refutation of the notion that the Renaissance was "the discovery of man and the world," because that notion has long been obsolete. Insofar as it has implied that there was a release of hitherto suppressed impulses and energies for the exploitation and enjoyment of this world, it may have been partly correct with respect to the exploitation, but it has certainly been misleading as regards the enjoyment. Trinkaus collects excellent material from the writings of the Humanists, especially from the numerous treatises on Nobility and on the Dignity of Man, all of which demonstrate the predominance of a new form of asceticism and escapism. The period, of course, contained a strong accenting of man's earthly goods and his right to enjoy them, but this was almost lost amid the general pessimism and other-worldliness. Trinkaus shows the manifold shadings of the transcendental attitude, the glorification of poverty, and of withdrawal from all every-day activity, the elevation of "knowledge in and for itself" to the rank of the highest virtue, the formation of a snobbish élite of intellectuals who despised the large mass of the "uneducated," the scorn of reason, and so on, and he summarizes humanistic philosophy in the felicitous phrase: "The new ideal is the medieval ideal of the world-flight made this-worldly."

The humanist doctrines consequently emerge as the first phase of the lengthy process of "introversion" whereby the rebellious drives and desires of the emancipated individuals were suppressed and diverted into the "inward" realm of Christian virtues. The Humanists thus essentially connect up with the work of the Reformation, as well as with Montaigne's rather conformist scepticism: they did their part in teaching men to submit to or comply with the forces which governed the rising order of capitalism.

Trinkaus does not dwell upon the far-reaching social implications of the "introversion." A shortcoming of his important study, therefore, is that he derives the attitude of the Humanists from the insecurity and competition of their personal existence.

HERBERT MARCUSE (Los Angeles).

Thorndike, Lynn, *A History of Magic and Experimental Science.* Vols. V and VI. The sixteenth Century. Columbia University Press. New York 1941. (695 and 766 pp.: $10.00)

With the appearance of these two volumes on the 16th century, a monumental series that began in 1923 comes to a conclusion. To give an idea of the prodigious research involved, the author's own compilation shows that in these last two volumes more than 3,000 names are cited—writers and men

[1]See *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,* ed. by the Institute of Social Research, VII (1938), p. 55.

of learning, printers, princes, prelates and lay figures in the play of ideas. The index includes some seventeen hundred items. Treated or mentioned are Biblical and Jewish writers, church fathers, early medieval Latin writers, and so on through the long list.

The material with which the present two volumes deal is organized in 48 chapters. After an introductory characterization of the century as a whole, the investigation opens with Leonardo da Vinci and proceeds according to individual subjects like Astrology, Anatomy, Alchemy, Medicine, Chiromancy, Natural Philosophy and Natural Magic, so that single chapters often bear in their titles the names of the leading personalities in the field under survey. One must marvel at the author's extensive reading and his knowledge of the vast material; he knows practically everything that was written during and concerning this time: books, manuscripts, pamphlets, and news articles. He lists not only all editions of the works he treats, but the translations and criticisms which they underwent or the discussions which they occasioned, their affinities with similar ideas of earlier writers or their open plagiarisms.

The examination that follows should offer an impression of the rich and interesting material that has gone into his work. We were informed of the extent of astrology, alchemy and occult arts before Thorndike published his work. For this reason it is of especial interest to learn from him what the adversaries of these arts had to say. We know that a papal decree against alchemists existed. But how little material interest the church had in combatting alchemy is disclosed by what Thorndike reports concerning Johannes Pantheus, a Venetian priest. Despite the papal decree Pantheus published in 1518 a work on alchemy, *Art of Metallic Transmutation,* and an edict of Pope Leo X gave him the exclusive right to print the work in the papal states! Subsequently, when someone called the attention of the papal court to the existence of a decree against alchemists, Pantheus quietly wrote another alchemist work (1530), a sort of "cabala of metals," only he was clever enough to say that this was not a work in alchemy but, as the title indicates, *Voarchadumia contra alchimiam: ars distincta ab alchimia et sophia.* Thereupon the apostolic legate again gave him permission to publish (V, p. 539).

Another "adversary" of occult arts, the Frenchman Symphorien Champier, criticizes magic, incantation, images, alchemy, and much of astrology, especially in medicine. His *Dialogue in Destruction of Magic Arts* (1500) enters into the power of demons in magic and shows him to be convinced that men can free themselves of diabolic magic through prayer, confession, and fasting. Good angels can help, as can exorcism, or sorcery which employs demons of a superior order. If a melancholy person speaks languages previously unknown to him, that is a sure sign he is possessed by a demon. Aristotle offers a natural explanation even for this phenomenon, but he may not have encountered people possessed by demons. The Bible and other early Christian works convinced Symphorien that demoniacs exist. He repeats Pico della Mirandola's arguments against astrology in general, but asserts that stars influence the weather, crops, disease, sedition and war, tempering this opinion with the observation that philosophers, farmers, and sailors can foresee these effects as well as astrologers can (V, pp. 111ff).

Despite his rich collection of materials, Thorndike does not offer a definitive picture of the epoch. He excludes from his investigation fields of knowledge that were extremely characteristic of the time with which he is

dealing: mathematics, physics, and especially mechanics, and justifies this procedure on the ground that it would "avoid duplication of what has already been brought out by investigations of others, particularly Pierre Duhem." If Thorndike nevertheless thinks that "sufficient ground has been covered to indicate amply the relations between the magical and the scientific interests and methods in the sixteenth century" (V, p. 12), he is laboring under an illusion. The most precise report out of a criminal court also gives only a picture of a section of life, not of life itself. As on the field of military conquest, so in the field of intellectual activity, not all provinces of knowledge are of equal weight. To hold sway, it is enough to take the key positions and it does not matter much that at many other points the enemy is still able to resist. During the 16th century such key positions were represented by mathematics, physics and above all mechanics. They constituted the basis for shaping the mechanistic conception which slowly emerged from the world of scholastic speculation to dominate the intellectual arena for four centuries. As a result of separating off this element that was so characteristic of the time, what remains—the province of astrology, alchemy, astrological medicine, and such—obtains an undue significance. For this reason, the very opening chapter on Leonardo da Vinci is not an accurate picture of the great scholar. Thorndike has a tendency to lay stress not on what was new in Leonardo but on what was old, what tied him in with the past, for example, "the fact that Leonardo was to a large extent interested in the same topics as his predecessors" (V, p. 23). Thorndike even goes so far as to say that "Leonardo's manuscripts are too disorderly and wanting in method to qualify as classified knowledge or science" (V, p. 18). The revolutionizing of science, however, often comes not from the "classified knowledge" of the university text book but precisely from the "disorderly" and unsystematic outsider. Thorndike does mention, though briefly, the pioneer activities of Leonardo in paleontology and geology, attributing to Leonardo "a determination to face all natural questions on a purely physical basis" (V, p. 36), but he underscores the more strongly that he "harbored many incorrect notions" and wishes to place these "in balance against his instances . . . of argument well sustained upon a strictly natural basis" (V, p. 29). An idle endeavor! We know, for instance, that Newton was largely interested and spent most time not in chemistry in the modern sense but in alchemy, that he was interested in the transmutation of metals, in the philosopher's stone and the elixir of life. And Newton's conception of matter, his atomic theory, made it possible that by rearrangement of these fundamental components one element could be transmuted into another. "The changing of bodies into light," he wrote, "and light into bodies, is very comfortable to the cause of nature which seems delighted with Transmutations."[1]

This was perhaps the reason why Newton's distinguished contemporaries, Huygens and Leibniz, who were aware of his alchemist leanings, suspected that he was seeking to revive occult faculties through his doctrine of attraction at a distance without the intermediary of matter. Huygens called the principle of attraction "absurd" (1690) and Leibniz wrote against Newton his article *Antibarbarus Physicus pro Philosophia reali contra renovationes qualitatum scholasticarum et intelligentiarum chimæricarum.* Newton's alchemy seems to have been connected less with his scientific than with his

[1] J. W. N. Sullivan, *Isaac Newton 1642-1727*, London 1938, p. 52.

mystical meditations. Should we therefore stamp him an avowed representative of the Paracelsian period, or should we rather not maintain that Newton's chemical knowledge was rudimentary and that despite the fact that he was encumbered with obsolete ideas in the field of chemistry, his trail-blazing doctrine of gravitation was to become indisputable master in the intellectual world of the next 200 years?

What applies to Leonardo da Vinci is repeated in many other chapters, for example, in the one on Paracelsus. Thorndike seems to have a predilection for painting the irrational aspects of the human mind while the rational ones interest him little. Thus, he says of Paracelsus that he may be regarded as a specialist in hysteria, mountain diseases and syphilis. On the last he had more medical knowledge than anyone who lived before 1850. It would have been interesting to hear the ideas of the 16th century on hysteria or syphilis, but nothing is said on this subject, while the slogan attributed to Paracelsus, "the sick should be doctors' books," (V, p. 441) receives an entire page of polemical criticism. From the slogan Thorndike deduces that Paracelsus wished to renounce book learning together with profit through the experience of others. Is such an interpretation of the text correct, however? Just at this time, when so many physicians were prone to follow the humanist trend of relying on ancient Greek medical authorities, as Thorndike himself reports (V, p. 435), one must see nothing else in the slogan than the principle, so often extolled elsewhere, that nature should be the ultimate source of our experience. This in no case would involve renouncing the profit to be derived from the experience others have stored in their books.

Thorndike mentions the book *Pirotechnia* (1540) written by Vanuccio Biringuccio, and remarks, "the text deals chiefly with metals and little with fireworks and artillery." One gets the impression that we are dealing here with an alchemist work. Thorndike does say that "the opening chapter is sceptical as to the possibility of transmutation," but he immediately adds, "in general the book impressed me as a sixteenth century version in Italian of what one might find in Latin works of the three previous centuries" (V, p. 544). This would lead to an incorrect impression. Biringuccio is not the belated associate of the middle ages, but on the contrary the representative of modern times, of that new type of man who takes his starting point from practice and enriches his practical experience through theory. He was no alchemist but an engineer, founder of modern metallurgy and practical manager of mines and iron works, as the title of his book, chiefly a treatise on mining and metallurgy, would indicate. "De La Pirotechnia . . . si tratta non solo di ogni sorte & diversita di Miniere ma anchora quanto si ricera intorno a la prattica di quelle cose di quel che si appartienne a l'arte de la fusione ouer gito de metalli . . ." By virtue of his better understanding of frictional laws, Biringuccio introduced into a north Italian iron works a new arrangement of machinery, discovered by him, for the better utilization of water power.

Thorndike sometimes presents facts without giving an explanation of the intellectual currents around them. For instance, he asserts that almost no alchemical treatises had been printed during the period of incunabula and that they appeared slowly in the 16th century, that "for the most part

alchemy remained relatively quiescent in laboratory and manuscripts until the Paracelsan revival of the second half of the century" (V, p. 532). The rise of Paracelsanism went hand in hand with the development of occult philosophy and a benevolent attitude to natural magic. We read that this tendency continued briskly into the 17th century until "by its excesses" it exhausted itself and was replaced by the sceptical rationalism and enlightenment of the 18th century (V, p. 14), though never uniformly in all provinces of knowledge. While Galileo, Descartes and Newton introduced clarity and precision into mathematics, physics and astronomy, the case was different in the fields of biology, chemistry, and medicine. Here, a good deal of the old feeling for occult nature persisted even in the Age of Reason (V, p. 14). Thorndike does not go beyond the assertion. We who are seeking an explanation already know from Duhem that for example as early as the 12th century a wave of rationalism arose and continued into the 13th century, that for example Thierry of the school of Chartre gives, in the 12th century, a rationalistic, purely physical theory of world genesis wherein the six days of the bible are interpreted as six stages of becoming. "L'oeuvre de six jours," Duhem says, "s'est donc déroulée sans aucune intervention direct du Dieu, par le jeu naturel des puissances du feu . . . Dieu créât la matière pour que cette matière, livrée à elle-même, produit le Monde tel qu'il est. Ni Descartes, ni Laplace ne dépasseront l'audacieux rationalisme de Thierry."[1]

Why did this rationalist upsurge of the 12th and 13th centuries give way to anti-rationalist currents, only to reappear, in partial form, in the 16th and, in larger measure, in the 17th century? Why does this age of Reason pursue its triumph only in a few strictly limited fields, in mathematics, physics, mechanics and astronomy, while the old forms of thinking continue to spread within the remaining provinces of knowledge? Thorndike leaves such questions open.

He establishes that about a quarter century after the death of Paracelsus a Paracelsian movement was growing. When Paracelsus' alchemist work, *Archidoxa*, appeared in Cracow in 1569, it was followed in one single year, in 1570, by six other editions, in Basle, Munich, Cologne, and Strassburg. As to how this Paracelsus renaissance is to be explained, Thorndike answers that Paracelsus corresponds to the same spirit which produced Telesio's *Natural Philosophy* in Italy at the same time (1565). This answer shifts the problem: one must inquire why in Italy, Poland and Germany during the second half of the 16th century a demand should arise for books of this kind, and that notwithstanding the most extravagant statements to be found in Paracelsus' *Archidoxa*, for example. Thus, Paracelsus avers that he had seen a man who lived without food for six months, and he adds that a man could live without food provided his feet are planted in the ground. And so on. There is no such thing for Paracelsus as a natural law or natural science. Even the most incurable disease can yield to magic rites. Mystery is everywhere; everywhere there is animism and invisible power, and all this at a time when Copernicus was endeavoring to restore the movements of heavenly bodies to circular regularity and uniformity. Thorndike ends his discussion with the declaration, "Such are the contrasts which are possible in the thought of the same period" (V, p. 629). But

[1]P. Duhem, *Le Système du Monde*, III, Paris 1915, p. 185.

instead of going on to clarify the trend and the contrast for us, he contents himself with the melancholy remark, "It was indeed a discouraging contrast in intellectual history, . . . the same half century which refused to digest and accept the solid demonstrations of *De Revolutionibus* of Copernicus . . . swallowed eagerly the innumerable . . . tomes of Paracelsus and his followers."

Thorndike's magnificent work is nevertheless a mighty contribution to an extension of our knowledge. He has assembled the most wonderful materials for building a cathedral—marble, porphyry, granite. We owe him thanks for this and admiration. But even the most beautiful materials are not yet the cathedral.

These latest two volumes will be indispensable as handbooks for every scholar of the medieval and modern history of science, just as the earlier volumes have been. But are they a history of science and magic in the 16th century?

HENRYK GROSSMAN (New York).

Ergang, Robert, *The Potsdam Führer, Frederick William I, Father of Prussian Militarism.* Columbia University Press. New York 1941 (290 pp.; $3.00)

Tims, Richard Wonser, *Germanizing Prussian Poland. The H-K-T Society and the Struggle for the Eastern Marches in the German Empire, 1894-1919.* Columbia University Press. New York 1941. (312 pp.; $4.25)

Crothers, George Dunlop, *The German Elections of 1907.* Columbia University Press. New York 1941. (277 pp.; $3.00)

Today is a fitting time for the historian to study the origins of Prussian Militarism and of German Imperialism. Ergang has written a good book on Frederick William I, but one with a misleading title, since the term Führer belongs to the modern Nazi movement. It is perfectly true, however, that Frederick William was the father of Prussian militarism and one of the most important men of German history, for the military machine he built survived all the crises and defeats of three centuries. Since Frederick is very little known to the American public, Ergang has done an exceedingly valuable service by bringing together the results of German specialists' studies on the militarist of Potsdam. He very carefully describes the activities of the king himself, but he has studied too little of the general background of Prussian social history. It is highly improbable that Frederick William would have achieved anything if fate had made him, for instance, ruler of Bavaria instead of Prussia. He was able to establish the Prussian body of military officers because in the countries on the Eastern side of the Elbe he found many thousands of poor agrarian noblemen, a type of the Junker which did not exist in Western and Southern Germany.

The development of cities, trade, and industries in Prussia during the 18th century was tremendous. The rise of Berlin from a poor little town to one of the centers of European civilization finds a parallel only in the

development of American cities in the 19th century. The rise of Berlin became possible because Eastern Germany, especially Prussia, was a colonial soil where the mentality of men was different from the old German territories. In spite of all its unpleasant features, Prussia in the 18th century was a country of pioneers.

As a result of the Prussian conquests of the 18th century, millions of Poles had become subjects of the Prussian king. The autocratic rulers of the 18th century were not much interested if their serfs talked a teutonic or a slavic dialect, but in the second half of the 19th century, in the period of rising imperialism, the problem of the national character of German Ostmark became extremely important. Tims has written a very valuable book on the Polish problem in Prussia. He has not only collected the results of local German research, but has added a number of very pertinent critical observations. The surprising thing is not that the Germans persecuted the Poles between 1870 and 1914, but that the enormous German machine achieved so little in fighting them. In 1914, Polish landed ownership, the Polish economic and political organization, was stronger than in 1871.

What was the cause of this surprising failure of German Imperialism? The plan to confiscate Polish landed property, to drive out the Polish population and bring German settlers into Ostmark in their stead was never fulfilled. The conservative attitude of the German landed aristocracy did not allow it. In the face of socialist propaganda, confiscation of the big Polish estates seemed to be a dangerous precedent. If the state can confiscate the property of the Radziwills today why not the property of the Bülows tomorrow? There was no real hatred between the German and the Polish aristocrats in Prussia. The Polish landlords enjoyed the protection of the high tariffs and sent their sons into the Prussian Army, where they could as easily become officers as the aristocrats of German blood. Prussian agrarian conservatism hindered the fulfillment of the plans of the thorough imperialists. It is interesting to compare the slow and vacillating behaviour of the Prussian government towards the Poles before 1914 with the utmost brutality of the Nazis today. For Nazi Germany has lost the basis of big landed property on which the Empire of the Hohenzollern was built.

German imperialism before 1914 was unable to defeat the property whims of the Junkers, but it was always strong enough to defeat the Social Democratic leadership. That was proved by the famous Reichstag elections of 1907. Crothers has made a careful synthesis of the facts that led to the dissolution of the Reichstag by Bülow, the subsequent electoral campaign, and the tremendous failure of the Social Democratic Party. As soon as the imperial and colonial issue was brought before the electoral body of Germany, the Socialists lost forty of their eighty seats in the Reichstag. It is a pity that Crothers has not made a more detailed study of the statistical details of the election, for these would be a great advantage in knowing in which district German socialism withstood the imperialistic onslaught and in which it did not. It seems that in certain parts of Germany, as for instance in the labor districts of Berlin and Hamburg, practically the whole people had become Socialists up to 1907, not merely the industrial workers, but the white-collar employees, the petty bourgeois, etc. In such districts, the Socialists could win in 1907 as well. But in most of the cities of Germany,

the Socialists had not yet reached such a preponderance among the population. There, a broad middle layer existed between the organized workers on one side and the bourgeoisie on the other. These doubtful elements left the Socialist camp in 1907 and went over to imperialism.

A. ROSENBERG (New York).

Porché, François, *Baudelaire et la Présidente.* Editions du Milieu du Monde. Genève 1941. (pp. 250)

Borel, Pierre, *Lettres de Guy de Maupassant à Gustave Flaubert.* Edouard Aubanel, ed. Avignon 1940. (pp. 111)

Carco, Francis, *Nostalgia de Paris.* Editions du Milieu du Monde. Genève 1941. (pp. 247)

Lacretelle, Jacques de, *L'Heure qui change.* Editions du Milieu du Monde. Genève 1941. (pp. 246)

Ravel, Louis, *Stendhal curieux homme.* Edouard Aubanel. Avignon 1941. (pp. 109)

Sainte-Beuve, *Cinq Lundis Agenais.* 2 vols. Editions Saint Lanne. Agen 1941. (pp. 165 and 206)

Hytier, Jean, *André Gide.* 2nd ed. Editions Edmond Charlot. Alger 1938. (pp. 266)

Haedens, Kléber, *Paradoxe sur le Roman.* Editions Sagittaire. Marseille 1941. (pp. 95)

François Porché, who is already to be thanked for his good books on Baudelaire, Verlaine, and Tolstoi, offers us in his new book a biography of Madame Sabatier, the woman whom Théophile Gautier called "La Présidente." She performed at least two significant services for French literature and art: first, for many years, the leading spirits of her time gathered at her table, resulting in intellectual contacts that might otherwise not have been made. Baudelaire, Gautier, Flaubert, the Brothers Goncourt, Ernest Reyer the musician and the best known painter of the epoch, all met at her house. Second, she inspired Baudelaire to a series of his most beautiful poems.

On these two counts "La Présidente" is an interesting figure and on both of them Porché is able to bring together, most cleverly, the known and lesser known facts and in particular to light up the psychological relation of Baudelaire to this woman. His book is a noteworthy contribution to appreciating Baudelaire the poet and the man. Over and above this it interposes a colorful picture of the intellectual social life of a period which was one of the most fascinating in the development of French literature and art.

The small collection of *Maupassant's Letters to Flaubert* is truly characteristic for both writers, for their relation to one another and for their time. The editor's promise to issue more of Maupassant's letters (to his publisher) has unfortunately not been realized up to now.

Carco's "nostalgia" for Paris refers exclusively to the Paris of the poet. To this extent his book can be deemed a contribution, though a more lyric than systematic one, to the history of French literature. It contains an abundance of not uninteresting remarks on Paris and the relation to Paris of Baudelaire, Villon, Paul Fort, Verlaine, Rimbaud, Francois Porché, Victor Hugo, Appolinaire, and many other poets—half a millenium of French poetry is glimpsed from the viewpoint of this unique town.

The book of the Academy member, Jacques de Lacretelle, is a compilation of three dozen short articles on cultural and literary themes. Side by side with extremely shallow remarks on the "art of writing," travel impressions and such, there is a group of well-devised portraits of contemporary French authors: Duhamel, Mauriac, Roger Martin du Gard, Maurois, Claudel, Gide, Cocteau, etc. In its intellectual attitude, the book is full of contradiction: some chapters are outspokenly reactionary and in the crudest sense "anti-bolshevistic"; others evidence a straightforward attitude on the author's part against the mounting attacks, dating from the summer of 1940, on modern French literature. The author speaks for a tolerant understanding of writers who are ideologically quite far from him. Let it be noted that de Lacretelle, in various stout utterances, has for some time courageously defended French literature against reactionary assaults.

The little work on Stendhal is a fore-runner of the literature to be expected in commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of his death (March 1942). Full of reverence for Stendhal, the little book brings together all sorts of excerpts from the voluminous Stendhal literature and a string of less characteristic Stendhal anecdotes. It is without a merit of its own.

Of the countless volumes of criticisms and portraits that flowed from the pen of Sainte-Beuve, copious selections have already appeared from the various points of view. The two volumes here bring together articles that Sainte-Beuve wrote about five of the figures who stemmed from the cultural circle of Gascony: Marshal de Monluc, an important writer of the sixteenth century; Marquis de Lassay, whom Sainte-Beuve took as the occasion for writing about the Versailles of Louis the Fourteenth; the two Dukes de Lauzon, one belonging to the 17th, the other to the 18th century; the poet Jasmin. Through solid introductions which take ample account of the results of research carried on during the last ninety years and which provide us with numerous bibliographic data, the works of Sainte-Beuve are most valuably supplemented.

The book by Jean Hytier, instructor at the University of Algiers and author of various studies in aesthetics and literary history, has been characterized by Gide himself as the best that has thus far been written about his work. Hytier prefaces the book with a saying from Gide's diary: "Le point de vue aesthétique est le seul où il faille se placer pour parler de mon oeuvre sainement." With this in mind, Hytier, in sovereign mastery of the material, handles the many-sided work of Gide with thoroughness, stimulation, and interest and sets the figure of this writer in the frame of our time.

Kléber Haedens is one of the most vital phenomena among the young generation of writers. Not yet thirty, he can look back on more than that number of novels and essay collections and is at the same time literary critic, film reviewer and sports editor (of *Figaro*). The work before us is an

extraordinarily temperamental disputation with all those who would prescribe definite laws for the French novel. It condemns all authors (Proust for one) who do not guide themselves accordingly. As against these, Haedens defends the rights of creative personality and shows (partly very directly, partly obliquely) the great possibilities of the French novel. In terms of its proper theme, the brochure is an interesting and essentially sympathetic contribution to the actual discussions of the strong and the weak in contemporary French literature.

WILLIAM FINLEY (Chicago, Ill.).

Newman, Ernest, *The Life of Richard Wagner, 1859-1866*. Alfred A. Knopf. New York 1941. (xxxvi and 569 pp.; $5.00)

The third volume of Mr. Newman's extensive biography of Wagner confines itself to the seven years from 1859 to 1866. These, however, are the critical years of Wagner's life, the years of the Tannhäuser scandal in Paris, of Wagner's financial breakdown in the Spring of 1864, his rescue through King Ludwig, the Tristan première, the expulsion from Munich and the union with Cosima. It is the period upon which literature about Wagner has always concentrated its interest. Further light has been thrown on this period today through the publication of Wagner's correspondence with the King of Bavaria. Thus, the problem put to Newman this time was not, as was the case with Wagner's political-revolutionary phase, to work out biographical connections that have been unknown or obscured, but the problem of insight into details often of the most subtle kind. Such details may sometimes assume a quite disproportionate weight in rounding out our knowledge of years whose every event means so eminently much for the development of German music and German ideology.

The musicological contributions Newman has to make, such as the analysis of certain inconsistencies in the second act of the Mastersingers and also of the genesis of the Prize Song, are striking testimonies of both philological acuity and historical instinct. It may not be unfair to summarize the result as follows: Even in the period when Wagner's idea of the *Musikdrama* was fully developed, his music maintains a weight of its own throughout the process of production and this historically justifies its supremacy over the drama which today, since we have gained a greater distance from Wagner, is esthetically manifest anyhow. Newman's inquiries relative to the history of the Siegfried Idyll and its relationship to the third act of the opera move in the same direction. Yet, one must not necessarily endorse Newman's interpretation of the style break in the musical texture of the third act in the passages where the older themes of the idyll are used. At any rate, the reviewer is of the opinion that there were urgent reasons within the composition itself which compelled Wagner, then at the summit of his power, to suspend the *Leitmotiv*-mechanism at decisive spots. Wagner appears to have realized the profound necessity of allowing the musicdrama to "stop," to breathe and to reflect upon itself, as it were. Only in his latest works this has again been more or less forgotten.

Newman's rectifications of detail pertain to strictly biographical facts as well. He destroys with truly epical enjoyment the legend of King Ludwig's

madness. The passages in which he does justice to the eccentricities of the King belong to the most beautiful parts of the book. They fall within a tradition which can call no lesser witnesses than Verlaine and George against the stupidity of common sense. "He had a strong distaste for the pompous ceremonial of Courts, and suffered agonies of boredom at the official dinners and other functions he was sometimes compelled to attend. He preferred the talk of men of culture to the chatter of women, and had no use for the fripperies of the sex-comedy. He had no liking for the conventional royal mountebankery of playing at soldiering. He suffered scheming priests and politicians and other knaves and fools anything but gladly. He had not only the intellectual but the physical *pudeur* of the sensitive solitary, so that he enjoyed the theatre in general, and Wagner's works in particular, most fully when he could listen to the performance either quite alone or in the company merely of a few choice spirits built more or less on his own model, who would not break in upon his dream with the customary gabble of theatre-going humanity. In short, he exhibited so many signs of exceptional sanity that it was a foregone conclusion that the world would some day declare him to be mad; for the majority of men always find it difficult to believe in the sanity of anyone who is not only markedly different from themselves but betrays no great desire for their company, and shows the most uncompromising contempt for their standards of value. His "madness" has accordingly become a legend; yet there is no proof, and there never was any proof, that he was insane in either the strict medical or the strict legal sense of the term." (215) The prudence of Wagner and Cosima contrasts most unfavorably against such reason within the royal madness. They violate the bourgeois moral code while incessantly striving to comply with it. Throughout his work Newman defends Wagner against all kinds of philistine objections. But he takes sides against Wagner with unfailing instinct as soon as the latter deserts to the existing norms and identifies himself with the type of moralism that Nietzsche so thoroughly analyzed.

Another detail of some relevance is the proof that Bülow from the very beginning knew of Wagner's relationship with Cosima and that he aided in keeping it secret. To the same sphere belongs the discovery that Brahms had his hands in the affair of the *Putzmacherin* letters. The realm of purity, chastity and master-like asceticism, which is so significant for the German music of the second part of the 19th century, appears to be inseparably bound up with blackmail, marital scandals and illegitimate birth. The element of plush-culture in Wagner's work, which becomes evident only gradually, is open at hand in the biography. The skeleton in the closet is part of the Wagnerian furniture and Cosima ought to have known very well why she hated Ibsen.

The chapter devoted to her is probably the most outstanding achievement of the whole book. The image of the governess-like Egeria, the power politician of art, would be worthy of a great novel, though it is hardly accidental that such images no longer find their place in novels today, but in works of scientific character. The type of woman to whom life dissolves itself into a sequence of situations which she has to manipulate administratively is of a societal impressiveness which far transcends the psychological case: "The way most likely in the end to achieve her own purposes was to see every difficult situation calmly as a problem that could be 'managed' in terms of an understanding of the personalities involved in it." (282) This analysis is matched

by the description of her intellectual makeup: "In spite of her wide reading and her inexhaustible interest, almost to the end of her long life, in the pageant of the world, hers was a onetrack mind; whatever entered it took on instantaneously the shape and colour of it, and was accepted or rejected according as it squared or failed to square with her own immovably fixed prepossessions and prejudices. She was astonishingly like Wagner in her way of referring everything to the touchstones of a few convenient formulae of her own; she complacently simplified every problem, however complicated, in history, in politics, in literature, in art, in life, by submitting it to the test of conformity or nonconformity with a few principles that were as fixed for her as the constitution of matter or the courses of the stars." (284) In one passage Newman distinguishes Wagner from "the opera composer turning out operas in order to live and competing in the open market with opera composers for the public's money." (233) If Wagner is actually characterized by this aloofness from the market, Cosima has truly developed for him the technique and practice of a monopolist. These as well as the apodictical judgments on matters about which one knows nothing, superseding rational decisions, as it were, by power and authority, have later become fully absorbed into the behavior of National Socialism. Hitler is the heir of Wahnfried not only with regard to racism. The attitude of the sublimely barbarian hangman is already visible throughout the literary judgment of this woman who from her early youth remained faithful to one maxim, to corroborate every existing prejudice through despotism based on success, as if it had been created by herself. Her sentences are both death-sentences and trivialities.

It is she, the daughter of an Hungarian pianist and a French Countess, who has added the mercilessly terroristic touch to the Wagnerian anti-Semitism (Cf. 286f). This fits into Newman's argument which leaves practically no doubt of Geyer's paternity and therewith of Wagner's partially Jewish descent. It rounds out the picture of a revolutionary who after he had become the most intimate friend of the King, refused to intervene for a man condemned to death (324).

T. W. ADORNO (Los Angeles).

Political and Social Science

Neumann, Franz, *Behemoth, The Structure and Practice of National Socialism*. Oxford University Press. New York 1942. (xvii and 532 pp.; $4.00)

A flood of books on Nazi Germany has been published during the last few years; but only a few of them will survive. Neumann's book belongs to these few; for Neumann has not only a most intimate knowledge of the facts about Germany, but also the theoretical understanding of the new problems that arise together with the coming of Fascism.

There are two usual theories on Nazi Germany: According to one theory, rule by the Nazis means the power of the most energetic representatives of modern monopoly capitalism. The other theory regards Hitler as the builder of a state socialist, or generally socialist, society. Both theories could justify a long and successful existence of Nazi power. For, if capitalism lasted for such a long time, why should not a more energetic and more efficient type of capitalism continue to last? Or, if you regard Hitler's state as socialistic; and if you believe that socialism is the society of the future, you could also give the Nazis a fair chance of long survival.

Neumann disagrees with both interpretations of the Nazi system. He names the state of Hitler "Behemoth," the giant monster of the Jewish prophetical language, that was brought into the modern political terminology by Hobbes. Neumann writes: "Since we believe National Socialism is—or tending to become—a non-state, a chaos, a rule of lawlessness and anarchy, which has 'swallowed' the rights and dignity of man, and is out to transform the world into a chaos by the supremacy of gigantic land masses, we find it apt to call the National Socialist system THE BEHEMOTH."

Neumann believes that National Socialism is incompatible with any rational political philosophy, that is, with any doctrine that derives political power from the will or the needs of man. He also doubts that Hitler's Germany is a "state": "But if the National Socialist structure is not a state, what is it? I venture to suggest that we are confronted with a form of society in which the ruling groups control the rest of the population directly, without the mediation of that rational though coercive apparatus hitherto known as the state. This new social form is not yet fully realized, but the trend exists which defines the very essence of the regime."

Neumann makes a very strong case for his new theory and shows, based on an excellent knowledge of all the pertinent facts, the weakness of all the former interpretations of the Nazi system. But there remains one unsolved question: Hitler's organisation has been the strongest power in Europe during the last nine years. That is a fact, and when the usual categories of political science are unable to describe this fact, there is perhaps something wrong with the categories. Learning and science are

always part of an existing society, and the political theory of the last 200 years was an appendix of the "Liberal" society. Also the conservative and the radical or socialist enemies of Liberalism were much more dependent on its theories than they usually confessed or knew. We see, at present, in Europe the total breakdown of the old "Liberal" society. Therefore, also the old science falls. It is a most important part of our fight against Fascism to develop a new theory that fits into the changed world and defeats Fascism on its own field. It is the greatest merit of Neumann's book that it helps to clear the ground for the necessary new political science of our time.

Neumann's book contains, besides its theoretical qualities, many passages of great importance for practical politics, on the contradictions and rifts within the Nazi system, on the best method of a political propaganda war against Hitler, and on the necessary reconstruction of post-war Europe.

Arthur Rosenberg (New York).

Friedrich, Carl J., *Constitutional Government and Democracy*. Little Brown & Company. Boston 1941. (695 pp.; $4.00)

At a time when constitutional government has disappeared over so large a portion of the globe the publication of this revised edition of Professor Friedrich's earlier work is an event of more than academic importance. For this volume is a profound and extremely comprehensive examination of the fundamental principles of constitutional government.

Constitutionalism, in Professor Friedrich's definition, is essentially the operation of effective restraints on governmental activity. Thus, "the political scientist inquiring into the process of constitutionalizing a government must study the technique of establishing and maintaining effective restraints on political and governmental action." And constitutionalism becomes democratic as the basis of the groups exercising those restraints is broadened.

Professor Friedrich's functional analysis is cast largely in terms of the objectives of government action. The first section of the book is thus concerned with the major functions which governments are created to discharge: administration, the maintenance of economic prosperity and physical security, international affairs, the settlement of disputes, etc. In the second section, Professor Friedrich analyzes the development of constitutionalism as the process by which restraints on governments were established. Here, he examines at length the basic techniques: the enactment of constitutions, the functional and territorial separation of powers, judicial review, the amending process. The actual functioning of modern government is set forth in the third section where Professor Friedrich discusses political parties, representation and electoral systems, cabinet, executive and parliamentary government, administration, interest groups, communications and direct popular action. A chapter on method and very extensive bibliographical notes end the volume.

On all of these problems, the distinguished political scientist writes with vast erudition. His knowledge of the governmental systems of England, America and Continental Europe is extremely extensive and, throughout, the historical background of the various institutions and forms is adequately drawn. With much common sense, Professor Friedrich cuts through a large

number of subjects and concepts which are habitually surrounded with obscure verbiage. At all times, he is concerned with institutions and techniques in terms of their effectiveness as restraints on governmental activity.

In a work projected on so vast a scale it is but natural that anyone who has thought on the problems of political science will find something with which to quarrel. Some may feel, for example, that Professor Friedrich's discussion of responsible government service is not quite his best chapter; that, as Herman Finer has pointed out, he fails to distinguish clearly enough between responsibility as a principle of technical efficiency within the service and responsibility to the public's expressed desires as a fundamental principle of democratic government. Or, that the analysis of interest groups and their relation to constitutional government is not quite as adequate as the excellent chapter on the press and radio which precedes it. One wishes, too, that Professor Friedrich had sketched the development of American political parties against the background of the expanding capitalist economy, which largely explains the minimal nature of their difference, and that he had examined the results for the American system of the absence of any fundamental differences between the major parties. And, if, as some observers have noted, America is beginning to develop a party system rooted in the realities of class division, what will be the impact of that fact on political institutions? But whatever differences one may have with Professor Friedrich, no one will fail to profit immensely from his prodigious scholarship, his shrewd comments and his profound insights.

Professor Friedrich's method "inspects the historical evidence and tries to formulate no more generalizations than the facts will permit." That reluctance to employ any broad analytical apparatus may account for one weakness of this volume. Friedrich knows that institutions are shaped by a multiplicity of factors: technological developments, class antagonism, geographical forces, religious convictions; and in his extensive historical discussions, he gives full recognition to their influence. But he has made no attempt to clarify their interrelationships or to evaluate their respective importance. In a work that so consistently seeks to orientate institutions in their historical setting, the absence of an integrated theory of social change becomes a major defect. A theory of social change would not only have added to the incisiveness of Professor Friedrich's analyses but would have offered us a more adequate basis than he has here given us for projecting the future of constitutional government.

Thus, for example, Professor Friedrich declares that "nowhere has it been found necessary to develop a concept such as the ruling class or the elite. . . . For a constitutional system, and more especially a constitutional democracy, is a system of power in which a group of people called the government administer the collective concerns under a constitution in accordance with the anticipated reactions of the people. Where, then, do the state, the sovereign or the ruling class come in?" But, surely, any realistic examination of history will reveal that the government or the groups who exercise effective restraint have almost invariably been dominated by or limited to particular social classes.

One cannot help but feel, too, that the value of Professor Friedrich's work would have been greatly enhanced had he not set his definition of constitutionalism wholly in terms of institutional restraints. That definition leads

Professor Friedrich to accept, on the whole, present governmental forms and the traditional techniques for restraining power. But constitutionalism may also be defined in terms of the positive functioning of government. Many of the failures of democratic government in recent years have been the result of the inability of antiquated institutional forms to cope with new problems, the hampering influence of traditional constitutional restraints and the ability of powerful economic minorities to prevent governments from giving effect to popular aspirations. The major constitutional problems of our age may therefore well be to discover methods for destroying the restraints minority groups have exercised over governments and of developing new forms of political organization that will conform to new economic realities. And that does not mean, as Professor Friedrich fears, an advocacy of the scrapping of restraints and constitutional government. It means merely that in the place of old forms and old restraints whose combination prevented democracy from functioning effectively in a complex society, we must devise new forms and new restraints that will permit democratic governments to operate efficiently—and constitutionally.

DAVID W. PETEGORSKY (New York).

Hermens, F. A., *Democracy or Anarchy?* A Study of Proportional Representation. University of Notre Dame. Notre Dame, Indiana 1941. (447 pp.; $4.00)

In this volume, Professor Hermens, who enjoys a well-earned reputation as a thoroughgoing student of electoral systems, presents us with a detailed analysis of the electoral systems of all major countries and most of the smaller ones. To this he has added a special chapter dealing with proportional representation in American local government. Although the author is a convinced anti-proportionalist of long standing, he takes great pains to do justice to the arguments of his adversaries, and the special chapters he devotes to the refutation of all their real and imaginable arguments are among the most original parts of his very informative book. In these chapters he has tried to differentiate between material and formal factors influencing social developments, but unfortunately, he has immediately frustrated the insight he could have derived therefrom by proceeding to elevate the formal factor of the electoral system to a dominant position overshadowing all material elements. Having thus posited the influence of the electoral system as major, he goes on to make proportional representation responsible for specific social developments. His most important argument against it is implicit in the casual connection he draws between the prevalence of proportional representation and the downfall of the parliamentary regime. But the more one follows his learned analysis of every country the more difficult it becomes to share his emphasis on the destructive character of proportional representation. His own argumentation always makes plain that material factors outside the province of the electoral system would have been needed to guarantee the continued existence of a parliamentary regime. Thus, for instance, he feels that one chief requisite for preserving the parliamentary regime consists in the existence of strong right wing social-democratic parties always ready to compromise with the middle-class elements. But it is not evident why such parties should prosper more under a majority than under a proportional system. And the German case where a very strong social-democratic party of the type

cited by Hermens existed under the most stringent system of proportional representation speaks convincingly against the author's thesis. The same apparent lack of relationship between the electoral system and social and political formations is evident in the increase of bureaucratic elements in the labor movement for which Hermens also makes proportional representation partially responsible. But Great Britain and the United States have seen the same process/of bureaucratization in the labor movement as Germany, although their electoral system comes so much nearer to Hermens' ideals. Only the author's zeal in his fight against proportional representation makes it understandable that he should speak of the Italian pre-war parliament's "gains in health and life" under the majority system after he has shown in his earlier elaboration that he is fairly conversant with the travesty of parliamentarism in pre-war Italy. At the same time he seems to have had no access to Margot Hentze's scholarly and impartial study on "Pre-Fascist Italy, the Rise and Fall of the Parliamentary Regime."

In sum, the book, at least insofar as it is concerned with Europe, seems, though unwillingly, to testify for the relatively small weight of the individual form of an electoral system (proportional representation, majority system etc.) in a given country. The material presented supports the thesis that the electoral system is more an expression of than a formative force in a given constitutional order, a conclusion to which Professor Friedrich's introduction to the book seems to lend its support. In criticizing the German party system the author quotes with approval Wolfgang Schwarz as "a leading Social-Democratic journalist" (pp. 252/3). In fairness to Schwarz it should have been added that he was one of the very few German Socialists who took to the system of "dual membership," having kept in one pocket his membership card in the Socialist Party and in the other his card in the Nazi Party.

OTTO KIRCHHEIMER (New York).

Lerner, Max, *Ideas for the Ice Age. Studies in a Revolutionary Era.* The Viking Press. New York 1941. (432 pp.; $3.00)

It is almost impossible to review a collection of essays on so many diversified subjects—political theory, literary criticism, current politics, constitutional law. There is, however, a unity of approach underlying these variegated contributions, one that consists in a combination of utopian thinking and machiavellian realism. The real problem is whether the two aspects of Mr. Lerner's philosophy have merged into a unit or whether they still stand unrelatedly side by side.

The volume contains essays of high literary craftsmanship and intrinsic beauty—such as those on Randolph Bourne and Franz Kafka; others (above all those on constitutional law) are masterpieces of analysis, while a remark on propaganda exhibits a shrewd insight into the deficiency of our views on that subject. The kernel of the volume, however, reformulates the problem that Max Lerner first articulated in his "It Is Later Than You Think"—how can a democracy achieve the efficiency of totalitarian systems without abandoning—by even deepening—democracy. In fact, the title of the book could very well have been "Democratic Ends and Totalitarian Means," the title of one of the papers.

If we concentrate our analysis on this kernel of the book, it becomes apparent that Mr. Lerner is primarily a utopian thinker. He understands how to arouse our emotions—but we cannot accept his arguments, or rather he fails to present them. In "Who Owns the Future," he sets out seven propositions for making a peace which would utilize the resources of the world for the welfare of the masses, that is, a peace that would be neither a veil for American imperialism nor a total state. None of the propositions could have been better formulated, and yet at no place has an attempt been made to show how they can be carried out in practice. All groups in society—industry, labor, congress—are, in his view, dominated by purely selfish interests, all are "prisoners of their habits and thoughts." If that is so, who is going to make the peace Mr. Lerner rightly wants? If the dominant forces of society are unable (or unwilling) to realize any of the propositions, does Mr. Lerner rely on spontaneous mass movements, fed by chiliastic longings?

The kernel of this book thus reveals a split between utopian thought and realistic analysis which is nowhere overcome, a predominance of utopianism which exemplifies the limping character of progressive thought in America.

Mr. Lerner's thought comes closest to that of Harold Laski in England. And yet there is a fundamental difference between them. In contrast to Max Lerner, Laski writes for and within a powerful English movement, and, however critical one may be towards the Labor Party, it is at least a party, programmatically committed to the very principles which Mr. Lerner elaborates. The vacuum in Mr. Lerner's thought corresponds to the vacuum in American politics. Since the political vacuum cannot apparently be filled, it is time to change the ideology.

FRANZ NEUMANN (New York).

Perry, Ralph Barton, . . . *Shall not Perish from the Earth.* The Vanguard Press. New York 1941. (159 pp.; $1.50)

This is another attempt to resolve the "dilemma" of the democratic principle that by virtue of the rights and liberties deriving from that principle it becomes possible for democracy to be abolished by democratic means. Through an analysis of the philosophy underlying modern democracy, Perry shows that the democratic liberties are conditioned upon a definite end, namely, the creation and perpetuation of "a set of social institutions in which liberty is realized." Democratic tolerance is restricted by this end: it is to be applied to all groups and forces which promote it, and to be denied to all those which are apt to destroy it. The criterion for this is provided by the individualistic principle: only those tendencies and movements are democratic which aim at enhancing the autonomy and reason of the individual, his "power of choice." Liberty of thought thus emerges as the "essential liberty" of democracy and all other liberties are subordinated to it as requisites and means. The strength of Perry's argument lies in the unerring faith with which he clings to the original critical content of individualism and in his frank admission that "the maxims of democracy do not describe what actually takes place, but define a hope and a goal of effort."

HERBERT MARCUSE (Los Angeles).

Stern, Bernhard J., *Society and Medical Progress*, Princeton University Press. Princeton 1941. (281 pp.; $3.00)

The author has devoted this book to the study of the relation between medicine and social progress and their reciprocal influence. Dr. Stern has given a vivid picture of events which at one time or another played an important rôle in medical progress and social relations. His point of view is peculiarly interesting for its originality when he speaks of the development of medical schools and of hospitals in America and of problems which derive from the problems of medical care, the fact that adequate medical care is now beyond the reach of the low income groups. The effects of organization and congested housing on public health and the rôle of economic factors in urban life yield little-known data of paramount importance. Another chapter of the book which condenses in a clear form a series of important facts deals with the consequences of industrial capitalism upon health, and traces in historical outline the relations of health and income as these have been recognized since antiquity and told in a dramatic fashion in an Egyptian papyrus, in a classic work of Hippocrates and in the words of Lucretius not less evidently than in the modern reports of the health offices. The author offers much evidence of the effects of the present economic crisis on the growth of children.

Many other problems are studied in an exact, critical way with the support of documents and statistical data. The history of changing mortality in different countries, the importance of the death rate for judging the health of a community, and above all the problem deriving from the changing age composition of the population are examined from the point of view of the successes obtained by medicine and of the possibility to provide economic security for the aged whose life has been prolonged. The contribution to human welfare inherent in the advances in the field of tropical medicine has opened new areas for agitation and for exploitation. An important political repercussion is demonstrated by the increase in the number of natives contrasting with their decline during earlier periods of the contact with whites. The active effect of medicine on agricultural progress, on stimulating scientific inquiries and far-reaching development in the field of history and in other branches of knowledge is clearly explained. Of special interest, in the judgment of this reviewer, are the pages which deal with the resistances to innovation in medicine, which may be said to be the rule rather than the exception and in which many complex factors are involved. The author examines these factors, beginning with traditional authority and dogmatic oppositions, popular and religious disapproval of dissection, the inertia which met the idea of asepsis and the strenuous difficulties which Lister and Pasteur had to combat before seeing their doctrine accepted.

In the last chapter of his book, Dr. Stern examines especially the situation existing in the United States: the impact of society upon the functioning of the medical profession, and the controversy over the methods of extending adequate medical care to low income groups. We believe that in this book, written with a clear comprehension of the social problems and with a bright vision of the development of medical thought and of medical practice, Dr. Stern has well achieved the objectives of his research and his study, that is, to give an analysis of medicine's changing rôle in society and

of the causes of resistances to medical progress,—in order to gain the right perspectives on contemporary situations.

ARTURO CASTIGLIONI (New Haven, Conn.).

Page, Charles H., *Class and American Sociology.* From Ward to Ross. The Dial Press. New York 1940. (xiv and 319 pp.; $3.50)

Page's book is concerned with the theories and concepts of the "Sociological Fathers" in America. These fathers for him are Lester F. Ward, William G. Sumner, Albion W. Small, Franklyn H. Giddings, Charles H. Cooley, Edward A. Ross. Thorstein Veblen is wittingly omitted because, technically, he is an economist, and other works have dealt with his class-theories. Page is not an antiquarian in his interest in these thinkers, as his analyses and his conclusion clearly manifest. Therefore, his book is a revealing study, not of concepts of class which can be used in research, but of the relation of a thinker's concept of class to his total speculative system and to his social attitudes. A common element which Page finds in all these thinkers is that "in their general distrust of the 'Lords of Creation' at the one extreme and the class-pointed proletarian leaders at the other, they stand truly in a stream of tradition which remains today a powerful, though somewhat shakier, force in American ideology."

Page is concerned with the fact that the successors of the "Fathers" became involved in research after World War I but they did not make class-analysis part of the research-program until the Great Depression. Today class-analysis is putatively a part of sociological research, although little work has been done on the subject in academic circles except as an aside. Page has only just unearthed the analytic problem which we must face. His own conclusion that class has two meanings, the socio-economic and the socio-psychological, and that "as working concepts in social research both can be effectively employed," seems a confusion of ontology and methodology. That attitudes and consciousness accompany class-position is undoubtedly true, but what attitudes and what consciousness accompany what class-position is a matter of investigation. Such investigation can be made only after, methodologically, an objective set of indices for class-position has been posited and statistical trends in terms of these indices have been plotted. It will be revealing to see whether Page is able to use a double concept of class as a research instrument now that he has analysed the Fathers, and dispatched the "intellectual history" of the subject in America.

GEORGE SIMPSON (New York).

The Works of Gerrard Winstanley, with an appendix of documents relating to the Digger Movement, ed. with an introduction by George H. Sabine. Cornell University Press. Ithaca, N. Y. 1941. (686 pp.; $5.00)

The student of Winstanley is now in an extremely fortunate situation. He possesses an extraordinarily precise analysis of the political and social philosophy, given him by Mr. David Petegorsky,[1] and an excellent edition of the tracts edited with love and care by George H. Sabine to whom he already owes the best modern history of political thought in the English

[1]Reviewed in this periodical Vol. IX, No. 1, pp. 178-179.

language. This beautiful edition merely whets the appetite of the historian of political and social thought; we can only wish that Professor Sabine might give us more such. Since there can be nothing but praise for the edition proper, the review can only be concerned with Professor Sabine's introduction which offers an interpretation in one respect different from that of Mr. Petegorsky. The issue between Professor Sabine and Mr. Petegorsky is, briefly, over whether Winstanley's theory was religious or secular. The problem is not merely academic, but of paramount political significance. Yet before we can indicate our own position, it would be wise to have some clarity as to what we understand by a religious theory of society and politics. We must not deduce from the language employed by a theorist the content and structure of his doctrine. The language might be religious. Arguments might be taken liberally from the Old or the New Testament, the terminology might be completely biblical. The language used would show a great deal of the temper of the period and perhaps of the education of the writer, but little of the structure of his theory. Revolutionary theories especially are often clothed in the garb of antiquity, and the most rationalistic natural lawyers read like commentaries to the Bible and the classics.

Nor is it the religious motive that makes a theory religious. There is no doubt, as Professor Sabine makes abundantly clear, that Winstanley's impetus was religious. Without the liberating force of the Reformation, his political and social theory would not have been possible. Many purely secular writers are animated by noble religious sentiments, and yet religious doctrines do not constitute the kernel of their theories.

What alone can be judged, therefore, is the kernel of the theory. And this kernel is solely the view held as to man's nature. If a theory maintains with the Catholic, and still more, with Protestant theologians, that man is by nature corrupt, that his wickedness is not the product of society but of his inner nature (his original sin), then such theory is purely religious. Applying this standard, we must call Winstanley a secular theorist. "I speak not in relation between the oppressor and the oppressed; the inward bondages I meddle not with in this place, though I am assured that if it be rightly searched into, the inward bondages of the mind, as covetousness, pride, hypocrisy, envy, sorrow, fears, desperation and madness are all occasioned by the outward bondage that one sort of people lay upon another." This remarkable statement from "The Law of Freedom" is quoted in Professor Sabine's introduction—to indicate a "shift of emphasis." I believe it to represent a most complete break with Calvinism and Protestantism in all its forms. Let us add that Winstanley is opposed to the millenarianism of the Fifth Monarchy Men, that he rejects religious teaching in schools, that he identifies the practice of the clergy with witchcraft—and we are forced to the conclusion that the very religious incentive has transcended the confines of a religious theory and turned into a secular revolutionary theory.

This change in a man who had no education, and who was often inconsistent, represents one of the most remarkable moments in the development of political and social thought and makes the endeavours to clarify his position and edit his tracts doubly necessary. There is something of Marsilius of Padua and of modern socialism in Winstanley, a fact which should give him a much better place in the history of political thought than he has held before.

FRANZ NEUMANN (New York).

White, Leslie A. (Editor), *Pioneers in American Anthropology: The Bandelier-Morgan Letters, 1873-1883.* Coronado Cuarto Centennial Publications, 1540-1940. The University of New Mexico Press. Albuquerque 1940. (2 vols., xv and 272 pp.; viii and 257 pp.)

The editor and publishers of these illuminating letters from Adolph E. Bandelier to Lewis H. Morgan have put not only specialists of the history of Spanish-America in their debt, but all students of culture history. For they contain the one way evidence (Morgan's letters have not been discovered) of the decisive influence of Morgan on Bandelier which caused him to reinterpret Mexican history in terms of the democratic pattern which the former had found among the Iroquois. In the 163 letters one can trace the various stages of Bandelier's discipleship, until he became an all out proponent of Morgan's views against his many critics. The letters are rich with ethnological fact and interpretation, not to speak of the very interesting light they throw upon the early history of American anthropology through the personal trials and tribulations of this pioneer anthropologist.

The editor of the letters is known for his defense of value of Morgan's contribution to anthropology. Yet in presenting the letters to the reading public, he takes occasion, in a long introduction, to evaluate the Morgan-Bandelier interpretation of aboriginal Mexican history and finds it wanting. He does so not on the basis of his own field research or by analysis of the original Spanish documentary sources. He rather finds refutation of their position in the evidence presented by Bandelier and Morgan themselves. The controversy is significant for it is relevant to the moot question of the origin of the state, the relationship between what Morgan called *societas,* in which society is based on kinship, and *civitas,* in which other than kinship factors are the primary determinants of human relationships.

It was Morgan's position that all aboriginal American societies were democratic at the time of their discovery, that nowhere had culture developed beyond the stage of *societas.* Bandelier originally held that the Mexicans and Peruvians had developed a social organization which differed in kind from other American tribes, and he gave credence to the accounts of the Spanish writers who were regarded by Morgan as unreliable.

White argues that Bandelier erred in yielding to Morgan. He finds the evidence of the existence of *gentes* (unilateral relationships) obscure; contends that their presence would not in itself have proven that the structure of the society was democratic; presents citations from Bandelier showing that a person's status and role in ancient Mexican society was not determined by kinship but by the possession or lack of property, and to some extent by the territory in which he lived. He thus concludes that public relations among the ancient Mexicans were economic rather than personal in character; that kinship relationships were subordinated in important respects to commodity or property relationships. Since this is the distinguishing feature of the *civitas,* as defined by Morgan, his judgment is that Morgan, and Bandelier following him, were wrong in their characterization of Mexican society at the time of the conquest. What is needed now before final judgment can be given is a further analysis of the Spanish sources themselves, which has not been done since Bandelier, except for a limited though valuable study by Paul Radin.

BERNHARD J. STERN (New York).

Political and Social Science:

Studies in Philosophy and Social Science is published three times a year by the Institute of Social Research, 429 West 117th Street, New York City.

The price of a single issue is $1.00, and the annual subscription is $3.00.

Editorial communications should be addressed to the Institute of Social Research, 429 West 117th Street, New York City.

Subscriptions and business communications should be sent to William Salloch, 344 East 17th Street, New York City.

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
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